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Abstract 
This thesis examines the important question of whether or not Islamic law and 
international human rights are compatible and whether Muslim States can comply with 
international human rights law while they still adhere to Islamic law. The traditional 
arguments on the subject are examined and responded to from both international human 
rights and Islamic legal perspectives. The thesis formulates a synthesis between two extremes 
and argues that although there are some differences of scope and application, that does not 
create a general state of dissonance between Islamic law and international human rights law. 
It is argued that the differences would be easier to address if the concept of human rights 
were positively established from within the themes of Islamic law rather than imposing it as a 
concept alien to Islamic law. To avoid a simplistic generalisation of the arguments, each 
Article of the international bill of rights (ICCPR and ICESCR) and some relevant articles of 
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women are 
analysed in the light of Islamic law. The thesis theoretically engages international human 
rights law in dialogue with Islamic law and then evaluates the human rights policy of modern 
Muslim States within the scope of that dialogue. The State Practice of six Muslim States is 
examined as case studies to establish the arguments of the thesis. The thesis concludes, inter 
alia, that it is possible to harmonise the differences between Islamic law and international 
human rights law through the adoption of the margin of appreciation doctrine by 
international human rights treaty bodies and the utilisation of the Islamic law doctrines of 
magäsid al-shari `ah (overall objective of Shari `ah) and maslahah (welfare) by Muslim 
States in their interpretation and application of Islamic law respectively. It is asserted that 
Islamic law can serve as an important vehicle for the enforcement of international human 
rights law in the Muslim world and recommendations are advanced to that effect in the 
conclusion. 
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Glossary 
Addlah: Justice. 
Adät: Custom. 
Add: Solitary Hadlth transmitted through a single chain of individuals. 
Amr bi al-ma `rüf wa nahy an al-munkar: The Islamic public order principle of commanding virtues 
and prohibiting vices. 
Asir: Prisoner. 
Bay `ah: Pledge of allegiance. 
Bayt al-mäl: State treasury. 
al-Birr: Goodness, Righteousness. 
Darürah: Necessity. 
Darüriyyät: Indispensable benefits or rights 
- 
comprising of. Life, Family, Property, Intellect and 
Religion. 
Dhimmi: Non-Muslim citizen of the Islamic State. 
Diyah: Blood-Money 
- 
Compensation for murder of injuries. 
Faskh: Judicial annulment of marriage. 
Fatwd: Legal or religious opinion by a qualified Islamic jurisconsult. 
Fiqh: Islamic Jurisprudence. 
Habs: Imprisonment. 
Habs Ihtiyäti: Preventive detention pending investigation of a crime. 
Hidänah: Child custody and care. 
Hadith: Saying; Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Häjiyyät: Necessary benefits or rights; 
- 
Comes next in line to Darüriyyät. 
Hakim: Law Giver. 
Haqq: Right. 
Haqq al- `afw `an al- `ugabah: Right of clemency from punishment; Amnesty. 
Haqq Allah al-khälis: Special right of God 
al-Hugüq al-Fitriyyah: Natural right; Fundamental right. 
Hibah: Gift. 
Hiräbah: Highway robbery; Brigandage. 
Hisbah: Public order. 
Hudüd: " Limits; The fixed punishments for certain crimes under Islamic law. 
Hukm: Legal ruling; Injunction; Decision. 
Hugüq: Rights. 
Hugüq Adamiyyin: Rights of humans; Private rights; Human rights. 
Huqüq al-Ibäd: Rights of servants (of God) i. e. Rights of humans; Private rights; Human rights. 
xi 
Hugüq al-Insän: Rights of human beings; Human Rights. 
Hugüq Allah: Rights of God; Public Rights. 
Hurriyyah: Freedom; Liberty. 
Ibäd: Servants (of God). 
Ibäddt: Acts of worship. 
Ihsän: Benevolence; Goodness 
Ijmä': Islamic legal consensus. 
Ijtihäd: Juridical reasoning of a qualified Islamic legist. 
Insäniyyah: Humanity; Humaneness; Civility. 
Isnäd: Chain of narrators of Hadith. 
Istihsän: Juristic preference. 
Istishdb: Legal presumption of continuity of a state until contrary is proved. 
Istisläh: Welfare; Benefit. 
Jähiliyyah: Ignorance. 
Kafdlah: Guardianship. 
Karämah: Honour; Human Dignity. 
Khiläfah: Representation; Rule by representation. 
Khiyär al-Bullig: Option of puberty. 
Khiyär al-Taläq: Option of divorce. 
Khul': Divestiture; Discharge of marriage initiated by the wife. 
Madhhab: School of thought. 
Ma'rüf Virtue. 
Mahküm alayh: Subject of the Law. 
Mahküm fih: Object of the Law. 
Mahr: Dowry; Marriage endowment (in cash or service) paid by the husband to the wife. 
Mahram: Unmarriageable male relation of a Muslim woman. 
Magäsid al-Shari `ah: Overall Objective of the Shari 'ah; Object and purpose of the Shari `ah. 
Mas'üliyyah: Responsibility. 
Maslahah: Welfare; Benefit. 
Maslahah Mursalah: Public Interest. 
Maslahah Wahmiyyah: Dubious welfare; non-genuine welfare. 
Mazälim: Complaints tribunal; Court of grievances. 
Mu `ämalät: Social intercourse: Inter-human relations. 
Mubära'ah: Dissolution of marriage by mutual/bilateral agreement of the couple. 
Mufti: Islamic jurisconsult. 
Muhtasib: Public order officer. 
Muhtasibün: Public order officers. 
xn 
Mujtahidün: Islamic legists competent enough to formulate independent legal or theological opinion 
based on the sources and methods of Islamic law (Singular: Mujtahid). 
Muräfa `ah: Defence; appeal; legal proceedings. 
Musäwäh: Equality. 
Musta'min: Safe alien: Non-national of the Islamic State who enjoys safe conduct in it. 
Mutaw `ah: Religious Volunteers 
Naqd al-Hakim: Governmental criticism: governmental censorship. 
Nasihah: Admonition; Advice. 
Naskh: Abrogation. 
Qadä': Judgement. 
Qadhf. Slanderous accusation (of adultery or fornication). 
Qädi: Judge. 
Qädi al-Qudät: Chief Justice. 
Qisas: Retaliation. 
Qawämün: Guardians; Protectors; Defenders. 
Qiyäs: Legal analogy. 
Rajm: Punishment by stoning. 
Riddah: Apostasy. 
Sabb Allah aw Sabb al-Rasül: Reviling God or reviling The Prophet; Blasphemy. 
Sadagät: Charity; Voluntary Alms. 
Sahib al-Mazälim: Complaints officer; Ombudsman. 
Sariqah: Theft as defined under Islamic law. 
Sharb al-Khamr: Wine-drinking. 
Shari `ah: The Right Path; Qur'an and Sunnah. Source of Islamic Law. 
Shürd: Consultation. 
Siyäsah Shar `iyyah: Legitimate governmental policy based on the Shari `ah. 
Sunnah: Practice; The Practices of Prophet Muhammad. 
Ta ` äwun: Co-operation. 
al-Täbi'ün: The early Muslims who met the era of the Prophet's Companions but not that of the 
Prophet himself. 
Tadry: Islamic legal principle of gradualism. 
Tafwid al-Taläq: Delegated repudiation of marriage. 
Ta 7iq al-Taläq: Suspended repudiation of divorce. 
Ta ` zir: Discretionary punishment under Islamic law. 
Tahsiniydt: Improvement benefits or rights; 
- 
Comes next in line to Häjiyydt. 
Takhayyur: Eclectic choice (Movement between the schools of Islamic jurisprudence). 
Taglid: Conformism; Blind following of a juristic view. 
xiii 
Tagnin: Codification. 
TashrI `: Legislation. 
`Ulamä': Traditional Islamic scholars. 
Ummah: Community (Nation). 
`Urf Custom; Usage; Practice. 
Zakät: Annual obligatory alms (tax) payable by Muslims in favour of the indigent. 
Zinä: Adultery/Fornication. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
International human rights is the most popular theme today that cuts across every aspect 
of modern international law and influences almost every aspect of modem international 
relations. It is an important objective that permeates all the other purposes of the United 
Nations (UN). 1 Almost every regional inter-governmental organisation today also 
acknowledges the idea of human rights. The protection of human rights has thus become a 
powerful tool of internationalism that pierces the "sacred" veil of State sovereignty for the 
sake of human dignity. The universality of human rights has also been regularly reiterated 
since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948.2 
Despite its popularity and universal acceptance however, opinions still differ 
considerably about the conceptual interpretation and scope of human rights. As observed by 
Weston, "(t)o say that there is widespread acceptance of the principle of human rights on the 
domestic and international plane is not to say that there is complete agreement about the 
nature of such rights or their substantive scope". 3 This has generated the paradox of 
universalism and cultural relativism in international human rights discourse. 4 The conceptual 
differences are neither meaningless nor trivial but emanate from the complexity and diversity 
' See Article I of the UN Charter on the Purpose and Principles of the UN. 1 UNTS, p. xvi. The UN Secretary General also 
reiterated in his Statement to the 55`h Session of the Commission on Human Rights in 1999 that human rights is "at the heart 
of every aspect of our work and every article of our Charter" (i. e. the United Nations Charter). See UN Doc. SG/SM/99/91 
of 7 April 1999. Par. 3. 
2 Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 1948. Both the Proclamation of Tehran [UN 
Doc. A/CON. 32/41at3l(1968)] after the 1s` World Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in 1968 and the Vienna 
Declaration after the 2"d World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 [UN Doc A/CONF. 157/23 of 12 July 1993] 
also reiterated the universality of human rights. 
3 Weston, B., "Human Rights" in New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 151h Ed. 
, 
Vol. 20, p. 713 at 714. See also Steiner, H. J., and 
Alston, P., International Human Rights in Context, Law, Politics and Morals (2"d Ed. 2000) p. 324 at 326. 
° Thus it is argued herein that "universality of"human rights differs from "universalism in" human rights. See Chapter 2, 
pp. 15-18 below. See also e. g. Donnelly, J., Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (1989) (defends a universal 
conception of human rights, but argues also that the concept of human rights is purely Western and foreign to non-western 
cultures. ); Milne, A. J. M., Human Rights and Human Diversity (1986) (proposes that human rights are not the same 
everywhere and argues that the concept of human rights must not presuppose Western values and institutions); Mutua, M., 
"The Ideology of Human Rights", (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law, pp. 589-657 (argues that even though 
the concept of human rights is not unique to European societies the philosophy of contemporary human rights is essentially 
European). See n. 3 thereof for list of literature on discussion of different philosophical perspectives of human rights. See 
also Renteln, A. D., International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (1990) p. 10 and literature cited there on 
the conceptual differences about human rights. 
1 
of human society and civilisation. Some scholars do argue that we need not address the 
conceptual differences anymore but rather focus on the problems of guaranteeing human 
rights and preventing their continued violations universally. 5 That argument ignores the fact 
that the conceptual differences have major consequences on the practical universal 
observance of human rights. The drafters of the UDHR had correctly identified that "a 
common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the(ir) 
full realization". 6 This demands a continued attempt at harmonising the different concepts, to 
achieve, despite the complexity and diversity of human society, a common universal 
understanding that ensures the full guarantee of human rights to every human being 
everywhere. The present research is a contribution to that end focusing on the realisation of 
international human rights within the context of the application of Islamic law in Muslim 
States. 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Islam is one of the major civilisations of the world and is claimed to be the fastest 
growing religion in the world today. 7 Many Member States of the UN are Muslim States that 
apply Islamic Law either fully or partly as domestic law. Also, Islamic law influences, one 
way or another, the way of life of more than one billion Muslims globally. 8 While Muslim 
States participate in the international human rights objective of the UN, it will be observed 
that they enter declarations and reservations on grounds of the Shari 'ah or Islamic law when 
they ratify international human rights treaties. 9 Also in their periodic reports to UN human 
rights treaty and Charter bodies many Muslim States do refer to Shari 'ah or Islamic law in 
their arguments. 10 There is however a general view, especially in the West, that Islamic law 
is incompatible with the ideals of international human rights, and thus human rights are not 
realisable within the dispensation of Islamic law. At the same time, there is also some 
pessimism in the Muslim world about the disposition of the current international human 
rights objective of the UN. Due to the fact, inter alia, that human rights are best protected by 
5 See e. g. Bobbio, N., The Ae of Rights, (1996) pp. 12-13. 
6 Emphasis added. See the 7` Preambular paragraph of the UDHR. 
7 See e. g. Freamon, B. K., "Slavery, Freedom, and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic Jurisprudence", (1998) 11 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal, p. 1 n. 2 for list of citations on the fast growth of Islam and importance of Islamic law in the world 
today. 
8 ibid., n-5- 
9 See e. g. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, Status as at 31/12/1999, Vol.!, Part 
1, Chapters ItoXl. 
1° See e. g. Sudan's 2°d Periodic Report on the ICCPR 
- 
UN Doc CCPR/C/75/Add. 2 of 13/03/97 and Saudi Arabia's Initial 
Report on the Child Convention 
- 
UN Doc. CRC/C/61/Add. 2 of 29/3/2000. 
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States within their different cultures and domestic laws, the relevance of Islamic law to the 
effective application of international human rights law in the Muslim world cannot be over- 
emphasised. As Muslim States possess the sovereign right of applying Islamic law within 
their jurisdictions, the question of whether international human rights can be effectively 
guaranteed within the application of Islamic law remains very important in the international 
human rights discourse. 
Previous research on this subject has mostly emphasised the classical doctrines of 
Islamic law and an exclusionist interpretation of international human rights law. This has 
obscured many commonalities that do exist between Islamic law and international human 
rights law and has continued to strengthen the theory of incompatibility between them. The 
incompatibility theory puts international human rights law at a sort of crossroads in Muslim 
States that apply Islamic law. Apart from much very general literature on this important 
subject, the more prominent works are An-Naim's Towards an Islamic Reformation11 
, 
Mayer's Islam and Human Rights12 and Monshipouri's Islamism, Secularism, and Human 
11 An-Na'im, A. A., Towards an Islamic Reformation, Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law, (1990). Other 
works of An-Na'im on this subject include: "The Position of Islamic States Regarding the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights" in Baehr, P., et. al., (eds. ) Innovation and Inspiration: Fifty Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1999) pp. 177-192; "Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives" (1990) 3 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, pp. 13-52; "Toward an Islamic Hermeneutics for Human Rights" in An-Na'im, A. A., et. al., 
(eds. ) Human Rights and Religious Values: An Uneasy Relationship? (1995) pp. 229-242; "Islamic Law and Human Rights 
Today" (1996) Interights Bulletin, No. 1,3; "Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights" in An-Na'im, 
A. A., and Deng, F. M., (eds. ) Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (1999) pp. 331-367; "Towards a Cross- 
Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment" in An-Na'im, A. A. (ed. ) Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives (1992) pp. 19-43; 
"Universality of Human Rights: An Islamic Perspective" in Ando, N., (ed. ) Japan and International Law: Past, Present and 
Future (1999) pp. 311-325. Professor An-Nai'm's work subjected traditional Islamic law to the jurisprudence of 
international human rights, disregarding any Islamic jurisprudential justifications. His main proposition is for an Islamic law 
reformation "from within" to conform with international human rights principles through a reversed process of "naskh" (i. e. abrogation of certain verses of the Qur'an by others), whereby the application of some Medinan revelations of the 
Qur'an would be abandoned in favour of other Meccan revelations. Some writers on the subject have however questioned 
the practicality of that proposition. See e. g. Sachedina, A., "Review of Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward an Islamic 
Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International Law" (1993) 25 International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
p. 155-157; and Manzoor, P., "Human Rights: Secular Transcendence or Cultural Imperialism? " (1994) 15 Muslim World 
Book Review, No. 1, p. 3 at 8. 
12 Mayer, A. E., Islam and Human Rights, Tradition and Politics (3`d Ed. 1999). Other works of Mayer on this subject 
include: "Universal versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct? " (1994) 15 Michigan 
Journal of International Law, p. 306-404; "Islam and the State" (1991)12 Cardozo Law Review, p. 1015-1056; "Current 
Muslim Thinking on Human Rights" in An-Nai'm, A. A., and Deng, F. M., (eds. ) Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives (1999) pp. 131. The main thesis of Professor Mayer's work is that modern Islamic human rights schemes are 
dubious, in the sense that they borrow their substance from international human rights but use Islamic law to limit human 
rights applications. She relied mostly on traditional interpretations of the Shari 'ah and the practice in some Muslim 
countries based on those traditional interpretations, disregarding other legally valid alternative interpretations of the Shari `ah in that regard. Although she referred to the fact that "Islamic heritage offers many philosophical concepts, humanistic values, and moral principles that are well adapted for use in constructing human rights principles", she did not 
elaborate on those alternatives. One reviewer has thus observed that: "As to the crucial task of comprehensively elaborating 
a methodologically sound and truly contemporary Islamic human rights teaching based on the premodern Islamic heritage, 
she has been wise to leave this to Muslim believers and to the internal doctrinal debate among them". See Troll, C. W., 
"Book Review of Islam and Human Rights: Traditions and Politics By Ann Elizabeth Mayer" (1992) 3 Islam and Christian- 
Muslim Relations, No. 1, p. 131 at 133. 
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Rights in the Middle East. 13 While these works address some of the problems identified in 
this research, their approaches differ significantly from the one adopted in the present thesis. 
Their approach has been generally monological, and reflects what Watson has described as 
the presumption that the current interpretations of international human rights law are or must 
be valid, with everything else being adjusted to maintain that assumption. 14 The argument 
often is that when Muslim States ratify international human rights treaties they are bound by 
the international law rule that a State Party to a treaty "may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty". 15 In practice however, Muslim 
States do not generally plead the Shari `ah or Islamic law as justification for "failure to 
perform" their international human rights obligations. They often argue not against the letter 
of the law but against some interpretations of international human rights law which, they 
claim, does not take Islamic values into consideration. 
This thesis thus aims to fill an important lacuna in the international human rights 
discourse by proposing a synthesis between two extremes and providing an alternative 
perspective to the relationship between Islamic law and international human rights law. 
Using arguments from both Islamic jurisprudence and international human rights practice, 
the aim is to challenge the argument that the observance of international human rights law is 
impossible within an Islamic legal dispensation. The thesis will theoretically engage 
international human rights practice in dialogue with Islamic jurisprudence and then evaluate 
the human rights policy of modern Muslim States within the scope of that dialogue. The 
importance of this dialogical approach was observed by the General Rapporteur, Mrs. Mary 
Robinson, in the conclusions adopted at the end of the inter-regional meeting organised by 
the Council of Europe in advance of the World Conference on Human Rights at Strasbourg 
in 1993, that: 
"We must go back to listening. More thought and effort must be given to enriching 
the human rights discourse by explicit reference to other non-Western religions and 
13 Monshipouri, M., Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East, (1998). Other works of Monshipouri on 
this subject include: "Islamic Thinking and the Internationalization of Human Rights" (1994) 84 The Muslim World, No. 2-3, 
pp. 217-239; "The Muslim World Half a Century after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Progress and Obstacles" 
(1998) 16 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, No. 3., pp. 287-314; Monshipouri, M., and Kukla, C. G., "Islam, 
Democracy, and Human Rights: The Continuing Debate in the West, " (1994) 3 Middle East Policy, No. 2, pp. 22-39. The 
central theme of Professor Monshipouri's work is that "fusing secular and Islamic principles can effectively promote human 
dignity". See Monshipouri, M., Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East, supra, p. 25. One reviewer has 
however observed that while "he judges specific rules of Islamic law against conceptual values of secularism for 
compatibility (he) does not articulate the parallel essential values of Islam, let alone place specific secularist human rights 
norms against them for judgment. " See Quraishi, A., "Book Review of Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the 
Middle East By Mahmood Monshipouri" (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 625 at 628. 
14 Watson, J. S., Theory & Reality in the International Protection of Human Rights (1999) p. 15. 
"Art. 27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). See also e. g. Mayer, E. A., (1999) supra, note 12 above pp. 10- 
12. 
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cultural traditions. By tracing the linkages between constitutional values on the one 
hand and the concepts, ideas and institutions which are central to Islam or the Hindu- 
Buddhist tradition or other traditions, the base of support for fundamental rights can 
be expanded and the claim to universality vindicated. The Western World has no 
monopoly or patent on basic human rights. We must embrace cultural diversity but 
not at the expense of universal minimum standards" 
. 
16 
The hypothesis herein is that although there are some differences of scope between 
Islamic law and international human rights law, that does not create a general antithesis 
between the two. The differences can be meaningfully discussed and the noble ideals of 
international human rights realised in the Muslim world if the concept of international human 
rights can be convincingly established from within the themes of Islamic law rather than 
expressing it as a concept alien to Islamic law. This is premised on the fact that the positive 
means to promote any concept within a particular culture is through evidential support from 
within its legitimising principles. Also, since morality and substantive justice are important 
principles applicable to the philosophy of both Islamic law and international human rights 
law, the principle of justification need be accommodated in proposing practical 
harmonisation of the conceptual differences between Islamic law and international human 
rights law. Thus the jurisprudential arguments of Islamic jurists on differing issues will be 
analysed vis-ä-vis the interpretations of modern international human rights law. Applying 
the justificatory principle the thesis argues for paradigm shifts from traditional hard-line 
interpretations of classical Islamic law and also from exclusionist interpretations of 
international human rights law. The Islamic legal doctrine of maslahah (welfare) 17 and the 
European human rights "margin of appreciation"18 doctrine are explored in establishing the 
arguments in this thesis. 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is composed of 9 Chapters and divided into three parts. Chapter 1 is the 
introduction. Part One, consisting of Chapters 2 to 5, addresses the conceptual issues. In 
Chapter 2 the nature and evolution of international human rights law is examined while 
16 See Council of Europe Doc. CE/CMDH (93) 16, of 30 January 1993, at p. 3. See also Robinson, M., "Human Rights at the 
Dawn of the 21' Century" (1993) 15 Human Rights Quarterly, 629 at 632. 
17 Karnali has observed that the Islamic law doctrine of "maslahah " can strike a balance between public expectations of 
government and its meaningful identification with Islam. See Karnali, M. H., "Have We Neglected the SharI'ah Doctrine of 
Maslahah? " (1988) 27 Islamic Studies, p. 287 at 288. 
18 According to Macdonald, the "margin of appreciation" is more of a principle of justification under the European human 
rights regime. See Macdnold, R. St. J., "The Margin of Appreciation" in Macdonald, R. St. J., et al., (eds. ) The European 
System for the Protection ofHuman Rights (1993) p. 83 at 123. 
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Chapter 3 analyses the nature and evolution of Islamic law. This establishes a general 
framework of reference for the thesis in respect of both international human rights and 
Islamic law. The approach adopted in those two chapters is different from the traditional 
"end of history" approach usually followed, especially in the analysis of Islamic law. The 
possible and continued evolution of both International human rights law and Islamic law in 
directions that promote their harmonious co-existence in Muslim States to ensure the 
protection of individuals against the misuse of the apparatus of State is highlighted. Chapter 
4 examines human rights in the context of Islamic law and researches into the sources, the 
jurisprudence and the legal theories of Islamic law to discover whether the theory and 
practice of human rights can be established from within Islamic law. In doing that, the 
research goes beyond mere theoretical postulations to examine necessary legal practicalities 
leading to identification of the commonalties and the conceptual differences between the two 
legal dispensations. Chapter 5 then examines and traverses the conceptual differences 
identified and also discusses the justificatory principle as a necessary synthesis between 
international human rights law and Islamic law. 
Part Two, consisting of Chapters 6 and 7, is a comparative legal analysis of the 
International Bill of Rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)19 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)20 are examined in the light of Islamic law in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. The 
practices of the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights are respectively analysed in respect of the rights guaranteed under each of the 
two Covenants. Due to the topicality of the question of women's rights in the international 
human rights/Islamic law debate, necessary Articles of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)21 are also referred to in the 
examination of women's rights under the two Covenants. The juristic views of the different 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence are then examined on each aspect of the rights guaranteed 
under the two Covenants. The Islamic juristic justifications in respect of Islamic views are 
analysed vis-ä-vis the liberal principles of international human rights law as interpreted by 
the Committees and vice versa. On grounds of the justificatory principle earlier established, a 
thesis of inclusive interpretation is advanced to facilitate every legitimate shift from a static 
traditional Islamic jurisprudence and from an exclusionist interpretation of international 
human rights law. 
19 Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200A(XXI) of 16 December 1966; 999 UNTS 171. 
20 Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200A(XXI) of 16 December 1966.993 UNTS, p. 3. 
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Part Three is the case studies, where in Chapter 8, the international human rights policy 
and practices of selected Muslim States are examined within their different phases of Islamic 
law application. 
For the purposes of Chapter 8 it is necessary to define the notion of the modem Muslim 
State in this thesis. The Muslim world is today divided into separate sovereign nation- 
states. 22 A few of these States have been specifically declared as Islamic Republics, some 
others indicate in their Constitutions that Islam is the religion of the State, while most are 
only identifiable as Muslim States on the basis of their predominant Muslim population and 
the allegiance of the people to Islam. A different single criterion adopted in this research for 
defining the modern Muslim States is membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC). That all the 56 Member States of the OIC are identifiable as Muslim States is 
supported by the first charter-objective of the Organisation, which is "to promote Islamic 
solidarity among member States". 23 The States exist as independent sovereign States but are 
theoretically linked by their Islamic heritage, traditions and solidarity. For prudence, the 
Muslim States are in this research divided into four main categories in their application of 
Islamic law, and six States have been selected for case studies in Chapter 8. The main focus 
is on legislation, State policies and judicial interpretations in the selected countries as general 
case studies of how modern Muslim States have responded to international human rights 
within their different phases of applying Islamic law as State law. 
Finally, the findings and recommendations of the research are presented in Chapter 9 as 
the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
21 Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979; 1249 UNTS 13. 22 For analysis of the evolution of the Muslim world into modem nation states See e. g. Baderin. M. A., "The Evolution of 
Islamic Law of Nations and the Modem International Order: Universal Peace through Mutuality and Co-operation" (2000) 
17 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, No. 2. pp. 57-80. See also Nasr, S. V. R., "European Colonialism and 
the Emergence of Modem Muslim States" in Esposito, J. L., The Oxford History of Islam (1999) pp. 549-599; Khadduri, M., 
The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani 's Siyar, (1966) pp. 19-20; and al-Ghunaimi, M. T., The Muslim Conception of 
International Law and the Western Approach, (1968) pp. 3 8-54. 
23 See Art. 11(A) (1) Charter of the OIC. The OIC as at February 2001 had 56 Member and 4 Observer States. The Members 
States are: Afghanistan, Republic of Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Republic of Benin, Brunei, Burkina 
Faso, Republic of Cameroon, Chad, Islamic Republic of Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea- 
Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrghyzistan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, Islamic Republic of Maldives, Mali, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Oman, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, 
Surinam, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. 
The Observer States are: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, C6te d'Ivoire, and Thailand. See 
the OIC Website at: http: //www. oic-un. orglabout/mcmbers. htm [12/2/2001]. 
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PART ONE: 
Conceptual Issues 
CHAPTER 2 
The Nature and Evolution of 
International Human Rights Law 
It is essential to begin by establishing a general framework of reference in respect of 
international human rights law for this thesis. We will not delve into the complex 
philosophical arguments associated with the concept of human rights, ' but will focus on the 
development of the international protection of human rights and the basis and legality of 
international human rights law. The question of universalism and cultural relativism will also 
be revisted as part of the background for latter arguments in the thesis. 
WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 
Human rights are the rights of humans. They are the rights of all human beings in full 
equality. We are entitled to them simply because we are human beings. They derive from 
the "inherent dignity of the human person"2 and have been defined as "those claims made by 
men, for themselves or on behalf of other men, supported by some theory which concentrates 
on the humanity of man, on man as a human being, a member of mankind. 
.. 
113. These 
claims relate to standards of life, which every person has a right to expect from society as a 
human being. In the words of Umozurike: 
"Human rights are thus claims, which are invariably supported by ethics and which 
should be supported by law, made on society, especially on its official managers, by 
individuals or groups on the basis of their humanity. They apply regardless of race, 
colour, sex or other distinction and may not be withdrawn or denied by governments, 
people or individuals. "4 
' For detailed philosophical and critical analysis of the theory of human rights See e. g. Winston, M. E., (ed. ) The Philosophy 
of Human Rights (1989); Shestack, J. J., "The Jurisprudence of Human Rights", in Meron, T., (ed. ) Human Rights in 
International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, Vol. 1, (1984) pp. 69-113; Nino, C. S., The Ethics of Human Rights (1991); 
Rosenbaum, A., (ed. ) The Philosophy of Human Rights, International Perspectives (1980); and Douzinas, C., The End of 
Human Rights (2000). 
2 See e. g. The 2"d Preambular paragraph of both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 993 UNTS 3. and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 UNTS 171. See also Is' 
Prembular paragraph of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 3 Dowrick, F. E., (ed. ) Human Rights: Problems, Perspectives and Texts (1979) p. 8. 
Umozurike, U. O., The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1997) p. 5. 
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Scholars have advanced different views concerning the origins of the human rights idea. 
While some authors assert that "human rights are as old as people are", others hold that 
human rights should be listed as "new business". 5 A better perspective than considering the 
idea of human rights either as old or new business, is to conceive it as an evolutionary 
phenomenon that has matured over time through the different stages of human civilisation 
and enlightenment. Lauren has thus observed that: 
"The historical evolution of visions of international human rights that continues to 
this day started centuries ago with efforts attempting to address these difficult and 
universal questions. It began as soon as men and women abandoned nomadic 
existence and settled in organized societies, long before anyone had ever heard of the 
more recent expression "human rights, " or before nation-states negotiated specific 
international treaties. " 6 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME? 
Although the historical origins of human rights dates back into ancient times and often 
linked with the idea of natural rights, the First and Second World Wars, and the periods 
between them played the antecedent roles for the emergence of the international human 
rights regime. 8 The opprobrious and savage treatment of individuals and groups during the 
period, and the use of the apparatus of the State to deal unwholesomely with human beings 
created international concerns for the protection of human beings. Concern for the protection 
of minority groups in Central and Eastern Europe after the First World War was the first 
attempt for an international human rights regime. Two human rights notions emerged in the 
process, i. e. the notion of individual rights and that of collective rights. The first was for the 
protection of the rights of individuals and the second for the protection of minorities. 9 
Attempts at including human rights provisions in the Covenant of the League of Nations, that 
was to be created, was however unsuccessful. What emerged were separate minority 
protection treaties and State declarations guaranteeing the protection of the rights of 
minorities. The League of Nations however performed a supervisory role over the 
5 See e. g. Cleveland, H., "Introduction: the Chain Reaction of Human Rights", in Henkin, A. H., (ed. ) Human Dignity: The 
Internationalization of Human Rights (1979) p. ix. 
6 Lauren, P. G., The Evolution of International Human Rights, Visions Seen (1998) p. 5. See also generally Ishay, M. R., (ed. ) 
The Human Rights Reader: Major Political Essays, Speeches and Documents from the Bible to the Present (1997). 7 See e. g. Sohn, L. B., "The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States" (1982) 32 
American University Law Journal, 1-64. 
8 See e. g. Weston, B., "Human Rights" in New Encyclopaedia Britannica, I5`h Ed., Vol. 20, p. 713; Douzinas, C., The End of 
Human Rights (2000); Szabo, I., "Historical Foundations of Human Rights and Subsequent Developments" in Vasak, K., (ed. ) The International Dimensions of Human Rights (1982) Vol. 1, pp. 11.; Cassese, A., Human Rights in a Changing World (1990) pp. 1-23. 
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obligations created, which were considered of international concern. 10 
Private endeavours continued both within and outside the League of Nations for the 
realisation of an international human rights regime. In 1929 the Institute of International" 
Law, a private body of distinguished authorities on international law in Europe, the Americas 
and Asia, adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Manl1, in which it considered it the duty 
of every State to recognise, inter alia, the equal rights of every individual to life, liberty and 
property. The Institute also considered that every State had a duty to accord to everyone 
within its territory the full and entire protection of these rights without distinction as to 
nationality, sex, race, language or religion. Although the Declaration was not a binding 
document, it contributed to the popularisation of the idea of international human rights in the 
years immediately after its adoption. The Declaration also set a pace for a new relationship 
between the individual and the State under international law. Marshall Brown, an editor of 
the American Journal of International Law in 1930 reflected the Declaration's significance in 
the then emerging international order as follows: 
"This declaration... states in bold and unequivocal terms the rights of human beings, 
"without distinction of nationality, sex, race, language and religion, " to the equal 
right to life, liberty and property, together with all the subsidiary rights essential to 
the enjoyment of these fundamental rights. It aims not merely to assure to 
individuals their international rights, but it aims also to impose on all nations a 
standard of conduct towards all men, including their own nationals. It thus 
repudiates the classic doctrine that states alone are subjects of international law. 
Such a revolutionary document, while open to criticism in terminology and to the 
objection that it has not juridical value, cannot fail, however, to exert an influence on 
the evolution of international law. It marks a new era which is more concerned with 
the interests and rights of sovereign individuals than with the rights of sovereign 
states. " 12 
The fascist atrocities during the Second World War further aroused the asperity of 
humanity and moved the world community to call for formal international measures aimed at 
ensuring the protection of human rights and achievement of world peace and security. The 
Allies determined even before the end of the war that an international commitment to the 
protection of human rights should be a part of the post Second World War settlement. Thus, 
in the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation which emerged after the 
9 See Szabo, I., (1982) ibid, p. 21. 
10 See e. g. Article 12 of The Polish Minorities Treaty (1920). See also Cassese, A., (1990) supra, note 8 above, pp. 17-21; 
Weston, B., supra, note 8 above, p., 717; and Ezejiofor, G., Protection of Human Rights Under Law (1964) pp. 38-50. 11 See (1941) 35 American Journal of International Law pp. 662-665. 
12 See (1930) 24 American Journal of International Law p. 127. 
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war, 13 the Member States declared their determination "... to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small... ". They also made it clear in Article 1(3) that one of 
the purposes of the UN was "(t)o achieve international co-operation in... promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion... ". 
The UN Member States also pledged themselves under Article 56 of the Charter "to take 
joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the 
purpose stated in Article 55", which include "universal respect for, and observation of, 
human and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion. " Although the Charter contains no provisions as to the contents of human rights, it 
signalled the dawn of the international human rights regime. It provided for the establishment 
of an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) whose functions included making 
"recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all. 5A4 Henkin has succinctly described the development as 
follows: 
"The UN charter ushered in a new international law of human rights. The new law 
buried the old dogma that the individual is not a "subject" of international politics 
and law and that a government's behaviour toward its own nationals is a matter of 
domestic, not international concern... It gave the individual a part in international 
politics and rights in international law, independently of his government. It also gave 
the individual protectors other than his government, indeed protectors and remedies 
against his government". 15 
The UDHR was the first UN document adopted containing a list of internationally 
recognised human rights. 16 It was adopted as a simple resolution of the General Assembly of 
the UN in 1948.17 The rights in the UDHR were stated in very general terms and some of its 
principles are considered to have become part of international customary law because they 
13 The UN Charter was adopted on June 26 1945 and is regarded as "the constitution of the organized world community 
after World War II" and is binding between all the Member States of the UN. See Ermacora, Nowak and Tretter (eds. ) 
International Human Rights: Documents and Introductory Notes (1993) p. 3. 
14 See Chapter 10 of the UN Charter. 
15 See Henkin, L., (ed. ) The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (1981) p. 6. 
16 The rights covered by the UDHR are Life, Liberty and Security of Person (Art. 3), Recognition as a person (Art. 6), 
Equality before the law (Art. 7), Effective legal remedies (Art. 8), Due process of law (Art. 9,10 & 11), Freedom of 
Movement (Art. 13), Asylum (Art. 14), Nationality (Art. 15), Marriage and Family (Art. 16), Property (Art. 17), Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art. 18), Freedom of Opinion and Expression (Art. 19), Peaceful Assembly and 
Association (Art. 20), Participation in Government (Art. 21), Social Security (Art. 22), Work and Equal Pay for Equal Work (Art. 23), Rest and Leisure (Art. 24), Adequate Standard of Living (Art. 25), Education (Art. 26), Cultural Life (Art. 27), 
Prohibition of Slavery or Servitude (Art. 4), Prohibition of Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (Art. 5), 
Prohibition of Arbitrary Interference with Privacy (Art. 12). 
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lead to rights accepted by States generally. 18 The UDHR has served as framework for not 
only subsequent international human rights treaties but also many national and regional 
human rights documents. 19 
In 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)20 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights (ICESCR)21 were adopted, and 
both entered into force in 1976. The two Covenants together with the UDHR constitute the 
International Bill of Rights. The rights guaranteed under the two Covenants cover nearly all 
the basic values cherished by every civilised human society. 22 Apart from the international 
bill of rights, the UN has also adopted other ancillary international treaties and declarations 
on the rights of women, children, refugees, stateless persons, diplomatic agents, minorities, 
e. t. c. There are also specific international human rights treaties for the protection of the 
human person against atrocities such as genocide, racial discrimination, apartheid, slavery, 
forced labour, torture, e. t. c. 23 
Regional organisations such as the Council of Europe, the Organisation of American 
States, the Organisation of African Unity, and the League of Arab States have also adopted 
different regional human rights treaties in recognition of the noble ideals of international 
human rights. The basic regional human rights treaties are the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), 24 The European Social 
Charter (196 1), 25 The American Convention on Human Rights (1969), 26 The African Charter 
on Human and People's Rights (1981)27 and the Arab Charter of Human Rights (1994)28. Of 
relevance to this thesis is also the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam adopted by 
the Organisation of Islamic Conference in 1990.29 
All the above international treaties and declarations on human rights confirm, as rightly 
observed by Henkin, the acceptance of the human rights idea by "virtually all states and 
17 10 December 1948, GAOR, 3`d Sess., Res. 217A. 
18 See Lillich, R. B., "The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law" (1995-96) 25Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, Nos. 1&2,1-30. 
19 See Hannum, H., "The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law" (1995-96) 
25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Nos. I&2,287-396. 
20 999 LINTS 171. 
21 993 UNTS 3. 
22 See Chen, L., An Introduction to Contemporary International Law, (1989) pp. 209-211. 
23 See UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: http: /hvww. unhchr. ch/html/intlinst. htm [10/2/2001]. 
24 Adopted on 4 November 1950. E. T. S. No. 005. 
25 Adopted on 18 October, 1961. E. T. S. No. 035. 
26 Adopted on 22 November 1969. O. A. S. T. S. No. 36 at 1. 
27 Adopted on 27 June 1981. OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; (1982) 21 I. L. M. 58. 
28 Adopted 15 September 1994. Reprinted in (1997) 18 Human Rights Law Journal, 151. See Rishmawi, M., The Arab 
Charter on Human Rights: A Comment" (1996) 10 Interights Bulletin, No. 1,8-10 for an overview of the Arab Charter. 
29 Adopted on 5 August 1990. The Declaration was submitted by the OIC to the UN prior to the 2"d World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna. See UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/62/Add. 18 (1993). 
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societies" of the contemporary world "regardless of historical, cultural, ideological, 
economic or other differences". 30 
CATEGORISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Human rights are today classified either by subject, object or generation. Thus, we talk 
of civil and political rights distinct from economic, social and cultural rights, and of 
individual rights separate from collective or group rights. We also talk of first generation, 
second generation, and third generation rights. The civil and political rights are often referred 
to as the first generation rights. 31 They are the traditional rights relating to the liberty and 
justice that individuals are entitled to expect from the State. They are the favourites of 
Western States, some of whom consider them as the only true human rights. 32 The ICCPR 
contains the list of the internationally recognised civil and political rights. Apart from the 
right of self-determination, the civil and political rights are mostly individual rights, which 
every individual may demand of the State. In the past, these rights were sought through the 
channel of civil disobedience and revolution. Today, international human rights law 
provides the individual with legal channels for the demand and guarantee of these rights. 33 
Economic, Social and Cultural rights are the so-called second generation rights. They 
are mostly rights which States have to take positive action to promote. They may be called 
the sustenance or enjoyment rights, and are strongly advanced by socialist and developing 
nations. 34 The ICESR contains a list of internationally recognised economic, social and 
cultural rights. Despite their inevitability for the sustenance of human dignity, the economic, 
social and cultural rights are often considered as "utopian aspirations", non-legal and non- 
justiciable. 35 Shue however argues strongly that there is a basic or fundamental human right 
to subsistence which the economic, social and cultural rights fulfil. He contends that justice 
and international law requires the rich nations to share their abundant resources with the 
millions of human beings who are chronically malnourished all over the world. 36 Human 
rights would certainly be meaningless in a world where one part of humanity is in abundance 
30 See Henkin, L., (1981) supra, note 15 above, p. 1. 
31 See e. g. Harris, D. J., Cases and Materials on International Law (5`h Ed. 1998) p. 625; Weston, B., supra, note 8 above. 
V, 715; and Sohn, L. B., (1982) supra, note7 above, p. 32. 
See e. g. U. S. position in UN Doc. A/40/C3/36, p. 5 (1985) that economic, social and cultural rights were "societal goals" 
rather than human rights. 
"See e. g. Optional Protocol Ito the ICCPR; 999 UNTS 171. 
34 See Harris, D. J., (1998) supra, note 31 above; Weston, B. supra at note 31 above; and Sohn, L. B., (1982) supra, note 31 
above. 35 See e. g. Cranston, M., What Are Human Rights (1973) p. 9-17. 
36 See generally, Shue, H., Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (2"d Ed., 1996). 
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but yet feels no obligation for another part of it in abject poverty. The notion of generations 
of human rights can thus be misleading if not well addressed. For instance, it had for a long 
time blurred attention from the important role of the economic, social and cultural rights in 
the enhancement of human dignity. Many scholars therefore reject this notion of 
generations. 37 While the civil and political rights might have been pursued more vigorously 
in international law for political and ideological reasons, this does not mean that the 
economic, social and cultural rights are less important. 38 
Supplementary to the so-called first and second generation of rights mentioned above is 
also the notion of a third generation of human rights. These are collective rights, not 
individual rights. They are described as solidarity rights based on solidarity between men. 
According to its major proponent, Karel Vasak, the third generation human rights are born of 
the obvious brotherhood of men and their indispensable solidarity. 
39 The right to 
development, right to peace, and right to a healthy and balanced environment are prominent 
on the list of the proposed third generation of human rights. This group of human rights also 
expresses aspirations for co-operation between developed affluent nations on one hand and 
developing poor nations of the world on the other, for the benefit of humanity. With the 
exception of treaties on environmental protection, which are reflective of the right to a 
healthy and balanced environment, there is no UN international treaty yet on the third 
generation of human rights. 40 
Although the categorisation of human rights may serve the useful purpose of easy 
identification of particular rights, there is the need to emphasise the treatment of human 
rights as a totality. The UN General Assembly has thus stressed the fact that all human rights 
are indivisible and interdependent. 41 This will prevent a rigid compartmentalisation of human 
rights and ensure a wholesome realisation of the ideals of international human rights law. 
37 See e. g. Eide, A., and Rosas, A., "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; A Universal Challenge", in Eide, A., et al (eds. ) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook. (1995) p. 27. 
3$ See Van Hoof, G. J. H., "The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal of Some Traditional 
Views", in Alston, P., and Tomasevski, K., (eds. ) The Right to Food. (1984) pp-97-1 10 (argues that it is wrong to construe a 
strict dichotomy of the two groups of rights, and suggests a more integrated approach that covers both sets of rights. ). 
39 See Vasak, K., "For the Third Generation of Human Rights: "The Rights of Solidarity", Inaugural Lecture to the le 
Study Session of the International Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 2-27 July, 1979. 
40 The UN General Assembly has however adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development at its 97`h plenary meeting 
on 4`h December 1986, and recognised in its preamble that "development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and 
political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on 
the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting 
therefrom. " The right to development also continues to be a subject of discussion within the activities of the UN 
Commission for Human Rights. See e. g. The UN Secretary General's Report on Right to Development to the 55`h Session of 
the UN General Assembly 
- 
UN Doc. A/55/283 of 8 August 2000. 
41 See e. g. GA Res. 32/130 of 16 December 1977, and also Paragraph 5 of the Declaration of the World Conference on 
Human Rights, Vienna 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23. 
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UNIVERSALISM IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
The question of universalism in international human rights law has been very intensely 
debated 42 It is noted however that the "universality of' human rights has often generally 
been confused with "universalism in" human rights within the international human rights 
discourse. Although the two concepts are inter-related, each refers to a different aspect of the 
universalisation of human rights. An appreciation of the distinction between the two concepts 
is very important for a realistic approach to the question of universalism in international 
human rights law. 
"Universality of' human rights refers to the universal quality or global acceptance of the 
human rights idea as elaborated above, while "Universalism in" human rights relates to the 
interpretation and application of the human rights idea. 43 The universality of human rights 
has been achieved over the years since the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, and is evidenced 
by the fact that there is no State today that will unequivocally accept that it is a violator of 
human rights. Today, all nations and societies do generally acknowledge the human rights 
idea, thereby establishing its universality. However, universalism in human rights has not 
been so achieved. Universalism connotes the existence of a common universal value 
consensus for the interpretation and application of international human rights law. The 
current lack of such universal consensus is evidenced by the fact that universalism continues 
to be a subject of debate within the international human rights objective of the UN. 44 
Universalism is often confronted by the cultural relativist argument at every opportunity in 
the international human rights discourse. For example during the Vienna Conference on 
Human Rights, representatives of some African, Asian, and Muslim States challenged the 
present concept of universalism in international human rights as being west-centric and 
insensitive to non-western cultures. Prior to the conference, a group of Asian States had 
adopted the Bangkok (Governmental) Declaration recognising the contribution that can be 
made by Asian countries to the international human rights regime through their diverse but 
rich cultures and traditions. 5 An NGO coalition from the Asia Pacific region had also 
42 See e. g. Symposium on "Universalism and Cultural Relativism: Perspectives on the Human Rights Debate" (1997) 
Human Rights at Harvard, April 5,1997, pp. 9-38. See also Steiner, H. J., and Alston, P., International Human Rights in 
Context, Law Politics Morals (2"d Ed., 2000) p. 366. 
43 Linguistically the suffix "-ity" denotes the quality, condition or degree of a phenomenon while the suffix "-ism" denotes 
its system, principle, result or practice. See e. g. Pearsall, J., and Trumble, B., (eds) The Oxford English Reference 
Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2d Ed., 1996) p. 746 and p. 749. 
44 See e. g. Yash, Ghai, "Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate" (1994) 15 Australian Yearbook of International 
Law 11. See also generally Renteln, A. D., International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (1990); Bauer, J. R., 
and Bell, D. A., (eds. ) The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (1999); and also Smith, J., (ed. ) Human Rights: Chinese 
and Dutch Perspectives (1996). 
as See "Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights" (Bangkok, March 29 - April 2, 
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adopted the Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights promoting the emergence of "a 
new understanding of universalism encompassing the richness and wisdom of Asia pacific 
cultures. "46 Muslim States that apply Islamic law also often advance similar arguments in 
respect of Islamic law. 47 
When the UDHR was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 it was very clear 
from the outset that the human rights it guaranteed were intended to be universal. Apart from 
it being titled a "Universal Declaration", the General Assembly proclaimed it as "a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations". The need to promote respect for the 
rights through national and international measures, and to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance were also identified in the Declaration. 48 The UN was then 
constituted of only 58 Member States. 9 Although none of the Member States opposed the 
human rights idea nor its universalisation, 8 of them (Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, USSR, Ukrainian SSR, and Yugoslavia) abstained from 
voting for the adoption of the Declaration due principally to interpretational differences on 
some of its provisions. 50 While the number of abstaining States may have seemed 
insignificant, it was no doubt a signal of the possible interpretational divergence ahead of the 
then emerging universal human rights initiative. Renteln has observed notably in this respect 
that all the eighteen drafts considered for the UDHR "came from the democratic West and 
. 
She concluded thus that "(t)he fact that there were no that all but two were in English" 51 
dissenting votes should not be taken to mean that complete value consensus had been 
achieved. s52 
One of the earliest indications of the need for a universal value consensus and thus a 
multi-cultural approach to the then emerging international human rights initiative was given 
in 1947 by the American Anthropological Association in its memorandum submitted to the 
UN Commission on Human Rights charged with the drafting of the UDHR. The Association 
1993), UN Doc. A/Conf. 157/ASRM/8, Preambular Paragraph 2. 
46 See 1S` Paragraph under Challenges in the Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights. Reproduced in (1993) 14 Human 
Rights Law Journal, p. 352. 
47 See Case Studies in Chapter 8 below. 
48 See Paragraph 8 of the Preamble of the UDHR. 
49 Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia. Brazil, Belarus, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia. 
50 On Saudi Arabian reasons see Chapter 8 p. 262 below. 
51 Renteln, A. D., (1990) supra, note 44 above, p. 30; See also Tolley, H., The UN Commission on Human Rights, (1987) 
20. 
2 Renteln, A. D., ibid. 
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had stated, inter alia, that: 
"Because of the great numbers of societies that are in intimate contact in the modern 
world, and because of the diversity of their ways of life, the primary task confronting 
those who would draw up a Declaration on the Rights of Man is thus, in essence, to 
resolve the following problem: How can the proposed Declaration be applicable to 
all human beings, and not be a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the 
values prevalent in the countries of Western Europe and America?... the problem is 
complicated by the fact that the Declaration must be of world-wide applicability. It 
must embrace and recognize the validity of many different ways of life. It will not be 
convincing to the Indonesian, the African, the Indian, the Chinese, if it lies on the 
same plane as like documents of an earlier period. The rights of Man in the 
Twentieth Century cannot be circumscribed by the standards of any single culture, or 
be dictated by the aspirations of any single people. Such a document will lead to 
frustration, not realization of the personalities of vast numbers of human beings. "" 
(emphasis added) 
The above observation was calling attention to universalism in human rights because it 
referred specifically to the "world-wide (i. e. universal) applicability" of the Declaration. The 
UN Commission seemed however to have concentrated more on the universality of human 
rights at that early stage and not necessarily on the means of identifying a universal value for 
achieving the rights guaranteed by the Declaration 
- 
i. e. universalism in human rights. It is in 
the context of universalism (not universality) that many publicist, in retrospect, contend that 
were the UDHR to be re-adopted, it would perhaps be impossible to reach the same 
unanimity in today's fragmented world of more than 180 culture-conscious Member States of 
the UN. 5' 
It is discernible however that emphasising universalism by the UN Commission at that 
early stage in 1947 could have stalled the whole universal human rights initiative. Rather, the 
UDHR was drafted in very general terms to secure the support of all the States despite their 
different cultures. The seventh preambular paragraph of the Declaration however stated that 
"a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the 
full realization of this pledge. " But since the Declaration contained no ultimate interpretative 
organ, the interpretation of the rights declared was more or less left to the individual States, 
each interpreting the values within its cultural context. The controversy on universalism in 
human rights did not fully arise until human rights had established itself as a powerful 
catalyst in international relations championed strongly by Western nations, and Western 
scholarship consequently projecting human rights as a strictly western concept subject to 
53 See American Anthropological Association, "Statement on Human Rights", (1947) 49 American Anthropologist, pp. 
539-543. 
54 See e. g. An-Na'im, A. A., "Universality of Human Rights: An Islamic Perspective" in Ando, N., (ed. ) Japan and 
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complete west-oriented interpretations. This was met by counter arguments advocating a 
culturally relative interpretation of international human rights norms. Thus began the 
contending theories of universalism versus cultural relativism within the universal human 
rights objective of the UN, which has resulted in a sort of paradox. 
THE PARADOX OF UNIVERSALISM AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
The theory of universalism is that human rights are the same (or must be the same) 
everywhere both in substance and application. Advocates of strict universalism assert that 
international human rights are exclusively universal. This theory is mostly advocated by 
western nations and scholars who present universalism in human rights through a strict 
western perspective. They reject any claims of cultural relativism and consider it as an 
unacceptable theory advocated to rationalise human rights violations. Western scholars who 
argue that human rights were developed from western culture also argue that western norms 
should always be the universal normative model for international human rights law. 
55 
Advocates of this exclusive concept of universalism usually seek support for their argument 
in the language of international human rights instruments, which normally states that "every 
human being", "everyone" or "all persons" are entitled to human rights. While it is trite that 
the language of international human rights instruments generally support the theory of 
universalism, present State practice hardly supports any suggestion that in adopting or 
ratifying international human rights instruments, non-western State Parties were indicating an 
acceptance of a strict and exclusive western perspective or interpretation of international 
human rights norms. 56 One may observe in this regard that Art. 31(2) of the ICCPR, for 
instance, provided that in electing members of the Human Rights Committee "consideration 
shall be given to equitable geographical distribution of membership and to the representation 
of the different forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems" of the State Parties. 
(emphasis added). It is arguable that this recognises the need for an inclusive and multi- 
civilisational approach in the interpretation of the Covenant. 57 The theory of cultural 
relativism is thus advocated mostly by non-western nations and scholars who contend that 
International Law: Past, Present and Future (1999) p. 311 at 318-319. 
ss See e. g. D'Amato, A. A., Collected Papers, International Law Studies (1997) Vol. 2, pp. 139-40; and Mayer, E. A., 
"Current Muslim Thinking on Human Rights" in An-Naim, A. A., and Deng, F. M., (eds. ) Human Rights in Africa, Cultural 
Perspectives (1990) p. 131 at 147-8. 
56 e. g. See Case Studies of Muslim States in Chapter 8 below. 
57 The same provision can be found in Art 8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1965) on the election of the members of CERD. Also Article 9 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (1945) provides for "the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the 
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human rights are not exclusively rooted in western culture, but are inherent in human nature 
and based on morality. Thus human rights, they claim, can not be interpreted without regard 
to the cultural differences of peoples. Advocates of cultural relativism assert that "rights and 
rules about morality are encoded in and thus depend on cultural contexts. i58 The theory 
emanates from the philosophy of the need to recognise the values set up by every society to 
guide its own life, the dignity inherent in every culture, and the need for tolerance of 
conventions though they may differ from one's own. 59 Cultural relativism is thus 
conditioned by a combination of historical, political, economic, social, cultural and religious 
factors and not restricted only to indigenous cultural or traditional differences of people. 
A critical evaluation of both theories reveals that, on the one hand, the theory of cultural 
relativism is prone to abuse and may be used to rationalise human rights violations by 
different regimes. It admits of pluralistic inputs, which, if not properly managed, can debase 
the efficacy of human rights. On the other hand, the current values projected for the 
interpretation of international human rights law by advocates of strict universalism have been 
criticised as purely western and not really universal. 60 The present theory of universalism is 
itself thus criticised as being culturally relative to western values. 61 That is the paradox, 
whereby the controversy between universalism and cultural relativism actually portrays a 
situation of cultural relativisms. 
To most of the former colonies, western values are essentially being used as the 
universal repugnancy test for the interpretation of international human rights law in the same 
way Western laws and customs were used in colonial periods to eliminate local laws. 62 The 
question has thus often been raised as to whether the theory of strict universalism in human 
rights is not another "form of neocolonialism serving to strengthen the dominance of the 
West. ". 63 The ideals of universalism in international human rights law need therefore to be 
advanced in a manner that escapes charges of cultural imperialism within non-western 
societies. Universalism in international human rights law demands the evolution or 
identification of a universal consensus in the interpretation of human rights principles. This 
world" in the election of its judges. S$ See Steiner, H. J. and Alston, P, International Human Rights in Context, Law Politics Morals (2°d Ed., 2000) p. 366. 
59 See Herskovits, M., Man and His Works (1950) p. 76. 
60 See e. g. Mutua, M., "The Ideology of Human Rights", (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law, p. 586 at 592- 
593. 
61 ibid. 
62 See generally e. g. Obilade, O. A., The Nigerian Legal System (1979) and Park, A. E. W., The Sources of Nigerian Law (1963) for an analyses of the application of the Repugnancy principle in the Nigerian Legal System. See also Allot, A. N., 
New Essays in African Law (1970). 
b3 See Higgins, R., "The Continuing Universality of the Universal Declaration" in Baehr, P., et at. (eds. ) Innovation and 
Inspiration: Fifty Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1999) p. 17 at 19. 
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calls for a multicultural or cross-cultural approach to the interpretation and application of the 
international human rights principles in a manner that will not reduce its efficacy but lead to 
the realisation of an inclusive theory of universalism. The American Anthropological 
Association had argued in its earlier quoted comment to the Human Rights Commission that 
international human rights should "... not be circumscribed by the standards of any single 
culture, or be dictated by the aspirations of any single people. "64 An-Na'im has also 
reiterated that: "Any concept of human rights that is to be universally accepted and globally 
enforced demands equal respect and mutual comprehension between rival cultures". 65 That 
argument continues to be advanced today mostly by non-western nations. There is thus a 
need for an objective evaluation of what every civilisation can contribute to universalism in 
international human rights law. Presumptions of cultural inferiority must be avoided and 
justifications on cultural differences must be examined and critically evaluated within the 
parameters of human dignity with a view of evolving an inclusive universalism in 
international human rights law. 
Whatever definition or understanding we ascribe to human rights, the bottom line is the 
protection of human dignity. There is perhaps no civilisation or philosophy in today's world 
that would not subscribe to that notion. Thus it may only be difficult, but not impossible to 
evolve a universally acceptable conception in that respect. There is need for sincere and 
justificatory cross-cultural evaluations of human dignity with a view of evolving an 
international moral value which no repressive regime may find easy to circumvent in the 
business of State governance. 
RELEVANCE OF ISLAMIC LAW TO UNIVERSALISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
The relevance of Islamic law in the quest for an inclusive universalism that will ensure 
the full realisation of international human rights in the Muslim world is, in view of the 
number of Muslim States in the international legal order, quite obvious. This has often been 
practically demonstrated by references to Islamic law in the arguments and reports of Muslim 
States to UN charter and human rights treaty committees. The general relevance of Islamic 
law in international law is also demonstrated by the existence of a "Committee on Islamic 
Law and International Law" amongst the international committees of the International Law 
Association (ILA). Notably, the Committee for instance proposed in its report after the ILA 
64 See American Anthropological Association, (1947) supra, note 53 above. 
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London Conference in July 2000, "to contribute to the advancement of International Law on 
asylum and refugees by incorporating some aspect of Islamic Law on asylum in International 
Law". 66 Mayer has however observed that there is a general indifference to the Islamic 
tradition within learned international human rights literature and that "(q)uestions of Islamic 
law are only occasionally mentioned in scholarly writing on international human rights 
- 
for 
the sake of comparison with international norms or to illustrate the problems of introducing 
international norms in areas of the developing world. i67 Thus while Islamic law is recognised 
as a factor relevant to the introduction of international norms in Muslim areas of the 
developing world, legal scholarship on the subject has not been persuasive enough to achieve 
effective harmonisation of the differences in scope between Islamic law and international 
human rights law. 
It is noteworthy however that the ILA adopted Resolution No. 6/2000 after the London 
Conference observing that "... aspects of Islamic Law are protective of human rights" and 
requested its Committee on Islamic Law and International Law "to continue its work on the 
contribution of Islamic Law to the development of International law by undertaking further 
studies, with a view of reporting on that work to the 70`h conference to be held in New Delhi 
in 2002". 68 
More than just establishing a religious and legal order, Islam is an institution of 
legitimacy in many States of the Muslim world. Many regimes in the Muslim world today 
seek their legitimacy through portraying an adherence to Islamic law and traditions. Any 
attempt to enforce international or universal norms within Muslim societies in oblivion of 
established Islamic law and traditions thus creates tension and reactions against the secular 
nature of the international regime no matter how humane or lofty such international norms 
may be. For example the Representative of Islamic Republic of Iran, Said Raja'i-Khorasani 
at the 65th meeting of the Third Committee during the 39th Session of the UN General 
Assembly on 7th December, 1984 had argued in defence of alleged violation of human rights 
by his country that the new political order in Iran was 
"in full accordance and harmony with the deepest moral and religious convictions of 
the people and therefore most representative of the traditional, cultural, moral and 
religious beliefs of Iranian society. It recognised no authority... apart from Islamic 
law... (therefore) conventions, declarations and resolutions or decisions of 
international organisations, which were contrary to Islam, had no validity in the 
65 See An-Na'im, A. A., "What Do We Mean By Universal? " (1994) Index on Censorship, September / October, 120. 66 See the ILA Internet Website at http: //www. ila-hq. org/ [11/12/ 2000]. 
67 See Mayer, A. E., Islam and Human Rights, Traditions and Politics, (3`d Ed., 1999) p. 41. 68 See note 66 above. 
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Islamic Republic of Iran. " 
69 
Conversely, accommodation of Islamic law is also often seen in international human 
rights circles as accommodating a constraint on freedoms, liberties and human rights 
generally. The assumption is that it is impossible to realise human rights within an Islamic 
legal dispensation.. For example when one of the States in the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
recently passed a Bill into law for the full application of Islamic law within its jurisdiction70 
many human rights groups both within and outside the country expressed fears that the 
application of Islamic law would adversely constrain fundamental human rights and 
freedoms within the jurisdiction of the State. 7' Similar fears were expressed by human rights 
groups in 1998 when the government of Pakistan proposed a constitutional amendment bill to 
its parliament seeking to make the Qur'an and Sunnah the supreme law of Pakistan. 72 Such 
apprehension is believed to have also contributed to the abortion of the democratisation 
process in Algeria in 1992 through a military take over, when it appeared that the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) would emerge victorious in the overall elections. According to Bassam 
Tibi: "If the FIS were to come to power, the first measure it would have taken would have 
been to abolish the constitution and declare nizam al-islami (Islamic system of government 
based on the shari `a)". 73 
While the political and legal philosophy of Islam may differ in certain respects from that 
of the secular international order, it does not necessarily mean a complete discord with the 
international human rights regime. Removing the traditional barriers of distrust and apathy 
would reveal that diversity is not synonymous to incompatibility. Mayer has observed that: 
"The Islamic heritage offers many philosophical concepts, humanistic values, and 
moral principles that are well adapted for use in constructing human rights principles. 
Such values and principles abound even in the premodern Islamic intellectual 
heritage"74 
Judge Weeramantry formerly of the International Court of Justice also observed in his 
69 UN General Assembly, 39th Sess., Third Committee, 65th Mtg, 7 December, 1984, A/C. 3/39/SR. 65. 
70 See Shari'a Court of Appeal Law of Zamfara State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Zamfara State of Nigeria Law No. 6 
of 81h October, 1999. 
71 Similar fears were raised in 1979 and 1989 during the debates on provisions for a SharI'ah Court of Appeal in the 
Nigerian Constitution. See generally Basri, G., Nigeria and Shari 'ah: Aspirations and Apprehensions, (1994). 72 Constitution (15`x' Amendment) Act, 1998. The Bill was passed by the National Assembly on 9 October 1998. But the 
Senate had not voted on it before it was suspended by the Musharraf regime that took power in October 1999. However, 
there is an Enforcement of SharI'ah Act of 1991 already in force, Article 3 (1) of which provides that; "The Shari'ah, that is 
to say the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah, shall be the supreme law of Pakistan. " 
73 Tibi, B., "Islamic Law/Shari'a and Human Rights: International Law and International Relations", in Lindholm, T., and 
Vogt, K., (eds. ) Islamic Law Reform and Human Rights: Challenges and Rejoinders, (1993) p. 75 at 76. 
74 See Mayer, A. E., (1999) supra, note 67 above, p. 43. 
22 
penetrative work titled Justice Without Frontiers, Furthering Human Rights, that although 
Locke, the founding father of Western human rights, never attended most of his lectures as a 
student at Oxford, "he assiduously attended only the lectures of Professor Pococke, the 
professor of Arabic studies". According to the learned judge: "Those studies may well have 
referred to Arabic political theory including the idea of rights that no ruler could take away, 
subjection of the ruler to the law, and the notion of conditional rulership". He concluded that: 
"When Locke proclaimed his theory of inalienable rights and conditional rulership, this was 
new to the West, but could he not have had some glimmerings of this from his Arabic 
studies? 75 
The wide gap that still exists between the theory and reality of the universal protection 
of human rights76 indicates that universalism in international human rights law is not yet a 
fait accompli. The evolution of international human rights has therefore not reached the end 
of its history yet. With the cognisance that international human rights law is aimed at the 
enhancement of human dignity and the promotion of the well being of humanity, it is 
submitted that Islamic law rather than contradicting it, should be able to contribute to the 
realisation of its ideals and also to the achievement of its universal observation, especially in 
the Muslim world. What is required as observed by one writer, is an expatiation "from within 
by a Muslim intellectual who can engage in dialogue with the traditionally educated scholars 
, 
in a comparative manner with international human rights law. of Islamic jurisprudence" 77 
75 See Weeramantry, C. G., Justice Without Frontiers: Furthering Human Rights (1997) Vol. 1, pp. ] 39-140. 
76 See generally, Watson, J. S., Theory & Reality in the International Protection of Human Rights (1999) for a critical 
analysis of this. 
" See Sachedina, A., "Review of Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward and Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human 
Rights and Internatipnal Law" (1993) 25 International Journal of Middle East Studies, p. 155-157. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Nature and Evolution of Islamic Law 
This chapter examines the nature and evolution of Islamic law to serve as background 
for the later arguments of this thesis in respect of Islamic law. A distinction is made between 
the sources and the methods of the law and the overall objective of Islamic law is also 
examined at the end. 
Traditionally, Islamic law is not stricto senso monolithic. Its jurisprudence 
accommodates a pluralistic interpretation of its sources, which does produce differences in 
juristic opinions that can be quite significant in a comparative legal analysis. Afshari has 
argued that "(w)hen reference is made to "Islamic law", a host of diverse positions... comes 
into the picture". ' The complexity of Islamic law does not however make it indeterminable. 
The differences of the jurists and schools of Islamic jurisprudence represent "different 
manifestations of the same divine will" and are considered as "a diversity within unity". 
2 It 
depicts recognition of the inescapable pluralism that exists within human society. Islam, as 
observed by Breiner, "refuses the temptation to find unity only in uniformity, even in matters 
of law". 3 The appreciation of differences, Breiner further observed, is an "important principle 
of Islamic law, one quite different from the assumptions of Roman law inherited throughout 
most of Europe". 4 There is in fact an Islamic jurisprudential maxim that says: "The blessing 
of the (Muslim) community lies in the jurists' differences of opinion". 5 Law is ultimately the 
product of its sources and methods, and Islamic law is not an exception to that fact. It is 
Afshari, R., "An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human Rights", (1994) 16 Human Rights 
Quarterly, p. 235 at 271; See also Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, Islam and Justice (1997) p. 18 where another law 
Professor had expressed that when people talk about SharI'ah or Islamic law he really does not know what is meant. 
2 See Karnali, H. M., Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, (1991) p. 169. 
3 Breiner, B. "A Christian View of Human Rights in Islam" in Breiner, B. (ed. ) Two Papers on Shari'ah (1992) p. 3. 
4 ibid. 
S The maxim says: "Rahmah al-Ummah fi Ikhtildf al-A'immah ". This indicates that the jurists' differences of opinion in the 
interpretation of legal sources on certain matters offer a broad and equally legal scope from which the community may 
choose the most compassionate and beneficial interpretation for themselves. It was on the basis of this that the Islamic legal 
principle of "takhayyur" (eclectic choice) was evolved, which allows for unification or movement within the different 
schools of jurisprudence. A 15`h Century Islamic jurist, Abü Abdullah al-Dimashgi, wrote a jurisprudential book titled 
"Rahmah al-Ummah fi Ikhtiläfal-A'fmmah" in which he listed the legal consensus and dissension of the classical Islamic 
jurists. Republished by Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, Beirut, Lebanon (1995). 
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important therefore to distinguish between Shari `ah as the source from which the law is 
derived and Fiqh as the method by which the law is derived and applied. 6 
THE NATURE OF ISLAMIC LAW 7 
There is a general traditional misconception about Islamic law being wholly divine and 
immutable. This arises from the usual non-distinction between the sources and interpretation 
of Islamic law. Distinguishing between Shari'ah and Fiqh is very significant for a proper 
understanding of Islamic law. Although either of the terms is often referred to as Islamic law, 
they are not technically synonymous. Literally Shari'ah means "path to be followed" or 
"right path"8 while Fiqh means "understanding. "9 The former refers more to the sources 
while the latter refers more to the methods of, Islamic law. In the strict legal sense Shari'ah 
refers to the corpus of the revealed law as contained in the Qur'an and in the authentic 
Traditions (Sunnah) of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). 10 It differs in this sense from Fiqh 
because it (Sharä'ah) refers here to the primary sources of the law, which is textually 
immutable. Fiqh on the other hand refers to methods of the law, i. e. the understanding 
derived from the Shari'ah, which may change according to time and circumstances. " The 
significance of this distinction with respect to the arguments of this thesis are: 
(i) Sharl'ah as a source of Islamic law is divine in nature and thus immutable, while 
Fiqh, as the understanding, interpretation and application of the Shari 'ah, is a 
human product that may change according to time and circumstances; and 
(ii) Shari'ah broadly covers the moral, legal, social, and spiritual aspects of the 
Muslims' life, while Fiqh mostly covers the legal or juridical aspect of the 
Shari'ah as distinguished from the moral. 12 
6 See e. g. Karnali, M. H., "Law and Society: The Interplay of Revelation and Reason in the Shariah" in Esposito, J. L., The 
Oxford History of Islam (1999) p. 107. 7 See generally e. g. Karnali, M. H., Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, (1991); Hallaq, W. B., A History of Islamic Legal 
Theories, (1997); Qadri, A. A., Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World (1986); Ramadan, S., Islamic Law: Its Scope and 
Equity, (1970); Philips, A. A. B., The Evolution ofFigh (1988) for English language expositions on the nature of Islamic 
law. 
8 See e. g. Doi, A. R., Shari'ah: The Islamic Law (1984) p. 2. 9 In Q45: 18 the word Shar? 'ah is used as "straight path" or "right way" 
- 
"Then We put you on a right way (Shari'ah) of the 
affairs, so follow it... " and the Prophet Muhammad used Fiqh in one of his sayings to mean "understanding"- "To 
whomsoever God wishes good, He gives the understanding (fiqh) of the faith ". Fiqh is also used in the Qur'an to mean 
understanding. See e. g. Q 9: 87. See also Qadri, A. A., (1986) supra, note 7 above, p. 15-17. 
10 The abbreviation PBUH which means 'Peace be Upon Him', will not be repeated in writing after this first occurrence but 
shall be implied as repeated after every occurrence of the Prophet's name hereinafter. 
11 See e. g. Ramadan, S., (1970) supra, note 7 above, p. 36 and Philips A. A. B., (1988) supra, note 7 above, pp. 1-4. 12 Note however as pointed out by Professor Karnali that "There is often... a relationship between strict compliance to a legal 
duty and the Islamic concept of moral excellence". See Karnali, M. H., Freedom of Expression in Islam, (Revised Ed. 1997) 
p. 27; and Karnali, M. H., (1999) supra, note 6 above, p. 107 at109. 
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Islamic law thus consists of two component parts: (i) immutable divine revelation 
termed Shari `ah and (ii) human interpretation of the Sharä `ah termed Fiqh. 'Abd al 'At! has 
correctly observed that "confusion arises when the term sharI `ah is used uncritically to 
designate not only the divine law in its pure principal form, but also its human subsidiary 
sciences including figh". 13 We will now examine the characteristics of these two component 
parts of Islamic law. 
SOURCES OF ISLAMIC LAW 14 
Shari `ah 
The Qur'an and the Sunnah are the formal sources of Islamic law. They contain the 
corpus of the revealed law. The Qur'an is the principal source and is believed by Muslims to 
be the exact words of God revealed to Prophet Muhammad over a period of approximately 
23 years for the guidance of humanity. 15 It is not strictly a legal or constitutional code. It 
more specifically addresses itself as a book of guidance16. Out of its approximately 6666 
verses, which cover both the spiritual and temporal aspects of life, Muslim jurists estimate 
between 350 to 500 verses as containing legal elements, " and according to Coulson: "No 
more than approximately eighty verses deal with legal topics in the strict sense of the 
term". 18 This conceivably anticipates the application of some juridical principles to extend 
the few strictly legal verses to cover the dynamic and expansive nature of human life. Those 
verses that may be viewed largely as moral rules also constitute basis for every Islamic legal 
principle. 19 
The words of the Qur'an are, to Muslims, immutable and from it "springs the very 
conception of legality"20 in Islam. The Qur'an forms the foundation or the basic norm of 
Islamic law, the grundnorm, as Kelsen will call it in his pure theory of law, or the "ultimate 
13 `Abd al At!, H., The Family Structure in Islam (1977) p. 14. 
14 The approach adopted here deviates from the traditional classification of the Qur'an, Sunnah, Ijmä' and Qiyäs as main 
sources of Islamic law, a classification which Ramadan has rightly observed, "is by no means a decisive or authoritative 
one". See Ramadan (1970) supra, note 7 above, p. 33. The approach here distinguishes the sources of the law (i. e. Qur'an 
and Sunnah) from the methods of the law (i. e. Ijmä' Qiyäs, Ijtihdd, e. t. c) to avoid the confusion of the traditional 
misconception of the whole of Islamic law as being divine and immutable. 
15 See e. g. Q26: 192 which says: "Verily this is a Revelation from the Lord of the Worlds" and Q45: 2 which says: "The 
revelation of The Book is from God, The Exalted in Power, Full of Wisdom ". 
16 See e. g. Q2: 2 which says: "This is the Book; In it is guidance sure, without doubt, to those who fear God 
" See Karnali, M. H. (1991) supra, note 7 above p. 19-20 and p. 41 n. 19. 8 Coulson, N. J., A History of Islamic Law (1964) p. 12. 
19 Although law and morals are not fully merged in Islamic law, they are also not strictly separated as understood in the 
theory of positivism in Western legal philosophy. See Karnali, M. H., (1997) supra, note 12 above, p. 27. 20 See Ramadan, S., (1970) supra, note 7 above, pp. 42-43. 
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rule of recognition" in Hart's concept of law. 21 This explains, as observed by Mayer, why 
"many works on the topic of Islam and human rights are burdened with long quotations 
from" especially the Qur'an. 22 While legal texts are very significant in every legal system, 
their interpretation is what actually constitutes law at every point in time. The text of the 
Qur'an is divine, but its application has been through human interpretation since revelation. 
The Prophet Muhammad being the receiver of its revelation, was obviously in the best 
position to interpret the Qur'an during his lifetime, and he did so in his dual role as a Prophet 
and a judge. His elucidation of some verses of the Qur'an formed the initial basis of what 
came to be known as his Sunnah or Traditions. 
The Sunnah as a source of law consists of the Prophet's lifetime sayings, deeds and tacit 
approvals on different issues, both spiritual and temporal. The Sunnah developed from the 
need for elucidation, by the Prophet, of some Qur'anic verses, supply of details to some 
general provisions of the Qur'an and instructions on some other aspects of life not expressly 
covered by Qur'anic texts. Thus Imam al-Shäfi`i, the eponym of the Shäfi'i school of Islamic 
jurisprudence23 had stated that: 
"the Sunnah of the Prophet is of three types: first is the Sunnah which prescribes the 
like of what God has revealed in His Book; next is the Sunnah which explains the 
general principles of the Qur'an and clarifies the will of God; and last is the Sunnah 
where the Messenger of God has ruled on matters on which nothing can be found in 
s24 the Book of God. 
The role of the Sunnah as a source of law is supported in the Qur'an itself. 25 The Qur'an 
and the Sunnah thus formed the only sources of law from the Prophet's lifetime. Ramadan 
has therefore observed that "the structure of Islamic Law - the Shari'ah - was completed 
during the lifetime of the Prophet, in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. "26 An illustrative evidence 
of the Qur'an and Sunnah being sources of Islamic law from the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad is the well known Tradition in which the Prophet was reported to have asked one 
of his companions named Mu'ädh ibn. Jabal, when he deployed the latter as a judge to 
Yemen, as to what would be his source of law in deciding cases. Mu'adh replied: "I will 
21 See Kelsen, H., Pure Theory of Law (1967) and Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law, (2nd Ed. 1994). As illustrated by 
Nyazee, the basic Islamic attitude to law is: "I am ready to obey such and such law as it has been communicated to me by a 
qualified jurist. I follow the opinion of the jurist as it is in conformity with the sources of Islamic law. I obey a law based on 
the sources as they are the sources revealed to Muhammad. I obey Muhammad for he is a Messenger of (God) and I believe 
in (God). " See Nyazee, I. A. K., Theories of Islamic Law (n. d. ) 38. 
22 See Mayer, A. E., "Current Muslim Thinking on Human Rights" in An-Na'im, A. A. and Deng, F. M., (eds. ) Human Rights 
In Africa: Cultural Perspectives (1990), p. 133 at 134-135. 
23 The development of the Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence are explained below. See p. 29 below. 
24 Shäfi`i, M., al-Risälah (1983) pp. 52-53 English translation cited in Kamali, H. M., (1991) supra, note 7 above, p. 63. 
25 See e. g. Q3: 31 and Q33: 21. 
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judge with what is in the book of God (Qur'an)". The Prophet then asked "And if you do not 
find a clue in the book of God? ", Mu'ädh answered: "Then with the Sunnah of the 
Messenger of God". The Prophet asked again: "And if you do not find a clue in that? ", 
Mu'ädh replied: "I will exercise my own legal reasoning. "27 The Prophet was reported as 
being perfectly satisfied with these answers by Mu'ädh, which signified an approval by the 
Prophet. The general rule on the application of the Qur'an and Sunnah as main sources of 
Islamic law is that in case of any irresolvable conflict between a verse of the Qur'an and a 
reported Sunnah, the former prevails, because of its indubitable authenticity in Islamic law. 28 
While Muslims believe generally that the Sunnah also has elements of divine 
inspiration, they appreciate that not every reported Sunnah is authentic. The political 
differences between the fourth Caliph, Ali and Mu'äwiyah in the middle of the first century 
of Islam, which led to the emergence of factions among the Muslims, led to the emergence of 
fabricated statements and distorted interpretations attributed to the Prophet. 29 A conscientious 
and critical technique of authenticating the Sunnah was thus developed which eventually 
culminated in the emergence of the six recognised and authentic books of Sunnah of the 
Sunni school in the third century of Islam. 30 In applying a Sunnah the two main questions 
that need be answered are whether the Sunnah is authentic and if so whether it is obligatory. 
The first question is basically a question of fact that is usually considered on the basis of the 
evidence adduced to support it in accordance with laid down criteria for the verification of 
Prophetic Traditions. The second question is a question of law depending, inter alia, on the 
context and language of the Tradition. 
METHODS OF ISLAMIC LAW 
Fiqh 
The passage of time and the expansion of Islam after the demise of the Prophet brought 
many new cases that were not directly covered by the Qur'anic texts or the Prophetic 
26 Ramadan, S., (1970) supra, note 7 above, p. 36. 
27 See e. g. Abü Däwiid, Sunan Abü Ddwdd, Trans. A. Hasan, (1984), Vol. p. 1019, Hadith No. 3585. Mu'ädh is reported 
in this Tradition to have used the words "ajtahidu rd'iy" meaning "I will exert my own reasoning". The noun "Utihdd " 
meaning exertion was later adopted to indicate "legal reasoning" as a legal method of Islamic law. 
28 See Kamali, M. H., (1991) supra, note 7 above, p. 59. 
29 ibid. pp. 65-68. 
30 The six authentic Sunni books of the collections of the Prophets Traditions are those by al-Bukhäri (d. 870AD), Muslim 
(d. 875AD), Abü Däwüd (d. 888AD), al-Tirmidhi (d. 892AD), al-Nasä'i (d. 915AD) and Ibn Mäjah (d. 886AD). Muslims are 
divided into the two main groups of Sunni and ShI'ah. The Sunni are the majority while the Shf'ah constitute about 10% of 
the world Muslim population. The ShI'ah group developed from a schism among the Muslims during the Caliphate of Ali. 
The Sh1'ah also have their own different collections of the Prophet's Traditions apart from the six Sunni books mentioned 
above. 
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Traditions. On the authority, inter alia, of the Tradition of Mu'ädh ibn. Jabal quoted above, 
the concept of Utihäd (legal reasoning) was developed as a method of Islamic law and from it 
emerged the legal methods of Ijmä' (juristic consensus) and Qiyäs (legal analogy) as well as 
legal doctrines such as Istihsdn (juristic preference), Istisläh or Maslahah (public interest or 
welfare), `Urf (Custom), Darürah (Necessity) e. t. c., through which the formal sources could 
be extended to cover new developments of life. These methods, which are usually considered 
as secondary sources of Islamic law, were products of human reasoning, an indication of the 
recognition of human reasoning in the Islamic legal process from the earliest period of Islam. 
The methods were applied to new cases not expressly covered by Qur'anic texts or the 
Sunnah, and also facilitated the adequate interpretation and application of the sources to suit 
the different circumstances of human life. Thus while the revealed sources of Islamic law 
(i. e. Shari `ah) was completed with the demise of the Prophet, the evolved methods of Islamic 
law were to be the vehicle by which the jurists would transport the Shari `ah into the future. 
In the words of Qadri, "the jurists are emphatic in saying that though God has given us a 
revelation He also gave us brains to understand it; and He did not intend to be understood 
without careful and prolonged study. "31 The careful and prolonged study helps to prevent 
misapplication of the methods. 
With the expansion of Islam and its establishment within different cultures outside 
Arabia, about 500 schools of legal reasoning developed in the early years but most of them 
disappeared and others merged by the beginning of the third century of Islam. Four Sunni 32 
schools of jurisprudence survived up to the present times. They are the Hanafi School 
(prevails in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya), 
the Mäliki School (prevails in North Africa, West Africa and Kuwait), the Shdfi'1 School 
(prevails in Southern Egypt, Southern Arabia, East Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia) and the 
Hanball School (prevails in Saudi Arabia and Qatar). Other schools of jurisprudence also 
emerged from within the Shi'ah. The major ones being the Ithnä `Ashari (prevails in Iran and 
Sorthern Iraq), the Zaydi (followed in Yemen), the Ismä'ill (followed in India) and the Ibddi 
(followed in Oman and parts of North Africa). 33 
All the schools of Islamic jurisprudence generally recognise the Qur'an and Sunnah as 
31 Qadri, A. A., (1986) supra, note 7 above, p. 199. 
32 See note 30 above. 
33 See e. g. Makdisi, G., The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (1981) p. 2; and Karnali, M. H. 
(1999) supra, note 6 above. pp. 112-114. Note also that there were other schools of rational theology that were not strictly 
jurisprudential schools, but their arguments and views sometimes influenced and were reflected in the jurisprudence of the 
jurists. Some of the schools of rational theology were the Ash'arl, Mu'tazilah and Mäturidi schools which will be referred 
to below. See Chapter 4, pp. 44-46s below. 
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the primary sources of Islamic law. The differences of opinion on particular matters result 
from their different interpretations of some Qur'anic verses and Prophetic Traditions. The 
different views of jurists on certain matters reflected their sensitivity to the different cultures 
of the different provinces within which the different schools flourished. 34 To control the 
divergence of interpretations of the sources, the jurisprudence of these schools on both the 
aspects of worship (ibädät) and inter-human relations (mu'ämalät) compiled in form of legal 
treatises became the material sources of Islamic law. By the tenth century it was thought that 
the established schools of jurisprudence had fully exhausted all the possible questions of law 
and that the necessary material sources of Islamic law was fully formed. The utilisation of 
the doctrine of independent legal reasoning (ijtihäd) consequently diminished and this led, by 
the thirteenth century, to what was termed as "closing the gate of legal reasoning (ijtihäd) 
and opening that of legal conformism (taglid)". Islamic law thus became restricted largely to 
the application of the legal findings of the jurists as recorded in the treatises of the 
established schools of jurisprudence dating back to the 10`h Century. 35 Muslims thus became 
restricted to conform to or follow the rulings of any one of the schools of jurisprudence but 
not generally allowed to exercise independent legal reasoning on any matter. This brought a 
halt to the dynamism that had been injected into Islamic law from its inception, and that, in 
the words of Iqbal, "reduced the Law of Islam practically to a state of immobility". 36 
Although many contemporary scholars have challenged the notion of the closing of the gate 
of ijtihäd, 37 the legal conformism (taglld) of following the rulings of the jurists of the very 
early period of Islam continues to this day. The jurisprudence (flqh) of the established 
schools found in their treatises dating from the 10`h Century are today held as the corpus of 
Islamic law and erroneously portrayed as the immutable Shari'ah. In respect to that Ramadan 
has rightly observed that: 
"the invariable basic rules of Islamic Law are only those prescribed in the Shari `ah 
(Qur'an and Sunnah), which are few and limited. Whereas all juridical works during 
more than thirteen centuries are very rich and indispensable, they must always be 
subordinated to the Shari `ah and open to reconsideration... "" 
34See generally Daura, A., "A Brief Account of the Development of the Four Sunni Schools of Law and Some Recent 
Developments" (1968) 2 Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law, 1. 
's See e. g. Karnali, M. H. "Law and Society" supra, note 6 above, at p. 114-115. 
36Igbal, M., The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (1951) p. 148. 
37 See e. g. Hallaq, W., "Was the Gate of Ijtihäd Closed? " in Hallaq, W., (ed. ) Law and Legal Theory in Classical and 
Medieval Islam (1995) pp. 3-41. 38 Ramadan, S., (1970) supra, note 7 above, p. 36. 
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SPIRITUAL AND TEMPORAL ASPECTS OF ISLAMIC LAW 
As already observed above, the provisions of the Shari `ah broadly covers all aspect of 
human life. But through the methods of Islamic law the jurists have categorised Islamic law 
into two broad spheres. The first sphere embodies spiritual laws regulating religious 
observance and acts of worship. This is generally referred to as ibädät and concerns the 
direct relationship between an individual and God. The second sphere embodies temporal 
laws regulating inter-human relations and the temporal affairs of this world. This is generally 
referred to as mu `ämalät and generally promotes the realisation of the common good 
(ma ` riJ) of humanity. While the jurisprudence on the spiritual aspects is considered to be 
fully settled and unchanging, the same is not true of the temporal aspects. It is in the sphere 
of temporal laws that the arrest in the dynamism of Islamic jurisprudence is greatly felt. The 
traditional jurisprudence (fiqh) of the established schools on many aspects of inter-human 
relations have been overtaken by the dynamic nature of human life and thus created a wide 
lacuna in Islamic legal and political judgement. 
The need to rejuvenate the methods of Islamic law to generate a more encompassing and 
realistic jurisprudence to meet contemporary challenges became evident from the nineteenth 
century with the intimate interaction between the East and the West. That urge continues 
today. The advancements and developments of modem life have affected inter-human 
relations in many ways which Islamic law needs to address from contemporary perspectives. 
The emergence of international human rights law is one such development. Due to the 
erroneous impression that the traditional opinions of the established schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence were immutable, Muslims were hesitant in formally accepting the need for a 
re-appraisal in the methods of Islamic law. Islamic legal scholarship aiming at a formal, 
adequate and cohesive re-appraisal of the methodology of Islamic law in the light of 
contemporary challenges has been going on since the last century with general contributions 
from many Muslim thinkers and intellectuals. 39 Nevertheless, the stagnation of the thirteenth 
century continues to eclipse the great legacy of the earliest Islamic jurists that developed 
Islamic law into a most dynamic legal system from which even the West was a borrower in 
the middle ages 40 
"See Karnali, M. H., "Law and Society" supra, note 6 above, at p. 116-118. 
40 See e. g. Makdisi, G., (1981) supra, note 33 above, pp. 290-91. 
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THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF ISLAMIC LAW 
Today, Islamic law continues to be formally applied in most parts of the Muslim world 
as we had it interpreted by the classical Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence with regards 
to the Sunni Muslims and the classical Shi'ah schools with regards to Shi'ah Muslims. A 
static and immoderate application of those traditional interpretations of the Shari `ah can 
however constrain the scope of Islamic law for present times. Research shows that the 
earliest Islamic jurists had utilised the methods of Islamic law within the scope of the 
Shari `ah in an evolutionary and constructive manner that prevented any unwarranted 
circumscription upon human living during their times. Such evolutionary and constructive 
application is more relevant today than before. Cognisance of the object and purpose of the 
Shari `ah (magäsid al-shari'ah), which has been identified as promotion of welfare and 
prevention of harm (maslahah) 
'41 also ensures realisation of the proper and benevolent scope 
of Islamic law. 
In his analysis of the scope and equity of Islamic law, Ramadan has identified six 
important characteristics of Islamic law deductible from a thorough study of the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah and the works of some classical Islamic jurists. They are as follows: 
1. The formal sources of Islamic law, i. e. Qur'an and Sunnah "are basically inclined 
towards establishing general rules without indulging in much detail". This makes 
room for a wider application of the legal sources through the legal methods for 
the best benefit of humanity. 
2. Qur'anic "texts were directly meant to deal with actual events (and) 
Presupposition was basically excluded from" the legislative philosophy of 
Islamic law. This characteristic, Ramadan observes, is a method of realism which 
"is apt to minimize the definite limitations imposed on human dealings", which 
in essence makes things easier for humanity. 
3. "As a rule, everything that is not prohibited is permissible. " In explaining this 
rule Ramadan rightly observed that: "Islamic Law was not meant to paralyze 
people so that they might not move unless allowed to. Man on the contrary, is 
repeatedly called upon by the Qur'an to consider the whole universe as a Divine 
grace meant for him, and to exhaust all his means of wisdom and energy to get 
the best out of it. " 
4. "Even in the field of prohibition, the Qur'an sometimes used a method which 
could gradually meet a growing readiness in the society where the revealed 
enjoinments were to be implemented. " This is the so-called principle of 
gradualism (tadrý) by which legislation was gradually upgraded in view of 
societal circumstances. Thus social circumstances are not overlooked in the 
development of the law. 
41 See e. g. al-Shätibi, A. I., al-Muwäfagät (Arabic) (1997), Vol. 2; and Masud, M. K., Shatibi's Philosophy of Islamic law (1995) p. 151. 
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5. "All that the Qur'an and the Sunnah have prohibited becomes permissible 
whenever a pressing necessity arises". This is based on the doctrine of necessity 
(darürah) by which all Islamic jurists generally agree that "necessity renders the 
prohibited permissible". 
6. "The door is wide-open to the adoption of anything of utility, of whatever origin, 
so long as it does not go against the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah" 42 
Apart from the many Qur'anic verses and Prophetic Traditions cited in support of the 
above characteristics of Islamic law, the following Qur'anic verse succinctly summarises the 
benevolent nature of Islamic law. 
"... For he commands them what is just and forbids them what is evil; he allows them 
as lawful what is good and prohibits them from what is bad. He releases them from 
their heavy burdens and from the yokes that are upon them" 43 
Thus the overall objective and purpose of the Shari'ah, which must always be kept in 
mind in both its interpretation and application, is the promotion of welfare and prevention of 
harm. 
PROMOTION OF WELFARE AND PREVENTION OF HARM (MASLAHAH) 
Among the many doctrines and principles established by the founding jurists for an 
intelligible application of Islamic law, maslahah is considered as the most viable means of 
bringing the ideals of Islam closer to realisation for all time. Kamali has observed that: 
"The doctrine of maslahah is broad enough to encompass within its fold a variety of 
objectives, both idealist and pragmatic, to nurture the standards of good government, 
and to help develop the much needed public confidence in the authority of statutory 
legislation in Muslim societies. The doctrine of maslahah can strike balance between 
the highly idealistic levels of expectation from the government on the part of the 
public and the efforts of the latter to identify more meaningfully with Islam". ' 
The doctrine was originally introduced by Imam Malik, the eponym of the Mäliki school 
of Islamic jurisprudence, and later developed by jurists such as al-Gazäli and al-Tüfi of the 
Shäfi `i and Hanball schools respectively. The fourteenth century Maliki jurist, Abü Ishäq al- 
Shätibi further developed the concept as a "basis of rationality and extendibility of Islamic 
law to changing circumstances (and also) as a fundamental principle for the universality and 
42 See Ramadan, S., (1970) supra, note 7 above, pp. 64-73. See also a]-Shdtibl, A. I., (1997) ibid.; and Ibn al-Qayyim, I'läm 
al-Muwaqqi in An Rabb al- Alamin (Arabic (1996)Vol. 1 pp. 71-72. 43 Q7: 157. 
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certainty of Islamic law". 45 It is an expedient doctrine of Islamic law acknowledged today by 
Islamic legalists as containing "the seeds of the future of the Shari `ah and its viability as a 
living force in society. "46 Against the background of the nature and evolution of Islamic law 
established above, the doctrine of maslahah is thus advocated in this thesis as a veritable 
Islamic legal principle for the realisation of international human rights within the 
dispensation of Islamic law. 47 We will rely on the doctrine within the ample scope of the 
Shari `ah in deriving legal benefits and averting hardship to the human person, as endorsed by 
the Quranic verse that: "He (God) has not imposed any hardships upon you (humans) in 
religion". 48 
°° Karnali, M. H., "Have We Neglected the Shari'ah-Law Doctrine of Maslahah? " (1988) 27 Islamic Studies, No. 4, p. 287- 
288. 
45 See Masud, M. K., (1995) supra, note 41 above, p. viii. 
46 Kamali, M. H., (1988) supra, note 44 above, at p. 288. 
47 For further elaboration on the principle of Maslahah See e. g. Karnali. M. H., (1991) supra, note 7 above pp. 267-282; and 
al-Shätibi, A. I., (1997) supra, note 41 above; Masud, M. K., (1995) supra, note 41 above, pp. 127-164. 49 Q22: 78. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Idea of Human Rights within Islamic Law 
Against the background established in the last two chapters, this chapter will, in 
pursuance of the first proposition of this thesis, examine whether the concept of human rights 
can be established from within the themes of Islamic law. The chapter will examine and 
respond to traditional arguments on the subject and research into the sources, methods and 
jurisprudence of Islamic law to identify the concept of human rights in relation to the concept 
under international human rights law. 
BREAKING TRADITIONAL BARRIERS 
Traditionally, a number of difficulties confront the discourse of international human 
rights from an Islamic legal perspective. On one hand is the domineering influence of the 
Western perspective of human rights, which creates a tendency of always using Western 
values as a yardstick in every human rights discourse. It is often argued that human rights 
principles are "principles that were developed in Western culture", thus Western norms 
should always be the universal normative model for the content of international human 
rights. ' There however continues to be opposing arguments against that assertion. 2 While it is 
true that the impetus for the formulation of international human rights standards originated 
from the West, the same cannot be said of the whole concept of human rights, which is 
perceivable within different human civilisations. 3 Related to that is the negative image of 
Islam in the West. Often, some of the punishments prescribed in Islamic law and the political 
cum human rights situation in many parts of the Muslim world today are, inter alia, cited by 
Western analysts as evidence of Islamic brutality and lack of provision or respect for human 
1 See e. g. Mayer, A. E., "Current Muslim Thinking on Human Rights" in An-Na'im, A. A. and Deng, F. M., (eds. ) Human 
Rights In Africa, Cultural Perspectives (1990) p. 131 at 147-8. 
2 See e. g. Said, M. E., "Islam and Human Rights" (1997) Rowaq Arabi, January ed. p. 11 at 13; Manglapus, R., "Human 
Rights are not a Western Discovery" (1978) 4 Worldview, pp. 4-6; and Kushalani, Y., "Human Rights in Asia and Africa" 
(1983) 4 Human Rights Law Journal, No. 4, p. 404. 
See e. g. Kushalani, Y., (1983) ibid.; and Smith, J., (ed. ) Human Rights: Chinese and Dutch Perspectives (1996) for 
discussions on different perceptions of the concept of human rights. 
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rights in Islamic law. 4 This has created what has been termed "Islamophobias5 in the West, 
which adversely affects the view about human rights in Islam generally. In the academic 
realm there is also what Strawson calls the "orientalist problematique" by which "Islamic 
law is represented within Anglo-American scholarship as an essentially defective legal 
67 systems, especially with regards to international law. 
On the other hand, is the obstacle of static hard-line interpretations of the Shari ah and 
non-relative application of traditional Islamic jurisprudence on some aspects of inter-human 
relations. Islamic law or Shari `ah are both sometimes vaguely advanced by some Muslim 
countries as excuse for their poor human rights records without any elaboration on the 
precise position of Islamic law on the matter. 
Due to the above difficulties, the concept of human rights under Islamic law has often 
been discussed from either a reproachful or a defensive angle, depending on the leanings of 
the discussant. Piscatori has frowned at the defensive approach of most Muslim writers in the 
international human rights discourse. 8 We need to determine however, whether the 
defensiveness is merely an apology in the face of genuine challenges posed by international 
human rights to Islamic law, or are genuine defences against criticisms of Islamic law for 
human rights situations in Muslim countries not necessarily justifiable even under the 
Shari `ah. On one hand, it is undeniable that Western initiatives and modern challenges, 
which include the international human rights regime, have forced contemporary Muslim 
thinkers and intellectuals to strongly propose a review of some traditional Islamic 
jurisprudential views, especially in the area of international law and relations. 9 On the other 
hand, there have also been general erroneous reproaches against Islamic law for the 
4 See Bannerman, P., Islam in Perspective, A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law. (1988) p. 25. See also Robertson, 
B. A., "Islam and Europe: An Enigma or a Myth? " (1994) 48 Middle East Journal, No. 2, pp. 288-307. 
5 See e. g. Tash, A. Q., "Islamophobia in the West" (1996) Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November/December 
ed. p. 28; and "Islamophobia" in BULLETIN, University of Sussex Newsletter, 7th November, 1997,16. Available Online: 
httR: //www. sussex. ac. uk/press office/bulletin/07nov97/iteml2. html [12/03/2001]. 
6 See generally Strawson, J., "Encountering Islamic Law", University of East London Law Department Research 
Publications Series, No. 1., p. 1. 
7 Strawson for instance refers to Schacht's very well known work, Introduction to Islamic Law, which omits the discussion 
of Islamic international law because of what the learned professor described as "its essentially theoretical and fictitious 
character and the intimate connection of the relevant institutions with the history of Islamic states... " (See Schacht, J., 
Introduction to Islamic Law (1964) p. 112). It is difficult to imagine how international law can stand without an "intimate 
connection of the relevant institutions" of the State. As to the excuse of "its essentially theoretical and fictitious character", 
this was in 1964 when, even in western discourses, public international law had its own cynics as to whether it was really 
law or not, but this never ostracised public international law from the law books. Such approaches to Islamic law were some 
of the barriers, inter alia, which shut out Islamic law from contemporary international law discourses. See also generally 
Said, E. W., Orientalism, Western Conceptions ofthe Orient (1978). 
8 See Piscatori, J. P., "Human Rights in Islamic Political Culture" in Thompson, K, (ed. ) The Moral Imperatives of Human 
Rights: A World Survey (1980) p. 139 at 152-162; See also Manzoor, P., "Humanity Rights as Human Duties" Inquiry, July 
1987, p. 34 at 37-38. 
9 See e. g. AbuSulayman, A. A., Towards an Islamic Theory of international Relations: New Directions for Islamic 
Methodology and Thought (1993). 
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sometimes appalling attitudes or actions of some governments in Muslim countries that are 
not justifiable under the Shari `ah. At the end of a Seminar on Human Rights in Islam held in 
Kuwait in 1980, jointly organised by the International Commission of Jurists, the University 
of Kuwait and the Union of Arab Lawyers, the conclusion, inter alia, was that: 
"It is unfair to judge Islamic law (Shari'a) by the political systems which prevailed in 
various periods of Islamic history. It ought to be judged by the general principles 
which are derived from its sources... Regrettably enough, contemporary Islamic 
practices cannot be said to conform in many aspects with the true principles of Islam. 
Further, it is wrong to abuse Islam by seeking to justify certain political systems in 
the face of obvious contradictions between those systems and Islamic law. "° 
While the theoretic arguments concerning the conceptual foundations of human rights 
may be difficult to settle, the indisputable fact is that international human rights is today not a 
prerogative of a single nation. It is a universal affair that concerns the dignity and well being 
of every human being. However, as earlier analysed in Chapter two, there is yet to emerge 
what we may call a "universal universalism" in international human rights. 
" What exists 
now has been described as "provincialism masquerading as universalism". 
12 While the 
flagrant abuse of human rights in Muslim States under the pretext of cultural differences is 
unacceptable, the role and influence of the Muslim world in achieving a peaceful co- 
existence within the international community does permit Muslim States to question a 
universalism "within which Islamic law (generally) has no normative value and enjoys little 
prestige". 13 An exception to the general non-consideration of Islamic law principles and 
values in the development of international human rights law is found only in the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) adopted in 1989. Article 20(3) of the CRC makes a specific 
reference to the principle of "kafalah of Islamic law". Apart from Somalia and Palestine, all 
Muslim States have ratified the CRC. 14 Since human rights are best achieved through the 
domestic law of States, recognition of relevant Islamic law principles in that regard will 
enhance the realisation of international human rights objectives in Muslim States that apply 
Islamic law fully or partly as State law. 
As will be shown, there is need for the Muslim world to also acknowledge change as a 
necessary ingredient in law. The adaptability of the Shari 'ah must be positively utilised to 
10 See International Commission of Jurisits, Human Rights in Islam: Report of a Seminar held in Kuwait in December 1980 
(1982) p. 7. 
See p. 15 above. 
12 See Strawson, J., supra, note 6 above, p. 2 and also Mutua, M., "The Ideology of Human Rights" (1996) Virginia Journal 
of International Law, p. 589, at 592-3. 
13 See Mayer, A. E., Islam and Human Rights, Tradition and Politics, (3`d Ed. 1999) p. 41. 
14 The CRC as at 1 March 2001 has 191 ratifications. See UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: 
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enhance human rights in the Muslim world. 15 While Muslims must be true to their heritage, 
the ideals of international human rights can shed new light on their interpretation of the 
Shari `ah, their international relations and self-awareness within legal limits of Islamic law. 
ISLAMIC RESPONSES IN THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 
Halliday has identified at least four classes of Islamic responses to the international 
human rights debate. The first is that Islam is compatible with international human rights. 
The second is that human rights can only be fully realised under Islamic law. The third is that 
the international human rights objective is an imperialist agenda that must be rejected, and 
the fourth is that Islam is incompatible with international human rights. 16 There is a fifth 
noteworthy response not mentioned by Halliday, which is that the international human rights 
objective has a hidden anti-religious agenda. 17 Viewed critically, most of these responses are 
Muslim reactions to what is often described as the double standards of countries at the helm 
of international human rights promotion. The responses reflect the entrapment of human 
rights between international politics and humanitarianism rather than actual disagreements on 
the concept of human rights in Islamic law. We will now evaluate these responses within the 
perimeters of Islamic law. 
The view that Islam is compatible with human rights is the most sustainable within the 
principles of Islamic law. This is not merely by vaguely or apologetically reading the western 
notion of human rights into Islamic principles. The sources and methods of Islamic law 
contain common principles of good government and human welfare that resonate with 
modern international human rights ideals. Respect for justice, protection of human life and 
dignity, are central principles inherent in the Shari `ah which no differences of opinion can 
exclude. They are the overall purpose of the Shari `ah, as will be shown below, to which the 
Qur'an refers that: 
"God commands justice, the doing of good, and liberality to kith and kin, and He 
forbids all shameful deeds, and injustice and rebellion: He instructs you, that you 
may receive admonition". 18 
http: //www. unhchr. ch/hti-nl/menu3/b/k2crc. htm [1/3/2001]. 
15 See Yamani, A. Z., "The Eternal Shari'a" (1979) 12 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, p. 205. 
16 Halliday, F., "Relativism and Universalism in Human Rights: The Case of the Islamic Middle East" in Beetham, D., (ed. ) 
Politics and Human Rights (1995) p. 152 atl54-55. 
17 See e. g. Mortimer, E., "Islam and Human Rights" Index on Censorship, October, 1983, No. 12, p. 5 (quoted the late leader 
of Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam Ayatollah Khomeini observe that: "What they call human rights is nothing but a 
collection of corrupt rules worked out by Zionists to destroy all true religions"). 
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The view that human rights can only be fully realised under Islamic law is exclusionist 
and will be culpable of the same egoism of the criticised exclusive Western perspective to 
human rights. Islam is not egocentric with respect to temporal matters but rather encourages 
co-operation (ta'äwun) for the attainment of the common good of humanity. 19 Islam 
encourages interaction and sharing of perception. A Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad 
advised Muslims to seek knowledge as far as in China, (a non-Muslim country) and in 
another Tradition he stated that wisdom is the lost property of a Muslim and is most entitled 
to it wherever it may be found. All these point towards the recognition by Islam of possible 
alternative and permissible routes to the betterment of humanity in temporal matters. 
AbuSulayman thus observed that: "(t)he Islamic call for social justice, human equality 
(equity), and submission to the divine will and directions of the Creator requires the deepest 
and sharpest sense of responsibility, as well as the total absence of human arrogance and 
egoism, both in internal and external communication. s20 
The view that the international human rights regime is an imperialist agenda is not 
peculiar to the Islamic discourse on human rights. It is common in the human rights 
discourses of all developing nations. 21 This results from the fear of neo-colonialism, and is a 
psychological effect of the past colonial experience of most developing nations under 
Western imperialism. That fear is sometimes strengthened by the Western nations' 
insistence on defining human rights only in the western perspective without consideration for 
the contribution and understanding of other cultures. 
If we understand international human rights strictly as a universal humanitarian 
objective for the protection of individuals against the misuse of State authority and for the 
enhancement of human dignity, then the view that Islam is incompatible with it is very 
unsustainable. That is because the protection and enhancement of the dignity of human 
beings has always been a principle of Islamic political and legal theory. While there may be 
some areas of conceptual differences between Islamic law and international human rights 
law, this does not make them incompatible. It is sometimes also argued that human beings 
have no rights in Islamic law but only to submit to God's commands. 22 This is also 
misleading. While it is true that human beings are to submit to God's commands, this does 
not mean that they have no inherent rights under Islamic law. The principle of legality is a 
18 Q 16: 90. 
19 See e. g. Q 5: 5 "... Co-operate with one another in good deeds and piety but not in sin and enmity ". 
20 AbuSulayman, A. A., (1993) supra, note 9 above, p. 54. (emphasis added). 
21 See e. g. Mutua, M. W., (1996) supra, note 12 above, pp. 589-657. 22 See e. g. Imam Khomeyni's view in that regard in Rajaee, E., Islamic Values and Worldview: Khomeyni on Man, the State 
and International Politics (1983) pp. 42-45. 
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fundamental principle of Islamic law whereby all actions are permitted except those clearly 
prohibited by the Shari `ah. 23 That means human beings have inherent rights to everything 
except for things specifically prohibited. To say that humans have no rights but only 
obligations to God expresses a principle of illegality, which makes life very restrictive and 
difficult. That will be inconsistent with the overall objective of the Shari `ah, which is the 
promotion of human well being as will be analysed later. 
Most Muslim proponents of the incompatibility view are really not opposed to the 
concept of human rights per se. Their position only reflects a disappointment with, and 
protest against Western hegemony and thus against any ideology considered as championed 
by Western nations. They often refer to "double standards" of the West and the general 
disparity in reactions to human rights abuses under "Islamic" and "non-Islamic" regimes as 
evidence of lack of sincerity in the international human rights regime. 24 For instance one 
Egyptian writer has been quoted as denouncing the UDHR in the following words: 
"I must admit that I am not a supporter of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights that the United Nations Organisation issued on December 10,1948. Our 
history of civilisation has taught us to be wary of big and noble words as the reality 
of our history has taught us how big words can be transformed into atrocious crimes. 
We cannot forget that the initiators of the Declaration of Human Rights and the plain 
French citizens are the same people who shortly afterwards, and before the ink of the 
Declaration had dried up, organised a campaign and sent their forces under the 
leadership of their favourite general, Napoleon, to Egypt. We must not forget either 
that the United Nations Organisation issued the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in the same year that it recognised the Zionist state that usurped Palestine and 
robbed its people of every right stipulated in the Declaration, including the right of 
life. s25 
Huntington has also drawn attention to this protestation by pointing out that: 
"Non-westerners.. 
. 
do not hesitate to point to the gaps between Western principle and 
Western action. Hypocrisy, double standards, and "but nots" are the price of 
universalist pretensions. Democracy is promoted but not if it brings Islamic 
fundamentalists to power; nonproliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq but not for 
Israel; 
... 
human rights are an issue with China but not with Saudi Arabia;... Double 
standards in practice are the unavoidable price of universal standards of principle. "" 
Finally, the view that the international human rights objective harbours a hidden anti- 
religious agenda also results from some suspicion among Muslims that, having separated the 
23 See Chapter 3, p. 32 above. 
24 In nearly all human rights communique or resolutions adopted at every Islamic conference, the question of Palestine 
always comes up as an issue of double standards in international relations and law. 
25 See Sayf al-Dawla, I., "Islam and Human Rights: Controversy and Agreement" (1988) 9 Minbar al-Hiwar pp. 33-39, cited 
in R. al-Sayyid, "Contemporary Muslim Thought and Human Rights", (1995) 21 Islamochristaina, p. 27 at 28. 
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Church from the State in the Western world, the West intends the same for the Muslim world 
and through the "crusade" of international human rights wants to discredit the Islamic faith 
with a new international ideology of humanism in its effort to totally remove religiosity from 
the world order. This, as it may seem, is not an opinion canvassed only be governments in 
Muslim States but even by some ordinary individual Muslims whom human rights are 
intended to protect. This indicates the need for continuous education and practical 
demonstration of sincerity and genuine commitment to the humanitarian ideals of 
international human rights. Bielefeldt has stressed in this regard that human rights "do not 
pretend to serve as a transhistoric yardstick, for measuring cultures and religions generally 
(and) 
... 
are not, and should not be presented as, an international `civil religion"' but be 
presented as shedding "new light on the self-perception of cultural and religious 
communities because, the principle of human dignity, which has roots in many cultures, 
"Z7 serve as the foundation for human rights. 
IS THERE A THEORY OF RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW? 
A common view in the discourse of rights in general and human rights in particular is 
that Islamic law is only a system of duties that does not recognise the idea of rights. 28 Kamali 
has described this view as a "persistent misunderstanding of Islamic law" on the subject of 
rights. 29 Although Islamic law emphasises the concept of duty, this does not seem to 
subsume or annihilate the concept of rights within the system. The existence of rights in 
Islamic law can be established logically, semantically and through its legal sources and 
methods respectively. 
Logically, the fact that Islamic law provides for legal remedies is a prima facie indicator 
of its recognition of the concept of rights. This is because legal remedies can be available 
only in a system that recognises not only the concept of duties but also the concept of rights 
and claims. Semantically too, Islamic law has a term for rights. The Arabic word for 
"right" is "haqq" and its plural is "huqüq ". 30 Literally, "haqq " means established fact, 
truth, justice, right, claim or reality. It also connotes duty when used with the Arabic 
26 Huntington, S. P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (1996), p. 184. 
27 See Bielefeldt, H., "Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate" (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly, 587 at 616. 
Z$ See e. g. Siegman, H., "The State and the Individual in Sunni Islam, " (1964) 54 The Muslim World, p. 14 at 23; Donnelly, 
J., Universal Human Rights In Theory and Practice (1989) p. 51. 
29 See Karnali, M. H., "Fundamental Rights of the Individual: An Analysis of Haqq (Rights) in Islamic Law" (1993) 10 
American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, No. 3, p. 340 at 341. The article is a detailed and scholarly analysis of rights in 
Islamic law from which the present researcher has benefited extensively. 
30 Arabic is the language of the primary sources of Islamic law. It is also the common language of the Middle East and 
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genitive "ald" (upon). 31 In that sense it is constructed either as "right upon" or "right 
against" (haqq `alä) to connote duty. Its juridical usage has followed its literal meaning 
since the earliest period of Islam and it has been used quite extensively in both the primary 
sources of Islamic law and the works of the earliest Islamic jurists. The sixteenth century 
Hanafi school jurist, Ibn Nujaym is perhaps the first to give a legal definition of the term 
"haqq". He defined it as "mä yastahigquhü al-insän" meaning "that to which a person is 
entitled". 32 Contemporary Islamic jurists even define "haqq" in broader terms. 33 While 
Yusuf Musa defined "haqq" as "an identifiable benefit" (maslahah thäbitah) conceded by the 
Legislator to the individual or to the community or to both"34 
, 
Shalabi defined it as "every 
benefit (kull maslahah) conformable to the Shari'ah"3s 
Nearly all the Islamic jurists tend to define right (haqq) with reference to "maslahah ". 36 
This refers to the ultimate goal of rights. In Islamic law, a right is not an end in itself. It is a 
means to an end, and that end is what the jurists have identified as "maslahah ". This term, 
which literally means welfare, benefit or interest, is mostly used to express the Islamic legal 
doctrine of public interest or public welfare when qualified as "maslahah mursalah ". 37 
Although "maslahah " as a legal doctrine is generally conceived as collective or communal 
welfare, the ultimate goal of rights in Islamic law is also maslahah in which sense it extends 
to the benefit of individuals to ensure individual well being. The jurists' definitions of haqq 
(right) support this submission. For instance Yusuf Musa's definition of right as maslahah, 
does not restrict the term to the concept of community but also mentions the individual. 
Shalabi's definition also mentions "every benefit" (kull maslahah), which will include that of 
the individual. Furthermore, the ultimate objective of rights does not actually end with the 
individual per se. The well being of the individual will consequently ensure the well being of 
the community and ultimately the realisation of public welfare and vice versa. This makes 
the doctrine of maslahah very relevant in the concept of human rights under Islamic law. 
Turning to the sources of Islamic law, one observes that in the Qur'an "haqq" is mostly 
used to connote "truth", "certainty", "justice" or "right". A specific use of the word to 
North African countries, and is spoken by many non-Arab Muslims world-wide. 
31 See e. g. Cowan, J. M. (ed. ) The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (1960) p. 192 and under "Hakk" in 
Bearman, P. J., (ed. ), The Encyclopaedia oflslam, Glossary and Index of Technical Terms to Volumes I- VIII (1997) p. 107. 
32 Ibn Nujaym, Z., al-Bahr al-Räiq: Sharh Kanz A[-Dagä 'iq (Arabic) (1311 AH) cited in Tamüm, M., al-Haqqfi al-Shari'ah 
al-Islämiyyah, (Arabic) (1398AH/1978CE) p. 33. See also Karnali, M. H., (1993) supra, note 29 above, e. 343. 33 See Tamüm, M., ibid., pp. 36-37. See also al-Zuhayli, W., al-Fiqh al-IslämI Wa Adillatuh (Arabic) (4` Ed. 1997), Vol. 4, 
pp. 2837ff. 
See Musa, M. Y., al-Fiqh al-Islamiyy (Arabic) (1954) p. 211. 35 See Shalabi, M. M., al-Madkhal Li al-Figh al-Isldmiyy, (Arabic) (n. d) p. 238. 
36 See e. g. Tamüm, M., (1398AH/1978CE), supra., note 32 above, pp. 36-37. 
37 See e. g. Hallaq, W. B., A History of Islamic Legal Theories (1997) pp. 112-113; Kamali, H. M., Principles of Islamic 
Jurisprudence (1991) p. 267; and Masud, M. K., Shatibi's Philosophy of Islamic Law (1995) pp. 127-164. 
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connote "right" as opposed to "duty" occurs in Qur'an 51: 19 
- 
"And in their wealth is a 
right (haqq) for the needy and the outcast". We also find in the Sunnah, many sayings of 
the Prophet Muhammad where "haqq" is used in the above context. An example of his use of 
the term "haqq" to connote right, as opposed to duty, is in respect of Qur'anic heirs, where 
he is reported to have said: "God has given every legal heir his/her right (in the inheritance) 
so there shall be no (additional) bequest for a legal heir". 38 Although "haqq" is used 
sometimes in the Qur'an to connote duty (right against), its use to connote right (as opposed 
to duty) is more common. 39 Due to its significance in Islamic law, it is nearly impossible not 
to find the use of the word "haqq" in most classical and contemporary Islamic juristic works. 
It is observed that the jurists have also mostly used "haqq" to connote right as opposed to 
duty in their legal scholarship. From the very early period of Islamic jurisprudence one finds 
discourses on the nature of rights by Islamic jurists on questions such as whether rights were 
absolute and whether the exercise of rights could give rise to liability. While Abu Hanifah 
and al-Shäfi'i, the eponyms of the Hanaji and Shäfi'i schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
respectively, held that the exercise of rights was absolute, Malik, the eponym of the Mäliki 
school and other jurists held the view that rights were not absolute, and should thus not be 
exercised to cause injury to others. 40 The later view prevails in the modem theory of rights. 
It becomes evident from the above that the concept of rights is not alien to Islamic law as is 
often portrayed. 
Rights are however very interwoven with duties under Islamic law. The two are seldom 
treated in isolation from each other. This indicates the appreciation of the correlating nature 
of the two concepts. In Islamic jurisprudence, rights and duties are not independent legal 
concepts. They both evolve from the Islamic legal norm called "hukm" (legal ruling) which is 
normally conveyed in form of either a sanction, command or prohibition aimed at regulating 
human conduct. 41 Rights and duties are therefore, mediums through which the law functions. 
Thus the law will often place a duty on one party which conversely confers a right on another 
through the same injunction. Many verses of the Qur'an vividly demonstrate this approach. 
38 Reported by Abo Däwüd. See e. g. Fazlul Karim, A. M., Al-Hadis: An English Translation and Commentary ofMishkat-ul- 
Masabih with Arabic Text (1994) Vol. 2, pp. 324-325. Hadith No. 34. 
39 A Concordance of the Qur'an shows a total of 247 entries of the word "hagq" out of which 15 entries are used in the 
context of "right" (Q3: 21, Q3: 112, Q3: 181, Q4: 155, Q5: 116, Q6: 151, Q11: 79, Q17: 26, Q17: 33, Q22: 40, Q25: 68, 
Q40: 75, Q41: 15, Q46: 20, Q70: 24) while only three entries (Q2: 180, Q2: 236, Q2: 241) are used in the context of "duty". 
See Kassis, H. E., (ed. ) A Concordance of the Qur'an (1983) pp. 537-542. Note however that there are other Qur'anic 
terminologies for "duty" apart from the word "haqq ". This analysis is not to say that rights are more recognised than duties 
in the Qur'an but to show that the idea of "rights" as opposed to "duty" exists in Islamic law, and that the term "haqq" is 
mostly used to connote "right" rather than "duty". 
40 See Khadduri, M., and Liesbesny, H. J., (ed. ) Law in the Middle East (1955) Vol. I, pp. 186-187. 
41 See Karnali, M. H., (1993) supra, note 29 above, pp. 34 land 347-350. 
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Islamic legal theory recognises three essential elements in this process. First, there must be 
the Lawgiver (häkim), then the object of the law (mahküm fih) and lastly the subject of the 
law (mahküm alayh). 42 Every rule regulating human conduct in Islamic law must conform to 
that principle. We shall now analyse the three elements in relation to human rights. 
God is considered generally as the original Lawgiver through His revelation which is the 
major source of Islamic law. The role of human beings in the legal process is only to 
interpret, expand and apply the law. In Islamic human rights, God is thus considered to be 
the source of rights and duties. 43 Human rights must therefore conform to His commands as 
conveyed in revelation, the conclusive of which, according to Islamic belief, is the Qur'an. 
This raises questions concerning the relation between law, revelation and reason. Does the 
human intellect have any role at all in the determination of what is good or evil and what is 
right or wrong? Three views were advanced by the classical Islamic theologians on this 
question as 
First is the view that human intellect can not be relied upon as a source of law and that 
revelation is the only criterion of right or wrong, good or evil. This is the view advanced by 
the Ash 'arä theological school. They argue that human reason is liable to error, and that 
perceptions differ in respect of what is right or wrong, good or evil. Thus what may be 
evaluated as right by the reasoning of one person may be evaluated as wrong by the 
reasoning of another. They also point to the inevitable subjectivity of human reasoning and 
conclude that revelation alone is the authentic source of law, rights and duties. 45 
Second is the view of the Mu `tazilah that human intellect can identify right or wrong 
and good or evil by reference to the overall benefit or harm that is derivable from a particular 
action. They emphasise reason and thus assert that whatever human reason identifies as right 
is also right in the sight of God, and vice versa. They argue that reason and revelation must 
always correspond, that it is impossible for God to command what is intrinsically wrong or 
prohibit what is intrinsically right. Their position therefore is that the probity of revelation 
should be subjected to its compatibility with human reason. This view manifests an utilitarian 
approach whereby rights are evaluated on the basis of the benefits they entail. It also exhibits 
some traits of the natural law school. Al-Ghazäli argued that this approach is too relative, 
because the standards of right and wrong vary with environment and from person to person. 
42 See e. g. Qadri, A. A., Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World, (1986) p. 18; Karnali, M. H., (1991), supra, note 37 
above, pp. 342-349; and Hasan, A., Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (1993) pp. 230-387. 
43See e. g. Maududi, A. A., Human Rights in Islam, (1993) p. 15; and Uthmän, M. F., Huqüq al-Insän Bayn al-Sharl'ah a! 
- Islämiyyah Wa al-Fikr al-Qanüni al-Garbiyy (Arabic) (1402AH/1982CE) p. 16. 
44 See Kamali, M. H., (1991) supra, note 37 above, pp. 343-345. 
45 ibid., p. 343. 
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The law of God can thus not be subjected to such a relativistic approach. 46 The Mu'tazilah 
were generally considered as pure rationalists whose theology faced a lot of opposition. Their 
utilitarian approach to law was however to be utilised later by Islamic jurists to a large extent 
in the methods of Islamic law. Islamic legal scholars therefore acknowledge that their 
contribution to Islamic legal thought "cannot be denied by an impartial observer. 947 
The third is the MäturidI view. While agreeing that right and wrong can be discerned 
through human intellect, this school holds that human reason must be evaluated on the basis 
of divine revelation. They argue that the law of God may not always necessarily correspond 
to human reasoning because human intellect is liable to error. 48 Since the law must be 
interpreted and also continue to grow and adapt itself to new situations of life, reliance on 
human reason becomes inevitable. But this must always be subjected to the evaluation of 
divine revelation. This view attempts to harmonise the two previous ones and has been 
adopted by the Hanau school. It is the most practical view on the relationship between law, 
revelation and reason. Although the Ash'arl view is the traditional Sunni majority view, the 
adoption of methods of Islamic law such as giyäs (legal analogy) and ijmä' (legal consensus) 
clearly demonstrate the impossibility of a literal application of that view. While the Ash'arl 
view rejects reason as an independent source of law it can not mean to exclude reason totally 
as a necessary tool for expanding the scope of revealed sources. In practice, almost all 
Islamic jurists tend to follow the Mäturldi approach when they expand the law to cover new 
areas not expressly covered by either the Qur'än or the Sunnah. The inevitability of this was 
actually confirmed by Abü al-Hassan al-Ash'ari (the eponym of the Ash'arI theological 
school) himself, but only cautioned that in dealing with new cases, matters relating to reason 
should be distinguished from those relating to the divine, "without confounding the rational 
with the traditional, or the traditional with the rational". 49 Sayyid Qutb thus maintained that 
full recourse to reason by modem Muslims was essential to fulfil the demands of revelation. 
He observed that both the Mu'tazilah and Ash'arI views failed to estimate the value and 
position of reason correctly. The former overestimated reason by placing it over revelation 
while the later underestimated its significance and lost sight of its important role in realising 
the demands of divine revelation. He thus advocated a middle path that aims at creating a 
correct relationship between reason and revelation to ensure human happiness and felicity. 50 
46 ibid., p. 344; See also Al-Ghazäli, A. M., al-Mustas Min Ilm al-Usill, Vol. I (Arabic) (1356AH) pp. 36 and 136. 
47 Qadri, A. A., (1986) supra, note 42 above, p. 156 referring to Abü Zaharah's work on Imam Abü Hanifah. 
48 See e. g. Khalläf, A. W., Ilm Usül al-Figh, (Arabic) (1398AH/1978CE) p. 99. 
49 See McCarthy, R., The Theology of al-Ash'an (1953) p. 131. 
so See Qutb, S., FI Ziläl al-Qur'an (Arabic) (1974) Vol. II, p. 806 and Abu Rabi', I. M., in his review ofMonsalli, A. S., 
"Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: the Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb" (1994) 1 Al-Mizan, Issue 1, 
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Al-Ghunaimi has also pointed out that "Islam recognises for reason a considerable domain, 
particularly in the realm of what Muslim jurists term as mu `ämalat. i51 The answers by 
Mu'adh bn Jabal to the Prophet's questions as to his sources of law, when he was deployed 
as a judge to Yemen confirms this approach. 52 It established the doctrine of i/tihäd (legal 
reasoning) without which the law will remain static and not be able to meet the demands, 
functions and new developments of life. Under Islamic law, the will of God and His 
command can therefore be known "either directly through divine revelation, or indirectly by 
means of inference, deduction and ijtihäd" (legal reasoning). 53 
Now turning to the objects of Islamic law (mahküm fih) with regards to human rights, 
these are both rights and duties through which human conduct is regulated, and the subjects 
of the law (mahküm alayh) are human beings to whom the law is addressed. While human 
beings are entitled to the rights granted under the law, they are also under an obligation to 
fulfil their duties within the law. 
In line with general principles of Islamic law, rights are further subjected, as objects of 
law, to three conditionalities. Firstly, the right must be identifiable. It must not be nebulous 
or ambiguous to the extent that it can not be legally determined. Secondly, the right must be 
executable. It must be accomplishable within human capacity. No right may be demanded 
that is not within the power of whom there is either the positive or negative obligation to its 
fulfilment. Thirdly, the right must be lawful within the Shari'ah and not prohibited by it. 54 In 
the light of the above principles, Breiner had observed notably that the Islamic legal theory 
reveals "a highly developed awareness of 
... 
rights and obligations, a combination of which 
enabled Islam to formulate a system which would seek to safeguard the rights of individuals 
to an extent which was not common in the legal thinking of many cultures and 
civilisations. "55 
One observes however, that the founding jurists of Islamic law mostly addressed issues 
of personal and private rights. Apart from a few but monumental legal works in specialised 
areas of law, such as al-Shaybäni's works on International law, 56 the early Islamic jurists did 
not bother to separate their treatment of legal issues specifically into tight compartments. 
P, 133 at 135. 
Al-Ghunaimi, M. T., The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach (1968) p. 101 and n. 4 
thereof. $2 See Chapter 3, pp. 27-28 above. 
53 See Karnali, M. H., (1991), supra, note 37 above, p. 342 especially pp. 366-391 for a detailed analysis on the doctrine of 
ijtihdd as "the most important source of Islamic law next to the Qur'an and the Sunnah ". See also generally al `Alwäni, 
T. J., Ijtihad, (1993). 
54 See e. g. Kamali, M. H., (1993) supra, note 29 above, pp. 344-345. 
ss Bremer, B., "A Christian View of Human Rights in Islam", in Two Papers on Shari'ah (1992) p. 1 at 3. $6 al-Shaybäni, M. H., al-Jämi' al-Kabir, Kitab al-Siyar and Kitdb al-Asl. 
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Human rights was thus not treated in their works as a separate subject of public law, but 
addressed within the general framework of rights and duties of both individuals and the State. 
HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN ISLAMIC LEGAL THOUGHT 
The common Arabic term used today to express human rights in Islamic legal writings 
and discourse is "huqüq al-insän ". The term is a construct derived from two words 
- 
"huqüq"(rights)-plural of "haqq" (right), and "insän" (human being). The term "huqüq al- 
insän" is of recent coinage and it neither appears in the primary sources of Islamic law nor in 
the writings of the founding jurists of Islamic law. The term "huquq Adamiyyin " which also 
means "rights of humans"57 is however found, used at least, as early as the eleventh century 
by al-Mäwardi in his famous work titled "The Principles of Government ", wherein he 
discussed the duty of the ruling authority to protect and ensure certain rights of individuals. 58 
Conceptually, many scholars have observed that the idea of human rights is not alien to 
Islamic law. Breiner has noted that "(I)slam developed the concept of human rights early in 
its legal tradition. , 59 Ostrorog had also stated earlier before him that: 
"Considered from the point of view of its logical structure, the system (Islamic law) 
is one of rare perfection, and to this day it commands the admiration of the student. 
... 
If the contents of that logical fabric are examined, some theories command not 
only admiration but surprise. Those Eastern thinkers of the ninth century laid down, 
on the basis of theology, the principle of the Rights of Man, in those very terms, 
comprehending the rights of individual liberty, and of inviolability of person and 
property, 
... 
elaborated a Law of War of which the humane, chivalrous prescriptions 
would have put to the blush certain belligerents in the Great War; expounded a 
doctrine of toleration of non-Muslim creeds so liberal that our West had to wait a 
thousand years before seeing equivalent principles adopted. " 60 (emphasis added) 
Briffault has also been quoted in similar vein as follows: 
"The ideals of freedom for all human beings, of human brotherhood, of the equality 
of all men before the law, of democratic Government by consultation and universal 
suffrage, the ideals that inspired the French Revolution and the Declaration of Rights, 
that guided the framing of the American Constitution and inflamed the struggle for 
independence in the Latin American countries were not inventions of the West. They 
find their ultimate inspiration and source in the Holy Quran. They are the 
quintessence of what the intelligentsia of Mediaeval Europe acquired from Islam 
57 Literally "rights of Adam's offsprings". In Islamic terminology human beings are generically addressed as "Adam's 
offsprings" being descendants of the first human being Adam. 
58 See al-Mäwardi A, Al-Ahkdm al-Sultäniyyah (Arabic) (1386AH/1966CE) 2nd Ed. pp. 243-258. See also the English 
Translation, Yate, A., Trans. The Laws of Islamic Governance (1996) pp. 337-362 at 341. 
59 See Breiner, B., (1992) supra, note 55 above, p. 3. 
60 Ostrorog, C. L., The Angora Reform (1927) pp. 30-31, cited in Fyzee, A. A. A., Outlines of Muhammadan Law (1964) 3a 
Ed., pp. 51-52. 
47 
over a period of centuries through the various channels of Muslim Spain, Sicily, the 
Crusader; and of the ideals propagated by the various societies that developed in 
Europe in the wake of the Crusades in imitation of the brotherhood associations of 
Islams61 
Islam's first contact was with a very chaotic society in the seventh century, which it 
described as an environment of ignorance (jähiliyyah). The reformative stance of Islam and 
its ultimate objective of bringing humanity from the darkness of ignorance into the light of 
enlightenment, directed its philosophy, from inception, towards the liberation of humanity on 
the basis of its holy book and examples of its Prophet. 62 Thus, major moral principles that 
serve as basic postulates for the concept of human rights, such as human dignity (karämah)63, 
freedom (hurriyyah)64, humanity (insdniyyah)65, equality (musdwah)66, beneficence (ihsdn)67, 
responsibility (mas'üliyyah)68, co-operation (ta'äwun)69 and justice (adälah)70 evolved, and 
were embodied in the general doctrines of Islamic theology, law and governance. 71 
The early jurists had carefully categorised the rights that evolve from Islamic law in 
relation to human conduct into "huqüq Allah" (rights of God) and "huqüq al-ibäd" or huqüq 
Adamiyyin72 (rights of humans). As indicated earlier, rights are not an end in themselves they 
are means for the well being of human beings. Thus, even though there is a notion of "rights 
of God" in Islamic law, such rights are not for the welfare of God per se. He is not in need 
of welfare. They are means only to the welfare or benefit of human beings. While they may 
be designated de jure as "rights of God" they are de facto "rights of humans" 
- 
human rights. 
There are "rights of God" in both the acts of worship and in inter-human relations. The first 
"right of God" is His right to be worshipped by every human being. The correlative duty to 
that "right of God" is that human beings shall worship no other being except God. That is the 
nucleus of every human conduct in Islam. It is an exclusive right of God (haqq Allah al- 
khälis). The immediate rights that emanate from this is the guarantee of the individual's 
liberty and dignity. Every person is liberated from subjugation to fellow beings, making 
human beings equally dignified. Thus, in the words of Raba ibn Amar to the Persian 
61 Quoted in Bari, M. E., "Human Rights in Islam with Special Reference to Women's Rights" (1994) 5 Dhaka University 
Series, Part-F, No. 1, p. I at 12. 
62 See e. g. Q 14: 1 "A Book which We revealed unto you in order that you lead mankind out of the depths of darkness into 
light..... 
. 63 See e. g. Q17: 70. 
64 See e. g. Q 5: 89. 
65 See e. g. Q46: 15. 
66 Seee. g. Q4: 1. 
67 See e. g. Q 2: 195. 
68 See e. g. Q 7: 6-7. 
69 See e. g. Q 5: 2. 
70 See e. g. Q5: 8. 
7' There are also numerous Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad that emphasise each of these and other similar values. 
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Emperor at the dawn of Islam, the mission of Islam was "to liberate humanity from the 
worship of humans to the worship of God, from oppression into freedom and from the 
injustice of (other) faiths into the justice of Islam. "73 
The notion of "rights of God" plays an important role in inter-human relations by 
placing correlative duties upon human beings, which ensure that certain fundamental human 
rights are protected both in private individual interactions and in interactions between 
individuals and the State. For example there exists a "right of God" in the maintenance of 
justice in all human interactions as enjoined in the Qur'an as follows: 
"God commands you to render back trusts to those to whom they are due, and when 
you judge between people that you judge with justice... s74. 
This injunction is binding on the whole of humanity, individually and collectively. In it 
is a "right of God" that justice be maintained, and because the institutions of justice are State 
organs, there is a positive duty, particularly upon the State to maintain and administer justice. 
From this emanates the right to justice for every human being. Where this duty is not 
fulfilled, any person whose right to justice is thereby violated is entitled to claim redress even 
against the State. An example may be cited of an incident that occurred during the reign of 
Umar ibn al-Khatäb, the second Caliph of the early Islamic State in Medina. While Umar 
was Caliph of the State, he once declared that no man should pay more than 400 dirhams as 
dowry to any woman. A lady protested saying that this was an injustice against women, 
because the Qur'an permitted that a woman may be given a whole treasure (kintär) as 
dowry, 75 thus the Caliph could not deny women of that right. The Caliph agreed that the 
woman was right. He thus went back to the pulpit and declared: "I had earlier prohibited you 
from giving more than 400 dirhams as dowry. Whoever wishes may give as much property 
as he likes". 76 This illustrates the recognition, under Islamic law, of the right of individuals 
to challenge State legislation that infringe on their ascertained legal rights. Mahmood has 
thus pointed out that "Man's right to protest against tyranny and injustice is given by Islam to 
all human beings 
- 
be it the state, the ruler or an individual howsoever highly placed who is 
guilty of such tyranny or injustice. "77 
The "rights of God" are, therefore, so called because they emanate from duties that God 
'Z See e. g. al-Mawardi, supra, note 58 above. 
73 See Uthmän, M. F., (1402AH/1982CE) supra, note 43 above, p. 7. 74 Q 4: 58. 
" See Q 4: 20. 
76 See e. g., Doi, A. R., Shari'ah: The Islamic Law (1984). p. 164). See also Chapter 7 of al-Mäwardi, A., Trans. Yate, A., (1996) supra, note 58 above, pp. 116-143 for further examples of Judicial Redress. 
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has placed, through His law, upon every individual as well as upon the State, and from which 
the whole community of the human race derives not only substantive rights but also 
protection against their violation. They are, in reality, more of a ruling (of God) than a right 
(of God). 78 In other words, they are public rights to which every individual is entitled for the 
mere fact of being human. 79 They are different from the private rights of individuals in that 
the duties that ensure them are placed in the State. The State has a duty to enforce them. 80 
The "rights of humans", on the other hand, are the individual rights or private rights which an 
individual has an option to or not to claim. 
The MälikI jurists divided the "rights of humans" into three categories. 81 These may be 
classified as special, general and private rights. The special rights are the rights of individuals 
vis-ä-vis God. They emanate from the fulfilment of the duty to worship Him. Thus the 
Prophet Muhammad asked Mu'ädh on one occasion whether he knew the right of God upon 
human beings and the right of human beings upon God. Mu'ädh answered, "God and His 
Apostle know best. " The Prophet Muhammad then said, "God's right upon His servants is 
that they should worship Him alone and ascribe no partners to Him. " and "The right of the 
servants upon God, for doing that, is that He should not punish them. , 82 This right is not a 
general right. It is a "special" right in the sense that, according to Islamic belief, it is granted 
only to those who fulfil the duty of worshipping God. 
The general rights are the rights that ensure the well being of every human being within 
the State. They are inherent in human nature and come into being without any further 
evidence other than the fact of being created as a human being by God. Some Muslim 
scholars sometimes describe them as "al-huqüq al-fitriyyah" that is "natural rights", because 
they arise without any special or legal undertaking other than the natural fact of being 
human. 83 The private rights are the rights between individuals such as contractual rights. 
Human rights can thus emanate in Islamic law either from the "rights of God" or the 
"rights of humans" or a combination of both. This does not practically allocate specific 
rights to God and others to human beings, but rather follows a religio-legal approach of 
77 Mahmood, T., "The Islamic Law on Human Rights" (1984) 4 Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 32 at 40. 
78 See Karnali, M. H., (1993) supra, note 29 above, p. 348. 
79 See e. g. Ibn Malik, I. A., Sharh al-Manär al-Anwdr (Arabic) (1308AH) p. 886; and Uthmän, M. F., (1982CE) supra, note 
43 above, p. 29. 
80 See Karnali, M. H., (1993) supra, 29 above, p. 350. 
81 See e. g. Tamüm, M., supra, note 32 above, pp. 61-62. 82 Reported by al-Bukhari, See e. g. Khan, M. M., (Trans. ) Sahih a]-Bukhari 
- 
Arabic-English Ed. (1997) Vol. 4, p. 80, Hadith 
No. 2856. See also al-Shätibi, A. I., al-Muwäfagdt (Arabic) (1997), Vol. 2 p. 538ff. 
83 See e. g. Ibn Nujaym, supra, note 32 above.; Karnali, M. H., (1993) supra, note 29 above, pp. 346-347; Abü Sinnah, A. F., 
"Nazariyyah al-Haqq" in `Uwaydah, M. T., al-Fiqh al-Isläm? Asäs al-Tashri (1391 AH). The Prophet Muhammad said in one 
Tradition that: "every child is born in a pristine natural state of Islam...... 
. 
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ensuring a non-compromise of the rights that every person is entitled to enjoy as a human 
being. Thus the rights categorised as "rights or God" cannot be waived. They are mandatory 
by the Shari'ah. They are public rights which the State has either a positive or negative 
obligation to ensure their fulfilment. Their being attached to God may be seen as a sort of 
built-in element to ensure the full enjoyment, by human beings, of the inherent rights 
conferred on them by God, from Who's sanctions, according to Islamic beliefs, none can 
escape, for the violation of those rights, which in essence will amount to not fulfilling an 
obligation to God. There is thus the view that every right has an element of "right of God" 
in order to ensure its fulfilment. 84 In the opinion of al-Qaräfi, a Mäliki jurist of the thirteenth 
century, the whole of the Shari'ah is the "right of God" which must be fulfilled because all 
rights and obligations are derived from His command. 85 And thus since the State must 
govern within the provisions of the Shari'ah, the rights of individuals become guaranteed. It 
is in that context that Brohi has observed as follows: 
"The perspective of Islam on (human rights) is theocentric 
- 
God-conscious. 
... 
the 
strategy of Islam is to emphasize the supreme importance of our respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedom as an aspect of the quality of religious consciousness 
that it claims to foster in the heart, mind and soul of its followers. The perspective is 
"theocentric" through and through... Man acknowledges the rights of his fellow men 
because this is a duty imposed on him by the religious law to obey God and the 
Prophet and those who are constituted as authority to conduct the affairs of state. In 
every thing that a believer does his primary nexus is with his Maker, and it is through 
Him that he acknowledges his relationship with the rest of his fellowmen as even 
86 with the rest of creation. " 
The theocentric element operates as a factor for the achievement of the well being of 
humans and the enjoyment of their human rights under Islamic law and not as an obstruction 
to it. This would however depend greatly upon (and envisages) compliance with the Shari'ah 
by both the rulers and the ruled. The pertinent question here is: What happens where the 
ruling authority decides to govern contrary to the provisions of the SharI'ah and denies the 
guarantee of human rights and welfare? Will such ruling authority be left accountable to God 
only, perhaps in the hereafter? This concerns the issue of accountability of government and 
the right of the people to criticise or challenge the abuse of power by rulers. We will examine 
that later below under the section on the State and the enforcement of human rights in 
Islamic law. 87 
84 See e. g. Tamüm, M., supra, note 32 above, p. 80. 
85 See Al-Qaräfi, S., Kitäb al-Furüq (Arabic)(I346AH) Vol.! p. 104. 86 Brohi, A. K., "Islam and Human Rights" in Gauher, A., (ed. ) The Challenge of Islam (1980) pp. ] 79-181. 87 See page 63 below. 
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HUMAN DIGNITY AS BASIS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 
As earlier analysed in Chapter 2, human dignity is the principal normative concept 
underlying the idea of human rights. 88 It finds acceptance in both religious and secular 
thought and is thus an important common ground factor in the international human rights 
discourse. Islam strongly acknowledges the dignity of human beings and Islamic legal theory 
promotes its preservation and enhancement. The Qur'an emphasises in very clear terms that 
God created humans "in the best of moulds"89, honoured them and also conferred special 
favours on them. 90 The very narration of the creation of Adam, his designation as the 
vicegerent of God on earth and his elevation even above the angels, indicate the worth of the 
human being in Islamic teachings. 91 The human being is considered as the "king" of the 
cosmos and God has granted him the intellect and all other faculties that enable him to 
maintain that esteemed position. Human dignity, according to Islamic teachings, is God- 
granted and is inherent in all human beings from conception to death. It cannot be taken 
away by any individual or institution. 92 That is why some rights attach even to the unborn 
child as well as the dead in Islamic law. 93 For example, the unborn child has, inter alia, a 
right to life and a right to legitimacy94 while the dead has a right not to be mutilated and to be 
buried decently and quickly. 95 Islamic law thus prohibits the violation of human dignity both 
in life and in death. 
An important aspect of human dignity in Islam is, as earlier stated, freedom from 
worship of any other being except God. This does not only reflect a theocentric 
characteristic, but also illustrates that if Man is considered as the "king" of the cosmos and 
the most dignified of all creatures, then it becomes most undignified of him to subdue 
himself to any other creature. Not to any other non-human creature because he is more 
dignified than it and not even to any other human being because they are equal. Man is only 
expected to deal in a righteous manner with his fellow humans and all other creatures, but not 
88 See p. 8 above. 
89 See Q 95: 4. 
90 See Q 17: 70. 
91 See Q 2: 30-35. 
92 See e. g. 4th and 5`h preambular paragraphs of the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the Islamic 
Council of Europe on 10 September 1981. 
93 cf. Mayer, A. E., (1999) supra, note 13 above, pp. 60-61 (argues that "It is hard to see how conventional "right" can be 
involved, since the beneficiaries are 
... 
dead.. (and) helpless to vindicate the "right" that is being afforded them). See also 
Belliotti, R., "Do Dead Human Beings Have Rights? " (1979) 60 Personalist, pp. 201-210. 
94 Abortion is generally prohibited under Islamic law except for a few recognised valid reasons such as when the life of the 
mother is endangered. See e. g. Omran, A. R., Family Planning in the Legacy of Islam (1992) pp. 8-9. 
9S See e. g. Maududi, A. A., (1993) supra, note 43 above, pp. 37-38. See also Art. 4 of the OIC Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam, which provides that: "Every human being is entitled to the inviolability and protection of his good name 
and honour during his lifetime and after his death. The State and society shall protect his remains and burial place. " (emphasis added). 
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to subdue himself to them. He subjugates himself only in worship to his Creator. Such a 
person accumulates both the general rights as a human being and the special rights for 
fulfilling the duty of worshipping God. 96 That is because Islam recognises that the inherent 
dignity conferred upon human beings by God can be further enhanced by each person 
through God-consciousness and good deeds. This is evidenced in the Qur'anic statement that: 
"... Verily the most honoured of you in sight of God is the one who is most God-conscious 
and righteous". 97 
Islam also recognises that every human being is born free, thus no one may be coerced 
nor shall life be unnecessarily regimented in any way to deprive the legitimate liberty of 
human beings. 98 There are thus repeated prohibitions against persecution, aggression and 
violations of the inherent human dignity in both the Qur'an and Sunnah. At the same time 
every person is encouraged to develop himself and seek perfection through piety and 
righteousness in order to enhance the inherent dignity. The question of slavery under Islamic 
law becomes relevant here. Slavery was widely practised in Arabia as well as other parts of 
the world before the advent of Islam in the seventh century. Despite the heinous nature of the 
institution it was a big source of labour and income in both the East and West. Slaves were 
treated in most inhuman and undignified fashion. No philosophy that promoted the concept 
of human dignity could have reasonably been insensitive to the plight of slaves in those 
periods. Thus in the spirit of reformation, both the Qur'an and Sunnah greatly encouraged 
and recommended the manumission and humane treatment of slaves. 
99 The Prophet and his 
companions also set many examples in the liberation of slaves. 
100 Although there is no direct 
injunction on its abolition, the Shari'ah also contains no provisions that authorises or 
supports slavery. There is consensus among Islamic jurists that freeing slaves is a 
recommended act, indeed it is the first of the options prescribed in the Qur'an as expiation 
for certain sins. 101 While some scholars view that those steps pointed towards abolition, and 
slavery should therefore be considered as abolished today under Islamic law102, others submit 
the contrary. For instance, while Tabandeh acknowledged those humane steps taken by Islam 
towards slaves, he still argued that "should the legal condition for the enslavement of anyone 
96 See page 50 above. 
97 See Q49: 13. 
98 The second Caliph, Umar is reported to have summoned one of his governors whose son assaulted a subject. Umar 
reproached the governor saying: "Do you want to enslave people when their mothers have given birth to them as free 
individuals? " See e. g. Uthman, M. F., (1402AH/1982CE) supra, note 32 above p. 8. 
99See e. g. Q 2: 177, Q9: 60, Q 4: 92, Q 24: 33, Q 90: 13, Q 58: 3. 
10° See e. g. Maududi, (1993) supra, note 43 above, p. 20. 
101 See e. g. Q4: 92 and Q58: 3. 
102 See e. g. Malekian, F., The Concept of Islamic International Criminal Law: A Comparative Study (1994) pp-83-89; and 
al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 33 above, Vol. 3, pp. 2019-20. 
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be proven... Islam would be bound to recognise such slavery as legal, even though 
recommending the freeing of the person... ". 103 An-Na'im has argued against that opinion, 
but also made reference to the continual existence of rules on slavery in the traditional books 
of Islamic jurisprudence and asserted that this is a fundamental human rights issue for 
Muslims until slavery is abolished in Islamic law. 104 
It is clear to see however that the rules in the traditional books of Islamic jurisprudence 
do not sanction or advocate slavery, they are mostly in respect of manumission and other 
ameliorating rules in the treatment of slaves. Those rules regulating the affairs of slaves 
found in traditional Islamic jurisprudence must thus be viewed inter-temporally. The 
problem of slavery could not have been solved radically in isolation of the prevailing social 
circumstances of that period. While Islam had, on one hand, endured the practice due to 
social factors of that period, it simultaneously promoted its gradual abolition on the other. 
Today most Muslim countries have ratified international instruments abolishing slavery or 
slavery-like practices, and no Muslim country will formally admit the practice of slavery. 
There is thus general consensus in Muslim States today against slavery. This can be adopted 
into a legal consensus (ijmd ) on its abolition in Islamic law. #mä' (legal consensus) 
constitutes a strong source of law in the absence of a direct text of the Qur'an or the Sunnah 
on any issue. It is appreciated that traditionally, i mä ` was restricted to the consensus of the 
legists (mujtahidün), meaning traditional Islamic theologians. 105 That view is considered too 
restrictive for contemporary needs, because contemporary international legal and policy- 
making involve complex techniques and considerations beyond such restrictive consensus. 106 
There can be no higher consensus on the abolition of slavery than this State practice of all 
Muslim States, none of which will officially sanction the practice of slavery today within its 
jurisdiction. This is strengthened by the fact that slavery contradicts the great emphasis laid 
by Islam on serving God alone as earlier addressed. 107 All human beings are referred to as 
servants or slaves (ibäd) of God and can thus not be the slaves of other human beings at the 
same time. Thus the doctrine of the overall objective of the Shari `ah (magäsid al- 
Shari'ah)108 strongly supports the consensus on the total abolition of slavery under Islamic 
law. ' 09 
103 Tabandeh, S., Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1970) p. 27. 
104 An-Na'im, A.. A., Towards An Islamic Reformation, (1990) p. 172-175. 
105 See al-Amidi, S. A., al-Ihkdm fi Usül al-Ahkäm (Arabic) (1402AH), Vol.!., p. 196 and 226, See also Karnali, M. H., (1991) 
sra, note 37 above, pp. 168-194, particularly p. 173. 106 See AbuSulayman, A. A. (1993), supra, note 20 above, p. 86. 
107 See p. 52-53 above. 
108 See page 62 below. 
109 See generally, B. K. Freamon, "Slavery, Freedom, and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic Jurisprudence", (1998) 11 
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LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 
The Shari `ah as the primary source of Islamic law provides the textual authority and 
legitimising force for human rights principles in Islamic law. The Shari `ah text may 
sometimes be declarative as in the following Qur'anic verse: 
"0 mankind We created you from a single pair of a male and a female, and made you 
into nations and tribes that you may know each other. Verily the most honoured of 
you in the sight of God is the one who is most righteous. "' 10 
This statement expresses the concept of equality of human beings and thus from it arises 
the general right of equality for all. The text can also be a positive assertion clearly indicating 
the existence of a right as in the Qur'anic verse: "... And women shall have rights similar to 
the rights against them 
... 
". "' The language of Shari 'ah texts is however often an imperative 
injunction in form of prescription or prohibition imposing positive or negative obligations on 
one hand, and correlatively conferring an array of rights on the other hand. For example the 
Qur'an provides that: "... Take not life, which God has made sacred except by way of justice 
and law... ". 112 From this injunction there is a duty not to take life arbitrarily, and from it 
arises the correlative right to life for every person. Also from the Qur'anic injunction that 
says: ".... Enter not houses other than your own until you have asked permission... " 113 there 
is a duty not to intrude into other person's privacy, and from it arises the correlative right to 
privacy for every person. 
The greater use of imperative injunctions in the Islamic legal sources is often argued as 
indicating the notion of duties and not that of rights in Islamic law. 114 Such argument can be 
justifiable only from a one-sided interpretation of the injunctions. It is easy to understand that 
while the injunctions impose obligations on one part they at the same time convey rights on 
the other part as correlates of the duties they impose. The injunctions are legal rulings that 
create duties and corresponding rights. Expressing rights through the language of duties may 
be a charateristic of Islamic law but it is not peculiar to it. One observes that even the 
language of international human rights instruments is not couched exclusively in terms of 
"right to". The language of duties in form of imperative injunctions 
- 
"No one shall be" is 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, p. 1; and also Hassan, R., "On Human Rights and the Qur'anic Perspective" in Swidler, A, 
(ed. ) Human Rights in Religious Traditions (1982)p. 51 at 58-59. 
110 Q 49: 13. 
"1 Q 2: 228. 
112 Q 6: 151 See also Q17: 33- 
113 Q24: 27. 
114 See e. g. Donnelly, J., "Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human 
Rights" (1982) 76 American Political Science Review, No. 2, p. 303 at 306. 
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also used in nearly all the international human rights documents. For example while the 
European Convention provides in its Article 8(1) that "Everyone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and correspondence", the ICCPR provides for the same 
right in its Article 17(1) through an imperative injunction that "No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence... ". It 
will also be observed that nearly all the international human rights instruments express the 
very important and fundamental right to freedom from torture in form of an imperative 
injunction 
- 
"No one shall be subjected to torture... "115 Expressing human rights either in 
the language of rights or that of duties is like presenting a coin from either of its two sides. 
Each of the two sides of a coin is indispensable to render it a legal tender. The same applies 
to human rights, because they are claim-rights, they can not exist without a correlative 
positive or negative duty. 116 It is sometimes also argued that it is the expression of human 
rights positively in the language of rights that renders them claimable. This is not necessarily 
so. The need to claim rights arises only when the rights are denied or violated. Therefore 
even where the rights are expressed in the language of duties a claim can still be brought in 
form of an action for restraint in case of violation and for performance in case of denial, 
provided that avenues for making such claims are available. Thus whether human rights are 
expressed in the language of obligations upon rulers or in the language of rights for the ruled, 
it is only a matter of form and not of substance. In fact no human right can be practically 
operative except it is first understood as an obligation. If human rights are viewed through a 
strict dichotomy of right and duty they cannot be sustained on the basis of rights alone. 
Imagining that human rights are argued monolingually with no notion of duty brought into it 
at all, States could then argue that since human rights are concerned only with rights and not 
at all with duties then there is no obligation of duty upon them to respect those rights. 
Human rights would certainly become empty rights in such situation. 
Illustrated alternatively, if the concepts of duty and right operated separately, the 
fulfilment of duties will automatically guarantee rights but claiming of rights does not 
automatically guarantee rights. Conversely, the non-fulfilment of duties automatically denies 
rights but the non-claiming of rights makes no difference. This indicates the necessary 
correlation of rights and duties and even the importance of duties for the guarantee of rights. 
Understanding human rights in the context of duties "does not affect the basic premise of the 
human rights idea" in any way, it rather instils into it a notion of responsibility that enhances 
115 See Art. 3 ECPHR; Art. 7 ICCPR; Art. 5(2) ACHR; Art. 5 ACHPR says "... torture... shall be prohibited ". 116 See e. g. Jones, P., Rights (1994) p. 14-15. 
56 
. 
respect for the concept. ' 17 Conceptually, there is thus no practical difference between the 
expression "Enter not houses other than your own until you have asked permission"' 
18 and 
"Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family (and) his home... "' 19 Whatever 
difference may be associated with them is merely semantic and theoretic. Muslim scholars 
and jurists thus identify that Islamic law confers an array of rights through many imperative 
injunctions of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 120 
The existence of rights is itself only one aspect of ensuring human rights, the other 
equally important aspect is the State, upon which is the major obligation of ensuring and 
protecting the rights. The State has a dual obligation in that respect. It must itself respect 
human rights by, for instance, not using its powers to violate the rights of any person. It also 
has a further obligation of ensuring the respect of human dignity amongst individuals within 
society. That is, it must ensure both a vertical and horizontal observation of human rights. 
Zaidan has thus observed rightly that the State is the most important means to facilitate the 
enjoyment of human rights, and it has a duty to do so under Islamic law. 121 The Islamic 
governmental policy (siyäsah shar'iyyah) formulated by the early jurists thus also imposed 
some obligations upon the State, which ensures the promotion and protection of human 
rights, as shown below. 122 
THE STATE AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 
The scope of the Shari'ah recognises the institution of State and the importance of 
governance. Qur'anic regulations relating to the administration of justice, the duties of 
ensuring public order, welfare of humanity, maintenance of law and international relations, 
e. t. c., cannot be implemented without the power of a State or governmental authority. Thus 
the maxim that: "God achieves through the authority of the State that which is not achieved 
through the Qur'an". 123 This indicates the recognition by Islamic jurists of the importance 
of the authority of State in the implementation or enforcement of law. However, sovereignty 
in Islamic law is seen as belonging to God, so the State is established on the basis of 
"' See e. g. Burgers, H. J., "The Function of Human Rights as Individual and Collective Rights" in Berting, J., et al (eds) 
Human Rights in a Pluralistic World, Individuals and Collectivities (1990) p. 63 at 68. 
118 Q 24: 27. 
119 Art. 8(1) European Convention. 
120 See e. g. Chaudhry, M. S., Islam's Charter of Fundamental Rights and Civil Liberties (1995). 
121 See Zaidan, A. K., Individual and the State in Islamic Law (1982) p. 16-17. 
122 See e. g. Weeramantry, C. G., Islamic Jurisprudence : An International Perspective (1988), p. 120 and Karnali, M. H., 
"Siydsah Shar`iyah or the Policies of Islamic Government (1989) 6 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, No. 1, 
59-80. 
123 See e. g. Zaydän, A. K., al-Fard wa al-Dawlahfi al-Shari'ah al-Islämiyyah, (Arabic) (1970) p. 12. This maxim is ascribed 
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representation (khiläfah). To prevent abuse of State authority, Islamic law defines the 
purpose for which the State or the institution of governance is established. The main purpose 
of the State under Islamic law, as defined by the early Islamic jurists, is to enforce the 
principles of Sharl'ah in a manner that ensures the well being of humanity. The individual 
human being is a very important aspect of it, and the fullest "enjoyment of his rights is 
considered to be the greatest safeguard for the survival" of the State. 124 The Islamic State 
does not exist merely to maintain law and order, or to protect its territory. Its viability 
depends also upon its ability to achieve social justice, promote public good and balance the 
relationship between individuals, society and government. Government must not become 
absolute and individual freedom must not threaten the interest of society nor vice versa. It is 
the duty of the State to enhance human dignity and alleviate conditions that hinder the 
guarantee of human rights. 125 
Manifestations of human rights observance in the early Islamic State are well 
documented in the leadership chronicles of Prophet Muhammad and the rightly guided 
Caliphs after him. The protection of rights as a duty of the State was reflected, for example, 
in the inaugural speech of the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, in which he was reported to have 
stated, inter alia, 
"0 Men! Here I have been assigned the job of being a ruler over you while I am not 
the best among you. If I do well in my job, help me. If I do wrong, redress me.... 
The weak shall be strong in my eyes until I restore to them their lost rights, and the 
strong shall be weak in my eye until I have restored the rights of the weak from 
them... Obey me as long as I obey God and His Prophet. But if I disobey God's 
command or His Prophet's, then no obedience is incumbent upon you... "126 
The Caliph appointed governors who ruled and performed all functions of State over 
their respective provinces, but they were directly responsible to the Caliph for any violations 
of public law or people's rights. For example the forth Caliph, Ali ibn Abi Tälib is recorded 
to have advised Malik ibn Ashtar when he appointed the later as a governor to Egypt in the 
following words: 
"... know Malik, that I am sending you as a governor to a country which had seen 
many governments before,... you must be kind compassionate and love your 
subjects,... you must never forget that if you are a ruler over them, then the Caliph is 
a ruler over you and God is the Supreme Lord over the Caliph... ". 127 
to Uthmän, the 3rd Caliph of the early Islamic State in Medina. 
124 See Weeramantry, C. G., (1988) supra, note 122 above, p. 120. 
125 See Said, A. A., "Precepts and Practice of Human Rights in Islam" (1979) 1 Universal Human Rights, No. 1, pp. 68-70. 
'26 See Haykal, M. H., The Life of Muhammad (1983) pp. 510-511. 
127 See e. g. Imam Ali Ibn Abu Tälib, Nahjul Balagha, Peak of Eloquence, Trans. Reza, S. A., (1984) Letter No. 53, p. 534. 
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The Caliph could therefore receive petitions from people throughout the Islamic Empire 
against any governor or his officers with respect to any injustice or violation of rights. 
The Islamic theory of State traditionally envisaged that the State will, due to the 
assumed piety of those in authority, discharge its obligation under the SharI'ah and thus the 
individual will automatically enjoy his guaranteed rights under Islamic law without the need 
to claim for it. There was an assumption that rulers would always act in the best interests of 
both the individual and the community. The first Islamic State in Medina under the 
leadership of Prophet Muhammad is often cited as a model of the Islamic State in which the 
fulfilment of State obligations under the Sharl'ah guaranteed the enjoyment of human rights 
without the need to demand for it. Human rights were observed as part of the Islamic legal 
and religious ideals. Being a Prophet of God, Muhammad combined in his person all the 
qualities necessary to fulfil those purposes. He practicalised the ideal State envisaged by 
Islam in which the rights of individuals were neither denied nor violated and wherein existed 
no conflict between the individual and the State. Reference is also usually made to the four 
rightly guided Caliphs after him as having largely followed his precedents in that respect. 
However, later political events that followed demonstrated the need for some control on 
rulers to prevent misuse of State power to the detriment of human welfare. For instance al- 
Mäwardi had noted that the period of the four Caliphs was a period when "men... willingly 
allowed themselves to be guided to the truth and 
... 
desisted from wrong action by mere 
admonition", but that after the Caliphate of Ali, "people would openly act unjustly towards 
each other and try to get the better of each other", and also "injustice of (public) officers and 
the oppressive conduct of the haughty increased to such a point that only the most powerful 
authority and most strict of commands could restrain them". 128 
Between 661CE and 850CE during the Umayyad and Abassid dynasties, many political 
and social developments occurred within the Islamic State that manifested a lacuna between 
ideals of the law and realities of the time. Cases of violation of the rights of individuals 
became frequent and the judges (gädis) could also not deal effectively with claims against 
high and powerful officials of State. A complaints tribunal or court of grievances called the 
mazälim was formally instituted by the Abässid Caliphate in an effort, inter alia, to ensure a 
practical and effective protection of the rights of individuals. The mazälim tribunal was 
128 See e. g. al-Mäwardi, A., Trans. Yate, A., (1996) supra, note 58 above pp. 117-118. The four Caliphs that assumed 
leadership of the Islamic community in order of succession after Prophet Muhammad (i. e. Abubakr, Umar, Uthmän and Ali) 
are refereed to by Sunni Muslims as "the rightly guided Caliphs". This is from the belief that being very close companions of 
the Prophet during his lifetime and also by their level of sincerity of faith and piety, were rightly guided by God during their 
respective Caliphate of the Islamic community. The Prophet had also used the phrase "the rightly guided successors after 
me" in one of his Sayings. 
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different from normal Shari'ah courts. The Shari'ah courts are normal everyday judicial 
courts that adjudicated on both civil and criminal matters while the mazälim tribunal was a 
special tribunal constituted to, inter alia, consider complaints against public officers 
including the Caliph himself. Complaints were addressed through it for the attention of the 
Caliph who could personally look into a complaint or appoint an independent person to look 
into complaints against public officers. The mazälim tribunal sought to safeguard the rights 
of individuals against the excesses of State officials. It was meant to "ensure government 
under the rule of law in that abuse of power by influential persons and state dignitaries did 
not escape the law due merely to their capacity at resisting it... (and) was first and foremost 
an administrative tribunal which looked into disputes between the citizen and state. 029 it 
was usually constituted under a "Complaint's Officer" (sahib al-mazälim) instead of a judge 
(gädi) as in the normal Shari'ah courts and with a "special administrative-cum-constitutional 
jurisdiction" to hear petitions and enquire into complaints against officials or agents of the 
State. 130 Tyan has observed that "the mazalim procedure was applied to all torts, caused not 
only by an individual, a group or an administrative body to another individual, but many 
other diverse means, when the victim is an individual "131. It did not apply only to violations 
of "the subjective right of an individual, but instances of erroneous or faulty application of 
the objective rules of law, either in specific cases or in a general way, such as the bad 
administration of a foundation or negligence in the observance of municipal police 
regulations. , 132 Its jurisdiction was inter-provincial and any violations by governors of the 
provinces or their agents against individuals "were scrutinised and corrected" through it. 133 
Although the mazälim tribunal started more or less as the Caliphs' Court, a curia regis of the 
time, it was ultimately separated from the office of the Caliph and put under the supervision 
of the Complaints Officer (sahib al-mazälim). It combined under its jurisdiction, the justice 
of the judge and the power of the sovereign. 134 
Karnali traced the origin of the mazälim procedure to the time of Prophet Muhammad 
when he was reported to have appointed one Rashid Ibn Abdullah to adjudicate complaints 
against government officials. 135 It was however formally institutionalised during the Abassid 
129 See Karnali, M. H., "Appellate Review and Judicial Independence in Islamic Law", in Mallat, C., Islam and Public Law 
(1993) p. 49 at 62. 
130 See e. g. Qadri, A. A., (1986) supra, note 42 above, pp. 488-492 and also Coulson, N. J., A History of Islamic Law (1964)p. 
122 and 128-129. 
131 See Tyan, E., "Judicial Organisation" in Khadduri, M., and Liebesny. H. J., Law in the Middle East (1955) p. 235 at 263 
(emphasis added). 132 ibid. 
133 See Qadri, (1986) supra, note 42 above, pp. 488-492. 
134 See Karnali, M. H., (1993) supra, note129 above. 
135 ibid. See also Qadri, (1986) supra, note 42 above, p. 488. 
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caliphate after which the procedure passed on to the later caliphates. It was revived in the 
eighteenth century as an attempt to protect people from the excesses of military officers and 
the police and was one of the influences that led to the first proposal in 1879 and the eventual 
establishment of the Egyptian Constitutional Court in 1946.136 Although the mazd1im 
tribunal would be considered in Western legal perspectives as a domestic administrative 
tribunal or an Ombudsman, its jurisdiction covered in the light of those times, the purpose for 
which modern human rights tribunals are created. 137 The mazd1im procedure demonstrated 
the recognition of a formal complaints system under Islamic law as early as the eighth 
century to ensure the protection of the rights of individuals against State violation. It had 
powers to take binding decisions against public officers and redress any abuse of rights 
against individuals where proved. 
Around the eleventh century the political and social developments further motivated the 
evolution of another " doctrine of public law which rationalised the place which the Shari'a 
had in fact come to occupy in the organisation of the Islamic state. "' 38 Governmental policy 
was modified through legal scholarship leading to the Islamic political doctrine called 
siyäsah shar'iyyah (legitimate governmental policy) to address the common principles of 
good government. The doctrine was intended to introduce some equity between ideals of law 
and reality of life on the principle that the overriding duty of the ruler was to protect public 
welfare, which in particular circumstances of time and place may prevent a strict and hard- 
line interpretation of the Sharä `ah. 139 The need to clearly identify the purposes of the State as 
a political entity thus became quite imperative. The Islamic legal scholars of the eleventh 
century were able to identify that the State as a political entity was instituted to fulfil six 
main purposes, i. e. protection of life, family, intellect, religion, property and elimination of 
corruption. 140 These are sometimes also classified as the indispensable aspects (darüriyyät) 
of public welfare, and their non-fulfilment by the State as capable of jeopardising normal 
social order. 141 The political policy of State must therefore be directed essentially to achieve 
those purposes. 
136 See Gibb, H. A. R., and Bowen, H., Islamic Society and the West (1957) Vol. ], Part 2, p. 130 and generally Hill, E., 
"Majlis al-Dawla: The Administrative Courts of Egypt and Administrative Law" in Mallat, C., (ed. ) (1993) supra, note 129 
above, pp. 207-228. 
137 Note that the term "Mazälim" is a derivative of the Arabic verb "Zalama" meaning "treated unjustly" or "tyrannised". 
The Mazdlim was thus a complaint arena for a person oppressed or tyrannised. 
138 Coulson, N. J., (1964) supra, note 130 above, p. 129. 
139 See e. g. Coulson, N. J., Conflicts and Tension in Islamic Jurisprudence (1969) p. 68. 
140 See e. g. Ibn Farhün, M., TabsIrdt al-Hukkdni (Arabic) (1937) Vol. 2, p. 133. See also Coulson, N. J., "The State and the 
Individual in Islamic Law" (1957) 6 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 49 at 51. 
141 See Karnali, M. H., (1993) supra, note 29 above, p. 362. He indicated that a minority view adds protection of dignity 
"ird" to this list of essential interests, but the majority view merge protection of dignity within the protection of life. 
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According to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, a HanbalI jurist of the fourteenth century, this 
includes all incidental measures that ensures the well-being of the people and removes harm 
from them even if no express authority is found for such action in the Shari'ah. 142 This finds 
support in the principle of the overall objective of the Shari `ah (magäsid al-Shari'ah). al- 
Shätibi, another fourteenth century jurist but of the Mäliki school, emphasised the need to 
always put into consideration the overall objective of the Shari 'ah in the application and 
interpretation of the law. This he also identified as "maslahah ". He asserted that the overall 
objective of the Shari'ah was to ensure welfare of human beings herenow and hereafter. 143 
Since what constituted welfare could be so multifarious, al-Ghazäli gave a hierarchical 
classification of three levels. On the first level are those benefits (or rights) considered as 
indispensable (darüriyyät) which he identified as protection of life, family, property, intellect 
and religion as earlier mentioned. Because of their indispensability they must not only be 
promoted but also be protected against any threats. Some contemporary Muslim scholars 
equate these with fundamental rights. 144 On the second level are those considered as 
necessary benefits (häjiyyät). These are supplementary to the first category and consist of 
those things, the neglect of which may cause hardship to life but do not lead to the collapse 
of society. The third level are those considered as improvement benefits (tahsiniyyät) and 
consist of those things, which improve and enhance life. 145 It was within the same period 
when the jurist al-Mäwardi first used the term "hugüq Adamiyyin " (rights of humans) in his 
work on Islamic principles of government146 that the Islamic legal theorists were also 
formulating these theories of categorising human welfare into indispensable, necessary and 
improvement benefits or rights. Although they were not using modern international human 
rights terminologies, they were certainly speculating human rights concepts. It must be stated 
however that the right of the individual to judicially challenge the State on the basis of those 
principles was not specifically provided for under the doctrines of traditional Islamic law. It 
was taken for granted that the State had a duty to fulfil them. 
Although the principles of the overall objective of the Shari'ah (magäsid al-Shari'ah) 
and that of welfare (maslahah) are also applicable to public interest to ensure the continued 
peaceful existence of the State, it will be a wrong interpretation of those principles to use 
142 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, A. M., al-Turuq al-Hukmiyyah Fl al-Siyäsah al-Shar'iyyah (Arabic) (1961)p. 16. See also 
Karnali, M. H., (1991) supra, note 37 above, p. 271. 
143 See al-Shatibi, A. I., al-Muwafagät, (1997), supra, note 82 above, Vol. 2, pp. 9 and 300. 
144 See Karnali, M. H., (1993) supra, note 29 above, p. 362. See also Imärah, M., Islam wa Hugüq al-Insün: Darürät Lä 
Huqüq (1989). 
145 See e. g. Kama] i, M. H., (1991) supra, note 37 above, pp. 271-272 and Hallaq, W., (1997), supra, note 37 above, pp. 89-90. 
146 Seepage 47 above. 
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them as justification for the gross violation of the rights of individuals on the excuse of 
protecting the overall peaceful existence of the State. The presence of autocratic or despotic 
rules in Islamic history that have wrongly utilised the doctrines of maslahah or siyäsah on 
the excuse of public interest to deny rights of individuals is not an indication that these 
doctrines are meant to be so applied. The concept of public interest is actually meant for the 
benefit of members of the community and not for the sole and personal interest of rulers who 
often consider their own personal interest as the public interest. The concept of public 
interest or the community approach in Islamic law does not aim at rendering the individual 
totally defenceless. 
Furthermore, it is also well established in Islamic legal theory that the fundamental 
principles underlying the Shari `ah are (i) Removal of difficulties (ii) Realisation of welfare 
and (iii) Realisation of universal justice, 147 which are all relevant postulates of human rights. 
The State therefore does not come into being as an end in itself but as a vehicle to ensure the 
well being of humanity. This perhaps explains why Islamic jurists identified as early as the 
eleventh century the important role of the State in the protection of human rights. They 
seemed quite conscious even at that early period that the well being of human beings was 
very much related to the issue of good governance and political justice. The political 
purposes of the State as identified by the jurists were elements that demanded political justice 
on the part of the State for the protection of the dignity of human beings. They are purposes 
that impose both negative and positive duties on the State and precursors to the protection of 
human rights. This brings us back to the issue of government accountability and the right of 
the people to challenge the abuse of authority and also demand redress for violation of rights 
raised earlier above. 148 
The Qur'anic verse that says: "0 you believers! Obey God and obey the Apostle and the 
holders of authority amongst you... " 149 is often cited as evidence of absolutism of authority 
in Islamic law. So also is a Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad in which he is reported to 
have said "Obedience to me is obedience to God and obedience to the leader is obedience to 
me; Rebellion against me is rebellion against God and rebellion against the leader is rebellion 
against me". 150 
While it is true that the Islamic theory of State tended to have centred all authority in the 
147 See e. g. Qadri, (1986) supra, note 42 above, p. 18 and Philips, A. A. B., The Evolution ofFigh, (1996) pp. 14-37. 
148 Seepage 51 above. 
149 Q 4: 59. 
150 Reported by al-BukhärI and Muslim. See e. g. Fazlul Karim, A. M., Al-Hadis: An English Translation and Commentary 
of Mishkat-ul-Masabih with Arabic Text, 3rd ed., Vol.. 2, (1994), pp. 573-574, Hadith No. 15. 
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Caliph on the assumption that he will act in the best interests of the people, yet the Caliph 
was not considered to be above the law. Siegman observed that "the early theory of the 
Caliphate provided for a "restrained" absolutism, for it contained both legal and moral 
restrictions to the ruler's arbitrariness. " The Caliph, he continued, "was subject to the Law 
like any ordinary Muslim 
... 
(h)owever, in the absence of specific procedures and institutions 
for the removal of an "illegal" ruler, the restraints conceived by the jurists proved 
worthless". 15' The concluding part of that Qur'anic verse on obedience to authority actually 
instructs that "... and if you dispute on any affair, refer such to God and to the Apostle if you 
do believe in God and the Last Day; that is the best and most suitable for the final 
determination". 152 That thus indicate that the order of obedience was by virtue of those in 
authority ruling according to the rules of the Shari'ah itself. There is therefore no duty of 
obedience in violation of the Shari `ah. It was the "fear and abhorrence of civil discord and 
fitna (strife)" that led the Islamic theologians and philosophers from the eleventh century 
onwards to adopt such views as: "Sixty years of tyranny are better than one hour of civil 
strife"153, and that "An evil doing and barbarous sultan (ruler), (who) can only with difficulty 
be deposed and (who) the attempt to depose 
... 
would create unendurable strife, must of 
necessity be left in possession and obedience must be rendered to him... ". ' 54 The general rule 
however is that people have a right under Islamic law to challenge the abuse of power by 
rulers. This is known as "naqd al-hakim " in Islamic law. 155 It is a fundamental Islamic 
political principle that entitles individuals to truthfully criticise and expose violations of 
ruling authorities even when this entails opposing the government. Individuals could also 
demand for redress. Taking further, this right forms part of the broader principle of 
maintaining social order (hisbah) and may thus be interpreted also as a "right of God" which 
thereby imposes a duty of challenging abuse of governmental authority. 
Karnali quoting Khidr Husayn has observed that: "Islam made it an obligation of the 
community to monitor the conduct of the head of state and his officials with a view to 
rectifying those who deviate, and alerting those who might be neglecting the duties with 
which they are entrusted". 156 There are many instances of the demonstration of this right by 
individuals during the period of the four rightly guided Caliphs. The incidence of the lady 
151 Siegman, H., "The State and the Individual in Sunni Islam" (1964) 54 The Muslim World p. 14 at15. 152 Q 4: 59. 
153 See Coulson, N. J., (1957) supra, note 140 above at p. 56. 
154 al-Ghazäli, A. M., Ihyä' 'Ulüm al-Din, Vol. II, (Arabic), p. 124, English Trans. cited in Lambton, A. K. S., State and 
Government in Medieval Islam, (1981), p. 116-117. 
155 See Karnali, M. H., Freedom of Expression in Islam, (1997), p. 49. 
156 See Husayn M. H., Naqd Kitäb al-Islam wa Usül al-Hukm (Arabic) (1925) p. 89 quoted by Kama] i, M. H. (1997) ibid, 
p. 52. 
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who protested against the declaration of Umar cited earlier above is still relevant here. Also, 
the inaugural address of the first Caliph Abubakr in which he encouraged the people to 
correct him whenever he goes wrong is an indication of this right. 157 
As observed by Seigman no specific procedural rules and institutions existed for the 
removal of barbaric rulers in the traditional theory of the Caliphate, but the same was not 
completely true for bringing complaints on violation of rights against the ruling authorities. 
The mazälim institution earlier discussed158 was meant to, inter alia, serve the later purpose. 
Whether the mazälim was an effective institution for that purpose is a very relative and 
subjective question. While it may not have been as sophisticated or independent as would be 
expected for a twenty-first century notion of an institution for the enforcement of human 
rights, the fact that the need for such an institution was recognised and that it was established 
so early in the history of Islam confirms the concept of human rights both in the theory and 
practice of Islamic law. 
BALANCE BETWEEN PUBLIC ORDER AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
It is often argued that the material aim of Islamic law is public or societal regulation and 
thus it contradicts the individualistic nature of human rights. Islam views human dignity as a 
virtue in itself and thus the promotion of virtue is considered an important aspect of 
enhancing human dignity. The Islamic legal doctrine of hisbah (public order or societal 
vigilance) enjoins the promotion of virtues and prohibition of vices (amr bi al-ma `rüf wa 
nahy an al-munkar). It is a social responsibility placed on both the individual and the State. 
Under Islamic law the Shari `ah indicates necessary virtues that must prevail in human 
society. The Qur'anic terminology for virtue in that regard is ma `rüf which literally means 
"well known" or "universally accepted". Virtue as dictated by the Shari'ah is thus projected 
as a universally recognisable value. Maududi has argued in that regard that human 
conscience has some sort of "uniform verdict in favour of certain moral qualities as being 
good and declared others as bad". '59 Renteln also expressed a similar view in her cross- 
cultural study on human rights by maintaining that values exist which all cultures share. 160 
Although any individual has the free will either to enhance his inherent dignity or to debase 
it, the State also has a duty under Islamic law to ensure that no individual debases himself in 
157 See Kama] i, M. H., (1997) ibid., pp. 49-57 for further examples. 
158 See p. 59-61 above. 
'59 See Maududi, A. A. Islamic Way of Life (1980) pp. 25-28. 
160 See Renteln, R. D., International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (1990) p. 86. 
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a manner that tarnishes human dignity generally. The State itself must not act in a manner 
that violates the dignity of any one. The Shari `ah thus aims at preserving and enhancing 
human dignity through a balance between liberty of the individual on one hand and 
protection of the general social order on the other. This balance, where properly maintained, 
prevents an unqualified defence of individual rights that may have negative consequences on 
other individuals and on society at large. The need to balance between liberties and social 
responsibilities has been reiterated by the Inter Action Council161 in its proposal for a 
"Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities" submitted to the UN in 1997 as follows: 
"Without a proper balance, unrestricted freedom is as dangerous as imposed social 
responsibility. Great social injustices have resulted from extreme economic freedom 
and capitalist greed, while at the same time cruel oppression of people's basic 
liberties has been justified in the name of society's interests or communist ideals. 
Either extreme is undesirable. At present, with the disappearance of the East-West 
conflict and the end of the Cold War, humankind seems closer to the desired balance 
between freedom and responsibility. We have struggled for freedom and rights. It is 
now time to foster responsibility and human obligations. 99162 
The Shari `ah should therefore not be interpreted as being anti-individual or de- 
emphasising the position of the individual. It neither over-stresses the individual above the 
State nor the State above the individual. One observes that the legal texts which assert 
human dignity and prohibit its violation, both in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, are almost 
always formulated in terms that refer to the individual. Islamic legal rules apply to every 
individual as much as it applies to the whole community. One reads Qur'anic verses such as: 
"We have indeed created Man in the best of mouldss163; "... if anyone slew a person unless it 
be for murder or for spreading mischief on the land, it would be as if he slew the whole 
people; and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole 
people.. 
. 
9,. 164 All these and similar expressions aim at the individual human being (Man, a 
person, a life). The individual is not however addressed as an isolated entity but as part and 
parcel of society. This may be explained from the fact that society is actually made up of a 
collection of individuals. State, community and society are not material entities, they are 
161 "The Inter Action Council consists of about 25 former heads of state and government who have been addressing long- 
term global issues. The members (who endorsed the proposed Declaration) included Schmidt (Germany), Lord Callaghan of 
Cardiff (UK), Jimmy Carter (United States), and other former heads of state from such countries as Australia, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Cyprus, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Singapore, Thailand, and Zambia. The Council submitted the proposed Declaration to 
the UN Secretary General for consideration for its proclamation by the UN General Assembly as a `common standard for all 
peoples and all nations'. See Steiner, H., and Alston, P., International Human Rights in Context: Law Politics Morals (2"a 
Ed. 2000) p. 351. See the Inter Action Council Website at: http: //www. asiawidc. or. ip/iac/UDHR/EngDeci l. htm [15/2/2001]. 
162 Kung, H., and Schmidt, H., (ed. ) Global Ethic and Global Responsibilities (1988) p. 6. 
163 Q 95: 4. 
164 Q 5: 32. 
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social veils which when lifted reveals nothing but individuals. Thus while acknowledging 
that one of the material aims of Islamic law is societal regulation, Schacht has cautioned that 
this should not obscure the important fact that "(t)he formal structure of Islamic law is 
individualist. "165 
While individualism is an important aspect of human rights it is not the whole of it. 
Stressing individualism in international human rights often tends to portray that human rights 
totally segregates the individual from society. This is not so. Human rights promote and 
protect the rights of a human being not only as an individual but sometimes as a member of a 
group against the excessive powers of the State. It does not actually set the individual aside 
from, nor place him totally above society. It only guarantees that his rights are not infringed 
through excessive use of State power. He is not an isolated individual but still part and parcel 
of the society. 166 Thus the UDHR for instance, recognises that the free and full development 
of the personality of the individual is possible only within a community and thus the 
individual has duties to that community. 167 Similar appreciation is expressed in the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 168, the American Convention on 
Human Rights169 and the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights. 170 
The essence of human rights does not really lie in individualism but rather in its 
humanitarianism. Human rights today protect both individuals and collectives. The right of 
self-determination is an important collective human right provided today under international 
human rights law. Judge Weeramantry has drawn attention to some important facts in the 
history of international human rights that clearly demonstrate the need to appreciate a more 
rounded and humanitarian rather than a totally individualistic view of human rights. He noted 
that: 
"On the eve of the fifth session of the General Assembly, in November 1950, a 
proposal was brought before the Third Committee by the representatives of 
Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia that the Human Rights Committee study in depth the 
problem of the right of peoples and nations to self-determination. The Saudi Arabian 
delegate drew attention to the fact, which Western proponents of human rights chose 
simply to ignore, that in the absence of an article containing the right to self- 
determination, colonial and mandatory powers would be merely encouraged to 
postpone indefinitely the establishment of equal rights among all nations. " 
165 See Schacht, J., "Islamic Law in Contemporary States" (1959) 8 American Journal of Contemporary Law, 133 at 138- 
140. 
" See generally Donnelly, J., "Human Rights and Western Liberalism" in An-Nairn, A. A. and Deng, F. M., (eds. ) Human 
Rights in Africa, Cultural Perspectives (1990) pp. 31 at 35; and Bielefeldt, (1995) supra, note 27 above, p. 591-2. 
167 See Art. 29(1) UDHR (1948). 
168 See Art. 29. 
169 See Art. 32. 
170 See generally Chapter II of ACHPR. 
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The learned judge thus concluded that: 
"With the accumulated wisdom of the many years that have passed since then, we see 
how important this view has been to the future development of human rights. The 
ability to pinpoint this feature at that early stage and to have stressed its importance 
was no doubt attributable in the delegates mentioned to the more rounded view of 
human rights in their totality, which had been inculcated in them by the perspectives 
of Islamic jurisprudence. When eventually the right to self-determination came to be 
included in both Covenants (on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) and became axiomatic, the countries of the Third World had taken 
human rights far beyond their traditional Western formulation. The contribution of 
the Islamic nations to this result was considerable and it is indeed the reverse of the 
truth for Western jurists to suggest that there was no doctrine of human rights in 
Islamic jurisprudence. In fact the Islamic concepts took the doctrine of human rights 
well beyond their Western formulation by reason of the more rounded and 
community-oriented attitudes of Islamic law""` 
Viewed from these perspectives the balance that Islamic law maintains between the 
individual and the State does not constitute an irreconcilable deviation from international 
human rights principles as is often portrayed by many writers on the subject. 
CODIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER ISLAMIC LAW 
As earlier observed, the founding jurists of Islamic law only addressed human rights 
issues within the general framework of rights and duties under the Shari `ah without specific 
codification or categorisation of the list of human rights under Islamic law. The nearest to 
such an endeavour was the six purposes of governance otherwise called the indispensable or 
fundamental human rights listed in the writings of some early jurists. 172 The Qur'an was 
taken as the general reference from which both rights and duties were generally established. 
The Sunnah also played a supplementary role in that respect. The case of the lady who 
protested against the declaration of Umar by reference to a verse of the Qur'an was an 
example of such practice. 173 However, it is important to observe here that there is no lack of a 
precedent in constitutionalism in the history of the Islamic State. At the very beginning of 
the nascent Islamic State in Medina, the Prophet Muhammad enacted an important document 
that has come to be known as the "Constitution of Medina", which clearly defined certain 
basic rights and duties of members of the community and some important fundamental 
principles of State that could be easily referred to by all members of the community. 174 From 
171 See Weeramantry, C. G., (1988) supra, note 122 above, p. 126. 
172 See page 62 above. 
"; See page 49 above. 
174 See e. g. Hamidullah, M., The First Written Constitution in the World (1981); and also Watt, W. M., Islamic Political 
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a modern constitutional and positive law perspective, codification is of utmost importance for 
a clear identification of the content of rights and duties. Thus faced with the modern 
challenges of international human rights and to demonstrate the accommodation of human 
rights within an Islamic dispensation there have recently emerged some codification of 
Islamic human rights principles from the Muslim world. 
The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) was issued in September 
1981 under the auspices of the Islamic Council of London and presented to United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). 175 The preamble of the 
Declaration refers to the Qur'an and Sunnah as the source of its rights and that "the human 
rights decreed by the Divine Law aim at conferring dignity and honour on mankind and 
designed to eliminate oppression and injustice". It also states that the rights can not be 
curtailed, abrogated, disregarded, surrendered or alienated. The rights proclaimed by the 
UIDHR are a mixture of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. 
In August 1990 the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam was issued after the 
nineteenth meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Cairo. 176 The Cairo 
Declaration bears more governmental authority having being adopted by an Organisation 
constituted of sovereign Muslim States, and endorsed by the foreign ministers of the Member 
States. In its Resolution adopting the Declaration, the OIC stated that the Declaration "will 
serve as a general guidance for Member States in the field of human rights". 177 The Cairo 
Declaration was also presented by the OIC to the 2°d International World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 as representing the consensus of Muslim States on human 
rights. 178 In its preamble the Member States of the OIC indicated their wish to "contribute to 
the efforts of mankind to assert human rights, to protect man from exploitation and 
persecution, and to affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life in accordance with the 
Islamic Shari `ah. " They also stated their belief that fundamental rights and universal 
freedoms are an integral part of the Islamic religion and that no one has the right to suspend, 
violate or ignore them because of their binding divine origin. The declaration is also a 
mixture of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. 
Thought, (1980) pp. 130-134; and Baderin, M. A., "The Evolution of Islamic Law of Nations and the Modem International 
Order: Universal Peace through Mutuality and Cooperation" (2000) 17 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 
No. 2., p. 57 at 60-61. 
175 Islamic Council, Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, 19 September 1981. The Islamic Council is a London 
based private Islamic Organisation affiliated to the Muslim World League. 
16 OIC, Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, of 5 August, 1990. UN Doc. A/45/5/21797 p. 199. 
177 Resolution No. 49/19-P on the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, reproduced in UN, A Compilation of 
International Instruments, Vol. II, Regional Instruments, p. 477. 
"$ UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/62/Add. 18(1993). The OIC Cairo Declaration is listed in the Regional Instruments Volume of 
the UN's A Compilation of International Instruments, Vol. II, Regional Instruments, p. 478-484. 
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Apart from the above declarations, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted the 
Arab Charter on Human Rights on 15 September 1994 in Cairo179. The League consists of 
twenty-two member States, all of which are Muslim States. 180 The Member States indicated 
in the preamble that the charter was "pursuant to the eternal principles of brotherhood and 
equality among all human beings which were firmly established by the Islamic Shari'a and 
the other divinely-revealed religions". 181 The preamble also reaffirmed the principles of the 
UN Charter, the UN Bill of Rights and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. The 
rights covered by the Arab Charter are also a mixture of civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights. 
SCOPE OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER ISLAMIC LAW 
The above analysis reveals the recognition of the concept of human rights in Islamic law 
and also the attempt by Muslim States and organisations to assert an Islamic notion of human 
rights. The scope of human rights under Islamic law is however not absolute. Since the 
Shari `ah is the legalising source of both Islamic morals and law, the scope of human rights in 
Islamic law is generally delimited by the injunctions of the Shari `ah. The Shari `ah is 
mentioned as a limiting factor in the two Islamic Declarations on Human Rights as well as in 
the Arab Charter. In addition to its reference to the Qur'an and Sunnah as the divine source 
of its rights in the preamble, the UIDHR subjects the rights it guarantees to "such limitations 
as are enjoined by the Law", and paragraph 1(b) of the explanatory notes provides that: "the 
term Law denotes the Shari `ah, i. e. totality of ordinances derived from the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah and any other laws that are deduced from these two sources by methods considered 
valid in Islamic jurisprudence". The OIC Cairo Declaration also provides in its Article 24 
that "All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic 
Shari'ah. " While the Arab Charter seems to emphasise Arab nationalism and does not 
specifically subject any of its provisions to the Shari `ah, it mentions the Islamic Shari `ah in 
its preamble. Its Article 4(a) also allows restriction on the rights and freedoms it provides 
"where such is provided by law and deemed necessary to protect the national security and 
economy, public order, health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others". Although the 
"'See a reproduction of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (1994) in: (1997) 18 Human Rights Law Journal, No. 1-4, 
pp151-153. }0 Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya Arab Jamahariya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and 
Yemen. 
181 See 2nd Preambular paragraph of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (1994) supra, note 179 above. 
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Arab Charter does not give a definition of law, it could be argued that where Islamic law is 
the law of any of the Member States the rights and freedoms it guarantees will be brought 
within the scope of Islamic law through the provisions of Article 4(a). Furthermore, since the 
Shari 'ah determines both morality and legality in Islamic law, the countries in which morals 
are determined in accordance with the provisions of the Shari 'ah may be able to subject 
some of the provisions of the charter to the limits of the Shari 'ah as deemed necessary to 
protect morals. 
Two important points are deducible from these formulations. The first is a 
demonstration of the Muslim worlds' appreciation of an Islamic concept of human rights and 
the second is their conviction that the scope of human rights in Islamic law must be in 
conformity with the Shari 'ah. While both the UIDHR and the OIC Cairo Declaration are 
emphatic on the second point, the Arab Charter is not as specific but still reflects that 
conviction. Placing the scope of human rights within the confines of the Shari 'ah has 
however been strongly criticised as cutting down the size of human rights. ' 82 This will be so 
from the perspective of international human rights law being interpreted in purely secular 
language without consideration for any religious compliance or from the Shari 'ah being 
interpreted in a very restrictive and hard-line manner without consideration for its 
humanitarian nature. 183 Although the Shari 'ah, like every legal system contains provisions 
usually aimed at the maintenance of morality, public order and the general welfare of society, 
which may restrict the scope of human rights, such limitations are exceptions that must not 
be over-emphasised to overshadow the general rule of permissibility evidenced by verses of 
the Qur'an such as: "God intends every facility for you, He does not want to put you in 
difficulties" 184 and "God has subjected to you all things in the heavens and on earth and Has 
made His bounties flow to you in exceeding measure, both seen and unseen... ". 
185 Facility 
and prevention of difficulties is thus an important rule of Islamic law applicable even in the 
application of the exceptional Shari 'ah rules of limitation. 
Confining human rights within the scope of the Shari 'ah has raised important questions 
especially in respect of the international human rights principle of equality and non- 
discrimination, 186 and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments. 187 
182 See e. g. Mayer, A. B., (1999) supra, note 13 above, p. 63ff. See also An-Na'im, A. A., (1990) supra, note 104 above, 
p. 170ff. 
183 See Chapter 5 below. 
1S4 Q2: 185. 
185 Q31: 20. 
186 See e. g. An-Na'im, A. A., (1990) supra, note 104 above, p. 175-7. 
187 See e. g., "Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading treatment or Punishment", in An-Na'im, A. A., (ed. ) Human Rights in Cross-Cultural 
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While the question of equality and non-discrimination will be examined especially under 
Articles 2(1), 3 and 26 of the ICCPR in Chapter 6.188 we will address the question of Islamic 
criminal punishment here due to its topical nature in relation to international human rights 
law. The severity of some of the criminal punishments under Islamic law has raised the 
question of their consistency with the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment under international human rights law. 189 Bannerman has stated for 
example that "it would be foolish to deny that in Western eyes today, amputations, 
executions, stoning, and corporal punishment are brutal". 190 Mayer has also observed that 
"laws imposing penalties like amputations, cross amputations, and crucifixions would seem 
to be in obvious violation of Article 7 (of the ICCPR)". 191 We will now examine the 
arguments dialogically from the perspectives of both Islamic law and international human 
rights law. 
ISLAMIC CRIMINAL PUNISHMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Criminal justice is an important aspect of public law. It is distributed by the State to 
maintain both public and private security within the State. The criminal jurisdiction of a State 
is thus generally not restricted to its nationals only but may extend also to foreign nationals 
who violate its laws. Normally, the determination of what constitutes criminal offences in a 
particular State and the prescription of sanctions and punishments for them are not the 
concern of international law but are within the discretion and sovereign authority of 
individual States. Although there are certain offences common to all civilised nations of the 
world, the punishments prescribed for them may differ in each State. While sovereign States 
have the autonomy of prescribing punishments for offences within their jurisdiction, 
international human rights law under the prohibition of torture also prohibits "cruel, inhuman 
or degrading" punishments. 192 International human rights law also restricts the imposition of 
the death penalty to the "most serious crimess193, and continues to promote its abolition as a 
means of the "enhancement of human dignity and progressive development of human 
Perspectives: A Quest For Consensus (1992) pp. 19-43. 
188 Reference is also made to the principle of equality and non-discrimination in other relevant articles of both the ICCPR 
and ICESCR in Chapters 6 and 7 due to its significance in the enjoyment of human rights generally. 
189 See under Article 7 of the ICCPR in Chapter 6, pp. 125-28 below. 
190 Bannerman, P., (1988) supra, note 4 above p. 26; See also Dudley, J., "Human Rights Practices in the Arab States: The 
Modern Impact of Shari'a Values" (1982) 12 GA Journal of International and Comparative Law, 55 at 74. 191 See Mayer, A. E., "A Critique of An-Na'im's Assessment of Islamic Criminal Justice" in Lindholm, T., and Vogt, K., (eds. ) Islamic law Reform and Human Rights: Challenges and Rejoinders (1993) p. 37 at 47. 
'92 See Art. 5 UDHR (1948); Art. 7 ICCPR (1966) and Art. 16 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) 1465 UNTS 85. 
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rights. s194 The international human rights Covenants do not however define "cruel, inhuman 
or degrading punishment" or "most serious crimes". The Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment only defines "torture" and 
excludes "pain or suffering arising from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions" from 
the definition of torture. 195 
The HRC has however observed in its General Comment 20 to Article 7 of the ICCPR 
that the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment "must extend to corporal 
punishment, including excessive chastisement ordered as punishment for a crime... "196. This 
means that criminal sanctions of a State Party that may not amount to torture due to the 
exclusion of lawful sanctions from that definition by the Torture Convention, could still be 
considered by the HRC as amounting to "cruel, inhuman or degrading" punishment under the 
ICCPR if it involves corporal punishment and excessive chastisement. 197 This could be 
problematic because of the lack of a universal agreement on what punishments may be 
deemed "cruel, inhuman or degrading". While it is not impossible, sociological factors may 
actually make a universal standard of criminal punishment quite difficult to achieve. 198 
Also in its General Comment 6 to Article 6 of the ICCPR the HRC observed that: "the 
expression "most serious crimes" must be read restrictively to mean that the death penalty 
should be a quite exceptional measure". 199 
From the above perspectives punishments under Islamic criminal law provisions have 
been brought into issue within international human rights circles. For instance the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Sudan in his February 1994 report, had criticised the application of the 
Islamic law punishments in the Sudan as violating the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment under international law. Sudan denied this and argued that it was "an 
unwarranted interpretation of the international human rights instruments since they excluded 
from such category all punishments provided for in national legislation. "ZOo 
Islamic law prescribes fixed punishments called hudüd for certain offences, retributive 
punishments called gisäs for other offences and discretionary punishments called t `azir for 
193 See Art. 6 ICCPR (1966). 
194 See Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty (1989). See also Paragraph 6 of Human Rights Committee General Comment 6 to Art. 6 of ICCPR UN Doc. 
HRI\GEN\1\Rev. I at 6 (1994). 
'95 See Art. I Convention Against Torture (1984) supra. 
196 See UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. I at 30 (1994), Par. 5. 
197 See An-Na'im, A. A., (1992) supra, note 187 above, p. 29. 
198 See ibid., p. 32 for an illustration of the difficulty that may be encountered in the effort to find a universal standard of 
criminal punishment. 
199 See Par. 7. UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. l at 6 (1994). 
200 See UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1994/122. 
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certain others. The gisäs and t `äzir are variable punishments and within the discretion of the 
victim of the offence (or the heirs) and the judge (or State) respectively. A Muslim State's 
conformity to an international standard of punishment in crimes that attract gisäs or t `azir 
punishments under Islamic law therefore depends on the political will and other international 
considerations of a particular State. The tension with international human rights law is 
essentially in respect of the hudüd punishments which are fixed and invariable as long as the 
crime is fully established as provided by Islamic law. 201 The hudüd punishments are 
generally prescribed for six offences under traditional Islamic law. They are, amputation of a 
hand for theft (sariqah); 202 death, crucifixion, cross-amputation of the hand and foot or 
banishment for rebellion or armed robbery (hirdbah); 203 stoning to death for adultery and one 
hundred lashes for fornication (zinä); 204 eighty lashes for false accusation of unchastity 
(gadhJ); 205 death for apostasy (riddah) and forty or eighty lashes for intoxication (sharb al- 
khamr). 206 While there is consensus among Islamic jurists on the first four punishments, there 
are some differences about the offences of intoxication and apostasy. The majority of jurists 
concede that intoxication is a hadd-type offence while others' consider it as t `azir-type. Also 
the punishment for intoxication is based on Sunnah, but while the Hanafi, Han ball and 
Mäliki schools hold that the number of lashes for intoxication is eighty, the Shäfi `ä school 
and other minority schools hold it to be forty lashes. Some contemporary Muslim scholars 
and jurists also argue that apostasy simpliciter is not a hadd-type offence and is not 
punishable with death on its own except when it involves acts of rebellion against the Islamic 
State. 207 
From the perspective of international human rights law, Mayer has argued that these 
punishments are inconsistent "with modern penological principles and modern human rights 
norms". 
208 There is also the argument that most Muslims who advocate the implementation 
201 See e. g. El-Awa, M. S., Punishment in Islamic Law, (1982) p. 1. 
202 See Q 5: 38 which says: "As to the thief, male or female, cut of his of her hand: a punishment by way of example, from 
God, for their crime... ". 
203 This punishment is based on Q 5: 33 which says: " The punishment of those who wage war against God and His 
Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of 
hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land... ". 
204 Q 24: 2 says: "The woman and the man guilty of zinä, flog each of them with a hundred stripes; Let no compassion move 
you in their case, in a matter prescribed by God ifyou believe in God and the last day... ". While Muslim jurists agree that 
the term zind covers both adultery and fornication, the punishment prescribed here is applied only to unmarried persons 
(fornication) while according to the Sunnah the punishment for adultery in the case of married persons (adultery) is stoning 
to death (rajm). See e. g. Rizvi, S. A. H., et al. "Adultery and Fornication in Islamic Criminal Law: A Debate", in Mahmood, 
T., et al. (eds. ) Criminal Law in Islam and the Muslim World (1996) pp. 223-241 for a debate on the punishment of zinä 
under Islamic law. See also Chapter 8, pp. 314-16 below. 
205 Q 24: 4 says: "And those who launch a charge against chaste women and produce not four witnesses (to support their 
allegations) f og them with eighty stripes... ". 
206 See e. g. Safwat, S. M., "Offences and Penalties in Islamic Law"(1982) 26 Islamic Quarterly, 169. 
207 See Section on apostasy in Chapter 6, pp. 162-64 below. 
208 See Mayer, A. E., (1993) supra, note191 above, p. 37. 
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of the hudüd punishments in Muslim countries are themselves quite ambivalent about them 
because of the severity of the punishments. 209 While Muslim jurists and scholars may not 
subscribe to the categorisation of the hudüd punishments as "cruel and inhuman", both 
classical and contemporary scholars of Islamic law do not deny the harshness of the 
punishments. Their justification however is that the harshness of the hudüd punishments are 
meant and actually serve as a deterrent to the offences for which they are prescribed. They 
further contend that the standard of proof for all the hudüd offences under Islamic law is very 
arduous, they must be proved beyond any atom of doubt based on the Tradition of the 
Prophet in which he said: "Avert the hudüd punishment in case of doubt 
... 
for error in 
clemency is better than error in imposing punishment", 21° which often makes the 
implementation of the punishments rare. Commenting on adultery and fornication (zinä) for 
instance, Shalabi pointed out that the proof required makes the punishment for zinä 
applicable only to those who committed the offence openly without any consideration for 
public morality at all, and in a manner that is almost impossible and intolerable in any 
civilised society. 211 
In a similar vein during a Conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 1972 on "Moslem 
Doctrine and Human Rights" between delegates of the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Justice and 
delegates from the Council of Europe, 212 a member of the Saudi Arabian delegate Dr. Al- 
Dawalibi observed as follows: 
"I have been in this country (Saudi Arabia) for seven years 
... 
and I never saw, or 
heard of, any amputation of the hand for stealing. This is because crime is extremely 
rare. So, all that remains of that punishment is its harshness, which has made it 
possible for all to live in perfect security and tranquillity, and for those who are 
tempted to steal, to keep their hands whole. Formerly, when these regions were ruled 
by the French-inspired Penal Code, under the Ottoman Empire, pilgrims travelling 
between the two Holy Cities 
- 
Mecca and Medina, could not feel secure for their 
purse or their life, unless they had a strong escort. But when this country became the 
Saudi Kingdom, the Koranic Law was enforced, crime immediately disappeared. A 
traveller, then, could journey, not only between the Holy Cities, but even from Al- 
Dahran on the Gulf to Jeddah on the Red Sea, and traverse a distance of more than 
one thousand and five hundred kilometers across the desert all alone in his private 
car, without harbouring any fear or worry about his life or property, be it worth 
millions of dollars, and be he a complete foreigner. ""' 
209 See generally, ibid. pp. 37-60 and Bannerman, P., Islam in Perspective (1988) p. 26. 
210 See e. g. Al-Zuhayli, Al-Figh al-Islami wa-Adillatuh (Arabic) (1997) Vol. 7., p. 5307. 
211 Shalabi, M. M., al-Figh al-lslän: iyy Bayn al-Mithäliyyah at-Wdgi 'iyyah (Arabic) (1960) p. 201. 
212 Comprising of Prof. Sean MacBride, former President of Council of Europe, Prof. Karel Vasak, Prof. Henri Laoust and 
Maitre Jean-Louis Aujol.. 
213 See Ministry of Justice (ed. ) Conference ofRiyad on Moslem Doctrine and Human Rights in Islam (March 23,1972) p. 8. 
Saudi Embassy News Website: at http: //www. saudiembassy. net/press release/hr-72. html (2/3/2001). 
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Another delegate also stated that: 
"In this manner, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where Islamic Law is enforced, 
state money is transferred from one town to another, from one bank to another, in an 
ordinary car, without any escort or protection, but the car driver. Tell me, 
Gentlemen: in any of your Western States, would you be ready to transfer money 
from one bank to another, in any of your capitals, without the protection of a strong 
police force and the necessary number of armoured cars? "214 
This confidence in the deterrent nature of the hudüd punishments is just one of its 
influencing factors within Muslim societies. The most influencing factor however is the 
divine weight of the hudüd punishments since they are injunctions of the Shari `ah. El-Awa 
has pointed out that while the considerations of social utility form the basis of the theories of 
punishment in Western penal systems, "in Islamic law the theory of punishment is based on 
the belief in the divine revelation contained in the Qur'an and the Sunna of Prophet 
Muhammad. "215 The hudüd punishments are thus classified as the rights of God (huqüq 
Allah). They are prescribed as punishment for violating divine injunctions that protect public 
interest and are therefore not remissible. Al-Mawardi had pointed out that the hudad are 
"deterrent punishments prescribed by God to prevent Men from committing what He 
forbade... "216 For the above reasons Muslim jurists hold that their severity cannot be 
217 questioned. 
While the need to punish those guilty of crimes is appreciated under international human 
rights law, the contention has been that offenders and criminals are still human beings and 
must therefore be treated with some dignity. Thus the punishment for crimes must not be 
excessively severe, degrading or inhuman, it must aim at reforming the offender. While 
Muslims are under a religious obligation to believe in the divine nature of the hudüd 
punishments and not question its severity, the same cannot be said of non-Muslims. Since 
criminal punishments are generally not restricted to Muslims alone within an Islamic State it 
becomes necessary to examine the principles of the Islamic criminal punishments outside the 
scope of strict divine penology. 
From a pragmatic perspective, the factors that are usually considered in the prescription 
of punishments for crimes are: the interests of the society, that of the victim and that of the 
214 ibid. See also Mourad, F. A., and al-Sa'aty, H., "Impact of Islamic Penal Law on Crime Situation in Saudi Arabia: 
Findings of A Research Study" in Mahmood, T., et. al. (ed. ) Criminal Law in Islam and the Muslim World (1996) p. 340-374 
for an empirical comparative study on the crime situation in Saudi Arabia. 
215 El-Awa, M. S., (1982) supra, note 201 above, p. xi. 
216 See al-Mawardi, A., al-Ahkäm al-Sultäniyyah (Arabic) (1386AH). See also the English Translation by Yate, A., The 
Laws of Islamic Governance (1996). 
217 See generally, e. g., Ibn a1-Qayyim, I'läm al-Muwagq'In 'An Rabb al- AlamIn (Arabic) (1996), AbO Zahrah, S. M., al- 
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offender. Thus, penological policy is usually based on the theories of deterrence, retribution 
and reform. Although there may be some overlapping, basically deterrence may be viewed as 
serving the interest of society, retribution that of the victim, and reform that of the offender. 
There could indeed be difficulty in defining a balance between these interests in the 
prescription of punishments for particular offences. For instance, while a generality of 
opinion in a particular society may reveal that a particular punishment is too severe for a 
particular offence, the opinion of victims of that offence in the same society, depending on 
their ordeals, might reveal that no punishment is too severe for perpetrators of such offences. 
It may be argued too that offenders are products of the society, so it is their reform that must 
be given priority in the determination of a penal policy. 
Against this background, El-Awa has pointed out that the hudüd punishment "cares very 
little for the criminal and his reform, and concentrates on preventing the commission of 
offences. "218 That is, it gives priority to the interest of society, by wanting to prevent, ab 
initio, the occurrence of the hadd-type offences through a deterrent and retributive 
philosophy. This suggests that Islamic law aims at an ideal society. But if despite the 
deterrent nature of the severe punishments the offences still occur, there would then arise the 
question of whether or not the society has played a contributory role for the commitment of 
the offence. Thus, even in the enforcement of the hudiid, the rule also is that there must exist 
an ideal Islamic society. Where it can be reasonably proved that the offender was a product 
of the society's sociological problems then his interest must be taken into consideration and 
the hudüd punishments would not be applied. There is evidence that the Prophet suspended 
the enforcement of the hadd punishment for theft during war, and the second Caliph, Umar, 
suspended its enforcement at a time of widespread famine in Medina. 
219 El-Awa also 
referred to the account of Abu Yüsuf, the great eighth century Hanafi jurist, in his famous 
work Kitäb al-Kharäj220, to indicate that circumstances could make it necessary to relax or 
suspend the enforcement of the hudüd punishment by the ruling authority. 
221 It could be 
argued therefore that while to Muslims the prescription of the hudüd punishment is not 
questionable, its application by the State is however not in isolation of other sociological 
factors within the State. The determination of the enabling or inhibiting sociological factors 
Jarimah wa al-'Ugabah fi al-Fiqh al-Islämi (Arabic) (n. d. ). 
218 El-Awa, M. S., (1982) supra, note 201 above pp. 23-35 and p. 134. 
219 See e. g. Abü Zahrah, M., Usül al-Fiqh (Arabic) (1958) p. 222 -228 Ibn Qayyim, I'läm al-Muwagq'In (Arabic) (1996) 
Vol. I p. 185. See also Karnali, M. H., Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (1991) p. 247 and 270. 
220 AbO Yüsuf, Y., Kitäb al-Khardj (Arabic) (1352A. H. ) pp. 149-152. 
221 El-Awa, (1982) supra, note 201 above, p. 137. See also Qutb, M., Islam the Misunderstood Religion (1978) pp. 165-171. 
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for the application of the hudüd punishment is, as shown by the examples above, left to the 
discretion of the State to be exercised in good faith. 
While the hudüd punishment is deterrent in nature for the public interest, the to `zir 
punishments, due to the wide authority that the State has in its prescription, provide means 
for punishments that aim for the criminals reform. The gisäs punishments complete the cycle 
by taking the interest of the victim into consideration in the enforcement of the retributive 
punishment. 222 It could be argued therefore that the three tiers of punishment under Islamic 
law are interpretable pragmatically to accommodate modern penological principles 
depending on the political and humanitarian will of the ruling authority in the Islamic State. 
Against the foregoing background, the conflict between criminal punishments under 
Islamic law and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments under 
international human rights law can be addressed from two dimensions. The first dimension 
concerns the punishment of non-hudüd offences. Since the State has discretion under Islamic 
law to impose less harsh punishments for non-hudüd offences, Muslim States can thus 
effectively exercise that discretion in cognisance of their international human rights law 
obligations, and directly proscribe their non-hudüd punishments that violate the prohibition 
of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments. It must be observed however that apart from 
religious factors, developing nations, for many reasons that include economic limitations, do 
often prefer an effectively deterrent "harsh" criminal punishment over a "humane" 
reformative one even where the legislative authority lies completely within the prerogative of 
the State. 
The second dimension concerns the hudüd offences, which are specifically prescribed 
by direct injunctions of the Qur'an. An-Na'im has observed in respect of the hudüd 
n 
punishments that "in all Muslim societies, the possibility of human judgment regarding the 
appropriateness or cruelty of a punishment decreed by God is simply out of the question", 
and that "(n)either Islamic re-interpretation nor cross-cultural dialogue is likely to lead to 
the(ir) total abolition... as a matter of Islamic law". 223 Questioning the hudüd punishments is 
considered as questioning the divine wisdom underlying them and impugning the divinity of-59 
the Qur'an and the theocentric nature of Islamic law. From an Islamic legal perspective the 
conflict may however be addressed indirectly through procedural means. Islamic legalists 
concede the fact that it is lawful to utilise "any strategem which averts the (hudüd) penalty 
222 The victim (or his heir) in Qisäs cases has a mediating role in the punishment of the offender. 223 See An-Na'im, A. A., (1992) supra, note 187 above, pp. 35-36. Emphasis added. 
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without impugning the Law", 224 the Prophet having advised that one should avert the hudüd 
punishment in case of doubt because error in clemency is better than error in imposing 
punishment. 225 Chief Justice Afzal Zullah (as then was) of the Pakistan Supreme Court had 
thus observed in The State v Ghulam Ali 226 that: 
"an uncontroverted principle of Hudood (is) that not only the maximum benefit of 
every reasonable doubt will be extended to the accused, but also 
... 
effort is to be 
made not to inflict the Hadd so long (as) it can be avoided by all legitimate and 
established means". 227 
Thus even though Muslim States can not, for the divine weight, directly proscribe the 
hudüd punishments, they can regulate its application through legally valid procedural devices 
under Islamic law. 228 Mayer has however raised the question that "if one attempts such a 
compromise, how does one go about defending it against fundamentalist critics, who are 
likely to accuse one of failing to take divine commands seriously? s229 This question 
highlights the volatility of the issue but can be answered through internal dialogue within 
Muslim States and among Muslim groups. It is establishable by reference to classical Islamic 
jurisprudence that averting hudüd punishments through procedural means does not amount to 
impugning divine commands. Such aversion does not necessarily mean that there would be 
no punishment at all, but that through adherence to strict and lawful procedural rules of 
Islamic law ta'zir punishments are applied instead of the hudüd punishments as highlighted 
by Chief Justice Zullah above. 
Although the obligations of State parties under international human rights instruments 
often require direct legislation abolishing punishments considered cruel, inhuman and 
degrading, such direct legislation can divest a ruling authority of its Islamic legitimacy in-/ 
many parts of the Muslim world today. The reverence of Qur'anic injunctions by Muslims 
thus puts at a cross-roads the Human Rights Committee's demand on Muslim States to 
directly abolish the hudad punishments. With the current resurgence and restoration of 
Islamic law in many Muslim States, it is more feasible to seek for reconciliation between the 
hudüd punishments and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments under 
224 See Eaton, G., Islam and the Destiny of Man (1994) p. 185. 
225 See e. g. Al-Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh al-Islämi wa-Adillatuh (Arabic) (1997) Vol. 7., p. 5307. 
226 (1986) 38 PLD (S. Ct) 741. 
227 ibid, at 759. 
22$ See Chapter 8, p. 314 below on how the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has for instance demonstrated this in practice. See 
also Mayer, E. A., (1993) supra, note 191 above, pp. 54-55. And for an analysis of the practice in Libya See Mahmood, T., 
"Legal System of Modern Libya: Enforcement of Islamic Penal Laws" in Mahmood, T., et al. (eds. ) Criminal Law in Islam 
and the Muslim World (1996) pp. 375-388 and Mayer, A. E., "Libyan Legislation in Defense of Arabo-Islamic Sexual 
Mores", in Mahmood, T., ibid., pp. 389-421. 
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international human rights law indirectly through legal procedural shields under Islamic law 
as is currently demonstrated in the practice of some Muslim States that apply Islamic law as 
State law. 
229 See Mayer, E. A., ibid., p. 47. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conceptual Differences in Islamic Law and 
International Human Rights Law 
We established the concept of human rights within the themes of Islamic law in the last 
chapter but identified that this is subjected to the provisions of the Shari `ah, which is 
religious based. Conversely, international human rights law is today interpreted in a purely 
secular language influenced by strong notions of Western liberalism and not constrained by 
any religious orthodoxy. This creates what has been described as "theocentric" and 
"anthropocentric" differences between Islamic law and international human rights law. ' To 
accommodate Islamic law is often feared as accommodating fundamentalism and a barrier 
against the liberties offered by international human rights law. ' Advocates of Islamic law 
also often consider Western liberalism as too permissive and intrusive upon religious ideals 
and morality. Thus the issues of "fundamentalism" and "liberalism" also raise some 
conceptual conflicts between Islamic law and international human rights law respectively. 
Traditionally, these conceptual differences have been mostly addressed from a 
monological "either/or" perspective. There is often the temptation to hang on to stereotyped 
negative notions of those terms, which does shut out consideration of any positive 
interrelationship of the concepts in their application to Islamic law and international human 
rights law respectively. In this chapter we will examine and traverse the traditional arguments 
on those conceptual differences, and propose a more accommodative consideration of the 
differences. 
THE THEOCENTRIC VERSUS ANTHROPOCENTRIC DIFFERENCES 
Theocentric means having God as the central point of focus while Anthropocentric 
means having Man (i. e. human being) as the central point of focus. The former is a religious 
perspective while the latter is a secular one. Based on religion, Islamic law follows the 
'See Brohi, A. K., "Islam and Human Rights", in Gauher, A., The Challenge of Islam (1980) p. 179 and Weeramantry, C. G., 
Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (1988) pp. 116-117. 
81 
theocentric approach and makes direct reference to God as the original granter of human 
rights. 3 The main and important effect is to instil an element of God-consciousness and 
religiosity in the duty to respect human rights under Islamic law. The Islamic commitment to 
human rights can thus be described as both religious and humanitarian. It is a dual 
relationship, one vertical between human beings and God, and the other horizontal between 
human beings themselves. 4 The vertical relationship is the religious commitment, which 
when fulfilled strengthens the horizontal and humanitarian commitments Conversely, 
International human rights law follows the anthropocentric approach. It has a secular 
approach that makes no direct reference to God. The commitment is only a humanitarian one 
and has the freedom and liberty of the individual human being at heart. Although 
international human rights law recognises freedom of religion as a human right6, it does not 
consider religion as a basis for human rights. Human rights are rather considered as a social 
practice that arises from human action and not granted by God. 7 A sharp and indicting divide 
is thus often advocated between the theocentric and anthropocentric perspectives by the 
champions of each approach. 
On one hand, there is often the tendency to want to portray the anthropocentric approach 
of international human rights law as being totally incompatible with the principles of Islamic 
law. On the other hand, a proposal during the drafting discussions of the UDHR of 1948 to 
inject an iota of "theocentricism" into the Declaration was defeated. 8 This raises the question 
of whether the non-reference to God in international human rights documents makes them 
irreverent and non-binding in Islamic law. In opposing any such suggestion, Riffat Hassan 
has stated that: 
"... even though many charters of human rights originating in the Western world do 
not make direct reference to God, it does not necessarily follow that God-centred or 
God-related concepts and laws are excluded from them. Reference to God does not 
necessarily make sacred, nor does nonreference to God necessarily make profane, 
any human document. To me it seems truly remarkable that an organisation such as 
Z See examples cited in Chapter 2 at p. 22 above. 
See e. g. the Preamble of the OIC Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990); and the Preamble of the Universal 
Islamic Declaration on Human Rights (1981). 
° The horizontal relationship here will include also the relationship between the State and the individual because the State is 
equally constituted of individual human beings placed in positions of authority as trustees. 
s See e. g. Weeramantry, C. G., (1988) supra, note 1 above, p. 116-117. 
6 See e. g. Art. 18 of the ICCPR. 
7 See e. g. Donnelly, J., Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, (1989) pp. 16-19. 
'See e. g. Abu-Sahlieh, S. A., `Muslims And Human Rights: Challenges and Perspectives' in Schmale, W., (ed. ) Human 
Rights and Cultural Diversity, (1993) p. 239 at 242. See also Little, D., Religion- Catalyst or Impediment to International 
Law? The Case of Hugo Grotius" (1993) American Society of International Law Proceedings, p. 322 at 323, where it is 
observed that "The legislative history of the Universal Declaration, in fact, clearly indicates that the drafters, after 
considerable controversy, deliberately refrained from including references to a deity... ". 
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the United Nations, where every word of every declaration is fought over in an 
attempt by each country and bloc to protect its vested interest, could arrive at a 
document such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which, though 
"secular" in terminology, seems to me to be more "religious" in essence than many 
`fatwas" given by Muslim and other religious authorities and agencies. "9 
The reference to "inherent dignity" of human beings in the UDHR represented a 
compromise language with which every State may feel comfortable, as is the diplomacy of 
drafting international instruments. While religiously inclined States may perceive the inherent 
dignity of the human being as emanating from God, States with no religious inclination were 
equally free to view the same as emanating from whatever source they choose to assign it. 
However, the conflcit is not really in whether or not direct reference is made to God in 
international human rights instruments. It rather lies in the capacity to interpret the 
theocentric into the anthropocentric and vice versa. The proposition of some scholars on this 
subject suggests that every aspect of the Shari `ah should be reformed to fall in line with 
present interpretations of international human rights law. Such proposition presumes the 
present interpretations of international human rights law as a fait accompli that fully satisfies 
a universalism acceptable in all respects to every culture and civilisation. Often there is a 
theoretic presumptive validity of universalism in international human rights discourse 
requiring that "everything else (be) adjusted in order to maintain that assumption. "" It is 
highly utopian to presume however that Muslim States would want to repudiate every aspect 
of their Islamic legal and moral autonomy for a universalism not inclusive of their religious 
sensitivities. Despite her strong argument for the UDHR above, one observes that Riffat 
Hassan still turned round to demonstrate the theocentric perspective by which Muslims 
generally look at life. She still concluded that human rights were given by God and are not a 
human invention and thus she does not, as a Muslim, "look for their origin or essence in 
books of law or history but in those books of scripture which contains God's eternal message 
and guidance to humankind. "11 After which she enumerated a list of rights from the Qur'an. 
This confirms Luca's observation that the Qur'an (i. e. Shari `ah) has a stronger hold than any 
other legislation on the mind of Muslims. 12 It also demonstrates the impossibility or great 
difficulty of divesting the concept of human rights in Islamic law from its theocentric basis. 
9 Hassan, R., 'On Human Rights and the Qur'anic Perspective', in Swidler, A., (ed. ) Human Rights in Religious Traditions, 
(1982), p. 51 at 52. 10 Watson, J. S., Theory and Reality in the International Protection of Human Rights (1999) p. 15. 
Hassan, R., (1982) supra, note 9 above, at 55. 
ýZ See Luca, C., `Discrimination in the Arab Middle East', in Veenhoven, W. A., (cd. ) Case Studies On Human Rights and 
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It is a matter of faith that needs to be appreciated. 
For the realisation of the ideals of international human rights law in the Muslim world, 
there is need for a bilateral harmonisation of the theocentric and anthropocentric differences. 
The divine and the secular need not be imperatively conflicting nor reproaching. They must 
of necessity interact. There cannot be a total separation between Man and God, especially on 
matters concerning human well being and welfare. This is because of the strong influence 
which religion has on a great population of the world's people. Although religions had been 
misused by some in the past in a very myopic manner to commit selfish atrocities against 
people, it is also true that principles of religion have equally been used to greatly alleviate 
human sufferings. There are still many individuals and groups today who are motivated only 
by religious principles in their involvement in humanitarian activities all over the world. For 
the well being of humanity, the harmonisation of the theocentric and anthropocentric 
perspectives of human rights is as essential as inhaling and exhaling13. On the part of Islam, 
the theocentric perspective of Islamic law must therefore not be seen or projected as a totally 
exclusionist one. It is equally humanitarian and must therefore be accommodative of the 
anthropocentric perspective of international human rights law. As eloquently expressed by 
Manzoor, "(t)he logic of Islam is to conjoin the paradigmatic truth of faith with the 
pragmatic order of the Community. Holding fast to the transcendence of truth, Islam does not 
allow the world to slip out of its hands". " The underlying principle here, as is reflected in the 
practices of the Prophet Muhammad, the rightly guided Caliphs and the early Islamic jurists, 
is that although secular principles can not override Islamic moral and legal values, yet 
valuable human ideas for the betterment of humanity cannot be prejudicially rejected. It was 
in that regard that the great twelfth century Mälikl jurist and Islamic philosopher, Ibn Rushd 
(Averroes), considered it an Islamic duty to study the thought of earlier scholars and thinkers 
and benefit from them. He said: 
"When we read the books of earlier thinkers, we see their thoughts in these books. If 
there is something there that corresponds to the truth, we accept this and rejoice over 
it... And if we find something in their thoughts that does not correspond to the truth, 
we call attention to it and warn against it. "15 
Fundamental Freedoms, Vol. 1. 
, 
(1975) p. 113 at 215. 
13 This simile is borrowed from Manzoor, P., "Faith and Order: Reclaiming the Islamic Theory of Practice", (1990) 10 The 
Muslim World Book Review, No. 2, p. 3. 
14 ibid. 
15 See Fasl al-Maqdl 13 in Falsafah Ibn Rushd (Arabic) (1968) cited in Zakzouk, M., "Cultural Relations Between the West 
and the World of Islam: Meeting Points and Possibilities of Co-operation on the Academic Level", Translated by Walpole, 
M., (1992) 3 Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, No. 1, p. 69 at 74. 
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This demonstrates the accommodating nature of the Islamic theocentric approach. It 
does not mean blindly shutting the door against everything emanating from human thought 
and secular. It is a Qur'anic injunction upon Muslims to always co-operate for the attainment 
of the common good of humanity. 16 Thus Khoury has pointed out that the contemporary 
Muslim world must, without loosing its theocentric identity, be able to contribute 
- 
"towards the realization of the universal solidarity of all people and towards the 
realization of a social order in which all (human beings) are essentially equal before 
the law and enjoy equal rights in their daily life, and where tolerance is not only 
practised, but the irrevocable human rights of all are unreservedly recognized. "" 
This is fully reflected in the Qur'anic injunction upon Muslims that says: 
"0 you Believers! Stand out firmly for God as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not 
the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be 
just: that is next to piety: and fear God for God is well acquainted with all that you 
do. " '$ 
Equally, there is the need in the interpretation of international human rights law for the 
appreciation and accommodation of the theocentric nature of Islamic law. The interpretations 
of the liberties and freedoms contained in the international human rights instruments should 
be sensitive to the moral values of the Shari `ah. That is the inclusive approach of 
interpreting and implementing international human rights law. A productive interpretation 
should appreciate the religious sensitivities of Islamic law in the quest for a true universalism 
in international human rights law within Muslim States. Where the door is shut completely 
against the Islamic theocentric perspective it will be difficult if not impossible to interpret 
international human rights law in the language of the Shari `ah or vice versa, no matter how 
hard the effort. For, as stated by Eaton, "(t)here is a limit to how far men can go in 
interpreting the Divine Word in terms of a language from which all the appropriate words 
have been excluded. "19 
The theocentric approach was not actually alien to the origins of Western perspectives of 
human rights too. The Magna Carta of 1215, which is considered as the basis of English 
constitutional liberties, was issued under the "grace of God"20. The formulators of the 
16 See e. g. Q5: 2. 
17 Khoury, A. Th., Toleranz in Islam (1982) p. 185 cited in Zakzouk, M., (1992), supra, note 15 above, p. 73. 
18Q5: 8. 
19 Eaton, H. G., The Keys To The Kingdom (1977) p. 180. 
20 See the preamble of the Magna Carta (1215). See e. g. Dickonson, J. C., The Great Charter (1955) p. 17. 
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American Declaration of Independence of 1776 also recognised that the rights it proclaimed 
were endowed unto men by "their Creator"21. They also appealed to the "Supreme Judge of 
the world for the rectitude of (their) intentions"22 in declaring those rights. Similarly, the 
rights contained in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizens of 1789 
were considered to be "sacred" and were declared "in the presence of the Supreme Being, 
and with the hope of His blessing and favour. , 23 
Departure from the theocentric approach to both law and morality in the West, was an 
aftermath of the Enlightenment Age when a strong faith was developed in materialism and 
the power of human reason as a tool of endless progress not only in technological 
development but even in moral values. Due to the earlier conflict between religion and 
scientific advancement in the West as well as the political use of religion for the destruction 
of opponents, religion came to be perceived as stifling and repressive. The Church was 
considered as an institution that had enslaved the human mind. Through philosophical 
scholarship human aspiration was thus motivated towards worldly happiness and against the 
belief in religious salvation. The Church was harshly criticised and stripped of authority in 
political and State matters. It was argued that Man must take control of his own destiny by 
separating religion and God from the public affairs of the State. Both political and legal 
authorities were therefore freed of any consideration of religious morality, which was 
considered to be a clog in the wheel of human civilisation. 
The atrocities of both the first and second world wars however proved that it was neither 
religion nor God that was savage or barbaric. It was Man himself who could be very unjust 
in the use of authority. Making Man more political and materialistic and less religious and 
God-conscious did not therefore stop him from being brutal. Men similarly misused secular 
political authority and again the need for morality became imperative even in secular political 
authority. International human rights law was thus an attempt to re-introduce the moral back 
into the political. So far a completely pragmatic and secular morality has still been adopted. 
The fact that there continues to be violations of human rights in both religious and secular 
societies of today's world indicate that the fault lies with Man himself. Having a theocentric 
perception therefore does not in any way accommodate the violation of human rights more 
than an anthropocentric perception does. The violations are more often political and 
21 See the preamble of the American Declaration of Independence (1776). 
22 See the conclusion of the American Declaration of Independence (1776). 
23 See the preamble of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen, Translated in Paine, T, Rights of Man, (1984) 
p. 110. 
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economic than religious. They are the evils of humans against humans. The Qur'an 
emphatically says that: "Verily God will not deal unjustly with mankind, it is mankind that 
deal unjustly with themselves. "24 Actually Muslims do argue that a sincere commitment to 
the theocentric perspective compels the religiously inclined to fulfil the obligations of human 
rights, because they would then be considered also as a religious obligation that will be 
accounted for in the hereafter. 
Human rights do not therefore have to be imperatively secular, nor depend on the 
existence of a secular State or society. " If they are, that will be difficult to reconcile with 
Islamic socio-legal thought. A common ideal shared by most Muslims, whether traditionalists 
or modernists, is their opposition to the replacement of the Islamic polity with a totally 
secular one. 26 The theocentric factor is therefore a theoretic constant in Islamic political, 
moral and legal thought that cannot be totally dislodged. An appreciation of this in 
international human rights law will facilitate some harmony in human rights values that will 
go a long way in creating a theoretical balance upon which a realistic universal application of 
international human rights law can be achieved, especially in the Muslim world. In that 
respect, one insightful authority has observed notably that: 
"The morality of religion has provided some of the glue that has made international 
law stick. The binding force of any law, international included, cannot rest solely on 
force. The legitimacy of international law and international organizations ultimately 
is a function of widespread individual beliefs that the law and its authorities are right 
and appropriate. International lawyers have long recognized the potential of 
religious and moral belief for building a sense of international community whereby 
peoples of the globe will be concerned with the fate of all the nations, not. just their 
own" 27 
It is clear from the above analysis that the theocentric and anthropocentric perspectives 
to human rights are not vehemently incompatible. Both perspectives are accommodative of 
each other through constructive analysis and proper understanding of the concepts. While the 
recognition of the right to freedom of religion and belief 
8 does facilitate the accommodation 
of the theocentric perspective within international human rights law, Shari `ah provisions 
such as "... God intends every facility for you (humans); He does not want to put you in 
24 Q 10: 44. 
25 But see e. g. Little, D., (1993) supra, note 8 above, p. 323 for the view that human rights has to be secular. 
26 See Binder, L., Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, (1988) p. 244. See also An-Na'im, A. A., 
Towards an Islamic Reformation (1990) p. 10. 
27 Janis, M. W., "Religion and International Law", (1993) American Society of International Law Proceedings, at 322. 
28 See e. g. Art. 18 of the UDHR (1948) and Art. 18 of the ICCPR (1966). 
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difficulties... "29 also facilitate the accommodation of the anthropocentric perspective within 
Islamic law. 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND WESTERN LIBERALISM 
Liberalism advocates values such as freedom, liberty, individualism, utilitarianism, 
pluralism, empiricism, and tolerance. 30 It is generally understood as a political or 
philosophical theory that postulates the complete liberty of the human person. Applied to 
human rights, liberalism embraces liberty and tolerance as a moral theory as well as a 
politico-legal philosophy. " Liberalism is considered in Western thought as the main vehicle 
to ensure perfect liberty of the individual and guarantee the enjoyment of his full human 
rights everywhere. Western liberalism has always been linked with the Enlightenment and its 
defence of rationalism and skirmish with religion. Thus liberalism is often considered to be 
mostly secular and anti-religious. Muslim States generally consider Western liberalism to be 
too permissive and fear that it can corrupt the moral values set by the Shari `ah. Western 
liberalism is often seen as promoting the notion of absolute liberty and freedom of the 
individual even against societal morality. 
Canvassing liberalism as a notion of absolute liberty and freedom of the individual is 
however misleading. A notion of absolute freedoms and liberties opposes the very foundation 
of political philosophy and the theory of law. This is because both law and political authority 
do in fact essentially constitute some limitation upon the liberties. and freedoms of 
individuals. 32 The fallacy of an absolute notion of liberty had long been expressed by Locke 
as follows: 
"... Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which cannot be, 
where there is no law: But Freedom is not, as we are told, A Liberty for every Man to 
do what he lists ". 33 
Under what has been described as the "fundamental liberal principle" there only exists a 
kind of presumption in favour of liberty, which places the burden of proof on anyone who 
29 Q2: 185. 
30 e. g. See generally Gaus, G. F., "Liberalism", in Zalta, E. N., (ed. ) Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Online: 
http: //plato. stanford. edu [12/2/2001]. 
" Although there exist different ideological approaches to human rights even in the West, the UN international human 
rights treaty bodies do demonstrate a liberalistic approach in their interpretation of international human rights treaties as is 
demonstrated for example in the practices of the HRC and the ESCR Committee in Chapters 6 and 7 below. 
J2 See e. g. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice ofAutonomy (1988) pp. 22-23. 
33 Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, Laslett, P., (ed. ) (1967) p. 324. 
88 
contends for any restriction on it. 34 Thus the power of the State to interfere in the actions of 
individuals is not completely ousted under liberal theory but is only curtailed. The necessity 
of control by the political authority through law is recognised, but any limitations they 
impose upon individual liberties and freedoms must be publicly justifiable to be acceptable. 
That is what is often referred to as the "justificatory principle" in liberal theory. This thus 
exposes the fallacy of the postulation that there exists a complete freedom to do whatever one 
desires in liberal societies. The justificatory principle establishes that restrictions upon the 
rights of individuals may not in themselves be wrong provided they are determinable and 
justifiable. The difficult question however is how to determine the parameters of justification 
for any limitations or restrictions that political authority and law may place on individual 
liberty. This involves a question of values. Values are without doubt subjective and also not 
static, whether in relation to international law or to Islamic law. The differences in values are 
reflected even in western liberalism by the fact that liberal traditions vary with respect to the 
different Western nations and over time. 35 Thus while liberalism is associated closely with 
civil and personal liberties in some Western countries, it centres on democracy or economic 
freedom or secularism in others. 
With respect to human rights, liberalism is more relevant to the civil and political rights. 
In international human rights law, both political authority and law must be geared towards 
ensuring the liberty of individuals. The theory of liberalism recognises both a positive and a 
negative conception of liberty in that respect. The negative conception of liberty is more 
emphasised than the positive conception of it in the West. The negative conception of liberty 
considers a person "to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with 
(his) activity" without compelling justification. 36 The State is generally prohibited (negative 
obligation) from interfering with the freedom of the individual to determine his own moral 
values, with the consequence that individuals may even have the right to do what is wrong 
from the moral point of view of the society as a whole. 37 A moralist regime is thus often 
detested in most Western societies today. This is why many Islamic analysts see Western 
societies as being too permissive. It must be acknowledged however that this emphasis on 
the negative conception of liberty has, in many respects, greatly contributed to the guarantee 
sa See e. g. Gaus, G. F., Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory, (1996) pp. 162-166. 
35 For instance, women got the right to vote in the United States in 1920 and in Britain in 1928, and it was only in 1965 that 
African-Americans could vote freely in the United States after the Voting Rights Act suspended certain voter qualifications 
that kept them out. 
36 See e. g. Berlin, I., "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, (1969) p 122. 
37 See Waldron, J., Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991. (1993) pp. 63-87. 
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of the human rights of individuals in some Western countries. It restrains the State from 
unnecessarily interfering with the liberties and freedoms of individuals. 
Islamic legal and political theory also recognises the negative approach to liberty, but not 
independent of religious morality and consciousness. 38 Under Islamic law the political 
authority has a moralist tendency due to its urge to ensure the maintenance of Islamic moral 
standards in the Islamic State. The State has an obligation to maintain public order by 
"commanding virtues and prohibiting vices". 39 Basically therefore, the individual does not 
have absolute liberty under Islamic law. He is not, as expressed by Locke, the "absolute Lord 
of his own Person", 40 but owes some obligations to his Creator. Some of these obligations 
fall within the scope 
, 
of public law, which the political authority has a duty to uphold. 
Individual liberty is thus subjected to both the Shari `ah and to the political authority, which 
itself is in turn also subject to the Shari `ah. 41 Because the Shari `ah is divine, the attitude of 
Muslims to its provisions is expected to be "we hear and we obey". 2 Although the Qur'an 
often gives some justification for its provisions regulating matters of human relations 
(mu ` ämalät), it is not a condition in Islamic legal and political theory that such justification 
must be absolutely within human rationality. This is based on the Islamic belief that human 
knowledge is limited and God, being Omniscience, knows what human beings know not. 3 It 
is interesting to note that a liberal theorist such as Hayek had also appreciated the limitation 
of human knowledge. 4' Karl Popper had also, criticised philosophers such as Plato, Hegel and 
Marx for failing to appreciate the limits of human knowledge. 45 Although the arguments of 
both Hayek and Popper were not aimed at accommodating religious principles within the 
liberal theory but to expose the defects in complete reliance on utilitarianism, it provides 
secular evidence for the main argument why Islamic law does not rely completely on 
rationalism, namely, Man's limited knowledge. 
The argument above does not however mean a total subjugation of the individual by the 
power of the State under Islamic law. The Islamic legal doctrine of hisbah (public order) only 
38 See Rahman, A., Readings in Political Philosophy, Vol.! LIBERTY, (1987)p. 129. 
39 This is termed Hisbah (meaning "public order") in Islamic politico-legal theory and expressed by the phrase "Amr bi al- 
M'arüf Wa Nahy 'an al-Munkar ". 
40 Locke, J., "The Second Treatise of Government", in Laslett, P., (1967) supra, note 33 above, p. 368. 
41 See Q4: 59. 
42 See Q 2: 285. See also An-Naim, A. A., "Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human 
Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", in An-Na'im, A. A., (ed. ) Human Rights 
in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest For Consensus, (1992) p. 19 at 35 where he explains the binding nature of 
Qur'anic injunctions upon Muslims. 
43 See e. g. Q 3: 66 "... It is God Who knows, and you (human beings) who know not. " 
44 See Hayek, F. A., The Mirage of Social Justice (1976) p. 20. 
45 See generally Popper, K., The Open Society and its Enemies (1945). 
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allows for what may be termed "benevolent interference" by the State in the affairs of 
individuals to enhance their liberty according to the divine provisions of the Shari `ah. This is 
similar to the positive conception of liberty in western liberal theory, whereby there may be 
positive restrictions on some liberties of individuals to further enhance their overall liberty 
and freedom. Thomas Green had argued for positive liberty on the grounds that an individual 
cannot be said to be free or to possess liberty if he is actually subject to a personal desire or 
craving that he cannot control 46 An example is that of an alcoholic, to whom the prohibition 
of intoxicants under Islamic law will appear as a limitation on his liberty to consume what 
pleases him. But intoxicants do, in fact, hinder people from acting independently and thus 
takes away the freedom and liberty of the alcoholic. Green equated such a person to a 
bondsman who has lost his liberty to his cravings 47 An important ideal of freedom 
recognised generally within liberal theory is that of a person who is independent, whose 
actions are his own and able to reflect on his ideals. 8 In the example of alcohol given above, 
the prohibition therefore actually increases the individual's inclination to act independently 
and is thus freedom-enhancing and a positive approach to liberty. Thus Rousseau had argued 
that a person can be "forced to be free". 49 The fact however is that this positive approach to 
liberty, in form of paternalistic interference of the State, is prone to abuse by the political 
authority, especially where the limits of the State's positive interference upon individual 
liberty are not clearly defined or where there are no independent supervisory judicial or quasi- 
judicial institutions to monitor such interference. Advocates of the negative approach thus 
see the positive approach to liberty as a threat to the overall freedom and human rights of 
individuals. Narveson has therefore argued that: "if we think people's liberty important, we 
should think it important enough not to violate it for the sake of promoting any 
... 
goal, even 
if it be called liberty. "50 The truth however is that individuals can not have absolute freedom 
within any political dispensation. The exemptive doctrine of public order in almost every 
legal system confirms that fact. The realistic approach is therefore the adoption of a principle 
of justificatory interference whereby the intervention of the State upon individual freedoms is 
recognised but can only be lawful where reasonably and legally justified. Such justifications 
must however be very specific, well defined and not just general or sweeping justifications 
46 Green, T. H., Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Essays, (eds. ) Harris, P., and Morrow, J., (1986) p. 228. 47 ibid. 
48 See generally e. g. Mill, J. S., JS Mill On Liberty: In Focus. (ed. ) Gray, J., pp. 471-582; Benn, S. I., A Theory of Freedom 
(1988); Dworkin, G., The Theory and Practice ofAutonomy (1988); and Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom (1986). 
49 Rousseau, J, The Social Contract and Discourses, Trans. Cole, G. D. H., (1973) p. 177. 
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that may be. abused_with. impunity, by the political authority. 
Under Islamic law the political authority owes a duty not only to the people but to God 
not to violate the freedom of the ruled without justification. The justificatory principle 
generally finds support from the fact that in the Qur'an itself a justifying clause usually 
accompanies nearly every regulation concerning inter-human relations (mu'ämalät). The 
perimeter of justification in Islamic law is thus the Qur'an itself. Theoretically, it is the only 
perimeter that can be free of human bias because it is a divine revelation that preceded the 
State itself. This is why Muslims put it above every human legislation. While the text of the 
Qur'an is not subject to amendment, its provisions may however be interpreted in the light of 
societal changes within the holistic values of the Shari `ah in a manner that ensures that there 
is no deviation from its theocentric basis. It is with respect to this that an Islamic legal maxim 
states that "tatagayyar al-ahkäm bi tagayur al-zamän" meaning that legal rulings (i. e. their 
interpretations) may change with the change in time. 51 This applies mostly to matters 
concerning human relations (mu'ämalät). Examples of this can be found in the practices of 
Muslim jurists of all ages. This facilitates the interpretation of the Islamic legal texts to 
accommodate the dynamic changes in human life. Also, when the justifications attaching to 
certain legal provisions change then the legal rule may change as well. 
An example can be cited of the Northern Nigerian52 case of Tela Rijiyan Dorawa v. 
Hassan Daudu53 which involved a land dispute between one Dorawa and one Daudu. The 
parties appeared before an Upper Area Court in Sokoto54, each calling a witness in evidence. 
Dorowa called one John (a Christian) as his witness while Daudu called one Hausa (a 
Muslim) as his own witness. The Upper Area Court after reviewing the evidence before it 
rejected the testimony of John on grounds that the evidence of a non-Muslim was not 
acceptable under Islamic law applicable by the court. Judgement was thus entered in favour 
of Hassan Daudu. Dorowa appealed to the Sokoto High Court. The learned High Court 
judge, himself a Muslim, in consultation with the Grand Kadi of the State, 55 allowed the 
appeal and overturned the ruling of the lower court. The high court cited Islamic legal 
literature to illustrate, inter alia, that the traditional reason for the disqualification of the 
50 Narveson, J., The Libertarian Idea, (1988) p. 33. 
"See e. g. al-Ghunaimi, M. T. Durüs f Usal al-Qänün al-Wada'7 (Arabic) p. 150, cited in al-Ghunaimi, M. T., The Muslim 
Conception of International Law and the Western Approach (1968) p. 101. 
52 Nigeria is a multi-religious nation with a predominant Muslim population, especially in the Northern part where Islamic 
law is applicable. 
5° (1975) Northern Nigerian Law Report, 87. 
S° The Upper Area Courts apply Islamic law. 
55 The Grand Kadi of a State in Nigeria is the most senior Islamic law judge within the State's judiciary. He is the head of 
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testimony of non-Muslims under Islamic law was the fear of their giving false evidence due 
to their lack of Islamic belief, and that their evidence was acceptable when there is no such 
fear or in case of necessity. The high court was said to have "regarded the condition of 
Nigeria today being a country with large Muslims, Christian and animist communities, living 
side by side and transacting business with each other, as satisfying the necessity" making the 
evidence of a non-Muslim admissible in Islamic law. 56 
One can thus correctly conclude that being liberal is not un-Islamic. Islamic law also 
accommodates the concept of liberalism but, as usual, in a sense that is not independent from 
Islamic religious and moral consciousness. The difference between Islamic liberalism and 
Western liberalism is thus a matter of degree, which rules out an absolute incompatibility 
between the two. This brings us to the question of "Islamic fundamentalism", a term often 
associated with the application of Islamic law. 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND "ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM" 
Fundamentalism is defined in the ordinary sense as "(u)nswerving belief in a set of basic 
and unalterable principles of a religious or philosophical nature". 
57 The term was originally 
used in reference to a faction of a Protestant Christian group in the United States of America 
that adhered strictly to traditional orthodox tenets of Christianity. They believed in the 
infallibility of the-Bible and emphasised adherence to the pristine purity of the Christian 
faith. 58 The term "Fundamentalism" became prominently associated with Islam when 
Western commentators used it to describe the Islamic element of the Iranian revolution that 
deposed the late Shah of Iran in 1979.59 Since then "Islamic Fundamentalism" has become a 
specific dictionary word and has been defined as "the belief that the revitalisation of Islamic 
societies can come about only through a return to the fundamental principles and practices of 
early Islam. "60 If the belief in the infallibility of the Qur'an and the revitalisation of Islamic 
society through adherence to the fundamental principles of Islam are the factors of Islamic 
fundamentalism, then almost every Muslim would be described as an Islamic 
the Shari`ah Court of Appeal of the State. 
s6 See Hon. Justice Mohammed, U., "Shariah and the Western Common Law: A Comparative Analysis", in Abdul-Rahmon, 
M. O., (ed. ) Thoughts in Islamic Law and Ethics (1992) p. 16 at 25. 
57 See Readers Digest Universal Dictionary (1987) p. 619. 
58 See generally, Barr, J., Fundamentalism (1981) 2"d Ed., and Marsden, G., Fundamentalism and American Culture (1980). 
59 See e. g. Chandra, M., Human Rights and the New World Order (1993) p. 177. 
60 See Pearsall, J., and Trumble, B., The Oxford English Reference Dictionary, 2"a Ed. (1996) p. 746. 
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fundamentalist, 61 because those factors are common inclinations of all Muslims. 
Fundamentalism has however acquired a general usage today, in relation to Islam, 
which is negative and different from the ordinary dictionary meaning. The term has been used 
derogatively to refer to demands for the political implementation of Islam or the application 
of the Shari `ah in Muslim States, and also used to connote fanaticism and terrorism. For 
instance the New York Times published an article in 1993, which stated, inter alia, that: 
"Muslim fundamentalism is fast becoming the chief threat to global peace and 
security as well as a cause for national and local disturbance through terrorism. It is 
akin to the menace posed by Nazism and fascism in the 1930s and then by 
communism in the 1950s". " 
The term "Islamic Fundamentalism" or "Muslim Fundamentalism" thus tends to project 
Islam and Islamic law as threats to international human rights and global peace. Muslims 
generally consider this as inaccurate and misleading and have objected to the use of the term 
in such derogative manner in reference to contemporary Islamic resurgence. 63 Certainly there 
have been instances where Muslim militant groups have been alleged and have also accepted 
responsibility for bombings, hijacking aeroplanes, kidnappings, issuing death threats and 
holding innocent people hostage. In many of such incidents innocent lives are lost, people are 
terrified and human rights are grossly violated. These incidents are normally reported in the 
Western media as acts of Islamic fundamentalism. The pertinent question to ask is whether 
these acts find support within Islamic law. Miah has observed in this regard that: 
"Islam prohibits all forms of terror and tyranny particularly against innocent people. 
It further prohibits, even in war, any unjust or cruel treatment of women, children 
and elderly persons; deliberate destruction of livestock and environment as well as 
cruelty towards the defeated enemy". ' 
It has therefore been argued on one hand that these acts are rather acts of extremism and 
fanaticism on the part of Muslims who commit them and are not tolerated by Islam and 
should thus not be addressed as acts advocated or supported by Islamic law. 65 On the other 
61 See Chandra, M., (1993), supra, note 59 above, pp. 177-8; See also An-Naim, A. A., (1990) supra, note 26 above p. 3. 
62 See The New York Times, 9 September 1993. See also statement by the former NATO Secretary General Willy Claes, that: 
"Islamic Fundamentalism is at least as dangerous as Communism. Please do not underestimate this risk" cited in FOSIS and 
Islamic Foundation, Essays on Islam, (1995) p. 112. 
63 See e. g. Chandra, M., (1993), supra, note 59 above, pp. 177-180; Ahmad, K., "The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence", in 
Esposito, J. L., (ed. ) Voices of Resurgent Islam (1983)pp. 225-226. See generally also the articles on "Fundamentalism" in 
Essays on Islam (1995), supra, note 62 above pp. 77-180. 
64 Miah, F., in Essays on Islam, (1995), supra, note 62 above, p. 112 at 117. 
65 ibid. 
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hand it has also been argued that such acts of extremism are usually reactions to social and 
political injustice taking place in Muslim lands and to which the international community 
usually closes its eyes or tacitly support. Al-Qaradawi thus observed that: 
"Extremism does not originate haphazardly (but) must indeed have causes and 
motives, 
... 
events and actions do not come out of the blue... (but) are governed by 
the law of cause and effect... Knowledge of the causes in this respect is essential to 
enable us to define the remedy... "' 
Akbar Ahmed has illustrated further, with reference to the reaction of the West to the 
cancellation of the democratic elections in Algeria in 1992 as an example of frustrations that 
could lead to such extreme acts by Muslim groups. He said: 
"... when the army prevented FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) from taking power and 
the tanks rolled into the streets, the West was jubilant. The beatings and killings, 
even in the mosques, the arrests and harassments did not appear to dim Western joy. 
The main news was that another Islamic movement had been stopped. There were 
no tears for democracy... Muslims were appalled at the double standards of the 
West. Had there been a similar military action, say in Pakistan, the Western media 
would have become hysterical with stories of the tyranny or martial law. They 
would have paraded the old arguments about the death of democracy in Muslim 
society, the inherent predilection of Muslims for authoritarian rule. But here was a 
situation where the West was gloating over the denial of power to the duly elected 
FIS. The double standards cause Muslims to ask, `Why is the West constantly 
hostile to us? ' 
... 
This manner of negative Western response will provoke a 
s67 virulently anti-Western position. 
The arguments go to the effect that the contemporary resurgence of Islam and calls for 
the application of the Shari `ah as public law in many Muslim countries should not be seen as 
fundamentalism in the sense of promoting extremism and fanaticism that violate the 
principles of international human rights. The call for the complete application of the 
Shari `ah in Muslim lands is in itself a protest against social and political deterioration in the 
Muslim world today and is not inherently antagonistic to the ideals of international human 
rights law, but rather "hostile to whatever or whoever is perceived to be the cause of 
frustration and oppression, be it internal or external. "68 
Fingers are however often pointed to some Muslim States to argue that the 
implementation of Islamic law in those countries have sometimes revealed pictures that 
66 al-Qaradawi, Y., Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism" (1990) p. 25; See also the Introduction in 
Tamimi, A., (ed. ) Power Sharing Islam? (1993). 
67 Ahmed, A. S., Living Islam (1995) p. 148-149. 
68 See Ahmad, K., `The Nature of Islamic Resurgence' (1983) supra, pp. 219. 
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greatly fall short of the threshold of international human rights standards. 69 Does this not 
indicate that even when understood in its ordinary sense, Islamic fundamentalism as an 
"unswerving belief' in the basic and traditional principles of the Shari `ah will still put 
Islamic law in conflict with the provisions of international human rights law? This is not 
necessarily so. Human rights violations occur in every country of the world due to many 
different factors. Violations of human rights in the United States of America for instance will 
not necessarily mean that the political ideology of the US is in conflict with international 
human rights law. The guarantee of human rights depends much on the attitude of 
governments in power who are the actual guarantors of human rights at every particular point 
in time. Every government or regime in power has a way of manipulating laws, attitudes, 
cultures, beliefs and even the very principles of international law to consolidate control and 
gain legitimacy. Even the most fundamental human rights are sometimes violated in that 
process. The guarantee or abuse of human rights in any given society does not solely depend 
on the ideology or beliefs of a State, it depends much more on the political and humanitarian 
will of the ruling authority. 
The fundamental belief of Muslims in the immutability of the Qur'an is the strength of 
both Islam and Islamic law. Any acceptance or acquiescence by Muslims to its mutability or 
fallibility repudiates the divine basis of both the Islamic religion and the law. Muslims are 
thus very careful of not jeopardising the divine basis of their faith and that of the Shari `ah. 
But while they hold strongly to the belief that the Qur'an being a revelation of God, is eternal 
and unchanging, Muslims also believe in the benevolence of God and that His law was 
revealed to bring justice and comfort to humanity. Thus in considering that they owe some 
duties to God under the Shari `äh, they do not also lose sight of the munificence of God upon 
them through the Shari `ah. 70 The Shari `ah is thus not supposed to be interpreted nor 
implemented by rulers in any manner that would be oppressive upon the ruled. In one of his 
Traditions, Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said that God said: "I have forbidden 
oppression for myself, and have made it forbidden amongst you, so do not oppress one 
another". " That Tradition explains precisely the message of international human rights. 
Thus adhering to the fundamentals of Islam does not necessarily advocate oppression, 
brutality or violation of international human rights law. 
69 See e. g., Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Beset By Contradictions: Islamization, Legal Reform and Human Rights 
in Sudan (1996); Levitt, M. A., "The Taliban, Islam and Women's Rights in the Muslim World" (1998) 22 The Fletcher 
Forum of World Affairs, 113-116. 
70 See e. g. Q 2: 185. 
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The Muslim world today may however be classified, in its interpretation of the Shari `ah, 
into the main divisions of "traditionalists" and "modernists". The "traditionalists" are those 
who see value in a tenacious adherence to the classical interpretations of the Shari `ah as laid 
down from the tenth century in the traditional treatises of Islamic law. They are sometimes 
also referred to as "conservatives" or "hard-liners" due to the sometimes strict "back- 
looking" interpretations and non-compromising adherence to the classical treatises of the 
founding jurists of Islamic law. The "modernists" are those who, while identifying with the 
classical jurisprudence and methods of Islamic law, seek to make it relevant to modern times. 
They believe in the continual evolution of Islamic law and argue that if the Shari ah must 
really cope meaningfully with modern developments and be applicable for all time then such 
modern developments must be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the Shari `ah. 
They are also referred to as Islamic liberals or moderates. They adopt a "back and forward- 
looking" approach in their interpretations of the Shari `ah. The scope of harmonisation 
between Islamic law and international human rights law in the different Muslim countries 
depends therefore upon whether the political authority follows a hard-line or moderate 
approach in its interpretation of the Shari `ah. The expediency of each approach will continue 
to become visible in the continuing arguments of this thesis. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The above analysis reveal that the conceptual differences on human rights in Islamic law 
and international human rights law may not be beyond harmonisation. It is clear that the 
theocentric concept of Islamic law cannot be ignored in its relationship with international 
human rights law because it influences every aspect of the Islamic polity. The theocentric 
concept cannot however be used as camouflage for oppression or abuse of human rights. 
There is need for an upright political and humanitarian will in Muslim States that will 
demonstrate an interpretation and application of Islamic law in a manner that shows that God 
is Most Gracious and Most Merciful to Mankind. " 
Equally, there must be an appreciation of the theocentric perspective of Islamic law 
within the international human rights regime which will accommodate a justificatory 
approach rather than a strictly secular and exclusionist approach in the interpretation of 
71 See e. g. Ibrahim, E., and Johnson-Davies, D., Forty Hadith, An-Nawäwi's (3d Ed., 1985) p. 80 72 Every Chapter of the Qur'an, except one, is headed by the "preamble" "In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most 
Merciful". 
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international human rights principles. Professor Rene David has rightly observed the 
impossibility of rejecting the Islamic legal tradition without rejecting the entire Islamic 
civilisation. " Since such rejection is not the goal of the international human rights regime, the 
accommodation of the Islamic legal tradition is of utmost importance for realising the ideals 
of international human rights in the Muslim world. It is in that perspective that the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR, representing the International Bill of Rights, will be examined in the light 
of Islamic law in the following two chapters. 
73 See R. David, and E. C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (1985), p. 482. 
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PART Two: 
Comparative Legal Analysis 
CHAPTER 6 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) in the Light of Islamic Law 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Within the international human rights objective of the UN, the ICCPR constitutes the 
positive international law guarantee of civil and political rights. It entered into force on 23 
March 1976 and has to date been ratified by 148 States, including 39 of the 56 Member 
States of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). ' Of the 6 Muslim States that are 
used for case studies in Chapter 8 of this thesis, three (Iran, Sudan and Tunisia) have ratified 
the ICCPR while the other three (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey) have not. 2 
This chapter will follow up the arguments of the preceding chapters by examining the 
provisions of the ICCPR in the light of Islamic law to determine its practical compatibility. 
Reference will be made to the practice of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and also to 
scholarly expositions on the rights guaranteed under the Covenant. In respect of Islamic law, 
the main sources, i. e. the Qur'an and Sunnah, will be cited as basic authority while the 
juristic views of the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence will also be analysed in 
respect of the rights guaranteed under the ICCPR. Although the State practice of some 
Muslim States will be examined later in Chapter 8, reference will still be made to some State 
practice where necessary in this chapter to throw light on the meaning of the ICCPR as 
interpreted by the HRC. The OIC Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam will also be 
cited for further elaboration of the human rights standards acceptable in Islamic law where 
relevant. Each of the substantive rights of the ICCPR will be analysed as interpreted by the 
HRC, followed by an Islamic law perspective to identify areas of agreement, differences and 
possible reconciliation. 
Although this chapter is specifically on the ICCPR, reference will be made to necessary 
Articles of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
' See the Status of Ratification of the ICCPR at the UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: 
httl2: //www. unhchr-ch/htmi/menu3ib/a ccnr. htm [15/2/2001]. 
2 Turkey signed the ICCPR on 15 August 2000 but is yet to ratify it. 
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Women (CEDAW)3 in the analysis of the rights of women under the Covenant due to its 
topicality in the international human rights cum Islamic law debate. 
THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE ICCPR 
The ICCPR guarantees twenty-four substantive civil and political rights. They are: 
Article 1 The Right of self-determination. 
3 Equality of Rights between men and women. 
6 The Right to life. 
7 Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and 
punishment. 
8 Freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labour. 
9 The Right to liberty and security of person. 
10 The Right to humane incarceration system. 
11 Freedom from imprisonment for contractual obligation. 
12 The Right to liberty of movement and choice of residence. 
13 Freedom of aliens from arbitrary expulsion. 
14 The Right to fair hearing and due process of law. 
15 Freedom from retroactive criminal law. 
16 The Right to recognition as a person before the law. 
17 The Right to privacy. 
18 The Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
19 The Right to freedom of opinion and expression. 
20 The Prohibition of propaganda for war and incitement to hatred. 
21 The Right of peaceful assembly. 
22 The Right to freedom of association. 
23 The Right to marry and found a family. 
24 The Rights of the child. 
25 Political rights. 
26 The Right to equality before the law. 
27 The Rights of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. 
1249 LINTS 13. Entered into force on 3 September 1981 and has been ratified by 44 of the 56 Member States of the OIC. 
100 
Prima facie, the above list of rights as contained in the ICCPR should raise no problems 
in the light of Islamic law. But as is the case with all legal provisions it is the interpretation 
of those rights that determine their scope. Being an international treaty the ICCPR is subject 
to the general rules of interpretation of treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. 4 Basically the Vienna Convention provides that an international treaty "shall be 
interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose". 5 Before proceeding 
to examine the substantive rights as listed above, we shall first identify the object and 
purpose of the Covenant and also analyse the obligation of the State Parties as provided 
under Article 2 of the Covenant. 
THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE COVENANT 
Legally, the object and purpose serves as a parameter of interpretation that prevents the 
destruction of the essence of the substantive provisions of a treaty. 6 The HRC has broadly 
outlined the object and purpose of the ICCPR as follows: 
"... The object and purpose of the Covenant is to create legally binding standards for 
human rights by defining certain civil and political rights and placing them in a 
framework of obligations which are legally binding for those States which ratify; and 
to provide an efficacious supervisory machinery for the obligations undertaken. "' 
It follows from the above statement that the object and purpose of the ICCPR is to 
guarantee the civil and political rights of individuals from States. To realise that objective, 
the HRC is established under the Covenant as the supervisory machinery for the obligations 
undertaken by the State Parties. The preamble of the ICCPR also declares the purpose and 
aspirations that motivated the adoption of the Covenant. 8 It refers to the inherent dignity of 
the human person as the bedrock of human rights and also recognises the "equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family" as the "foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world. " Through the enforcement of the ICCPR the State Parties aspire 
See e. g. Alberta Union v. Canada, Communication No. 118/1998, Human Rights Committee, UN. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 
34 (1984), Par. 6.3. 
s See Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 UNTS 331. See also Nowak, M., Commentary 
on the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1993) (1993) p. xxiii for a brief analysis of the rules governing the 
interpretation of the ICCPR provisions. 
6 See e. g. Buergenthal, T., "To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations" in Henkin, L., (ed. ) 
The International Bill ofRights, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1981) p. 72 at 90 
7 See General Comment. 24, Par. 7. 
s See UN Doc. A/2929 Annotation of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights prepared by the Secretary 
General (1955) pp. 32-36. 
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towards the enhancement of human dignity by fostering an ideal human community that 
guarantees freedom from fear and want; civil and political freedoms that lead to justice, and 
peace and general well being of all human beings. 9 
From the Islamic perspective the above objectives of the ICCPR are commensurate with 
the general provisions and ultimate objective of the Shari `ah as already established in the 
preceding chapters of this thesis. 10 The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
reiterates a similar aspiration in its preamble by declaring the wish of Muslim States "to 
contribute to the efforts of mankind to assert human rights, to protect man from exploitation 
and persecution, and to affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life in accordance with the 
Islamic Shari`ah". 11 It also states that the fundamental rights and universal freedoms are an 
integral part of Islam and are binding divine commandments which no one has the right to 
suspend, violate or ignore. 12 Reference to Islamic Shari `ah in the Cairo Declaration re- 
affirms the theocentric approach to human rights under Islamic law as distinguished from the 
anthropocentric approach under the ICCPR13, but does not impede the shared noble objective 
of protecting and enhancing human dignity. 
OBLIGATIONS OF STATES PARTIES UNDER THE ICCPR 
Article 2 
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other ojiinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status. 
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party 
to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant. 
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated 
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any 
9 See Pechota, V., "The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" in Henkin, L., (1981) supra, note 6 
above p. 32-33. 
1° We have already established in Chapter 4 above that the ultimate objective of the Shari'ah (i. e. magäsid al-Shari'ah) is to 
realise the well being of human beings. See p. 69 above. 
" See Par. 2 of the preamble of The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) UN. Doc. 
A/CONF. 157/PC/62/Add. 18(1993). 
12 See ibid. 
, 
Par. 4. 
13 See Chapter 5, p. 81 above. 
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other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to 
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
Does Islamic law restrict the Muslim States in anyway from fulfilling these obligations? 
Under Article 2(1) the States Parties undertake "to respect" and "to ensure" the effective and 
appropriate national implementation of all the rights guaranteed under the covenant "without 
distinction of any kind". The duty "td respect" is a negative obligation on the part of the State 
not to violate the rights while the duty "to ensure" is a positive obligation to take necessary 
steps to enable the enjoyment of the rights. An important aspect of this positive obligation is 
the enactment, where not already provided, of necessary domestic legislation by each State 
Party to ensure the guaranteed rights. 14 Under Islamic law, the legislative power of the State 
is not totally unlimited. It is theoretically proscribed by the philosophy that God is the 
ultimate Legislator Who has prescribed what is lawful and unlawful through revelation in the 
Qur'an. According to Justice Iqbal: 
"The legislature in an Islamic state has a restricted role; technically speaking, its 
authority is delegated and can be exercised only within the limits prescribed by the 
Qur'an and Sunnah.... Generally speaking, there are three possible spheres for 
legislative activity in a Muslim national state: 
(1) to enforce laws which have specifically been laid down in the Qur'an and 
Sunnah; 
(2) to bring all existing laws in conformity with the Qur'an and Sunnah, and 
(3) to make laws as subordinate legislation which do not violate the Qur'an and 
Sunnah. " 15 
Islamic jurists generally consider any State legislation that makes lawful what God has 
prohibited in the Qur'an or prohibits what God has made lawful in the Qur'an as exceeding 
the limits of human legislation allowed under Islamic law. 16 For instance during the 
consideration of Sudan's second periodic report on the ICCPR, the Sudanese representatives 
stated, inter alia, that: 
14 Art. 2(2) ICCPR. 
's See Justice Iqbal, J., "The Concept of State in Islam", in Ahmad, M., (ed. ) State Politics and Islam (1986) 37 at 49-50. 
This is, for example, evidenced in practice by the provision in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan that "No law 
shall be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunna 
... 
and existing 
law shall be brought into conformity with such injunctions". 
16 See e. g. al-Qaradawi, Y., The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam (1984) p. 18. 
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"The Sudanese parliament had decided against abolition of the death penalty. The 
jurisprudential argument for its continued existence was that the death penalty was 
mandatory for certain offences under Islamic law. "" 
This general rule does not however mean that the Islamic State is precluded from 
undertaking legislation at all. Today all Muslim States do legislate on various aspects of life 
and State policy as required by the needs of time. While conscious of the general rule of non- 
violation of the Shari `ah in enacting subsidiary legislation, most Muslim States often rely on 
Islamic legal principles such as siyäsah shar `iyyah (legitimate governmental policy), darürah 
(necessity), and maslahah (welfare) in necessary instances to legislate for the realisation of 
human welfare and State policy. A combination of these facilitating principles of Islamic law 
together with some margin of appreciation under international human rights law are 
necessary paradigms to ensure the positive realisation of the rights guaranteed under the 
ICCPR within an Islamic legal dispensation. 
The undertaking under Article 2(1) to respect and ensure all the rights guaranteed 
"without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" is of utmost 
importance. It reiterates the principle of equality and non-discrimination in the enjoyment of 
human rights. After analysing the preparatory works on the Covenants, Ramcharan 
concluded that both the terms "distinction" and "discrimination" as used in the ICCPR and 
ICESCR "exclude only arbitrary or unjust distinction or discrimination". 18 Islamic law also 
generally prohibits arbitrary or unjust discrimination, but there is notable tension in respect 
of distinction on grounds of sex and religion vis-ä-vis international human rights law, which 
will be examined under the relevant substantive Articles below. 
Under Article 2(3) States undertake to provide effective domestic remedies against 
violations of the rights guaranteed under the Covenant and to ensure that such remedies when 
granted, shall be enforced by the competent authorities. This accommodates judicial, political 
and administrative remedies in respect of human rights violations, but Nowak has observed 
notably that the intendment of Article 2(3)(b) is to place priority on judicial remedies. 19 This 
places the primary obligation of effectively protecting human rights on State Parties and is 
substantiated by the provision in Article 5(2) of the First Optional Protocol (OP 1)20 to the 
ICCPR that the HRC "shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has 
'7 See Human Rights Committee Summary Record of the 1629th Meeting: Sudan. 31/10/97. U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1629, 
Par. 15. 
s See Ramcharan, B. G., "Equality and Non-discrimination", in Henkin, L., (1981) supra, note 6 above, p. 247 at 258-259. 
"Nowak, M., supra, note 5 above, p. 59. 
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ascertained that... (t)he individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies". In R. T. v 
France the HRC observed that the reference to "all available remedies" in Article 5(2) of the 
OPI "clearly refers in the first place to judicial remedies". 21 
There is nothing under Islamic law that inhibits Muslim States from fulfilling this 
obligation to provide effective domestic remedies in case of the violation of the rights of 
individuals guaranteed under the Covenant. Islamic law does also prescribe for remedies in 
form of compensation for violation of a person's right payable by the injurer be it an 
individual or the State. 22 
THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
Article 1 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, 
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a 
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization 
of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Both the ICCPR and ICESCR contain this Common Article 1 on right of self- 
determination. Although it is a right of peoples rather than of individuals, 23 its importance 
and relationship to the realisation of individual human rights has been expressed by the HRC 
as follows: 
"The right of self-determination is of particular importance because its realization is 
an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human 
rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those rights. It is for that reason 
that States set forth the right of self-determination in a provision of positive law in 
20 999 UNTS 171. 
21 R. T. [name deleted] v. France, Communication No. 262/1987 (30 March 1989), U. N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at 
277 (1989). Par. 7.4. 
22 See e. g. Qadri, A. A., Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World (1986) pp. 341-358. 
u In Lubicon Lake Band. v. Canada the HRC observed that: "the author, as an individual, could not claim under the 
Optional Protocol to be a victim of a violation of the right of self-determination enshrined in article I of the Covenant, 
which deals with rights conferred upon peoples, as such". See Par. 13.3, Communication No. 167/1984 (26 March 1990), 
UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) at 1 (1990). See also Joseph, S., Schultz, J., and Castan, M., The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, Cases, Materials, and Commentary (2000) pp. 106-107. 
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both Covenants and placed this provision as article 1 apart from and before all of the 
other rights in the two Covenants. 9924 
The fact that two Muslim States, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, championed in 1950 the 
proposal that culminated in Article 1 on right of self-determination after an earlier initiative 
by the USSR had failed, 25 suggests that the right is not in conflict with Islamic law. This 
right was originally conceived and utilised as an instrument of decolonisation that 
accelerated the independence of most colonies. It essentially guaranteed the right of people 
to freely determine their own political status and independence and to pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development. 26 
The scope of the right was subsequently broadened and divided into external self- 
determination and internal self-determination. 27 External self-determination covers the scope 
of alien or colonial subjugation, both politically and economically, and is considered to be a 
peremptory norm of international law. 
28 Internal self-determination is the right of "peoples" 
within a given State to internal political and economic autonomy, that is "the right to choose 
the form of their political and economic future. 1929 Sometimes in the exercise of that right a 
"people" within an existing sovereign State may choose the path of independence which 
could lead to the creation of a separate State from an existing one. This usually arises as a 
consequence of the substantive State's denial of the fundamental rights of the "people" 
claiming such autonomy. 
30 This has enormous political problems with respect to state- 
sovereignty and often leads to violations of other human rights especially when invoked as a 
minority right within an existing State. During the deliberating stage of the Covenant, most 
ZA HRC General Comment 12, Par. 1; UN. Doc. HRI\GEN\I\Rev. lat 12 (1994). (The HRC General Comments will 
hereinafter be referred to as General Comment followed by its number). Many of the countries that participated in the 
drafting of the Covenant had also expressed similar views on the importance of the right of self-determination to the 
realisation of all other individual human rights. See Cassese, A., "The Self-Determination of Peoples", in Henkin, L, (1981) 
supra, note 6 above, p. 92 at 101. 
2S See Cassese, A., ibid., p. 92. 
" See Art. 1(1) of the ICCPR and the 4`h Principle in the G. A. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 1970, G. A. Res. 
2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. 
27 See Cassese, A., (1981) supra, note 24 above, p. 96ff; Kiss, A., "The People's Right to Self-Determination" (1986) 7 
Human Rights Law Journal 165 at 170 ff; and Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, pp. 6-25; Higgins, R., Problems and 
Process, international Law and How to Use It (1994) pp. 111-128. See also Principle VIII of the Helsenki Final Act I 
adopted on 1 August 1975 by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) which, by virtue of the right 
of self-determination, recognises the right of all peoples "to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external 
political status, without external interference... ". 
See e. g. Cassese, A, (1981) supra, note 24 above, p. 1 11; Dinstein, Y., "Collective Human Rights of Peoples and 
Minorities" (1976) 25 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 102 at 106; Kiss, A., (1986) supra, note 27 above, p. 
174; Gros Espiell, H., The Right to Self-Determination, Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, Study of the Special 
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (1980) U. N. Doc. 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/405/Rev. 1, p. 11 ff and p. 40. 
2'9 See Higgins, R., (1994) supra, note 27 above, p. 118. See also McCorquodale, R., "Self-determination: A Human Rights 
Approach" (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 857 at 864. 
3° See Higgins, R., ibid, p. 124. 
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of the developing nations had opposed the extension of the right of self-determination 
beyond colonial situations for the fear of it conferring alleged rights of secession on 
minorities. 1 Harris has pointed out notably in this regard that the right of self-determination 
"does not extend to claims for independence by minority groups in a non-colonial context". 32 
This is corroborated by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) in its General Recommendation No. 21 on right of self-determination that: 
"... in accordance with the Declaration of the General Assembly on Friendly 
Relations, non of the Committee's actions shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples and possessing a government representing the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour. In view of the Committee 
international law has not recognized a general right of peoples to unilaterally declare 
secession from a state. In this respect, the Committee follows the views expressed in 
the Agenda for Peace (paras. 17 et seq. ), namely that a fragmentation of States may 
be detrimental to the protection of human rights as well as to the preservation of 
peace and security. This does not, however, exclude the possibility of arrangements 
reached by free agreements of all parties concerned. " 33 
Since the tendency for invoking the right of self-determination towards independence by 
minorities is often triggered by oppression or gross denial of their civil and political rights 
within a State, wherever the rights guaranteed under the Covenant are respected and ensured 
by the State to all without discrimination the right of internal self-determination would have 
been fulfilled. Apart from its significance as a civil and political right, the right of self- 
determination also has an important link with economic, social and cultural development. 
This is evidenced by its repetition in the ICESR and also in Article 1(2) of the Declaration on 
the Right to Development. 34 Nowak has observed in that regard that "(s)elf-determination 
and development are closely associated", and has pointed out that "the continually spiralling 
difference between over- and under-development and the current debt crisis in the countries 
of the Third World show that most peoples of the South are still far removed from true self- 
determination. "35 
31 See Cassese, A., (1981) supra, note 24 above, p. 93. 
32 See Harris, D. J., Cases and Materials on International Law, (51h Ed., 1998) p. 113. See also Higgins, R., (1994) supra, 
note 28 above, p. 124, and McCorquodale, R., "The Right of Self-determination" in Harris, D. J., and Joseph, S., (eds. ) The 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and United Kingdom Law (1995) p. 91 at 104. 
33 See Par. 6., Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXI on Self- 
determination, UN Doc. CERD/48/Misc. 7/Rev. 3 (1996). See also Art. 8 of UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992) GA Res. 47/135. 
u G. A. Res. 41/128 of 1986. See also General Comment 12, Par. 5 for the HRC's comment on the economic content of the 
right of self-determination. 
3s See Nowak, (1993) supra, note 5 above, p. 8. 
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It is in the context of this last statement and against colonisation that developing nations 
generally and Muslim States specifically tend to view and advocate the right of self- 
determination. The right of external self-determination against colonisation and subjugation 
can be fully justified within the general context of Shari `ah prohibitions of oppression and 
subjugation of peoples. Article 11(b) of the OIC Cairo Declaration provides that: 
"Colonialism of all types being one of the most evil forms of enslavement is totally 
prohibited. Peoples suffering from colonialism have the full right to freedom and 
self-determination. It is the duty of all States and peoples to support the struggle of 
colonized peoples for the liquidation of all forms of colonialism and occupation, and 
all States and peoples have the right to preserve their independent identity and 
exercise control over their wealth and natural resources. " 
Apart from colonial contexts Muslim States strongly abhor the invocation of the right of 
self-determination by minority groups as a basis for independence or secession. The classical 
Islamic politico-legal notion of a single Islamic political empire that transcends ethnic, tribal, 
racial or territorial distinctions disfavours any claim to secession on the basis of right to self- 
determination. Hashmi has observed that Muslim States tend to "condone only the self- 
determination of Muslims living within states with a non-Muslim majority" and consider as 
illegitimate "(c)laims of self-determination advanced by Muslim minorities within existing 
Muslim states, especially when pressed to the point of secession". 36 In agreement with the 
requirements for internal self-determination, a Muslim State has a duty under Islamic law to 
deal equitably with all peoples within its jurisdiction and to guarantee the fundamental 
human rights of everyone so that the need for the minority's advocating secession may not 
arise. Where such claim arises in a Muslim State, it would suggest the ruling authority's 
failure to discharge its human rights obligations in respect of such minorities and would in 
that case have to discharge the obligations rather than for the minorities to secede. This is 
ideally in consonance with ensuring the fundamental rights of everyone within a State rather 
than accommodating secession that often leads to graver human rights violations. CERD had 
observed in its General Recommendation 21 that governments should be sensitive towards 
the right of minority groups "to lead lives of dignity, to preserve their culture, to share 
equitably in the fruits of national growth, and to play their part in the government of the 
country of which its members are citizens". 37 The pertinent question of whether or not non- 
I See Hashmi, S. H., "Self-Determination and Secession in Islamic Thought", in Sellers, M., (ed. ) The New World Order, 
Sovereignty, Human Rights and the Self-determination of Peoples (1996) p. 117. 
37 See CERD General Recommendation 21, supra note 33 above, Par. 5. 
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Muslim minority subjects of an Islamic State can as of right take part in the governance of 
the State, will be addressed under Article 25 below. 38 
EQUALITY OF RIGHTS BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN 
Article 3 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and 
women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant. 
Equality and non-discrimination are very fundamental principles of human rights. Both 
principles are usually taken as equivalent to each other. They indicate a positive and negative 
means of ensuring an important component of justice - impartiality, and have been described 
as "the most fundamental of the rights of man" and "the starting point of all other liberties. "39 
It had also long been noted that "inequality of rights has been the cause of all the 
disturbances, insurrections and civil wars that ever happened". 40 It was the root cause of 
slavery, the Holocaust and colonisation, and it continues to be the cause of many inhuman 
treatments that exist in human society today. From the context of international human rights 
law, the principle of equality is based on the recognition that "(a)ll human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights", 41 thus human rights are supposed to be egalitarian in 
nature and to be enjoyed by all human beings in full equality. The principle of non- 
discrimination is an extension of that, whereby the enjoyment of human rights shall be 
"without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. s42 
Apart from the general rule of equality and non-discrimination established within 
international human rights law, 43 Articles 2(1), 3, and 26 expressly guarantee equality and 
prohibits non-discrimination under the ICCPR. Reference has already been made to Article 
2(1) above under the obligation of State Parties "to respect and to ensure.. 
. 
the rights 
recognised in the... Covenant" without discrimination. 
4 The grounds of discrimination 
under Articles 2(1) and 26 are general and identical, i. e. "race, colour, sex, language, 
33 See pp. 221-223 below. 
39 See Justice Tanaka in the South West Africa case (1996) ICJ Reports, p. 304. See also Bayefsky, A. F., "The Principle of 
Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law" (1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal, p. 1. 
40 Paine, T., Works (ed. ) Mendun, J. P., (1878) cited in McKean, W., Equality and Discrimination under International Law 
(1983) p. 2. 
41 See Art. I UDHR. 
42 See Art. 2 UDHR, and Art. 2(1) ICCPR. (emphasis added). 
43 See Ramcharan, B., (1981) supra, note 18 above, p. 246. 
4A See pp. 102-3 above. 
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religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status". 
Article 3 thus seems superfluous because it only underlines the prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of sex by guaranteeing equality of rights between men and women. 45 The HRC 
has however restated Article 3's "important impact 
... 
on the enjoyment by women of the 
human rights protected under the Covenant". 46 This is due to the culture of discrimination 
that had existed from time immemorial against women in all societies and which has placed 
women in positions of disadvantage in many spheres of civil and political rights. 
Articles 2(1) and 3 are basically of an accessory character to ensure the equal enjoyment 
of the rights guaranteed under the Covenant, while Article 26 is of a general character. The 
Committee has observed however that the positive obligation of States "to ensure" under 
Article 3 "may have an inevitable impact on legislation or administrative measures 
specifically designed to regulate matters other than those dealt with in the Covenant but 
which may adversely affect rights recognized in the Covenant". 47 We shall address Article 3 
now on equality of rights between men and women under the Covenant and address Article 
26 later in respect of equality and non-discrimination generally. 
The HRC has issued General Comment 28 to update its former General Comment 4 on 
Article 3 in which it re-emphasised the need for ensuring the equality of rights between men 
and women and stated that "State parties should take account of the factors which impede the 
equal enjoyment of women and men of each right specified in the Covenant". 48 The 
Committee further observed that: 
"Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply 
embedded in tradition, history and culture, including religious attitudes... States 
parties should ensure that traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not 
used to justify violations of women's right to equality before the law and to equal 
enjoyment of all Covenant rights. States parties should furnish appropriate 
information on those aspects of tradition, history, cultural practices and religious 
attitudes which jeopardise, or may jeopardise, compliance with article 3, and indicate 
what measures they have taken or intend to take to overcome such factors". 9 
The obligation under Article 3 is understood to require both measures of protection and 
affirmative action for women through legislation, enlightenment and education to effect the 
°S See e. g. Joseph, S., and Lord Lester, "Obligations of Non-Discrimination" in Harris, D. J., and Joesph, S., (eds. ) (1995) 
supra, note 32 above p. 564 at 565. 
"' See Par. 1, HRC General Comment 28 on Equality of Rights between men and women (Article 3) of 29/03/2000. U. N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21 /Rev. l /Add. 10, CCPR. 
" General Comment 4 Par. 3. 
43 See General Comment 28, Par. 6. 
49 ibid. Par. 5. 
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positive and equal enjoyment of the rights between men and women under the Covenant. 50 
This derives from the concept that total elimination of discrimination against women and the 
achievement of total equality between the genders form an important aspect of international 
human rights laws' 
Islamic law also recognises equality between men and women but does not advocate 
absolute equality between them. Article 6 of the OIC Cairo Declaration states that: 
"(a) Woman is equal to man in human dignity and has rights to enjoy as well as 
duties to perform; she has her own civil entity and financial independence, and the 
right to retain her name and lineage. 
(b) The husband is responsible for the support and welfare of the family". 
Mayer has argued that the guarantee of equality "in human dignity" under the OIC Cairo 
Declaration falls short of the guarantee of equality to the enjoyment of all civil and political 
rights under the ICCPR. 52 That will be true with a narrow interpretation of human dignity. A 
broad interpretation of human dignity will of course imply the enjoyment of all rights 
incidental to human dignity. The OIC Cairo Declaration has not in any case been subjected to 
any judicial or quasi-judicial interpretation to ascertain the scope of its provisions. The HRC 
has however observed that: "Equality during marriage implies that husband and wife should 
participate equally in responsibility and authority within the family". 53 Article 6(b) of the 
OIC Cairo Declaration may no doubt foreclose women's right of equality in responsibility 
within the family. While the wife is not debarred from providing support and welfare for the 
family under Islamic law, it is the husband that is legally bound to do so, as will be further 
expatiated under family rights in Article 23 below. Equality of women is recognised in Islam 
on the principle of "equal but not equivalent". Although males and females are regarded as 
equal, that may not imply equivalence or a total identity in roles, especially within the 
family. 54 Muhammad Qutb has observed that while the demand for equality between man 
and woman as human beings is both natural and reasonable, this should not extend to a 
transformation of roles and functions. 55 This creates instances of differentiation in gender 
roles under Islamic law that may amount to discrimination by the threshold of international 
50 See Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, pp. 66-68. 
s' See e. g. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), 1249 UNTS 13; and 
Nowak, M., (1993) supra. note 5 above, p. 66. 
52 See e. g. Mayer, A. E., Islam and Human Rights (1999) p. 120 and, Mayer, A. E., "Universal versus Islamic Human Rights: 
A Clash of Cultures of a Clash with a Construct? " (1994) 15 Michigan Journal of International Law, p. 306 at 330. 
s; General Comment 28, Par. 25. 
54 See e. g. al-Faruqi, I. R., and al-Faruqi, L. L., The Cultural Atlas of Islam (1986) p. 150. 
55 See Qutb, M., Islam the Misunderstood Religion (1978) pp. 129. 
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human rights law. Although the UN annotations on the draft of Article 3 on equal rights of 
men and women records the appreciation of the drafters that "(i)t was difficult to share the 
assumption that legal systems and traditions could be overridden, that conditions which were 
inherent in the nature and growth of families and organized societies could be immediately 
changed, or that articles of faith and religion could be altered, merely by treaty 
legislations", 56 the HRC now seems convinced that "in the light of the experience it has 
gathered in its activities over the last 20 years", 57 it intends to push through a universal 
standard of complete gender equality under the Covenant aimed at changing traditional, 
cultural and religious attitudes that subordinate women universally. 
Muslim scholars argue that Islamic law had, over fourteen centuries ago, addressed the 
problem of gender discrimination and established the woman's position as a dignified human 
being sharing equal rights with her male counterpart in almost all spheres of life. 58 However, 
due to factors such as patriarchal conservatism, illiteracy and poverty, women in most parts 
of the Muslim world still suffer one form of gender discrimination or the other. Mayer has 
observed that "the most extensive conflicts between past interpretations of Islamic 
requirements and international human rights norms lie in the area of women's rights", and 
that "conservative interpretations of the requirements of Islamic law" may result in many 
disadvantages for women, especially in the enjoyment of civil and political rights. 59 
Apart from the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex in nearly all international 
human rights instruments, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women60 specifically advocates equality for women and prohibits all forms of 
discrimination against them. It is noteworthy however that even Muslim countries, such as 
Tunisia, 61 considered today as having adopted a most liberal approach in their interpretation 
of Islamic law, entered reservations to the Women's Convention. 
62 This may not be 
unconnected with the revolutionary approach of the Women's Convention. It aims at "a 
change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in family 
See UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 8 above, p. 62; See also Ramcharan, B. G., (1981) supra, note 18 above, p. 253ff. 
57 See General Comment 28, Par. 1. 
58 See generally e. g. Doi, A. R., Woman in Shari `ah (1989); El-Bahnassawi, S., Woman between Islam and World 
Legislations (1985).; and Al-Faruqi, L., Women, Muslim Society and Islam (1988); See also Chaudhry, Z., "The Myth of 
Misogyny: A Re-analyses of Women's Inheritance in Islamic Law"(1997) 61 Albany Law Review, 511 at 512-515. 
19 See Mayer, E. A., (1994) supra, note 52 above, p. 323 and 329 (See particularly n. 49 at 323). 
60 Supra note 3 above. 
61 The CEDAW Committee had described Tunisia "as a shining example for other (Muslim) countries, because of its 
progressive and programmative interpretation of Islam". See UN Doc. A/50/38, Par. 222. 
62 See UN Human Rights Treaty Database Website at: http: //www. unhchr. ch/htnil/intlinst. htni [16/2/2001]. See also Cook, 
R., "Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" (1990) 30 Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 643 at 688. 
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and at achieving full equality between men and women". 63 Muslim States tend to be cautious 
in that regard because both the society and family are very important institutions in Islam. 
The family and societal structures are based on principles prescribed by the religion, 
reinforced by law and cherished by individuals. Some family rights and obligations are not 
considered as entirely private family affairs but of concern to society. 64 No impetuous 
change in these two institutions, i. e. family and society, can thus occur in Muslim States 
without prompting serious debates on its Islamic legality. Authorities in Muslim States 
would thus be cautious to prevent total erosion upon Islamic norms, which could in turn 
undermine their own Islamic credibility from within. Even individuals either because of 
sincere convictions or for fear of societal reproach are often very cautious in flouting Islamic 
norms without valid Islamic evidence. It is important to observe however that some of the 
specific CEDAW reservations by some Muslim States, such as to Article 7 (elimination of 
discrimination against women in political and public life), Article 9 (equal rights of men and 
women to acquire, change or retain their nationality) and Article 15 (equality before the law, 
in civil matters and in choice of residence and domicile) are on grounds of national laws and 
not Islamic law per se. The specific reservations on grounds of Islamic law or Shari `ah are 
those in respect of Article 2 and Article 16 of the Convention relating specifically to 
marriage and family matters. 
Unlike its former General Comment 4, the HRC has offered a broader view on equality 
of rights between men and women in its General Comment 28. It interprets Article 3 in the 
context of almost all the other substantive articles of the Covenant and obviously raises issue 
with Islamic law in the following paragraphs of General Comment 28. 
¶ 13: "States parties should provide information on any specific regulation of 
clothing to be worn by women in public. The Committee stresses that such 
regulations may involve a violation of a number of rights guaranteed by the 
covenant, such as article 26, on non-discrimination; article 7, if corporal 
punishment is imposed in order to enforce such a regulation; article 9, when 
failure to comply with the regulation is punished by arrest; article 12, if 
liberty of movement is subject to such a constraint; article 17, which 
guarantees all persons the right to privacy without arbitrary or unlawful 
interference; articles 18 and 19, when women are subjected to clothing 
requirements that are not in keeping with their religion or their self- 
expression; and, lastly, article 27, when the clothing requirements conflict 
with the culture to which the woman can lay a claim. " 
63 See10 Preambular paragraph of CEDAW (emphasis added), supra, note 3 above. 
"See generally `Abd al `Ati, H., The Family Structure in Islam (1977). 
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¶ 14: "With regards to article 9 States parties should provide information on any 
laws or practices which may deprive women of their liberty on an arbitrary 
or unequal basis, such as by confinement within the house. " 65 
¶ 16: "As regards article 12, States parties should provide information on any legal 
provision or any practice which restricts women's right to freedom of 
movement as, for example, the exercise of marital powers over the wife or 
parental powers over adult daughters, legal or de facto requirements which 
prevent women from travelling such as the requirement of consent of a third 
party to the issuance of a passport or other type of travel documents to an 
adult woman. States parties should also report on measures taken to eliminate 
such laws and practices and to protect women against them, including 
reference to available domestic remedies" 66 
¶ 18 "States should inform the Committee... whether women may give evidence 
" 
67 
as witnesses on the same terms as men... 
¶ 24: "... the right to choose one's spouse may be restricted by laws or practices 
that prevent the marriage of a woman of a particular religion with a man who 
professes no religion or a different religion. States should provide 
information on these laws and practices and on the measures taken to abolish 
the laws and eradicate the practices... It should also be noted that equality of 
treatment with regard to the right to marry implies that polygamy is 
incompatible with this principle. Polygamy violates the dignity of women. It 
is an inadmissible discrimination against women. Consequently, it should be 
i68 definitely abolished wherever it continues to exist. 
¶ 25: "... Equality during marriage implies that husband and wife should 
participate equally in responsibility and authority within the family. "69 
¶ 26: "States must also ensure equality in regard to the dissolution of marriage... 
The grounds for divorce and annulment should be the same for men and 
women... Women should also have equal inheritance rights to those of men 
when the dissolution of marriage is caused by the death of one of the 
spouses. 9M 
¶ 27: "In giving effect to recognition of the family in the context of article 23, it is 
important to accept the concept of the various forms of family, including 
unmarried couples and their children... "" 
The Committee had already expressed concern on some of the above issues in its 
concluding observations on the reports of some Muslims States. In its concluding 
observations on the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1993 the Committee had observed that "the 
punishment and harassment of women who do not conform with a strict dress code; the need 
for women to obtain their husband's permission to leave home; their exclusion from the 
65 See p. 131 below. 
66 See p. 136 below. 
67 See p. 141 below. 
"See pp. 177 and 183 below. 
0 See pp. 111 above and n. 446 below. 
70 See pp. 185 and 188 below. 
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magistracy; discriminatory treatment in respect of the payment of compensation to the 
families of murder victims, depending on the victim's gender and in respect of the inheritance 
rights of women; prohibition against the practice of sports in public; and segregation from 
men in public transportation" were incompatible with Article 3 of the ICCPR. 72 Also on 
Sudan in 1997 the Committee expressed concern at the "official enforcement of strict dress 
requirements for women in public places, under the guise of public order and morality, and at 
inhuman punishment imposed for breaches of such requirements, (and that) (r)estrictions on 
the liberty of women under the Personal Status of Muslims Act, 1992 are matters of concern 
under articles 3,9 and 12 of the Covenant". 73 
The general regulation on women's clothing under Islamic law would be examined here, 
while each of the other issues raised in the quoted paragraphs of General Comment 28 above 
would be addressed under the relevant articles of the ICCPR cited. Under Islamic law, 
clothing is generally for the enhancement of human dignity. It serves as cover for private 
parts, adornment and protection against atmospheric hazards. 74 Due to the prohibition of 
adultery and fornication under Islamic law, both men and women are required to dress 
modestly and not to seductively expose sensuous parts of their body in public. Specifically, 
the Qur'an directs women to "draw their veils over their bosoms" and not to publicly display 
their beauty "except for what must ordinarily appear". 75 Opinions differ regarding the 
exception 
- 
"what must ordinarily appear", resulting in division of juristic views as to the 
extent of women's covering in Islamic law. 76 While the Sha fi `i and the HanbalI schools of 
jurisprudence hold that women must cover up their whole person without exception in 
public, the MalikI and Hanaji schools of jurisprudence allow exposure of the face, the hands 
up to the wrists and the feet up to the ankles. 77 Many contemporary Muslim thinkers and 
jurists have disagreed with the view on complete covering of women. 78 On one hand, Muslim 
women in many parts of the world today follow the view that allows exposure of the face, 
71 See p. 172 below. 
72 Concluding Observations on Islamic Republic of Iran (1993) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 25., Par. 13. See further Chapter 
8 on the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
73 Concluding Observations on Sudan, (1997) UN. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 85. Par. 22. Seefurther Chapter 8 on Sudan. 
`See e. g. Q7: 86 and Q16: 81. See right to clothing under Article 11 of the ICESCR in the next chapter. 
's See Q24: 30-31. 
76 See e. g. Ali, S. S., "Women's Rights in Islam: Towards a Theoretical Framework", (1997-98) Yearbook of Islamic and 
Middle Eastern Law, Vol. 4., p. 117 and references cited there in respect of the differences of opinion with regards to the 
veiling of women in Islam. 
77 See e. g. Darwish, M. H., Fasl al-Khitäb fi Mas'alah al-Hyäb wa al-Nigäb (Arabic) (1987) p. 51; See also Stowasser, B. F., 
Women in the Qur'an, Traditions, and Interpretation (1994) pp. 93-94 and Al-Zuhayli, W., Al-Figh Al-Islami wa-Adillatuh 
(Arabic) (1997) Vol. 1, pp. 743-754 and al-Juzayri, A. R., al-Fiqh ala Madhähib al- Arba'ah (Arabic) (1996) Vol. 1, p. 184. 
8 See e. g. Rahman, F., Status of Women in the Qur'an in Nashat., G., (ed. ) Women and Revolution in Iran (1983). See also 
the judgement of the Pakistan Federal Shariat Court in Ansar Burney 
. 
v. Federation of Pakistan 
, 
(1983) PLD (FSC) 73 at 
75ff. 
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hands and feet, without hindrance to their daily life and careers. On the other hand, Muslim 
States such as Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan enforce the rule that women must cover up 
completely in public. This restricts the liberty of women in many ways and sometimes 
curtails them to the four walls of their homes. 
79 While Islam was the first to liberate women 
more than fourteen hundred years ago from the inhuman conditions they were in, it is 
hypocritical if men on one hand acquire and enjoy many rights and liberties of today's world 
often through constructive and modernist interpretations of the Shari `ah, but on the other 
hand consider the rights and liberties of women stagnated upon the juristic views of the 
classical schools of Islamic law. The Prophet Muhammad had stated that women are full 
sisters of men which is an expression of equality. 
80 Women are therefore equally entitled to 
the rights and liberties of today's world, subject to respect for the principles of public 
morality as applicable to both men and women under Islamic law. 
81 
THE RIGHT TO LIFE 
Article 6 
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be 
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time 
of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present 
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by 
a competent court. 
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing 
in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any 
way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the 
sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all 
cases. 
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen 
years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women. 
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital 
punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant. 
79 See Levitt, M. A., "The Taliban, Islam and Women's Rights in the Muslim World" (1998) 22 The Fletcher Forum, p. 113. 
80 See Yammani, M., "Muslim Women and Human Rights: The New Generation" Paper delivered at the Cairo Conference 
on Democracy and the Rule of Law, (Dec. 7th - 9`h 1997) p. 2. 
81 See e. g. Qutb. M., Islam the Misunderstood Religion (1978) pp. 118-164. 
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Life is mankind's most valuable asset from which all other human possibilities arise. 
There is thus agreement on the fact that the right to life is the supreme and most fundamental 
human right without which all other human rights will be meaningless. 82 Many scholars are 
of the view that right to life isjus cogens under international law. 83 It is a non-derogable right 
under the ICCPR, 84 and the HRC has stated that "(i)t is a right which should not be 
interpreted narrowly". 85 
Article 6(1) provides for the sanctity of human life and it imposes a positive obligation 
on the State to protect life and a negative obligation not to take life arbitrarily. Apart from the 
duty to prohibit and punish criminal homicide as a means of protecting the right to life, the 
HRC has interpreted the scope of the States' obligation under Article 6(1) to include, inter 
alia, "the supreme duty to prevent wars, acts of genocide and other acts of mass violence 
causing arbitrary loss of life"; 86 the duty "to take all possible measures to reduce infant 
mortality and increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate 
malnutrition and epidemics"; 
87 the prohibition of "production, testing, possession, 
deployment and use of nuclear weapons"; 88 and also making effort to "strengthen 
international peace and security". 89 
The right to life under the Covenant is however non-absolute. Article 6(1) only prohibits 
the arbitrary deprivation of life. While the term "arbitrarily" is not defined by the Covenant, 
it generally connotes that the deprivation of life by the State is strictly limited. 
90 It must be in 
full accordance with due process of law and strictly proportionate on the facts. The State 
must also prevent arbitrary killing by its security forces and law enforcement agents. 
91 
92 See e. g General Comments 6 and 14. See also Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, p. 104; Ramcharan, B. G., "The 
Right to Life" (1983) Netherlands International Law Review 297 at 311 - 314.; Dinstein, Y., "The Right to Life, Physical 
Integrity and Liberty" in Henkin, L., (1981) supra, note 6 above, p. 114. See also Art. I Universal Islamic Declaration of 
Human Rights 1981; Chaudhry, M. S., Islam's Charter of Fundamental Rights and Civil Liberties (1995) p. 9; al-Ghazali, M., 
Nuqüq al-Insän Bayn T'älIm al-Islam wa I'län al-Umam al-Mutahidah (Arabic) (1993) p. 245; Doi. A. R., Shari'ah: The 
Islamic Law, (1984), p. 229. 
"See Ramcharan, B. G., (1983) supra, note 82 above, pp. 307,308,311 ff; Higgins, R., "Derogations under Human Rights 
Treaties", (1976/77) 48 British Yearbook of International Law, 281 at 282 and further references therewith. 
84 See Art. 4(2). 
BS General Comment 6, Par. 1. 
General Comment 6, Par. 2. 
General Comment 6, Par. 5; cf. Dinstein, Y., (1981) supra, note 82 above, pp. 115-116 for the view that the right to life is 
a civil right safeguarding against arbitrary killing and does not include issues such as guarantee against death from lack of 
medical attention or reduction of infant mortality. Nowak argues differently that such restrictive interpretation is due to "an 
improper merging of the second and third sentences in Art. 6(l). See Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, p. 106 n. 16. 
11 General Comment 14, Par. 4. This opinion of the HRC created some controversy on the part of many States such as USA, 
UK etc. 
" See General Comment 6 Par. 2 and 5 and General Comment 14. 
co See UN Doc. A/2929 supra, note 8 above, p. 83, Par. 3, where it is stated that the term "arbitrarily" was explained to mean 
both "illegally" and "unjustly" during the drafting. 
91 See Joseph, Schultz, and Castan (2000) supra, note 23 above, p. 108ff; and General Comment 6, Par. 3. See also the cases 
of Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, Communication No. R. 11/45 (5 February 1979), UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 
137 (1982); and Rickly Burrell v. Jamaica, Communication No. 546/1993, UN Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/546/1993 (1996). 
117 
Both the substantive provision and general interpretation of Article 6(1) are in 
concordance with Islamic law. There are many verses of the Qur'an and Traditions of the 
Prophet Muhammad that acknowledge the sanctity of human life, enjoin its protection and 
prohibit its arbitrary deprivation. The Shari `ah provisions on the sanctity and protection of 
human life are so fundamental and emphatic that they cannot be denied. The following 
Qur'anic verses are examples in that respect. 
"Take not life which God has made sacred, except by way of justice and law; thus 
does He (God) command you that you may learn wisdoms92 
"Nor take life 
- 
which God has made sacred 
- 
except for just cause. And if anyone is 
slain wrongfully, We have given his heir authority (to demand Qisäs [retribution] or 
to forgive): but let him not exceed bounds in the matter of taking life: for he is helped 
(by the Law). "93 
"... if anyone slew a person 
- 
unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the 
land 
- 
it would be as if he slew humanity as a whole: and if anyone saved a life, it 
would be as if he saved humanity as a whole. " 94 
The above verses apply to the State as much as to individuals. Also in his oft-quoted 
sermon given at the end of his farewell pilgrimage, the Prophet Muhammad is reported to 
have declared, inter alia, that: "Verily your lives and properties are sacred to one another till 
you meet your Lord on the Day of Resurrection". In another Tradition he is also reported to 
have warned that: "The first offences to be judged by God between mankind on the 
judgement day will be unlawful taking of lives. " 95 
Based on the above injunctions, Islamic jurists are unanimous on the sacredness of 
human life and that there is an obligation on the ruling authority in the Islamic State to 
protect the right to life of every individual. 96 The protection of life in Islamic law also 
includes the prohibition of suicide, thus shutting out the notion of a "right to die" under 
Islamic law. 97 Article 2 of the OIC Cairo Declaration thus provides that: 
(a) Life is a God-given gift and the right to life is guaranteed to every human being. 
It is the duty of individuals, societies and states to protect this right from any 
Q 6: 151. 
93 Q 17: 33. 
9a Q 5: 32. 
95 Reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim. See al-Juzayri, A. R., Kitäb al-Fiqh Ala al-Madhähib al-Arba'ah (Arabic) (1997) 
Vol. 5., p. 218. 
96 See e. g. ibid., p. 214 - 223; and al-Ghazali M., (1993) supra, note 82 above, p. 245. 
`° See. e. g. Ahmed, B. D. and Umri, J., "Suicide and Euthanasia: Islamic Viewpoint", in Mahmood, T., et al., (eds. ) 
Criminal Law in Islam and the Muslim World (1996) pp. 164 
-177. 
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violation, and it is prohibited to take away life except for a Shari'ah prescribed 
reason. 
(b) It is forbidden to resort to such means as may result in the genocidal annihilation 
of mankind. 
(c) The preservation of human life throughout the term of time willed by God is a 
duty prescribed by Shari"ah. 
(d) Safety from bodily harm is a guaranteed right. It is the duty of the state to 
safeguard it and it is prohibited to breach it without a Sharia-prescribed reason. " 
The "Shari `ah prescribed reason" proviso on the right to life in the Cairo Declaration is 
in respect of crimes attracting the death penalty under Islamic law, which must be strictly in 
accordance with the due process of law. This is reflected in the terms "except by way of 
justice and law" and "except for just cause" in the Qur'anic verses on the sanctity and 
protection of human life cited above. 98 
This brings us to the exception to the right to life under the ICCPR in respect of the 
death penalty. Although Article 6(1) does not prohibit the death penalty, Articles 6(2) to 6(6) 
place some restrictions on its imposition. Five specific restrictions on the death penalty may 
be identified from the provisions. 
The first is that the death penalty may not be imposed except only for the most serious 
crimes and in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. 99 
Thus while Article 6 does not abolish the death penalty, it restricts its imposition to the "most 
serious crimes" and the HRC has stated the need for State Parties to review their criminal 
laws to that effect. 1°° The term "most serious crimes" is however not defined in the 
Covenant. During the drafting of this provision of the Covenant, the phrase `most serious 
crimes' "was criticised as lacking precision, since the concept of `serious crimes' differed 
from one country to another. "101 The HRC has however observed that this expression "must 
be read restrictively to mean that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional measure". 102 
The Committee has concluded that "robbery, 103 traffic in toxic dangerous wastes, 104 abetting 
suicide, drug-related offences, property offences, 105 multiple evasion of military service, 106 
apostasy, committing a third homosexual act, embezzlement by officials, theft by force, 107 
"See note 92 above. 
99 Art. 6(2). 
See General Comment 6, Par. 6. 
'01 See UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 8 above, p. 84, Par. 6; See also Dinstein, Y., (1981) supra, note 82 above, p. 116. 
102 General Comment 6, Par. 7. 
103 Concluding Observations on Republic of Korea (1992) UN Doc. A/47/40,122-4, Par. 9. 
1°4 Concluding Observations on Cameroon (1994) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 33, Par. 9. 
10S Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka (1996) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 56, Par. 14. 
11 Concluding Observations on Iraq (1997) UN Doc. CCPR/79/Add. 56, Par. 11. 
107 Concluding Observations on Sudan (1997) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 85, Par. 8 
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crimes of an economic nature, adultery, corruption, and `crimes that do not result in the loss 
of life"'108are all not most serious crimes. Thus, according to Joseph, Schultz and Castan "it 
appears that only intentional killings or attempted killings, or the intentional infliction of 
grievous bodily harm, may permissibly attract the death penalty under article 6(2)". '09 
Under traditional Islamic law the death penalty is prescribed basically for the offences of 
murder, adultery, apostasy, armed/highway robbery. The views of the HRC above puts all 
these offences except murder outside its definition of "most serious crimes" under the 
Covenant. The argument of Muslim jurists and scholars is that the manner and circumstances 
in which the stated offences must be committed to attract the death penalty makes them very 
serious offences under Islamic law. 110 Murder is on retaliatory grounds of life for life. 
Armed/highway robbery attracts the death penalty only if it results in the death of the victim. 
Adultery basically requires the unanimous eye-witness evidence of four sane Muslim adult 
male witnesses to the sexual act. For apostasy to attract the death penalty, many Islamic 
scholars now define it in the context of sedition or treason against the State, and not merely 
as apostasy simpliciter. 111 
The HRC has also observed that the provisions of Article 6(2) and 6(6) suggest the 
desirability of abolishing the death penalty under international law. 112 There is however no 
unanimity amongst the States of the world yet on the abolition of the death penalty. While 
some States are considered as "abolitionist States" others are considered as "non-abolitionist 
States" in respect of the death penalty. Muslim States generally belong to the group of "non- 
abolitionist States. " Apart from the Republic of Azerbaijan, no other Muslim State has 
abolished the death penalty or become a Party to the Second Optional Protocol (OP2) to the 
ICCPR adopted in 1989 specifically aimed at abolishing the death penalty. 113 Since the 
Qur`an specifically prescribes the death penalty as punishment for certain crimes, Islamic 
jurists would consider any direct legislation against its legality as being outside the scope of 
human legislation under the Shari `ah. 1 4 
1°$ Concluding Observations on the Islamic Republic of Iran (1995) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 25, Par. 8. See Joseph, 
Schultz and Castan, (2000) supra note 23 above, p. 120. 
t° See Joseph, Schultz and Castan, (2000) ibid. 
110 See e. g. al-Juzayri, A. R., (1997) supra, note 95 above, Vol. 5. 
111 See further pp. 162-64 below. 
112 General Comment 6, Par. 6. See also Robertson, A. H., "The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
The European Convention on Human Rights" (1968-69) 43 British Yearbook of International Law 21 at 31. 
1" Azerbaijan acceded to the OP2 on 22 January 1999. See UN Doc. A/RES/44/128. 
II ' See e. g. Reference to the Sudanese Parliament on abolition of the death penalty at note 17 above. See also al-Qaradawi, 
Y., (1984) supra, note 16 above and main text thereof; and `Uthmän, M. F., Huqüq al-Insän Bayn al-Shari'ah a! 
-Islämiyyah 
wa al-Fikr al-QänünI al-Garbt" (Arabic) (1982) p. 67-68. 
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Islamic jurists often cite the Qur'anic verse which says: "In the law of gisäs (retribution) 
there is (saving of) life for you, 0 people of understanding; that you may restrain yourselves" 
115, to argue that the death penalty for murder, is itself a legal protection for the right to life 
and thus it will impugn the right to life to abolish it. 116 Most Muslim States who apply 
Islamic criminal law only try to avoid the death penalty through either procedural or 
commutative provisions available within the Shari `ah instead of direct prohibition of it. 
Islamic law demands strict evidential requirements for capital offences. A strict compliance 
with the evidential requirements of Islamic law would often lead, for instance, to payment of 
blood-money for murder, and discretionary (ta'air) punishments for the other capital offences 
in place of effecting the death penalty. In the case of murder, the Shari `ah allows for the 
alternative of payment of blood money by the offender to the heirs of the victim in lieu of the 
death penalty. Thus Sudan stated during consideration of its second periodic report on the 
ICCPR that: "... since 1973... execution had been avoided in cases involving the death 
sentence, either because the higher court or the President had not confirmed the sentence or 
because blood money 
- 
the diya had been paid" instead. 117 The Prophet Muhammad is also 
reported to have recommended that the death penalty should be avoided as much as 
possible. 118 
The second restriction on the death penalty under Article 6 is that no deprivation of life 
must be contrary to the provisions of the Covenant, thus for instance a fair hearing must be 
guaranteed, ' 19 there must be no discrimination in capital punishment120 and the methods of 
execution must not amount to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. 12' Also 
deprivation of life must not be contrary to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Genocide, 122 thus judicially imposed death sentences that may constitute genocide (as did 
the Nazi tribunals) are prohibited. '23 
Islamic law also emphasises a fair hearing, especially in capital-offence cases as will be 
further elaborated under Article 14 below. Islamic jurists however differ on the question of 
discrimination in capital punishment. The Shäfi `i and the Hanbali schools of jurisprudence 
hold that a Muslim will not be executed for the murder of a non-Believer. They base their 
us Q2: 179. 
116 See e. g. Uthmän, M. F., (1982) supra, note 114 above, p. 68; and Ibn Rushd al-Qurtubi, M., Bidäyah al-Mujtahid wa 
Nihdyah al-Muqtasid (Arabic) (10`h Ed., 1988), Vol. 2, p. 400. 
'" See HRC Summary Record of the 1628`h Meeting: Sudan; U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1628 of 02 October 1998, Par. 15. 
I's See e. g. Al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 77 above, Vol. 7., p. 5307. 
119 Pursuant to Art. 14 ICCPR. 
'20 Pursuant to Art. 2(1) and Art. 26 ICCPR. 
121 Pursuant to Art. 7 ICCPR. 
122 Art. 6(2) and (3). 
123 See Nowak, (1993) supra, note 5 above, p. 108 and pp. 116-117. 
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view on a Tradition in which the Prophet is reported to have said that: "A Believer will not 
be executed for a non-Believer". The Mäliki school holds similar view with a proviso that if 
the murder is brutal and for the purpose of taking property then the Muslim will be 
executed. 124 The HanaJl school however makes no such religious discrimination in capital 
punishment. The Hanafis hold that a Muslim will be executed for the murder of a non- 
believer and vice versa. 125 This is based on the lack of a Qur'anic basis for such 
discrimination and the specific Qur'anic reference to the rule of "life for life" in one 
verse. 
126 The Hanafis argue that the other three schools had interpreted the Prophet's 
Tradition out of context to arrive at their view. The Hanafi jurists further contend that since 
Islamic law does not discriminate between Muslims and non-Muslims in the punishment for 
theft and other offences the same rule must apply in the case of murder. The Hanafis further 
support their position with another Tradition in which the Prophet Muhammad was reported 
to have ordered the execution of a Muslim for killing a non-Muslim. The first three schools 
contend that this was a special case and an exception. 127 The Hanafi view is more consistent 
with other Traditions of the Prophet on equality of human beings and also compatible with 
the principle of non-discrimination under the Covenant. 
The prohibition of genocidal capital punishment under the Covenant is also in full 
concordance with the sanctity of life under Islamic law. Article 2(b) of the Cairo Declaration 
provides that: "It is forbidden to resort to such means as may result in the genocidal 
annihilation of mankind". 
The third restriction is that the death penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final 
judgement rendered by a competent court. 128 This proviso also aims at preventing the 
arbitrary deprivation of life and ensures justice as well as compliance with due process of 
law. This is in full agreement with the principle of justice under Islamic criminal law. 129 As 
earlier stated above, the Qur'an states clearly that: "Take not life which God has made 
sacred, except by way of justice and law; thus does He (God) command you that you may 
learn wisdom". 130 Islamic law differentiates the judgement (gadä) of a competent court from 
a legal opinion (fatwä) given by a jurisconsult (mufti) on a particular issue. A final and 
"See al-Juzayri, A. R., (1997) supra, note 95 above, Vol. 5, pp. 244-245 and Ibn Rushd al-Qurtubi, M., (1988) supra, note 
116 above, Vol. 2, p. 399. 
its ibid. See also Al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 77 above, Vol. 7., p. 5671. 
11 Q5: 45. 
1T7 See al-Juzayri, A. R., (1997)supra, note 95 above, Vol. 5, p. 246 and Ibn Rushd al-Qurtubi, M., (1988) supra, note 116 
above, Vol. 2, p. 399. 
128 Art. 6(2). 
129 See generally e. g. Awad, A. M., "The Rights of the Accused under Islamic Criminal Procedure", in Bassiouni, M. C., (ed. ) 
The Islamic Criminal Justice (1982) 91-107. 
130 Q 6: 15 1. Emphasis added. 
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executable judgement (gadä) can only be given by a competent judge (gädi) after the full 
consideration of a case in accordance with due process of the law. A fatwä, on the other 
hand, is only a legal opinion given by a mufti (jurisconsult), which is neither legally binding 
nor executable. 131 Only competent judges may consult a mufti for legal opinion to help them 
reach a legal decision on matters before the court. Thus under Islamic law, a mufti has no 
legal competence to give a binding fatwä imposing the death penalty or any other 
punishment for any offence under Islamic law without the case first being tried by a 
competent court and affording the accused person opportunity to defend himself in 
accordance with the law. 132 
The fourth restriction is that anyone sentenced to death shall be entitled to seek pardon 
or commutation of sentence and may be granted amnesty, pardon, or commutation of 
sentence. 133 The entitlement to pardon, commutation of sentence or grant of amnesty arises 
only after the final judgement and conviction by the highest court. It relates to the execution 
of the sentence after a fair trial and due process of law. The power normally lies with the 
Head of State. It is a prerogative act of clemency and thus subjective to other non-legal and 
non judicial considerations. It stands as a last resort by which a death penalty may be 
avoided, whereby the Heads of State in countries that still implement the death penalty may 
within their power avoid the execution of death sentences. 
In Islamic law pardon or amnesty may be granted by the Ruler under the principle of 
haqq al-'afw 'an al-'uqübah (i. e. the right to pardon from punishment). The State may 
pardon any to `zir punishment provided that the victim's right is not undermined. According 
to the Hanafi school, hudüd punishments cannot be pardoned by the State because they are 
the "rights of God". The other schools however hold that only the hudüd punishment for 
zinä and theft may not be pardoned by the State after a judge's decision. Their argument in 
the case of zinä is that the difficulty of proving zing through eyewitnesses is enough 
mitigation on the crime requiring no additional amnesty if an offender could be so heinous to 
commit the offence in the broad glare of four male witnesses. Also, the right to commute the 
death penalty in homicide cases (gisäs) for blood money (diyah) lies principally with the 
victim's heirs. 134 
131 See e. g. al-Magdis?, B. A. R. al-'Udah Sharh al-'Umdate (Arabic) (5`h Ed., 1997) 601. 
12 See e. g. Karnali, M. H., Freedom of Expression in Islam (1997) 296-297 for views of Islamic Scholars and Institutions on 
this point in relation to the Salman Rushdie affair. 
133 Art. 6(4). 
134 See al-JuzayrI, A. R. (1997) supra, note 95 above, Vol. 5, pp. 224 
-227. 
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The fifth restriction is that the death penalty shall not be imposed for crimes committed 
by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women. '35 
By this restriction the Covenant totally prohibits the sentencing of juveniles less than 18 
years to death for any crime whatsoever, including the "most serious crimes". In the case of 
pregnant women, they may be sentenced to death for the "most serious crimes", but the 
sentence shall not be carried out until after the delivery of the pregnancy. Both cases are a 
consequence of appreciating the innocence of childhood. 
The execution of the death penalty against pregnant women is also prohibited under 
Islamic law. The same exemption extends even to women breast-feeding a child until the 
child is weaned after two years. A child will also not be liable to death penalty under Islamic 
law based on a Tradition in which the Prophet Muhammad stated, inter alia, that a child is 
free from responsibility until he attains maturity. 136 The only difference being that it is 
possible for a child to attain maturity under Islamic law before the age of 18 years. 
Finally, the HRC has observed in relation to the right of women to life under Article 6 
that: 
"When reporting on the right to life protected by Article 6 
... 
States parties should 
give information on any measures taken by the State to help women prevent 
unwanted pregnancies, and to ensure that they do not have to undertake life- 
threatening clandestine abortions". 137 
Similarly, the Committee has expressed in many of its concluding observation of States' 
reports on the ICCPR that "criminalization of abortion leads to unsafe abortions which 
1 
account for a high rate of maternal mortality". 38 The Committee has not also interpreted the 
right to life to include that of the unborn child, leading Joseph, Schultz and Castan to 
conclude that "(c)ertainly, HRC comments have indicated that the prohibition of abortion is 
more likely to breach the ICCPR than the permissibility of abortion". 
139 While Islamic law 
does not prohibit the prevention of pregnancy140 it prohibits abortion except for valid reasons 
such as where continuance of the pregnancy endangers the woman's life. 
'4' On the debate of 
what amounts to an "unwanted pregnancy", the CEDAW Committee emphasises freedom of 
135 Art. 6(5). 
'3' See al-Juzayri, A. R. (1997) supra, note 95 above, Vol. 5, p. 269. 
General Comment 28, Par. 10. 
"g See e. g. Concluding Observations on Cameroon (1999) UN. Doc. CCPRJC/79/Add. 116, Par. 13. See also Joseph, Schultz 
and Castan (2000) supra, note 23 above pp. 135-137. 
139 Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000) ibid., p. 474-475. 
10 Muslim jurists however hold divergent views on reasons and methods of prevention. See e. g. Musallam, B. F., Sex and 
Society in Islam (1986); and Omran, A. R., Family Planning in the Legacy of Islam (1992). 
"' See e. g. Omran, A. R., ibid. p. 8-9. 
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choice for women. 142 Muslim States are mostly anti-abortion States who may consider 
abortion simply on the demand of a pregnant mother as violating the right to life of an 
unborn child. An anti-abortionist argument for the unborn child would be that being 
"unwanted" is no justification to be killed. An alternative middle way would be adequate 
State provision of social help for both mothers carrying "unwanted pregnancies" and for the 
"unwanted children" after birth. 143 
PROHIBITION OF TORTURE OR CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR 
PUNISHMENT 
Article 7 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation. 
The prohibition of torture is quite well established and is considered as a peremptory 
norm of international law. 
144 The ICCPR does not define torture, but Article 1(1) of the 
Convention against Torture (CAT) 145 contains a widely accepted definition of torture which 
provides that: 
"For the purposes of this Convention, (i. e. CAT) the term "torture" means any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or 
a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions". 
Torture is usually distinguished from "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and 
punishment" on intent, severity and intensity of pain or suffering. In Ireland v. UK, the 
European Court of Human Rights observed that the term "torture" attaches "a special stigma 
to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. " 146 Also in Tyrer 
142 See Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000) supra, note 23 above p. 137. 
143 See Rights of the Child in Article 24 below. 
'" See e. g. American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, Par. 702; and O'Boyle, M., "Torture and 
Emergnecy Powers under the European Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v. The United Kingdom" (1977) 71 
American Journal of International Law 674 at 687-688. 
j" 1465 LINTS 85. See also Art. 7(2)(E) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 of 17 
July 1998. 
1d6 (1978) Eur. Crt. Human Rights Reports, Series A, No. 3, Par. 167. 
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. 
v. UK, 147 the same court held that intensity of suffering justifying the use of the term 
"inhuman" is higher than in what may be described as "degrading". Inhuman relates to pain 
and suffering while degrading relates to humiliation. Thus there is some presumed "scale of 
aggravation in suffering which commences with degradation, mounts to inhumanity and 
ultimately attains the level of torture. " 148 Also cruel treatment is presumed to lie 
"somewhere between inhuman conduct and torture". 149 Thus even though a particular act 
may escape being categorised as torture, it may still amount to either, cruel, inhuman or a 
degrading treatment which are all prohibited under the Covenant. The underlying aim of the 
provision is "to protect both the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the 
individual". 150 
The prohibition of subjecting anyone to medical or scientific experimentation without 
his or her free consent under Article 7, "was intended as a response to the atrocities such as 
committed in concentration camps during World War 11"' 51 and thus excludes "(n)ormal 
medical treatment in the interest of the patient's health". '52 
Based on the dignified nature of the human person under the Shari 'ah, there is no 
conflict under Islamic law with the general prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or subjecting a human being to scientific experimentation without 
consent. 153 There are many verses of the Qur'an and Traditions of the Prophet that enjoin 
compassion and prohibit cruelty and oppression even to animals. Bassiouni observed that the 
Qur'an warns against persecution of human beings in two hundred and ninety-nine places. '54 
The Prophet was also reported to have warned against torture saying that: "God will torture, 
in the hereafter, those who torture people in this life. "155 And when he entrusted anyone with 
the affairs of the State the Prophet would instruct him thus: "Give glad tidings and do not 
terrorise, give ease and do not molest the people. " Following this humane principle of the 
Shari `ah, Caliph Umar ibn Abdul Aziz'56, was reported, in reply to a request of one of his 
governors who sought permission to torture those who refused to pay tax due to the public 
treasury, to have stated as follows: 
147 (1978) Eur. Cr!. Human Rights Reports, Series A, No. 28, Par. 30. 
148 See Dinstein, Y., (1981) supra, note 82 above, pp. 123 
- 
124; See also General Comment 7, Par. 2. 
'49 ibid. 
150 See General Comment 7, Par. 1, and General Comment 20, Par. 2. 
'S' See UN Doc. A/2929, p. 87, Par. 14. 
152 See Nowak, M., supra, note 5 above, p. 139. 
153 See al-Saleh, O. A., "The Rights of the Individual to Personal Security in Islam", in Bassiouni, M. C., (ed. ) The Islamic 
Criminal Justice System (1982) p. 72. 
11 Bassiouni, M. C., "Sources of Islamic Law, and the Protection of Human Rights in the Islamic Criminal Justice System", 
in Bassiouni, M. C., (ed. ) The Islamic Criminal Justice System (1982) p. 3 at 19. 
iss See al-Saleh, O. A., (1982) supra, note 153 above. 
" He ruled under the Umayyad Caliphate between 717 -720CE. 
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"I wonder at your asking permission from me to torture people as though I am a 
shelter for you from God's wrath, and as if my satisfaction will save you from God's 
anger. Upon receiving this letter of mine accept what is given to you or let him give 
an oath. By God, it is better that they should face God with their offenses than I 
should have to meet God for torturing them". 157 
Muslim jurists thus generally agree that torture or cruel and inhuman treatment or 
punishment is prohibited during the interrogation of offenders. 158 Article 20 of the OIC Cairo 
Declaration thus provides that: 
"It is not permitted to subject (an individual) to physical or psychological torture or 
to any form of humiliation, cruelty or indignity. Nor is it permitted to subject an 
individual to medical or scientific experimentation without his consent or at the risk 
of his health or of his life. Nor is it permitted to promulgate emergency laws that 
would provide executive authority for such actions. " 
The difference however lies in the interpretation of what amounts to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment. The HRC has plainly stated that punishments under 
Islamic law such as amputation, flogging and stoning are incompatible with Article 7 of the 
ICCPR159, to which some Muslim States have consistently objected. 160 The main pragmatic 
justification consistently advanced by Islamic jurists for those punishments under Islamic 
law, is their deterrent nature. 161 The HRC however rules out any limitation or justification in 
respect of Article 7.162 The European Human Rights Court has also held under Article 3 of 
the European Convention in Tyrer. v. UK that: "A punishment does not lose its degrading 
character just because it is... an effective deterrent or aid to crime control. "163 The difficulty 
here for Islamic legalists is that flogging and amputation for example are specifically 
prescribed as legal punishments for certain offences in the Qur'an and thus considered as 
divine injunctions. Thus the representatives of Sudan argued before the HRC that the 
punishments are lawful sanctions under Islamic law and must be exempted even though they 
cause pain or suffering. In its definition of torture, the UN Torture Convention excludes 
"pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions". 164 Nowak 
has argued that this "lawful sanction clause" may not be applicable to Article 7 of the 
157 See al-Saleh, O. A., (1982) supra, note 153 above, p. 72. 
isx ibid. 
"See e. g. Concluding Observations on Sudan (1997) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 85, Par. 9; Concluding Observations on 
Libya (1994) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 45, Par. 9; Concluding Observations on Islamic Republic of Iran (1993) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 25, Par. 11. 
160 See Chapter 8 below. 
161 See Chapter 4, pp. 72-80 above on Islamic Criminal Punishments. 
X62 General Comment 20, Par. 3. 
163 supra, note 147 above, Par. 31. 
164 See Art. 1(1) of CAT, supra. 
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ICCPR. Even where this "lawful sanction clause" is relied upon, it only applies to torture and 
does not extend to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments. 165 
One way adopted, for example, by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to get around this 
difficulty is through strict adherence to procedural and evidential requirements for those 
Qur'anic offences. This often results in the application of to `zir (discretionary) punishments 
due to the difficulty of satisfying the required valid evidence to enforce the hudüd 
punishments. 166 The HRC has however observed that Article 7 must be read in conjunction 
with Article 2 of the Covenant to the effect that a State Party is under an obligation to 
specifically abrogate any law considered incompatible with Article 7 of the Covenant. 
'67 
FREEDOM FROM SLAVERY, SERVITUDE AND FORCED LABOUR 
Article 8 
1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be 
prohibited. 
2. No one shall be held in servitude. 
3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour; 
(b) Paragraph 3 (a) shall not be held to preclude, in countries where imprisonment with 
hard labour may be imposed as a punishment for a crime, the performance of hard 
labour in pursuance of sentence to such punishment by a competent court; 
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term `forced or compulsory labour' shall not 
include: 
(i) Any work or service, not referred to in subparagraph (b), normally required of a 
person who is under detention in consequence of a lawful order of a court, or of a person 
during conditional release from such detention; 
(ii)Any service of a military character and, in countries where conscientious 
objection is recognized, any national service required by law of conscientious objectors; 
(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life 
or well-being of the community; 
(iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations. 
Article 8 is aimed at protecting individuals from the most deplorable and degrading 
exploitation by fellow beings. The prohibition of slavery, slave trade and servitude is total 
without exception and is non-derogable under Article 4(1) irrespective of whether or not the 
victim has consented to slavery or bondage. 
168 The prohibition of slavery qualifies as an 
established norm of customary international law. 
169 The prohibition of forced or compulsory 
165 See e. g. An-Na'im, A., "Towards a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The 
Meaning of "Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment" in An-Na'im, A, (ed. ) Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: 
A Quest for Consensus (1992) pp. 29-32. 
11 See examination of Islamic Criminal Justice of Pakistan in Chapter 8 at pp. 314-16 below. 
167 General Comment 20, Par. 14. See also p 102-103 above on legislative obligations of State Parties under the Covenant 
and the limitation of Muslim States in that regard under Islamic law. 
'" See Nowak, M, (1993) supra, note 5 above, pp. 143-ff; also Dinstein, Y., (1981) supra, note 82 above, pp. 126-128. 
10 See e. g. American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, Par. 702. 
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labour is however subject to five exceptions under the Covenant, viz, (i) the performance of 
hard labour in pursuance of a sentence imposed by a competent court, (ii) any other work or 
service required of a person in lawful detention or during conditional release from such 
detention, (iii) any service of a military character or national service required by law for 
conscientious objectors to military service, (iv) any service exacted in cases of emergency or 
calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community, and (v) any work or service 
which forms part of normal civil obligation. 170 Apart from the traditional forms of slavery, 
servitude and forced labour, other forms of modem slavery such as traffic in women for 
prostitution, exploitation of children, debt bondage, and exploitation of migrant workers have 
also been condemned in a UN Report on Slavery published in 1984.171 
The question of slavery under Islamic law has been extensively examined earlier in 
Chapter 4 above. 172 The fact that most modem Muslim States are State Parties to the 
international conventions prohibiting slavery and slave trade indicates the general consensus 
of Muslims on the compatibility of the prohibition of slavery with the principles of Islamic 
law. This is further buttressed by Article 11(a) of the OIC Cairo Declaration which provides 
that: 
"Human beings are born free, and no one has the right to enslave, humiliate, oppress 
or exploit them, and there can be no subjugation but to God the Most-High". 
THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND SECURITY OF PERSON 
Article 9 
1 Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his 
arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. 
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a 
judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to 
trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons 
awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to 
appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, 
for execution of the judgement. 
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that court may decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful. 
'70 See Art. 8 (3)(b) and (c) of ICCPR. See also Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, pp. 149-157. 
171 See Whitaker, B., Report on Slavery, U. N. Doc E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1982/20/Rev. 1, UN Sales No. E. 84. XIV. 1, p. 10; See also 
the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949). 
172 See pp. 53-54 above. See also Qutb, M., supra, note 55 above, pp. 45-77. 
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5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable 
right to compensation. 
The right to liberty and security of person is perhaps next only to the right to life. The 
State may however deprive a person of his liberty only in accordance with the due process of 
law. Article 9(1) is thus aimed on one hand at preventing the arbitrary and unlawful 
deprivation of the liberty of individuals by the State, and on the other hand, providing for the 
positive obligation of the State to ensure the security of all persons within its jurisdiction. 
Articles 9(2) to 9(5) provides the necessary procedural guarantees to ensure that liberty is 
only deprived according to law. 173 Although the deprivation of liberty is more often 
associated with criminal offences and imprisonment, the HRC has stated that Article 9(1) 
extends the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty to cases of "mental illness, 
vagrancy, drug addiction, educational purposes, immigration control, e. t. c. ". 
174 Thus it has 
indicated that deprivation of liberty for these purposes must also be in accordance with law to 
ensure that the inherent liberty of the human person is fully secured from violation except for 
justifiable and necessary reasons. 
Also in Katombe Tshishimbi v. Zaire175 the HRC observed that the right to security 
under Article 9 must not be limited only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty but 
extends to threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within a State's 
jurisdiction. '76 Thus the right to security "applies to persons in and out of detention". 177 
The right to personal liberty and security is also fully sanctioned under Islamic law. 178 it 
is the duty of the State to ensure it. The State cannot violate the personal liberty and security 
of anyone without justification. There is evidence for this from the practice of the Prophet as 
reported in a Tradition by Abü Däwüd. Some persons were arrested during the Prophet's 
time in Medina on suspicion. While the Prophet was giving a sermon in the mosque a man 
stood up and asked: "0 Prophet of God! Why have my neighbours been arrested and 
detained? " The Prophet kept quiet, expecting the officer in-charge of the arrests and 
detention who was present in the mosque, to give an explanation. The complainant asked the 
question a second and a third time, and when there was no answer from the officer in-charge, 
the Prophet ordered that the detained persons be released since their arrest and detention 
173 For comprehensive illustration of the procedural guarantees under Articles 9(2)-9(5) See Joseph, Schultz and Castan 
(2000) supra, note 23 above, p. 291. 
174 See General Comment 8, Par. 1. 
175 Communication No. 542/1993, UN Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/542/1993(1996). Par. 5.4. 
'76 See also Delgado Pdez v. Colombia, Communication No. 195/1985 (12 July 1990), UN Doc. Supp. No. 40, Par. 5.5 
(A/45/40) at 43 (1990). 
177 See Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000) supra, note 23 above, p. 207. 
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could not be justified. 179 This incident accommodates the modern constitutional law remedy 
of habeas corpus guaranteed under Article 9(4). There is therefore no conflict between 
Islamic law and the important procedural guarantees to ensure liberty and security of the 
individual under Articles 9(2) to 9(5). Scholars representing all schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence unanimously agreed during the Pakistan Constitutional debate of 1953 that the 
right of habeas corpus was in consonance with Islamic law and that the Shari `ah fully 
recognises the right of the individual to be able to move the highest court for redress against 
any unlawful detention. 180 
Islamic jurists are thus agreed that a person cannot be deprived of his liberty without a 
legally valid justification. 181 Abu Yüsuf, the great eighth century Hanafi jurist, in his famous 
work Kitäb al-Kharäj, had instructed the Caliph Harlin al-Rashid to order all governors in the 
provinces to investigate into the affairs of prisoners daily. They should punish those guilty of 
a charge and release them forthwith and release immediately those who are not charged with 
any specific offence. 182 The OIC Cairo Declaration thus provides, inter alia, in Article 18(a) 
that: "Everyone shall have a right to live in security for himself, his religion, his dependants, 
his honour and his property" and in Article 20 that: "It is not permitted without legitimate 
reason to arrest an individual, or restrict his freedom, to exile or to punish him". In the 
context of international human rights standards this must certainly accommodate the right to 
be tried within reasonable time, right to bail, and right to compensation for illegal detentions 
as provided under Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
In its General Comment 28 the HRC observed that laws and practices which "deprive 
women of their liberty on an arbitrary or unequal basis, such as by confinement within the 
house" may violate Article 9.183 It is sometimes alleged that Islamic law requires the 
confinement of women within the house. Many Muslim scholars and jurists refute this. 
According to El-Bahnssawi: 
"A Muslim woman was not doomed to be a crippled member in the society, with the 
sole task of welcoming her husband at his arrival and bidding him farewell at his 
departure. Stories reported from the early days of Islam demonstrated that women, 
immunized by their deep faith and chastity, had performed similar work as men... 
The Muslim society did not object to woman's work in many fields. Needless to say, 
the Prophet did not deny woman's active participation in social life and, in some 
178 See e. g. al-Saleh, O. A., (1982) supra, note 157 above, pp. 55-90. 
179 See Maududi, A. A., Human Rights in Islam, (1993) p. 26. 
Is' See Maududi, A. A., The Islamic Law and Constitution (1997) 338-40. 
181 See e. g. Ibn Qayyim, J., A! -Turuq al-Hukmiyyahfi al-Siydsah al-Shar'iyyah (Arabic) (1961)p. 103 and Ibn Hazm, A. A., 
a! 
-Muhalld, (Arabic) (n. d. )Vol. 11, p. 141. 
'$2 See e. g. All, A. A., (Trans. ) Kitab-ul-Kharaj (1979) p. 303. 
183 General Comment 28, Par. 14. 
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instances, beside man, as in military operations aimed at defending the religion of 
Islam". 184 
The Qur'an had earlier prescribed confinement within the house as punishment for 
adultery. 185 If women were generally required to be confined within the house, its 
prescription as punishment would have been meaningless. 
THE RIGHT TO A HUMANE INCARCERATION SYSTEM 
Article 10 
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person. 
2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from 
convicted persons and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as 
unconvicted persons; 
(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as speedily as 
possible for adjudication. 
3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which 
shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be segregated 
from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status. 
Public interest and the right to security of others may sometimes demand that certain 
persons be incarcerated in accordance with law as indicated in Article 9 above. Article 10 
ensures that any such incarcerated person is still "treated with humanity and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person. ". 186 The usual association of incarcerations with 
criminal offences and imprisonment mentioned above is portrayed here also by the 
references to "accused persons" and "treatment of prisoners" in Articles 10(2) and 10(3). The 
-IRC has pointed out that the right to humane treatment during incarceration is not restricted 
only to prisons but also include "for example, hospitals (particularly psychiatric hospitals), 
detention camps or correctional institutions" etc. 187. Incarcerated persons shall not be tortured 
or subjected to inhuman treatment and their living conditions must also be humane. 
The presumption of innocence until conviction is protected by the provision in Article 
10(2)(a) for the segregation of accused persons from convicted persons. Due to the 
vulnerability of juveniles Article 10(2)(b) also provides for their separation from adults 
I&' El-Bahnassawi, S., (1985) supra, note 58 above, p. 64. 
185 Q4: 15. 
Iss Art. 10(1). 
187 See General Comment 9, Par. 1 and General Comment 21, Par. 2. 
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during incarceration. There is an obligation also on the State to ensure that the penitentiary 
system aims essentially for the reform and social rehabilitation of prisoners. 
Under Islamic law, imprisonment of offenders falls within to `zir (discretionary) 
punishments. It is known as habs and could either be a preventive confinement pending 
investigation (habs ihtiyäti), imprisonment upon conviction for an offence, or even have a 
wider meaning of general deprivation of personal liberty. 188 The humane treatment of such 
incarcerated persons is generally covered by the rules of asir (i. e. captive in the custody of 
the State) under Islamic law. The humane treatment of captives and prisoners is found 
mentioned in the Qur'an. Yusuf Ali observes that in those times "when captives of war had 
to earn their own food,... (and) prisoners... often starved unless food was provided for them 
by private friends or from their own earnings", the Qur'an declared the feeding, for God's 
sake, of prisoners, inter alia, as a means of gaining paradise in the hereafter. 189 The Prophet 
is also reported to have ordered in respect of the prisoners of war taken by the Muslims at the 
Battle of Badr as follows: "Take heed of the admonition to treat prisoners fairly. s190 
The Muslim jurists are agreed that since a prisoner is in the custody of the State, it is 
responsible for his feeding, clothing, medical care and other essential needs. The prisoners 
right to the integrity of his person, body, mind and honour must be respected. Married 
prisoners are also entitled to periodic conjugal visitations. 19' Ali ibn Abi Tälib, the fourth 
Caliph after the Prophet, was reported to make surprise visits to prisons to ensure the humane 
treatment of the inmates and to hear their complaints. 192 There are also numerous Traditions 
of the Prophet ordering the humane treatment and kindness to both the physically and 
mentally sick, whether or not under incarceration. Abu Yüsuf had stated in his Kitäb al- 
Kharäj that: 
"all the Caliphs used to bestow upon the prisoners what would sustain them as 
regards their food and other goods and their clothing in winter and summer. The 
first one to do this was Ali b. abi Talib in Iraq, then Mu'awiya did that in Syria then 
the rest of the Caliphs followed the practice after him. s193 
188 See e. g. Awad, A. M., (1982) supra, note 129 above, p. 91 at 102. 
'" See generally Q76: 5-22 and Commentary note 5839 to Q76: 8 in Ali, A. Y., The Meaning of the Holy Qur'dn (1992) 
p. 1572. 
190 See Tabari, History I, pp. 1337-8 cited in Hamidullah, M., Muslim Conduct of State (Revised 7`h Ed., 1977) p. 214, 
Par. 441. 
19' The Saudi Arabian government is reported to apply this principle by allowing conjugal visitations to married prisoners of 
both sexes. See Al-Alfi, A. A., "Punishment in Islamic Criminal Law", in Bassiouni, M. C., (ed. ) The Islamic Criminal 
Justice (1982) p. 227 at 235-236. See also Document issued by Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Protection of 
Human Rights in Criminal Procedure and in the Organization of the Judicial System (2000). Section III: The Post-Trial 
Stage, Par. 7(a) and (b). Available Online at Saudi Embassy News Website: http: //www. saudienibassy. net/press release/hr- 
iudicial-l-menu. html [7/03/2001]. 
192 See Al-Alfi, A. A., ibid. pp. 235-236. 
193 See Ali, A. A., (Trans. ) Kitab-ul-Kharaj (1979) p. 301. 
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The OIC Cairo Declaration does not however contain any specific provision for a 
humane incarceration system. 
FREEDOM FROM IMPRISONMENT FOR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
Article 11 
No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation. 
Article 11 prohibits detention for liability arising from contractual obligations. There 
was agreement during the drafting that "the article should cover any contractual obligations, 
namely, the payment of debts, performance of services or the delivery of goods. "194 This 
indicates that such liabilities are not considered as constituting a crime. The freedom from 
imprisonment does not however extend to criminal offences related to the liability, such as 
criminal conviction for fraud or embezzlement of public funds. The provision also applies 
only in cases of "inability (of the debtor) to fulfil" such obligation and does not cover a 
refusal to fulfil contractual obligations or fraudulent and negligent bankruptcy. 195 
Islamic law does not also consider the inability to fulfil contractual obligations as 
permitting imprisonment or any other punishment. Although the Shari `ah strongly advocates 
the fulfilment of all obligations 
- 
"0 you who believe! Fulfil (all) obligations"196, yet the 
obligor shall have respite for the obligee in case of inability of the latter to fulfil his 
contractual obligation. The obligor is even encouraged to write off the debt in case of total 
inability of the obligee. The Qur'an 2: 280 provides that: "If the debtor is in difficulty, grant 
him time till it is easy for him to repay, but if you remit it by way of charity, that is best for 
you if you only knew. " The Prophet is also reported to have stated that: "Whoever gives 
respite to a debtor or grants him remission, God will save him from the difficulties of the 
Resurrection Day. "197 To indicate that the rule applies only in cases of inability of the debtor, 
the Prophet further stated that; "Delay by a solvent debtor to settle his debt is an oppression 
(against the creditor)". 198 The OIC Cairo Declaration does not provide specifically for this 
right. 
"d UN Doc. A/2929, supra, p. 106 Par. 46. 
`95 See Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, p. 193ff. 
'96 Q5: 1. 
'g' Reported by Muslim. See Karim, F., (1994) supra, note 197 above, Vol. 2, p. 206, Hadith No. 3. 
'" Reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim. See ibid, p. 207, Hadith No. 6. 
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THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND CHOICE OF RESIDENCE 
Article 12 
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right 
to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which 
are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre 
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent 
with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant. 
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. 
Freedom of movement is an important human right and a cardinal element of right to 
personal liberty. It is thus vital for the enjoyment of other human rights. Article 12 
guarantees both internal and external freedom of movement and choice of residence for those 
"lawfully within the territory of a State". The HRC has therefore observed that the provision 
"does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State, party. It is 
in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory". 199 The right is 
also subjected to limitations provided by law necessary to protect national security, public 
order, public health, morals, rights and freedoms of others consistent with the Covenant. 200 
Article 12(4) prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter one's own country. 
Although the right to enter one's own country is not subjected to the limitations in Article 
12(3), there seem nevertheless to be some implied limitations in the wordings of Article 
12(4) itself. Article 12(4) prohibits only "arbitrary" deprivation of the right to enter one's 
own country. Nowak has pointed out that based on the travaux preparatoires this limitation 
must be strictly interpreted "to relate exclusively to cases of lawful exile as punishment for a 
crime". 201 Jagerskoild has however argued that perhaps exile as punishment for a crime "is 
now prohibited under customary international law, and it may even be jus cogens. s202 This 
finds support in the HRC's Concluding Observation on the Dominican Republic that 
"punishment by exile is not compatible with the Covenant". 203 Also in Charles Stewart v. 
Canada the Committee observed that the obligation of a State under Article 12(4) to allow 
199 General Comment 15, Par. 5. See also Charles Stewart 
. 
v. Canada, Communication No. 538/1993, Human Rights 
Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1996, (16 December 1996) Par-12.5 and 12.6; and Canepa v. Canada, 
Communication No. 558/1993, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993 (20 June 1997) Par 11.3. 
200 Art. 12(3). See also Jagerskoild, S., "Freedom of Movement", in Henkin, (1981) supra, note 6 above, p. 166 at 174, and 
Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, pp. 206ff. 
201 See Nowak, ibid. p. 219. 
2' See Jagerskoild, S., (1981) supra, note 200above at 181. 
203 Concluding Observations on Domincan Republic, (1993) UN. Doc. CCPR/C/790/Add. 18, Par. 6. See also Concluding 
Observations on Islamic Republic of Iran (1993) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 25, Par. 14. 
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entry of a person into his own country also prohibited from deporting a person from his own 
204 
country. 
Freedom of movement and choice of settlement is recognised in Islamic law on the basis 
of the Qur'anic provision that: "It is He (God) Who has made the earth tractable for you 
(mankind), so traverse through its tracts and enjoy of the sustenance which He (God) 
furnishes; but unto Him is the Resurrection. s205 The Qur'an even indicates that people who 
refused to emigrate from persecution and died in sin would be confronted with the question 
on Judgement Day that: "Was not the earth of God spacious enough for you to emigrate 
therein? "206 There are also numerous verses of the Qur'an that charge human beings to 
traverse the earth to appreciate the majesty and benevolence of God. 207 
This right to freedom of movement and choice of settlement is reported to have been 
demonstrated by the fourth Caliph, Ali ibn Abi Tälib, even in the face of the difficult 
political crisis with Mu'äwiyyah during his reign. Ali was advised then to prevent the 
movement of some people who were crossing from Medina to Syria to join Mu'äwiyyah who 
was then contending the leadership of the Islamic Empire with the Caliph. Caliph Ali 
declined to prevent the movement on grounds that the people had a God-given right of 
movement over the land, which the Caliph could not revoke without justification. He is 
reported to have even assured the Dissenters (Khawärij) that they may live wherever they 
wished within the Islamic empire as long as they did not indulge in bloodshed and acts of 
oppression. 208 Article 12 of the OIC Cairo Declaration thus provides that: 
"Every man shall have the right, within the framework of Shari 'ah, to free movement 
and to select his place of residence whether inside or outside his country... " 
However, with regards to the right of women to freedom of movement under Article 12, 
the HRC has alluded to the requirements in some Muslim States that a male relative must 
accompany women on a journey. 209 This requirement is based on the Tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad that "No woman shall make journey covering the distance of a day and night 
except accompanied by a male relative (Mahram). s210 In a similar Tradition a man was 
reported to have then asked the Prophet saying that he had enrolled to take part in an 
264 supra note 199 above, Par. 12.2. 
205 Q67: 15. 
711 Q4: 97. 
See e. g. Q6: 1 1; 27: 69; 29: 20; 30: 42. 
208 See, Tabandeh, S., A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1970) p. 33. and Chaudhry, 
M. S., (1995)supra, note 82 above, p. 21. 
209 See e. g. HRC Summary Record of the 1628th Meeting: Sudan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1628 of 02/02/98, Par. 49. See also 
General Comment 28, Par. 16. 
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expedition but his wife also intended to travel for Pilgrimage. The Prophet instructed the man 
to abandon his expedition and follow his wife for her pilgrimage. 21 1 The latter explains that 
rather than being a restriction on the right of women to freedom of movement, the 
requirement was a security right to which women were entitled to ensure their safety on long 
journeys in those times. Kamali has observed in that regard as follows: 
"... Another example of ongoing reinterpretation is the scholarly contribution of the 
Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who validated air travel by women 
unaccompanied by male relatives. According to the rules of fiqh that were formulated 
in premodern times, women were not permitted to travel alone. Al-Qaradawi based 
his conclusion on the analysis that the initial ruling was intended to ensure women's 
physical and moral safety, and that modem air travel fulfills this requirement. He 
further supported this view with an analysis of the relevant hadiths on the subject and 
arrived at a ruling better suited to contemporary conditions. "212 
FREEDOM OF ALIENS FROM ARBITRARY EXPULSION 
Article 13 
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled 
therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except 
where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the 
reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the 
purpose before the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the 
competent authority. 
As is clear from the above provision, the guarantee here is not absolute, it only protects 
legal aliens from arbitrary expulsion and also sets out some procedural guarantees that must 
213 be fulfilled in case of expulsion. 
The above provision is in full consonance with Islamic law. Hamidullah quotes al- 
Shaybäni on the rights of aliens to enjoy protection and justice within the Islamic State as 
follows: 
"It is a principle (of Muslim law) that the sovereign of the Muslims has the obligation 
to protect foreigners coming with permission as long as they are in our (Muslims) 
territory, and to do justice to them 
- 
this in the same way as he has an obligation 
" 214 regarding non-Muslim subjects. 
2'0 Reported By al-Bukhari and Muslim, See e. g. Karim, F., (1994) supra, note 197 above, Vol. 3, p. 572, Hadith No. 11. Z" Reported By al-Bukhari and Muslim, See e. g. Karim, F., (1994) supra, note 197 above, Vol. 3, p. 571, Hadith No. 9. 212 See Kamali, M. H., "Law and Society: the Interplay of Revelation and Reason in the Shariah" in Esposito, J. L., (ed. ) The 
Oxford History of Islam (1999) p. 107 at 118. 
213 See General Comment 15, Par. 9 and 10. See also Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000) supra, note 23 above, pp. 268-276. 214 Hamidullah, M., (Revised 7`h Ed., 1977) supra, note 190 above, p. 133, Par. 249. 
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While Article 12 of the OIC Cairo Declaration recognised the right of residence outside 
one's own country it failed however to specifically provide for the right of aliens not to be 
arbitrarily expelled. 
THE RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
Article 14 
The right to fair hearing and due process of law is aimed at guaranteeing equity and fair 
play in the administration of justice. It protects the individual especially against the abuse of 
the criminal process by the State or its agents. The real importance of Article 14, which is the 
longest of the substantive provisions of the ICCPR, lies in the fact that the realisation of all 
human rights often depend on the proper administration of justice through equitable 
procedural guarantees. 
The procedural guarantees under Article 14(1) apply not only in criminal trials but also 
in matters concerning the determination of "rights and obligations in a suit at law". The HRC 
has observed that "(l)aws and practices dealing with these matters vary widely from State to 
State. "215 Nowak has pointed out that the provisions in Article 14 are based on Anglo- 
American (and Civil Law) "liberal principles of separation of powers and the independence 
of the judiciary vis-ä-vis the executive". 216 If it is perceived however, as stated by the HRC 
that "(a)ll of these provisions (in Article 14) are aimed at ensuring the proper administration 
of justices217 and not at imposing the Anglo-American or Civil Law systems, then it will be 
easier to interpret the guarantees under Article 14 in relation to other systems such as the 
Islamic legal system. 218 
Under Islamic law the issue of fair trial and due process, being procedural, is covered by 
the methods rather than by the sources of Islamic law. 219 The Shari `ah per se mainly covers 
the substantive aspects of Islamic law while the procedural aspects fall within the realms of 
figh as formulated by the jurists. While the Qur'an and Sunnah may specify the crime, 
prescribe punishments, and enjoin substantive justice, they do not give details of procedural 
matters such as arrest, detention, investigation, prosecution, hearing, judicial review, e. t. c. 
215 See General Comment 13, Par. 2. 
216 See Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, p. 237. 
217 See General Comment 13, Par. 1. 
215 It is important to note that Islamic law is based on a complete legal system having rules, procedures, courts and 
specialised judicial personnel apart from the clergy. See e. g. Azad, G. M., Judicial System of Islam (1987) and note 220 
below. 
219 See Chapter 3 above on the nature of Islamic law. 
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The Shari `ah mainly emphasises substantive justice leaving the procedure of its realisation 
for the State to decide in accordance with the best interests of society. 22° 
Drawing from the Prophet's practice and that of the rightly guided Caliphs, the early 
Muslim jurists endeavoured to lay down judicial procedures which they believed would 
facilitate the realisation of substantive justice as prescribed by the Shari `ah. The judicial 
procedures as found in the works of the classical jurists were not rigid but were adjusted in 
practice under the doctrine of siyäsah shay yyah, especially during the Abassid Caliphate. 
Muslim scholars fully agree that the particularities of the Islamic judicial system are not 
inflexible, but leave room for necessary refinement as the needs of substantive justice 
demand 
. 
221 Thus although the judicial procedures found in the works of classical Islamic 
jurists may not expressis verbis contain the list of guarantees provided in Article 14 of the 
ICCPR, it is not difficult to establish those guarantees within the Shari `ah and the principles 
of Islamic administration of justice laid down by the jurists. Tabandeh had pointed out that 
all the six articles relating to fair trial and due process of law under the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights222 "conform fully to Islamic law, which has long dealt with all the points 
they raise under its perfect social regulations". 223 
Due to the complexity of the provisions of Article 14 we shall examine the paragraphs 
one after the other and analyse the procedural rights they guarantee within the principles of 
Islamic law. 
14(1) All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any 
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded 
from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or 
national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of 
the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but 
any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public 
except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings 
concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children. 
120 For classical analysis of the development of the Islamic judicial procedure, See e. g. Ibn Khaldün, al-Mugaddimah, Vol 2. 
p. 35-37; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, M., al-Turuq al-Hukmiyyahfi al-Siydsah al-Shar'iyyah (Arabic) (1953) p. 218ff and al- 
Mawardi, supra 
, 
note 270 above, pp. 69-73. See also contemporary analysis on the subject by Awad, A. M. (1982) supra, 
note 129 p. 91-92; Al-Alwani, T. J., "Judiciary and Rights of the Accused in Islamic Criminal Law", in Mahmood, T., et at, 
(eds. ) Criminal Law in Islam and the Muslim World (1996) p. 256-263; Mahmood, T., "Criminal Procedure at the Shari'ah 
Law as Seen by Modern Scholars: A Review", in Mahmood, T., et al, ibid., pp. 292ff; and generally Lippman, M., et al, 
(eds. ) Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure: An Introduction (1988). 
22' ibid. 
IIZ i. e. Articles 6,7,8,9,10, and 11. 
223 See Tabandeh, S., A (1970) supra, note 208 above, p. 28. 
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The important rights guaranteed here are (i) equality of parties before the courts in both 
criminal and civil proceedings and (ii) fair and public hearing by legally competent tribunals. 
The HRC observed in Bahamonde. v. Equatorial Guinea that "the notion of equality before 
the courts and tribunals encompasses the very access to the courts and that a situation in 
which an individual's attempts to seize the competent jurisdictions of his/her grievances are 
systematically frustrated runs counter to the guarantees of article 14, paragraph 1". 224 The 
Committee has also observed that States parties must ensure that courts "are independent, 
impartial and competent, in particular with regard to the manner in which judges are 
appointed, the qualifications for appointment, and the duration of their terms of office; the 
conditions governing promotion, transfer and cessation of their functions". 225 These 
guarantees are in full consonance with the provisions of the Shari `ah. The Qur'anic 
injunctions on justice are always laden with the idea of equality and fairness. For example: 
"0 you who believe! Be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness for God's sake, 
even though it be against your own selves, your parents, or your near relatives, and 
"ZZ6 whether it be against (the) rich or (the) poor... 
"0 you who believe! Be upright for God, bearers of witness with justice; and let not 
the hatred of a people swerve you to act inequitably. Act equitably, for that is nearer 
"227 to piety... 
".... And when you judge between people judge with equity; certainly God counsels 
you excellently, and God hears and sees (all things)"228 
"God commands (the doing of) justice and fairness 
... 
and prohibits indecencies and 
injustice... s229 
Doing justice is considered under Islamic law as a duty to God from which emanates the 
rights to equality and fairness for all human beings without regard to status, race, gender or 
religion. The Qur'an says: 
"0 Mankind! Be mindful of your duty to your Lord who created you all from a single 
soul and from it created its mate and from the two of them spread out a multitude of 
men and women. Be careful of your duty toward God, through Whom you claim 
(your rights from one another) 
... 
and God is ever-watchful over you all. 11230 
224 Communication No. 468/1991, UN Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991 (1993). Par. 9.4. 
221 General Comment 13, Par. 3. 
226 Q4: 135- 
227 Q5: 8. 
218 Q4: 58. 
1 Q16: 90. 
2° Qur'an 4: 1. 
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The expression "0 Mankind! " with which the above verse begins is an important 
indicator of non-regard to status, race, gender or religion in the claiming of rights and the 
doing of justice with which the verse ends. The notion that "the Crown or the King can do no 
wrong" has never existed in Islamic legal theory. The Prophet himself and the righteous 
Caliphs after him demonstrated the principle of equality before the courts and tribunals both 
in words and deeds. An illustrative example of this was in a case brought by a commoner 
called Ubay ibn Ka'b against Caliph Umar ibn al-Khatäb during the latter's rule as second 
Caliph of the Islamic empire. The case was before Zayd ibn Thäbit. When Caliph Umar 
entered the courtroom to defend the suit brought against him by the commoner, Zayd (the 
judge) stood up as a sign of respect for Caliph Umar. For doing that, the Caliph rebuked 
Zayd saying: "that is your first injustice to the other party in this case". After the hearing, 
Ubay could not adduce enough evidence to establish his claim against the Caliph, but 
requested, in accordance with the prescribed rules of evidence under Islamic law, that the 
Caliph must make an oath to sustain his denial of the claim. Zayd, again out of respect for the 
Caliph, requested Ubay to spare Umar from that formality since it was clear that the Caliph 
could not be lying. Caliph Umar frowned at this favouritism and said to Zayd, "If an ordinary 
man and Umar are not equal before you, then you are not fit to be a judge 
. 
s231 al-Mäwardi 
also cited another instance in which Caliph Umar sent a message to one of the judges during 
his reign ordering him as follows: "Make people equal before you in your dispensation of 
justice, so that no noble may look forward to your favouritism and no commoner may despair 
of your justice". 232 There is thus a consensus among Muslim jurists that it is obligatory on a 
judge to maintain equality among the parties before him in every case. 233 In General 
Comment 28 the HRC raised the point of women giving evidence as witnesses "on the same 
terms as men" under Article 14. This brings the evidential capacity of women under Islamic 
law into issue as a matter concerning the equal right to fair hearing. 
The rules of evidence in Islamic law requires in some cases the evidence of two men or 
alternatively, one man and two women (i. e. two women replacing one man). This is based 
on Qur'an 2: 282 which provides, inter alia, that: 
"0 you who believe! When you contract a debt for a fixed period, write it down.... 
And get two witnesses out of your own men, and if there are not two men (available) 
231 See e. g. Hussain, S. S., "Human Rights in Islam: Principles and Precedents" (1983) 1 Islamic and Contemporary Law 
Quarterly, p. 103 at 121-126 and Maudüdi, A. A., (1993) supra, note 179 above, pp. 21-22 & 31-32 for further illustrations. 
232 al-Mawardi, supra, note 270 above, p. 76. 
233 See e. g. Ibn Rushd al-Qurtubi, A., (1988) supra, note 116 above, Vol. 2, p. 472, The Chapter on How to dispense justice. 
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then a man and two women, such as you agree for witnesses, so that if one of them 
(two women) errs, the other can remind her... "234 
It will be observed that the above verse substitutes the evidence of one man with that of 
two women and thus raises the question of inequality and discrimination on grounds of sex 
under international human rights law. Although this provision has traditionally been imposed 
generally upon all testamentary evidences under Islamic law, Muslim scholars have argued 
that it does not apply in all cases but is restricted only to testimony in business transactions, 
civil debts and contracts. They have contended that rather than being discriminatory, the 
provision is mainly precautionary, because such transactions being then seldom assumed by 
women, they ordinarily lacked experience in the intricacies involved and were more likely to 
err in the presentation of issues in that respect. Therefore the reason for requesting two 
women in the place of one man here was that "if one of them errs" in the presentation of 
issues "the other can remind her". 235 One observes that in all other provisions concerning the 
procurement of evidence other than in business or financial transactions, the Qur'an does not 
discern between the male and the female. For evidence in divorce cases the Qur'anic 
provision is that: 
"... When you divorce women 
... 
either take them back on equitable terms or part 
with them on equitable terms; and take for witnesses two persons from among you 
endued with justice... ""' (emphasis added). 
For evidence in bequest matters the Qur'anic provision is: 
"Oh you who believe! When death approaches any of you, (take) witnesses among 
yourselves when making bequests 
- 
two just persons of your own 
... 
23 (emphasis 
added). 
And in evidence for adultery the Qur`anic provision is that: 
"And those of your women who commit illegal sexual intercourse, take the evidence 
of four witnesses from amongst you against them... 238 (emphasis added). 
In all these other cases a generic term "two just persons" (dha wd adlin) or "witnesses" 
(shuhadä ) is used without any differentiation of gender as was adopted in the first case. It 
can therefore be argued that the transposing of the provision concerning commercial 
234Q 2: 282 touches basically on financial transactions and obligations. 
us See e. g. El-Bahnassawi, S., (1985) supra, note 58 above, p130-131. 
2" Q 65: 1-2. 
237 Q 5: 106. 
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transactions upon all other types of testamentary evidence arose from the traditional position 
of women in society, not from a direct Qur'anic text. In the same way there is consensus 
among the jurists that female evidence alone is admissible in cases where men lack adequate 
knowledge or where it is impossible for men to have knowledge except women. 239 El- 
Bahnassawi thus concluded that: 
"It should be borne in mind that Islam attributed this differentiation between the 
sexes to their respective natural dispositions, though it had acknowledged their 
creation from the same origin and essence. It is not indicative of woman's inferiority 
but touches directly on people's interests and the safeguarding of Justice. Should the 
law treat the testimony of a woman- as she is (was? ) inexperienced in business and 
commercial fields 
- 
equal to that of a man, it would be detrimental to the cause of 
justice and the interests of the contracting parties. Woman, it is clear, shall not draw 
any gain or advantage therefrom. """ 
While generally conceding to the principle of equality Islamic law also takes specific 
social needs that may arise in certain contexts into consideration. 241 The greatest desire is that 
of doing substantive justice. The prescription for two women in place of one man thus occurs 
only in business transactions in which women used not to have the same experience as men. 
This would then raise the question that, since women now partake in business transactions 
and many women have acquired professional experience commensurate to that of men in 
commerce, can the rule of two women witnesses in place of one man be suspended where no 
miscarriage of justice will be incurred? The argument of desire to do substantive justice can 
sway Muslim countries that adopt a liberal interpretation of the Shari `ah to leave out this rule 
on grounds of necessity or in the interest of justice as demonstrated in the Northern Nigerian 
case of Rijiyan Dorawa earlier cited in Chapter 5.242 The Pakistan Federal Shariat Court had 
also in the case of Ansar Burney 
. 
v. Federation of Pakistan243 referred to possible instances 
of a single female witness. States that maintain a hard-line traditional approach may however 
not be swayed by the same argument and will be in breach of Article 14(1) as interpreted by 
the HRC. 
With respect to public trials and legally competent tribunals, the first is evident under 
Islamic law from the fact that traditionally mosques were mostly used as the courtrooms. 
738 Q 4: 15. The rule applies vice versa for men who commit adultery. 
239 See e. g. Al-Jazä'iri, A. J. Minhäj al-Muslim (Arabic) (1976) 8`h Edition, p. 467; and Al-Zuhayli, W., supra, note 77 above, 
Vol. 8., pp. 6045-6046. See also Qadri, A. A., (1986) supra, note 259 above, p. 505 and El-Bahnassawi, S., (1985) supra, 
note 58 above, p. 132. 
24° Bahanssawi, S., (1985) ibid. 
241 See Hallaq, W. B., A History of Islamic Legal Theories (I 997)p. 184. 
242 See pp. 92-93 above. 
243 supra, note 78 above. 
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This was the most obvious public place within the Islamic Empire. Islamic law also provides 
specific qualifications for the appointment of judges, and only competent and duly appointed 
judges can give binding judgements. 244 
Thus, the guarantees in Article 14(1) are generally compatible with Islamic law. This is 
substantiated by Article 19 of the OIC Cairo Declaration which provides that: "(a) All 
individuals are equal before the law, without distinction between ruler and ruled; (b) The 
right to resort to justice is guaranteed to everyone". 
14(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law. 
Islamic law fully recognises this right. The presumption of the defendant's innocence is 
an important principle depicted in various rules of evidence under Islamic law. Basically, 
every human being is considered to be inherently immaculate. 245 Thus, by the Islamic legal 
principle of istishäb, (presumption of continuity)246 an accused person is considered innocent 
until the contrary is proved. Generally, the Qur'an enjoins Muslims to ascertain the truth of 
every allegation to avoid wrongfully harming innocent persons. 247 This is more specifically 
demonstrated through the general rule of Islamic evidence, which provides that the onus of 
proof lies on the Claimant or Complainant. For instance, the Qur'an provides that: "And 
those who launch a charge against chaste women and produce not four witnesses (to support 
their allegation) flog them with eighty stripes and reject their evidence ever after, for such 
men are wicked transgressors". 248 Also the Prophet had stated that: "The onus of proof lies 
upon the Claimant, and an oath is required of one who denies the claim. "249 A possible 
argument from a Western legal perspective would be that the requirement of an oath to 
sustain the defendant's denial under Islamic law impugns the total presumption of the 
defendant's innocence. This requirement of an oath to sustain the defendant's denial under 
Islamic law derives from the need to do substantive justice especially in civil claims, because 
it is possible that a Claimant may sometimes fail to prove his case only for lack of eloquence 
or simply on technicalities. Thus, in such cases the defendant's oath is only to ensure positive 
2" ibid., p. 460. See also Ibn Khaldün, Al-Muqaddimah, Vol. 2 p. 746. 
245 This is based on a Prophetic Tradition that: "Everyone is born inherently pure... 
246 Istishdb is a principle of Islamic law which denotes the continuation of an established state of affairs until the contrary is 
proven. For an analysis of its application see e. g. Karnali, M. H., Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (1991) pp. 297-309. 
247 Q49: 6. 
248 Q24: 4. Note that this onus of proof lies upon the accuser of both men and women of adultery. 
209 Reported By al-Bayhägl. See e. g. al-Asgalani, Ibn Hajar, Bulugh al-Maram (With English Translations) (1996) p. 499, 
Hadith 1210. 
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justice250 The presumption of the defendant's innocence under Islamic law is further 
demonstrated by the unanimity of the Islamic jurists that any balance of probabilities or 
doubt in criminal trials must be resolved in favour of the accused. This is based on the 
Prophet's instruction that the hudüd punishments should be averted with the slightest iota of 
doubt 
. 
251 Article 19(e) of the OIC Cairo Declaration thus provides that: "A defendant is 
innocent until his guilt is proven in a fair trial in which he shall be given all the guarantees of 
defence. " 
14(3) In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to 
the following minimum guarantees, in full equality; 
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the 
nature and cause of the charge against him; 
Prompt information of the accused person of the nature and cause of the charges against 
him aims, inter alia, at preventing arbitrary charges and also leaves the accused in no doubt 
of the charges against him. The HRC has stated in its General Comment 13 that the right of 
an accused person "to be informed of the charge `promptly' requires that information is 
given in the manner described as soon as the charge is first made by a competent 
authority. s252 Because the liberty and freedom of an accused person may be restricted to 
facilitate investigation, a prompt information in the language that the accused person 
understands will ensure certainty of the wrong committed to warrant any such restriction and 
the subsequent sanction that may be imposed thereafter if found guilty of the alleged wrong. 
This is in full consonance with Islamic law since the Qur'an provides that blame can only be 
against those who have certainly committed wrong. 253 
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to 
communicate with counsel of his own choosing; 
The guarantee in Article 14(3)(b) is related to the accused person's general right to 
defence, which is examined in detail under paragraph (d) below. 
(c) To be tried without undue delay; 
2`0 This may also be compared with the Oath or Affirmation undertaken by litigants to speak "the truth and nothing but the 
truth" at the commencement of evidence under Western legal systems. 
251 See Al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 77 above, Vol. 4., p. 3144; and al-'Awwa, M. S., "The Basis of Islamic Penal 
Legislation" in Bassiouni, M. C., (ed. ) The Islamic Criminal Justice (1982) p. 127 at pp. 143-144. 
252 General Comment 13, Par. S. 
253 See e. g. Q42: 42. 
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The guarantee to be tried without undue delay is consequential to the right to justice, 
because justice delayed is justice denied. Due to the great emphasis that Islam places on 
justice, any undue delay in the administration of justice is also prohibited. The Islamic jurists 
stress that the presentation of evidence for criminal offences must not be delayed. Some of 
the Islamic jurists are of the opinion that delayed evidence in criminal trial amounts to 
doubtful evidence which cannot sustain punishment for hudüd crimes under Islamic law. 254 
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, 
of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the 
interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he 
does not have sufficient means to pay for it; 
The accused person's right of appearance and defence are both very much recognised 
under Islamic law. The Qur'an establishes the right of defence in its narration that even when 
Adam violated God's order in the Garden of Eden, he was given the opportunity of defence, 
even though he apparently had non. 
255 Also the Qur'an presents us with scenarios of the fact 
that even in the hereafter God will give sinners an opportunity to present their defences, if 
any, before being punished. 256 The Prophet and the Caliphs after him also set examples in 
that respect. For instance when the Prophet appointed Ali ibn Abi Tälib as Governor to 
Yemen he instructed him not to decide any matter brought to him without first hearing the 
defence of the other party. 257 Caliph Umar ibn Abdul Aziz was also reported to have handed 
down instructions to judges during his rule as follows: "If a litigant comes complaining with 
a blinded eye, do not be quick to decide in his favour until the other party appears, for it is 
possible that the former has blinded the latter in both eyes. s258 
Qadri has pointed out that Islamic law "does not favour the trial of a claim in the 
absence of the defendant" and that if the court is forced to proceed ex Parte by the non- 
availability of the defendant, a representative must be appointed to protect the defendant's 
interest. 259 The right to defence has been so much emphasised under Islamic law to the extent 
that every effort must be made to ensure its adequacy. The right to adequate time and 
facilities to prepare one's defence under Article 14(3)(b) is very much incidental to the 
substantive enjoyment of this general right to defence and is thus also protected by the rules 
u° See Salama, M. M., "General Principles of Criminal Evidence in Islamic Jurisprudence", in Bassiouni, M. C., (ed. ) The 
Islamic Criminal Justice (1982) p. 113-115. 
'ss See Q 7: 22-24. 
256 See e. g. Q7: 22-35; 67: 6-11. 
u7 See Ibn Rushd al-Qurtubi, M., (1988) supra, note 116 above, at 472. 
"s See Awad, A. M., (1982) supra, note 129 above p. 97; and Al-alwani, T. J., (1996) supra, note 220 above, p. 274. 
259 Qadri, A. A., (1986) supra, note 22 above, p. 495. 
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stated above. The same applies to the right to counsel of one's choice. 260 It is often 
erroneously portrayed that representation by counsel is disallowed under Islamic law. 
Although the early Islamic jurists concentrated largely on the litigant presenting his case 
personally, they also recognised the right of a litigant to appoint another person to represent 
him. It is reported for instance that the fourth Caliph, Ali ibn Abi Tälib disliked litigation, so 
in any case in which he was a party he usually appointed Ukail ibn Abi Tälib to represent 
him. 261 Also in his work titled The History of the Judges of Cordova, al-Khushäni stated the 
instance of two men who brought a matter before the judge Ahmad ibn Bägi. In presenting 
their cases, the judge observed that one of the men was very eloquent while the other had 
problems presenting his case eloquently. The judge thus advised the latter saying: "Would it 
not be better if you were represented by someone who can match the verbal skills of your 
opponent? " The man answered saying: "But I only speak the truth". The judge in insisting 
that he engaged an attorney said: "How many men have perished telling the truth! (for lack 
of eloquence)". 262 Although representation by counsel is not generally practised in the 
Islamic judicial system of some Muslim countries, there is nothing in Islamic law that 
prevents the use of counsel to protect the interest of litigants and to ensure substantive 
justice. Due to the fact that most individuals are generally ignorant of the law and oblivious 
of their rights under the Shari `ah, the right to engage counsel and to communicate with 
counsel of one's own choice has actually become more imperative today under Islamic law. 
The guarantee of the right to counsel will no doubt ensure equality of arms at law especially 
in criminal trials between individuals and State Prosecutors who on their part are often not 
oblivious of the law as is the accused person. 
Islamic jurists are so particular about the right to defence to the extent that the Hanafi 
school holds that the hudüd punishment cannot be inflicted upon a dumb person because 
perhaps if he were capable of speaking he may have been able to raise some defence that 
may create some doubt and thus negate the application of the hudüd punishment. Many 
contemporary writers on Islamic law thus argue strongly that the right to engage counsel 
actually falls within the "theory of protected interest" of the individual under Islamic law and 
must be fully ensured by the State. 263 Provision of free legal aid by the State, in accordance 
260 See e. g. Al-Alwani, T. J., (1996) supra, note 220 above, pp. 273-276. 
21' See al-Bayhägl, A., Kitäb al-Sunan al-Kubrä (Arabic) (1925) 26 cited in al-Saleh, 0. A., (1982), supra, note 157 above, 
81. 
62 See Al-Khushani, Tärikh Qudät Qurtubah (Arabic) cited in Awad, A. M., (1982) supra, note 129 above p. 99. 
23 See e. g. Al-Alwani, T. J., (1996) supra, note 220 above, pp. 274-276; al-Saleh, 0. A., (1982), supra, note 157 above, pp. 
81-84; Awad, A. M., (1982) supra, note 129 above p. 95; Mahmood, T., "Criminal Procedure at the Shari'ah Law as Seen 
by Modem Scholars: A Review", (1996) supra, note 220 above, p. 300. 
147 
with Covenant obligations, to those who cannot afford to pay for such services will be very 
much advantageous in that regard and will thus not be contrary to Islamic law. 
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him; 
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court; 
Both the right to examine witnesses and the right to an interpreter are natural and 
essential aspects of the substantive right to defence earlier addressed above. Their denial will 
no doubt lead to injustice. Both guarantees are therefore fully recognised under Islamic law. 
On the issue of language the Qur'an states that God does not send a messenger "except in the 
language of his people, in order to make things clear to them". 264 This indicates the divine 
recognition of the right of human beings to be communicated in the language they 
understand. 
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 
Under Islamic law an accused person may be convicted through his voluntary 
confession but he is protected against being compelled to confess guilt or incriminate 
himself. The Shari 'ah provides that a person will not be punished for things done 
involuntarily or under compulsion. Even for the sin of apostasy, compulsion exonerates from 
God's punishment in the hereafter. The Qur'an provides that: 
"Anyone who after accepting faith in God, disbelieves, except under compulsion, 
... 
on them is anger from God and theirs will be a severe punishmenti265 (emphasis 
added) 
Prophet Muhammad had also stated that his community is exempted from responsibility 
for things committed through mistakes, forgetfulness and under duress. 266 The same rule 
applies to confession as a means of evidence. Islamic jurists have considered the probability 
of a forced confession being false as greater than its veracity. In prohibiting the extraction of 
evidence through coercion, Umar ibn al-Khatäb is reported to have stated that "A person 
264 Q14: 4. 
265 Q16: 106 (emphasis added). 
' Reported By Ibn Majäh. See e. g. Ibrahim, E., and Johnson-Davies, D., (Trans. ) Forty Hadith, An-Nawawi's (1985) 
pp. 120-121, Hadith 39. 
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would not be secure from incriminating himself if you made him hungry, frightened him or 
confined him. 99267 Also a man accused of theft was beaten until he confessed and was brought 
to Abdullah ibn Umar for punishment, but ibn Umar did not punish him because he 
confessed under coercion. 268 Islamic law thus specifies strict rules for confession and the 
majority of the Islamic jurists thus hold that any admission of guilt or confession obtained by 
coercion or interdiction amounts to inadmissible evidence. 269 The accused person has a right 
to remain silent and not to respond to questions put to him. Also the accused person has the 
right to retract his confessions in hudüd offences even up to the last minute of executing the 
punishment. 
Where the accused person is however known to be a notorious criminal and there are 
other contributing circumstances to the effect that he has hidden the stolen property, some 
scholars hold that he maybe coerced to confess. An example has been given of a known thief 
who denied stealing some goods and was coerced to confess where he had hidden the stolen 
goods. The jurist, Islam ibn Yusuf, who witnessed the coercion exclaimed saying: "never 
have I seen injustice appear so similar to justice than in this case". That the coercion was 
described by Ibn Yusuf in this instance as an injustice suffices to indicate its abhorrence. The 
jurists have therefore contended that conviction in such a situation would not be based on the 
confession but on the recovery of the stolen goods. 270 
14(4) In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of 
their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation. 
Rather than stigmatising young offenders with criminality and focusing on their 
punishment, this provision promotes their rehabilitation and re-integration "back onto the 
path of socially acceptable conduct. s271 This is very well supported by the Islamic teachings 
on the proper upbringing and training of children who are considered as the future 
generation. In fact the Prophet exonerated immature persons completely from responsibility 
by stating that "Three (categories of) people are free from responsibility, the insane until he 
is sane, the sleeping until he wakes and the child until it reaches maturity. , 272 
"' See al-Saleh, O. A., (1982) supra, note 157 above, p. 73. 
263 ibid. 
See e. g. Salama, M. M., (1982) supra, pp. 119-120. 
270 See al-Wani, T. S., (1996) supra, at 276ff. See also al-Mawardi, A., al-Ahkdm as-Sultäniyyah, Trans. Yate, A., (1996) p. 
310. 
271 See Noor Muhammad N. A., "Due Process of Law for Person Accused of a Crime", in Henkin, L., (1981), supra, note 6 
above, p. 155. 
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14(5) Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence 
being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law. 
The right to an appeal to a higher court is recognised under Islamic law. Abu Yüsuf was 
the first Qädi al-Qudät (Chief Justice) in the administration of Islamic justice. He was 
appointed during the rule of the Abassid Caliph, Härün al-Rashid in Baghdad in the eighth 
century and could hear appeals and review the decisions of other judges throughout the 
Islamic Empire. 273 Islamic jurisprudence thus provides for the principles of appeal and 
revision of judgements. This is under the Islamic legal principle of muräfa `ah which exists in 
the Islamic legal system of many Muslim States. 274 
14(6) When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and 
when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the 
ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a 
miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such 
conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non- 
disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him. 
Islamic law also recognises the right to compensation of a person who suffers injury or 
is punished through judicial error or miscarriage of justice. The jurists rely on an incident in 
which Ali ibn Abi Tälib ruled that the second Caliph Umar ibn al-Khatäb should pay 
compensation to a woman who suffered miscarriage as a result of the Caliph's mistaken 
orders. There are however differences of opinion among the jurists as to whether the 
compensation should be paid from public funds or from the private funds of the officer or 
judge responsible for such error or miscarriage of justice. 275 
14(7) No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has 
already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of each country. 
This is to avoid double prejudice against the offender and is in full conformity with the 
Islamic principles of justice. 
It is evident from the above analyses that even though Anglo-American and Civil law 
procedure may differ in some respects from Islamic judicial procedure, the principles of a 
fair hearing and the rule of law formulated into Article 14 of the ICCPR to ensure proper 
272 Reported By Ahmad. See e. g. al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 77 above, Vol. 4., p. 2969. 
273 See e. g. Ibn Sa`d Al Darib, S., al-TandhIm al-Qadd'i fi al-Mamlakah al-Arabiyyah al-Sa'udiyyah fi Daw' al-Shari'ah al- 
Islämiyyah, (Arabic) (1984) Vol. L, p. 250. 
274 See Qadri, A. A., Justice in Historical Islam (1968) and Qadri, A. A., (1986), supra, note 22 above, pp. 484 and 497-498. 
ns See e. g. al-Alwani, T. J., (1996) supra, note 220 above, 284-286. 
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administration of justice and legal protection of all other human rights are generally 
compatible with Islamic law. In the Resolution adopted after the First International 
Conference on the Protection of Human Rights in the Islamic Criminal Justice System held 
in Siracusa, Italy in 1979, the Conference resolved that "the letter and spirit of Islamic Law 
on the subject of the protection of the rights of the criminally accused are in complete 
harmony with the fundamental principles of human rights under international law". 276 The 
Resolution identified the following minimum guarantees for the criminally accused under 
Islamic law: 
(1) the right of freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, or physical 
annihilation; 
(2) the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a fair and impartial 
tribunal in accordance with the Rule of Law; 
(3) the application of the Principle of Legality which calls for the right of the 
accused to be tried for crimes specified in the Qur'an or other crimes whose 
clear and well-established meaning and content are determined by Shariah Law 
(Islamic Law) or by a criminal code in conformity therewith; 
(4) the right to appear before an appropriate tribunal previously established by law; 
(5) the right to a public trial; 
(6) the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself; 
(7) the right to present evidence and to call witnesses in one's defense; 
(8) the right to counsel of one's own choosing; 
(9) the right to a decision on the merits based upon legally admissible evidence; 
(10) the right to have the decision in the case rendered in public; 
(11) the right to benefit from the spirit of Mercy and the goals of rehabilitation and 
resocialization in the consideration of the penalty to be imposed; and 
(12) the right of appeal? " 
The minimum guarantees identified above are applicable to all individuals under Islamic law 
278 
without discrimination of any kind. Thus Article 19(b) of the OIC Cairo Declaration 
provides that: "The right to resort to justice is guaranteed to everyone". 
276 The Conference was held at the International Institute of Advanced Criminal Sciences in Siracusa, Italy between May 28- 
31 1979 and was attended by 55 penal jurists from 18 different countries including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, 
Mauritania, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and United Arab Emirates. Also in attendance were jurists from Belgium, 
France, Italy, Switzerland, United States of America, Yugoslavia, and the United Kingdom. See Bassiouni, C. M., (ed. ) The 
Islamic Criminal Justice (1982) at 249. 
277 See a reproduction of the Resolution in Bassiouni, C. M., (ed. ) (1982) ibid, at 249-250. 
278 See p. 140 above, for Qur'anic reference to the fact that the whole of mankind has right to justice under Islamic law 
without discrimination. 
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FREEDOM FROM RETROACTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
Article 15 
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the 
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that 
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to 
the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter 
penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby. 
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act 
or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations. 
This right which reiterates the principle of legality also falls within the guarantee of the 
due process of law. The wordings of Article 15(1) does not limit this right only to the 
prohibition of retroactive criminal laws but also prohibits a penalty heavier than the one 
prescribed by law at the time the offence was committed. This places a duty on the State to 
ensure that criminal offences and their penalties remain clearly defined by law for legal 
certainty. The reference to international law in Article 15(1) makes it imperative that 
international crimes must also be well defined for legal certainty. Article 15(2) excludes 
from the prohibition of retroactivity, acts or omissions that were at the time committed, 
criminal offences under international customary law. Thus State Parties can under this 
exception possibly punish war crimes, piracy or genocide through retroactive national laws. 
In that case the punishment is made legal by the prohibition of those offences under 
international law. 
The non-retroactivity principle is also reversed in respect of a lighter punishment 
enacted after the commitment of an offence. The last sentence of Article 15(l) which allows 
for the retroactive application of a lighter penalty, was proposed by Egypt during the 
drafting. 279 It places a duty on the State to retroactively apply a lighter penalty subsequently 
enacted in place of a heavier one after the commission of the relevant offence. This 
demonstrates a humanitarian approach to criminal law. Most international law scholars 
consider this exception to the rule of non-retroactivity as a trend of modem criminal law. It is 
interesting to note however that, based on the precedent of the Prophet, the classical Islamic 
jurists had also stated in their writings an exception to the rule of non-retroactivity of 
criminal law where the new law provides for a lesser penalty than that existing when the 
179 See E/CN. 4/425; E/CN. 4/SR. 159 Par. 94, cited in Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, p. 279. 
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offence was committed, in which case the lesser penalty was held to apply retroactively. 280 It 
is possible therefore that Egypt's proposal in that respect during the drafting of Article 15 of 
the ICCPR was influenced by Islamic jurisprudence. 
The Qur'an had from inception reflected the rule of non-retroactivity in some of its 
injunctions and so did the Prophet in some of his Traditions. Generally the Qur'an points out 
that God never punishes a people until He first sends a Messenger with His laws. 281 A 
specific instance of non-retroactivity of laws in the Qur'an is demonstrated in the laws 
prohibiting some types of marriage that were formerly lawful among the Arabs. The Qur'an 
provided as follows: 
"And marry not women whom your fathers married, except what is past; it was a 
shameful, odious and abominable custom indeed. Prohibited to you (also) are your 
mothers, daughters, sisters... except what is past; for God is Most-forgiving, Most 
Merciful. " 282 
Thus while those who violate the prohibited degrees in marriage after the revelation of 
these verses were committing a sin, those who did it before the law was revealed (what was 
past) were exempted on grounds of non-retroactivity of the law. Also during his last sermon 
the Prophet declared that any blood guilt traced back to the period of ignorance, (i. e. before 
the dawn of Islam in Arabia) should be disregarded because the Islamic provision on blood- 
money for homicide and torts was not operative then. That this applies to all other rules of 
Islamic law is also reflected in the saying of the Prophet that Islam wipes out any prohibited 
conduct that preceded it. 283 Thus any person who comes into Islam is not accountable for any 
prohibited conduct committed before becoming a Muslim. This indicates clearly that there is 
no liability under Islamic law prior to legislation. Thus Article 19(d) of the OIC Cairo 
Declaration provides that "There shall be no crime or punishment except as provided in the 
Shari' ah". 
THE RIGHT TO RECOGNITION AS A PERSON BEFORE THE LAW 
Article 16 
Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. 
See e. g. al-Saleh, O. A., (1982) supra, note 157 above pp. 62-65; See also Kamel, T., "The Principle of Legality and its 
Application in Islamic Criminal Justice", in Bassiouni, C. M., (ed. ) The Islamic Criminal Justice (1982) pp. 149-169. 
"' See e. g. Q 4: 165; 6: 19; 17: 15-16; 28: 59; 35: 25. 
292 Q4: 22-23 (emphasis added). 
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The importance of this right derives from the fact that the violation of any human right 
may only be remedied through the due process of law. Without recognition as a person 
before the law an individual will never be able to bring any claims before the law. 
Conversely, if everyone has a right to be recognised as a person before the law then everyone 
has capacity to bear rights and duties. 284 This is in full harmony with Islamic law. In case of 
the insane, imbecile or infant, Islamic law provides that their guardian shall represent them in 
law. 285 Article 8 of the OIC Cairo Declaration thus provides that: 
"Every human being has the right to enjoy his legal capacity in terms of both 
obligation and commitment, should this capacity be lost or impaired, he shall be 
represented by his guardian. " 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Article 17 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
The right to privacy guarantees individual autonomy and thus an important aspect of 
freedom, liberty and respect for human dignity. Article 17(1) however prohibits only 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy. The HRC has interpreted this to mean that no 
interference with privacy can take place "except in cases envisaged by the law-which itself 
must comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant" and "reasonable in 
the particular circumstances. "286 Article 17(2) also guarantees the right to protection of the 
law against such interference or attacks and thus places a positive obligation on the State to 
enact laws to protect that right both vertically and horizontally. Generally, the right to 
privacy therefore "guarantees the respect for the individual existence of the human being". 287 
The scope of right to privacy can however be very vague. 288 Volio has notably observed 
that "(a)lthough it is an old right and some of its manifestations have long been recognized, 
the right to privacy has acquired a new and special place in the law, as the means for 
invading the private life of individuals have multiplied and become more sophisticated and 
283 Reported by Muslim. See e. g. Karim, F., (1994) supra, note 197 above, Vol.!, pp. 137-138, Hadith No. 63. 
284 See Joseph, Schultz and Castan, (2000) supra, note 23 above, pp. 201-205. 
285 See e. g. Qadri, A. A., (1986) supra, note 22 above, p. 406. 
281 General Comment 16, Par. 3 and 4. 
197 Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, p. 288. 
288 See e. g. Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Hemdl in Coeriel and Aurik 
. 
v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 453/1991, U. N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/453/1991 (1994). 
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intrusive". 289 Specific aspects of privacy addressed by the HRC include famil Y290, home 
'291 
correspondence, 292 honour and reputation, 293 name, 294 person and body. 295 The regulation of 
sexual behaviour that takes place in private has also been considered as interference with 
privacy under Article 17. The HRC observed in Toonen v Australia296 that: "In so far as 
article 17 is concerned, it is undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity in private is 
covered by the concept of `privacy"'. The Committee went on to find that a Tasmanian law 
that criminalised homosexual practices interfered with the author's privacy and thus violated 
Article 17 of the ICCPR even if the provisions had not been enforced for a decade. 297 The 
Committee had also rejected the State Party's argument that the law was justified on grounds 
of public morals, which must be left to the domestic law of the State. It held that it "cannot 
accept 
... 
for the purpose of article 17 of the Covenant (that) moral issues are exclusively a 
matter of domestic concern, as this would open the door to withdrawing from the 
Committee's scrutiny a potentially large number of statutes interfering with privacy". 298 
The right to privacy is also generally well stressed under Islamic law. The Shari `ah 
prohibits any unlawful intrusion into the private life, home and correspondence of others or 
the violation of a person's honour and integrity. There is actually a chapter in the Qur'an 
titled "Private Apartments" or "The Chambers", 299 in which many Islamic rules on privacy 
and morality are specified. Generally the Shari `ah prohibits arbitrary suspicion and spying 
on others by providing that "... Avoid much suspicion; 
... 
And spy not on each other... ". 300 
289 Volio, F., "Legal Personality, Privacy, and the Family Life", in Henkin, L., (1981) supra, note 6 above, p185 at 192-3. 
290 See General Comment 16, Par. 5. See also Shirin Aumeeruddy-Czi, Jjra and 19 Other Mauritian Women v. Mauritius, 
Communication No. 35/1978 (9 April 1981), UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/l at 67 (1984). 
291 See General Comment 16, Par. 8. "Searches of a person's home should be restricted to a search for necessary evidence 
and should not be allowed to amount to harassment. " 
292 See General Comment 16, Par. 8. "Compliance with article 17 requires that the integrity and confidentiality of 
correspondence should be guaranteed de jure and de facto.... Surveillance, whether electronic or otherwise, interceptions of 
telephonic, telegraphic and other forms of communications, wire-tapping and recording of conversations should be 
prohibited". See also Miguel Angel Estrella v. Uruguay, Communication No. 74/1980 (17 July 1980), UN Doc. Supp. No. 
40 (A138/40) at 150 (1983), Par. 9.2. 
29' See General Comment 16, Par. 11. "Article 17 affords protection to personal honour and reputation and States are under 
an obligation to provide adequate legislation to that end". See also Tshisekedi. v. Zaire, Communication Nos. 241/1987 and 
242/1987. 
294 Coeriel and Aurik v. The Netherlands, supra, note 288 above. Par. 10.2. "The Committee is of the view that a person's 
surname constitutes an important component of one's identity and that the protection against arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with one's privacy includes the protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference with the right to choose and 
change one's own name". 
295 See General Comment 16, Par. 8. "So far as personal and body search is concerned, effective measures should ensure that 
such searches are carried out in a manner consistent with the dignity of the person who is being searched. Persons being 
subjected to body search by State officials, or medical personnel acting at the request of the State, should only be examined 
by persons of the same sex". 
296 Communication No. 488/1992, Human Rights Committee, (04 April 1994), UN Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992. 
297 ibid., Par. 8.1 and 8.2. 
29s ibid., Par. 8.6. 
296i. e. Q49. 
1 Q49: 12. 
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More specifically on right to privacy for the family and home, Qur'an 24: 27-28 provides 
that: 
"... Enter not houses other than your own, until you first announce your presence and 
invoke greetings of peace upon those therein; that is best for you, that you may be 
heedful. Even if you find no one therein, do not enter until permission is given to 
you, and if you are asked to go away then go away; that is purer for you; and God 
knows all that you do. " 
To drive this point home, the Prophet had stated in one Tradition that a man should not 
even peep into a house without permission, for if he does so he would have entered it. 
Islamic law also prohibits interference with the correspondence of others. The Prophet had 
warned that: "Anyone who reads the letter of another without permission will read it in hell- 
fire". 30' Also in prohibiting the violation of the honour and reputation of others the Qur'an 
prohibits scoffing, defamation, insults and offensive nicknames. 302 These rules apply to both 
State and private intrusions into privacy. 
Under Islamic law, only State officials conferred with the necessary jurisdiction may 
violate the above Islamic injunctions on right to privacy. They may only do so for the 
purpose of conducting reasonable searches or investigations, and this must be in accordance 
with the due process of law. 
303 It is reported that during the Caliphate of Umar ibn al-Khatäb 
he used to go round on night patrol of the city of Medina. One night while on patrol he heard 
some noise of drunkenness coming from a house and he knocked on the door to find out but 
no one answered him. He then climbed over the wall and saw a drunken party inside, he 
shouted down and accused the homeowner of breaking the law prohibiting intoxicants. The 
man replied, if I have committed one sin you have committed four sins to find out. You spied 
on us against God's command that "spy not on each other"304; You climbed over the wall 
despite God's command that "enter houses through the proper doors"305; You entered 
without announcing yourself nor greeting in violation of God's command that "announce 
your presence and invoke greetings of peace upon those therein"306; You entered without 
permission in violation of God's command that "do not enter until permission is given 
you". 307 The Caliph Umar was abashed and he said, "You are right and I must forgive you 
your sin". The man then indicted the Caliph saying "that is your fifth sin, you claim to be the 
301 See Al-Suyüti, J., al-Jämi ` al-Sagir (Arabic) (1964) p. 165. 
302Q49: 1 1. 
303 See al-Saleh, O. A., (1982) supra, note 157 above, p. 69. 
3°' Q49: 12. 
"5 Q2: 189. 
Q24: 27 
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Caliph and protector of Islamic law, how can you then say you forgive what God has 
prohibited. , 308 This vividly illustrates the importance of right to privacy under Islamic law 
and that the privacy of individuals cannot for any reason be violated contrary to due legal 
process. Article 18 of the OIC Cairo Declaration thus provides that: 
"(b) Everyone shall have the right to privacy in the conduct of his private affairs, 
in his home, among his family, with regard to his property and his 
relationships. It is not permitted to spy on him, to place him under 
surveillance or to besmirch his good name. The State shall protect him from 
arbitrary interference" 
(c) A private residence is inviolable in all cases. It will not be entered without 
permission from its inhabitants or in any unlawful manner, nor shall it be 
demolished or confiscated and its dwellers evicted. " 
However, since Islamic law prohibits and criminalises homosexuality the question may 
be raised whether the HRC will follow its decision in Toonen's case if faced with a Muslim 
State's domestic law prohibiting homosexuality vis-ä-vis the right to privacy under Article 
17. The question of reasonableness and public morals are relevant here. Toonen's v. 
Australia does not provide a clear answer and may be distinguishable from a Muslim State 
on grounds, inter alia, that: (i) with the exception of Tasmania, all laws criminalizing 
homosexuality had been repealed throughout Australia; (ii) the Tasmanian law had never 
been used and there was ongoing debate for its repeal; (iii) the Federal Government of 
Australia had acknowledged also that a complete prohibition of homosexuality was 
unnecessary to sustain the moral fabric of Australian society and therefore did not argue that 
the challenged laws were based on reasonable and objective criteria. 309 
The situation will apparently be different in the case of Muslim States. Homosexuality 
is generally seen to be strongly against the moral fabric and sensibilities of Islamic society 
and is prohibited morally and legally under Islamic law. The HRC may perhaps distinguish a 
similar case involving the domestic law of a Muslim State from its decision in Toonen's case. 
That will however require a consideration of the public sensibility and morality obtainable 
within Muslim societies and on that basis concede some margin of appreciation on moral 
grounds to Muslim States in that regard. Although the HRC does not presently apply the 
margin of appreciation doctrine, one of the arguments of this thesis is that the HRC need to 
"7 Q24: 28 
309 This incident has been reported in slightly varied versions by different narrators but all depict the same important 
principle of prohibition of violation of individual privacy under Islamic law. See e. g. Tabandeh, S., A., (1970) supra note 
208 above, pp. 31-32. 
309 See note 296 above. 
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adopt the margin of appreciation doctrine because of its utility for resolving cases involving 
public morals issues of States Parties to the Covenant. The cultural background and 
orientation of the Committee Members at the point in time will also play an influential role in 
that case. It is instructive to observe here that the US Supreme Court had in Bowers v 
Hardwick rejected on grounds, inter alia of public sensibility and morality, the claim that 
homosexual sodomy was protected by the US constitutional right to privacy. 310 
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION 
Article 18 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right 
shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, 
either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals 
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of 
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education 
of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 
Despite the diverse ideological and religious leanings of the international community 
there is an acceptance in modem society of the basic notion of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion as contained in the first sentence of Article 18(1). It is one 
of the foundations of a pluralistic and democratic society. The attempt to define the content 
of Article 18 of the ICCPR in terms of Article 18 of the UDHR to include the clause that 
"this right includes freedom to change (ones) religion or belief' met with opposition 
principally from Muslim countries such as, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Afghanistan, 
who pressed for its deletion. 
311 Instead of a complete deletion a compromise was achieved in 
the change of the language to "(t)his right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of (ones) choice". The HRC has however indicated that the freedom "to have or to 
310 (1986) 478 US 186. See also the view of the European Court of Human Rights in Otto-Preminger-Institut. v. Austria in a 
case of blasphemy under Article 10 of the European Convention, at p. 187 below. c. f. Self, J., "Bowers v Hardwick: A Study 
of Agression", (1988) 10 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 395 and Thornton, B., "The New International Jurisprudence on the 
Right to Privacy: A Head-on Collision with Bowers v Hardwick" (1995) 58 Albany Law Review, p. 725. 
"'See Partsch, K. J., "Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms", in Henkin, L., (198 I) supra, note 6 
above, p. 207 at 211. 
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adopt" include the freedom "to replace one's current religion or belief with another or to 
adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one's religion or belief'. 312 
The interpretation of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion to include 
freedom to change one's religion or even to adopt atheistic views has not been without 
controversy among Islamic scholars with respect to the crime of apostasy under Islamic 
law. 313 The different views will be analysed below. However, the trend among contemporary 
Islamic scholars on the issue of religious freedom under Islamic law has mostly been towards 
emphasising the Qur'anic provision which states that: 
"There is no compulsion in religion: truth stands out clear from error; whoever 
rejects evil and believes in God has grasped the most trustworthy handhold that will 
never break, and God hears and knows all things. " 314 
Elaborating on the principle of non-compulsion to adopt Islam, Ismail al-Fariigi had 
emphasised that by the wordings of the Qur'an every human is endowed with the capacity to 
know God if the intellect is exercised with candidness and integrity. He illustrated the human 
capacity to understand with reference to a story invented by the early Islamic thinkers about a 
mythical being called Hayy ibn Yagzdn315 "who grew up on a deserted island devoid of 
humans and hence tradition, and who gradually led himself by sheer intellectual effort from 
ignorance, to naive realism, to scientific truth and finally, to natural reason and the discovery 
of transcendent God. "316 There is however also the human capacity to misunderstand, 
especially when influenced or sometimes misled by the surrounding circumstances of non- 
isolated existence. Thus the Muslim is obliged by his faith, which he believes as the only 
true one, to present its claims to humanity not dogmatically nor by coercion but rationally 
through intellectual persuasion, wise argument and fair preaching. 317 The Qur'an points out 
that whoever accepts it does so for his own good and whoever rejects it does so at his own 
loss and none may be compelled. 318 To advocate thought or religion by coercion is, in the 
words of al-Färügi, "(t)o tamper with the process of intellection (and) constitutes a threat to 
man's integrity and authenticity" and is null and void from the standpoint of the Shari `ah. 319 
312 General Comment 22, Par. 5. 
313 See e. g. Tabandeh, S., (1970), supra, note 208 above, pp. 70-73. 
314 Q2: 256. For e. g. See generally al-Farugi, l. R., Islam and other Faiths, Ed. Siddiqui, A., (1998) especially pp. 129-160 
and 281-302. 
315 meaning "The Living" son of "The Awake". 
316 al-Faruqi, I. R., supra, note 314 above, p. 45. For an English translation of the story of Hayy ibn Yagzdn See Ockley, S., 
(Trans. ) The History of Hayy ibn Yaqzan (1986). 
"7 See e. g. Q16: 125. 
318 See e. g. Q10: 108. 
319 al-Farügl, (1998) supra, note 314 above, p. 291. 
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Uthmän has also observed that although the Islamic State has a duty to promote the 
religion of Islam, it is not allowed to force anyone to embrace Islam, but rather a duty to 
monitor and prevent those who seek to deny people their freedom of belief. 320 The rule 
under Islamic law that a Muslim male who marries a non-Muslim wife cannot compel her 
into Islam and also the recognition of the status of non-Muslims within the Islamic State 
indicates that Islamic law does not advocate forced conversions. According to the 12th 
Century Hanbalä jurist, Ibn Qudamah: 
"It is not permissible to force a non-believer into embracing Islam. For instance if a. 
non-Muslim citizen (Dhimmi) or a protected alien (Musta `min) is forced to embrace 
Islam, he will not be considered as a Muslim except his embrace of Islam is of his 
own choice... The authority for this prohibition of coercion is the words of God Most 
High that says: "There is no compulsion in religion". 99321 
Some traditional interpreters of the Qur'an such as al-Tabari however hold that the "no 
compulsion" verse applied only to the "people of the book" (e. g. Christians and Jews) and 
did not extend to the Arab idolaters or polytheists who did not follow any "heavenly" 
religion. Al-Tabari's view was based on the cause of revelation of the verse. He narrated that 
the two sons of a certain Muslim man of the tribe of Salim ibn `Awf, both of whom had 
embraced Christianity before the advent of Islam came to visit their father in Medina. The 
father was very grieved about them and requested them to convert to Islam but they declined. 
The father then brought both of them to the Prophet Muhammad and asked him to intervene. 
It was on this occasion that the "no compulsion" verse was revealed, and the man had to 
leave the two sons with their faith. Al-Tabari thus held that the verse applied only to either 
Christians or other "peoples of the book" and not to idolaters. 322 Where this view is 
followed, it will deny polytheists a right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
under international human rights law. Conversely, other interpreters, such as al-Zamakhshari, 
cite additional Qur'anic verses such as Qur'an 10: 99 which states that: "And had your Lord 
willed, everyone on earth would have believed. So will you, (0 Muhammad), compel 
mankind until they become believers? ", to contend that not only the "people of the book" but 
all human beings are free from being compelled into belief since if God had willed, 
"everyone on earth would have believed". 323 Ibn Hazm and some other jurists contend that 
320 Uthmän, M. F., (1982)supra, note 114 above, p. 91. 
321 Ibn Qudämah, al-Mugni, (Arabic) Vol. 8., p. 144. 
322 See al-Tabari, M., TafsIr al-Tabari, (Arabic) (1968) Vol. 9 p. 347. 
323 See al-Zamakshari, J., al-KashdfAn Hagd'iq al-Tanzll (Arabic) (n. d. ); See also Q 6: 107-108, which says: "Had God 
willed, they would not have taken others beside Him in worship and We have not made you a watcher over them nor are you 
set over them to dispose of their affairs. And insult not those whom they worship besides God, lest they insult God 
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the "no-compulsion verse" had been abrogated by the "verse of the sword" which says: "And 
fight the polytheists altogether as they fight you altogether, and know that God is with those 
who keep their duty (to Him)"324 and thus, according to him, compulsion is allowed in 
religion. 325 
Some contemporary Muslim scholars and jurists dispel this view and point out that this 
was an extreme position that has narrowed the Qur'anic experience. 326 Abü Zahrah has also 
stated a precedent of the second Caliph, Umar, which supports no compulsion into Islam. An 
old Christian woman was reported to have come to the Caliph with some request which the 
Caliph fulfilled, after which the Caliph invited her to Islam. The woman declined. The 
Caliph was reported to have then stated his sincerity of purpose in the following words: "My 
Lord, I did not intend to compel her, because I am aware that there must be no compulsion in 
religion... the right path has certainly become distinct and distinguished from the wrong 
path 
.,, 
327 This incident no doubt indicates an attitude of non-compulsion and freedom of 
religion. Today, most Muslim scholars who address the human rights question of freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, follow the moderate view and hold that Islamic law 
prohibits the compulsion of anyone in matters of faith. 
328 The rule of religious dissemination 
under Islamic law is "Invite (all) to the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful 
preaching and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious... "329 which does not 
also support or imply any notion of forced conversion. Thus Art. 10 of the OIC Cairo 
Declaration states that: "... It is prohibited to exercise any form of compulsion on man or to 
exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to convert him to another religion or to atheism". 
wrongfully without knowledge. Thus We have made fair-seeming to each people its own doings; then to their Lord is their 
return and He shall then inform them of all that they used to do 
324 Q9: 36. 
325 See e. g. AN Zayd, M., al-Näsikh Wa al-Mansükh: Dirdsah Tashri'tyyah, Ta'rikhiyyah Nagdiyyah (Arabic) (1963) 
Vol. 2., pp503-583 and Ibn Hazm, A., al-Muhallä, (Arabic)(n. d. )Vol. 2, p. 195. 
326 See e. g. AbüSulaymän, A. A., Towards An Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Islamic 
Methodology and Thought (1993) pp. 44-45. 
327 See Abü Zahrah, M., TanzIm al-Islam li al-Mujtama' (Arabic) (n. d) p. 192. 
328 See e. g. Chaudhry, M. S., (1995) supra, note 82 above, pp. 26-30; Ahsan, M. M., "Human Rights in Islam: Personal 
Dimensions" (1990) 13 Hamdard Islamicus, p. 3 at 7-8; Ishaque, K. M., "Human Rights in Islamic Law" (1974) 12 Review of 
the International Commission of Jurists, p. 30 at 35; Husain, S. S., "Human Rights in Islam: Principles and Precedents" 
(1983) 1 Islamic and Contemporary Law Quarterly, p. 103 atl 13-114 and Mahmood, T., "The Islamic Law of Human 
Rights" (1984) 4 Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 32 at34-38; See also e. g. Art. 7 of "Basic Principles of 
Islamic State" adopted by the Convention of Muslim Scholars and Thinkers representing all schools of Islamic thought in 
Pakistan in 1951 which stated that: "The citizens shall be entitled to all the rights conferred upon them by Islamic Law i. e. 
they shall be assured within the limits of the law,... freedom of religion and belief freedom of worship... " in Maududi, A. A., 
The Islamic Law and Constitution (1980) 7th Ed., p. 333. See also the Communique of the International Conference on 
Islamic Law held between the leading scholars of Arabia and Europe which stated inter alia, that: "The individual is free in 
regard to the creed he wishes to embrace, and it is unlawful to compel anyone to embrace a religion " and citing the no- 
compulsion verse as authority to that effect, in al-Dawalibi, Nadwah 'Ilmiyyah Hawl al-Shari'ah al-Islämiyyah Wa Huqüq 
al-Insän fi al-Islam (Arabic) cited in Karnali, H. M., Freedom of Expression in Islam (1997) p. 88. See also Art. XIII of the 
Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights(1981) which says: "Everyperson has the right to freedom of conscience 
and worship in accordance with his religious beliefs 
329 Q 16: 125. 
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This brings us to the question of apostasy under Islamic law vis-ä-vis the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. 
Apostasy from Islam is a topical issue under the concept of freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion because of its classification as a crime punishable with death under 
traditional Islamic law. This apparently contradicts the basic principle of non-compulsion 
advanced above. It also conflicts with the international human rights understanding of 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In paragraph 5 of its General Comment 22, the 
HRC observed, inter alia, that: 
"Article18.2 bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or 
belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel 
believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to 
recant their religion or belief or to convert. "330 
There had been differences amongst Muslim jurists and scholars about the definition and 
punishment of apostasy under traditional Islamic law since the early times of Islam. The 
Hanbali jurist Ibn Taimiyyah observed that some of the successors to the companions of 
Prophet Muhammad known as al-Täbi'ün such as Ibrahim al-Nakha`i (d. 95A. H/718C. E) 
who was a leading jurist of his time, and Sufyän al-ThawrI (d. 161A. H/884C. E) the author of 
al-Jdmi' al-Kabir and al-Jämi' al-SagIr (two important compilations of the Prophet's 
Traditions), held the view that a Muslim apostate must never be sentenced to death but 
should be invited back to Islam 
. 
331 Their views conform with the Qur'anic rule of 
propagation that says: "Invite (all) to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful 
preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious.., "332 
Both El-Awa and Karnali show through references to the Qur'an, the Sunnah, the 
practice of the rightly guided Caliphs, and views of some of the classical as well as 
contemporary Islamic jurists and scholars to establish that simple apostasy neither constitutes 
a hadd-type offence nor attracted the death penalty. 333 They both cited the twelfth century 
Mäliki jurist, Abu al-Walid al-Bäji as stating that apostasy is "a sin for which there is no 
hadd punishment. "334 Although Hamidullah included the crime of apostasy in his Muslim 
13° General Comment 22, Par. 5. 
331 See Ibn Taymiyyah, T., al-Sarim al-Maslül 'alb Shätim al-Rasfil (Arabic) Abd al-Hamid, M. M., (Ed. ) (1398AH) p. 318; 
al-Sha'räni, A. W., Kitäb al-MIzän (Arabic) (1329AH) Vol. 2, p. 134; Ibn Quddmah, M., al-MugnI (1981) Vol. 8. p126. 332 Q 16: 125. 
333 See El-Awa, M. S., Punishment in Islamic Law (1982) p50-56 and Karnali, M. H., (1997) supra, note 328 above pp. 87- 
107 See also. Sachedina, A. A., "Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Qur'an" in Little, D., Kelsay, J., and Sachedina, 
A. A., (eds. ) Human Rights and the Conflict of Cultures: Western and Islamic Perspectives on Religious Liberty (1988) p. 53 
at 76-83. 
334 El-Awa, M. S., (1982) ibid. Karnali, M. H. (1997) ibid. 
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Conduct of State, he went on to indicate that: "The basis of Muslim polity being religious and 
not ethnological or linguistic, it is not difficult to appreciate the reason for penalizing this act 
of apostasy. For it constitutes a politico-religious rebellion. "335 Contemporary Muslim jurists 
and scholars thus differ as to whether apostasy simpliciter in the form of a person denouncing 
the Islamic faith is a hadd-type offence at all, and also as to whether it attracted the death 
penalty. Many of the scholars and jurists define apostasy in terms of rebellion against the 
State, where a Muslim-subject of the Islamic State after denouncing Islam joins with those 
who take arms against the Islamic State and thus commits a political offence against the 
State. 336 The contention is that simple apostasy, in the sense of an individual denouncing 
Islam without more, wherever mentioned in the Qur'an does not stipulate any worldly 
punishment but is only described as attracting severe punishments in the hereafier. 337 The 
death punishment for apostasy was based on a reported Tradition of the Prophet that said: 
"Anyone who changes his religion, kill him". 338 Some Muslim scholars have however 
identified this Tradition as a solitary (ähäd) Tradition while others allege weakness in its 
transmission (isnäd). It has been contended also that there is no precedent of the Prophet 
compelling anyone into Islam or sentencing anyone to death for apostasy simpliciter. 339 El- 
Awa thus concluded that "the Qur'an prescribes no punishment in this life for apostasy, (and) 
(t)he Prophet never sentenced a man to death for it, (but) (s)ome of the companions of the 
Prophet recognized apostasy as a sin for which there was a to ` zir (discretionary) 
punishment. s340 Thus placing the matter within the legislative discretion of the Islamic State. 
Under Article 18(3) of the ICCPR, the right to freedom of religion and beliefs is not 
absolute. There is a restriction by the provision that: 
"Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others". 
... Hamidullah, M., (Revised 7`h Ed., 1997) supra, note 190 above, p. 174, Par. 330. 
336 See e. g. Abduh, M., Tafsir al-Manär (1947-48) Vol. 5, p. 327; El-Awa, M. S., (1982) supra, note 333 above, pp. 49-56; 
Rahman, S. A., Punishment ofApostasy in Islam (1978) Chapter 2. Al-Ganüshi, R., al-Huriyydt al-Amah fi al-Dawlah a! 
- 
Isldmiyyah (Arabic) (1993) pp. 47-51; Shaltüt, M., al-Islam AgIdah Wa SharI'ah (Arabic) (n. d. ) p. 292-293; al-Samurai, 
A. R. N., Ahkäm al-Murtaddfi al-Shari'ah al-Islämiyyah (Arabic) (1968) p. 144; Mahmassäni, S., Arkdn Huqüq al-Insän fi 
al-Islam (Arabic) (1979)p. 123-124. 
337 See e. g. Q 2: 217; Q 3: 86-91; Q 5: 54; Q 16: 106. 
338 Reported By al-BukhärI. See e. g. al-Asgalänt, Ibn Hajar, Bulugh al-Maram (With English Translations) (1996) p. 428, 
Hadith 1032. 
339 See e. g. Rahman, S. A., (1978) supra, note 336 above, p. 63; al-'Ili, A. H. H., al-Huriyyah a! 
- 
Amah (Arabic) (1983) p. 339; 
and Mahmassäni, S., (1979) supra, note 336 above. 
340E1-Awa, (1982) supra, note 333 above, p. 56. 
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That would perhaps be in consonance with the argument of contemporary Islamic 
scholars341 and that of some Muslim States that it is not the changing of one's religion 
simpliciter that is prohibited under Islamic law but its manifestation in a manner that 
threatens public safety, morals, freedom of others or even the existence of the Islamic State 
itself. In its second ICCPR periodic report Sudan stated in that regard that "conversion from 
Islam is not an offence in Sudan but only the manifestation of such conversion in a manner 
that adversely affects public safety". 342 In accordance with the requirements of due process 
of law the HRC has further observed that: 
"Article 18(3) permits restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion or belief only 
if limitations are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. The freedom 
from coercion to have or to adopt a religion or belief and the liberty of parents and 
guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted. " (emphasis 
added). 
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION 
Article 19 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his 
choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special 
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these 
shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary; 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputation of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals. 
The intellect is the greatest instrument of human life and its full potential can only be 
achieved through interaction of ideas among individuals. Freedom of opinion and expression 
is a birthright of every human being which stimulates dialectical intercourse that aids human 
development and well being. Expression is the outward manifestation of a person's opinion, 
thus a person's liberty is completely denied where freedom of expression is denied. Freedom 
3a' See e. g. note 339 above. 
342 See e. g. Par. 127 and 133 of Sudan's 2nd ICCPR Periodic Report of 1997 (U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/Add. 2. of 13/03/97). 
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of opinion and expression has therefore been long recognised as "one of the most precious 
rights of man"343 and also of "great importance for all other rights and freedoms". 344 
The right to hold opinions, being internal and private, is absolute and is here separated 
from the right to freedom of expression. "Opinion" and "thought" are quite synonymous, but 
since "thought" has been associated with religion or beliefs in Article 18 above, "opinions" 
here is deemed to point more towards political, secular and civil matters. 345 Although a 
person's opinion may be influenced by external factors, it cannot actually be restricted 
because it is an event of the mind and hardly interferes with the rights of others. In contrast, 
freedom of expression is a public matter that could easily interfere with the right of others if 
not controlled. Freedom of expression is thus not absolute. During the drafting of Article 19, 
it was appreciated that while "freedom of expression was a precious heritage" it could also be 
"a dangerous instrument" against public order and the personality of others. 346 Thus while 
the right to freedom of expression was made as comprehensive as possible to cover the 
seeking, receiving and imparting of information and ideas of all kinds through any media of 
one's choice, it carried with it "special duties and responsibilities"347 and also subjected to 
certain restrictions under Article 19(3). 
Due to the importance and preciousness of the right to freedom of expression, there were 
differences of opinion as to the scope of the limitations upon the right during the drafting. 348 
In its effort to define that scope, the HRC has pointed out that "when a State party imposes 
certain restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy 
the right itself (and) the restrictions must be "provided by law"; they may only be imposed 
for one of the purposes set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3; and they must be 
justified as being "necessary" for that State party for one of those purposes. "349 Moreover, 
"the word `necessary' imports `an element of proportionality' into Article 19(3): the law 
must be appropriate and adapted to achieving one of the enumerated ends. "35° 
The recognition of freedom of expression under Islamic law as a birthright of every 
human being is confirmed by Qur'an 55: 1-4 which states that: 
343 See Art. XI French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen (1789) Translated in Paine, T., Rights of Man, With 
An Introduction by Eric Foner (1984) p. 1 10. 
344 Partsch, K. J., (1981) supra, note 311 above, p. 208 at 216. 
345 ibid., p. 217- 
`6 See UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 8 above, p. 148. 
347 These duties and responsibilities were however not defined. 
348 See UN Doc. A12929, supra, note 8 above, pp. 147-152. See also Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, p. 348ff. 
349 General Comment 10, Par. 4. 
350 See Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000) supra, note 23 above, p. 392. 
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"(God) The most Gracious!. Taught the Qur'an. Created Man (and) Taught him 
eloquent speech (expression). " (emphasis added). 
In his pioneering work on freedom of expression in Islam, Kamali has observed that "it 
is generally acknowledged that freedom of expression in Islam is in many ways 
complementary to freedom of religion; that it is an extension and a logical consequence of 
the freedom of conscience and belief which the Shari `ah has validated and upholds. s 51 
There are a whole lot of recorded Traditions and practice during the lifetime of Prophet 
Muhammad and during the reign of the Rightly Guided Caliphs after him to support that 
freedom of speech and expression was acknowledged right from the inception of Islamic 
law. 352 Under the Shari `ah the main objective of this right is the "discovery of truth and 
upholding human dignity". 353 Islamic law endeavours a balance between these two principal 
objectives and does not accommodate the spread of evil or obscenity under its threshold of 
freedom of expression. While the Qur'an affirms that God gave mankind the power and 
freedom of expression, it also directs mankind to always be apposite in speech. It states 
clearly that: "God loves not the public utterance of evil speech"354 and that "Those who love 
(to see) scandal broadcasted among the believers will have a grievous penalty in this life and 
in the hereafter". 355 
Thus the freedom of expression under Islamic law is also not absolute but restricted to 
apposite speech and expressions. Examples of expressions and speech that amount to abuse 
of this right are specifically stated by the Qur'an and some Traditions of the Prophet. Karnali 
classifies these Shari `ah limitations on freedom of expression into "moral restraints" and 
"legal restraints". The moral restraints are essentially "addressed to the conscience of the 
believer" and include, inter alia, defamation, backbiting, lying, derision, exposing the 
weaknesses of others, and acrimonious disputation. The legal restraints, some of which are 
backed by specific sanctions include, inter alia, public utterance of evil or hurtful speech, 
slanderous accusation, libel, insult, cursing, seditious speech and blasphemy. 356 Of all these 
Shari `ah restraints, blasphemy is perhaps portrayed as the most controversial limitation on 
freedom of expression under international human rights law as was demonstrated through the 
351 Kamali, H. M., (1997) supra, note 328 above, p. 6. 
352 See e. g. Chaudhry, M. S., (1995) supra, note 82 above, pp. 31-33. 
353 See Kamali, H. M., op. cit., p. 8. 
354 Q4: 148. 
ass Q24: 19. 
356 See Karnali, M. H., (1997) supra, note 328 above, pp. 117-258. It is interesting to note that the section on the restraints 
takes the largest lump of Professor Kamali's work on Freedom of Expression in Islam. This perhaps portrays the non- 
absolute nature of the right to freedom of expression and the difficulty of balancing between the right itself and the restraints 
upon it. 
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reactions attracted by the Salman Rushdie affair from both international human rights 
advocates and Islamic legalists world-wide. 357 
Blasphemy is broadly referred to under Islamic law as "Sabb Allah aw Sabb al-Rasül ", 
meaning "Reviling God or Reviling the Messenger". Blasphemy overlaps with apostasy in 
the sense that an act of blasphemy by a Muslim also amounts to apostasy. Thus classical 
Islamic jurists often paired the two together in their legal treatises and prescribed the death 
penalty for both under traditional Islamic law. Blasphemy is however separable from 
apostasy especially when committed by a non-Muslim against Islam. 
358 
The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics defines blasphemy in Islam broadly as "All 
utterances expressive of contempt for Allah (God) Himself, for His Names, attributes, laws, 
commands or prohibitions (and) All scoffing at Muhammad or any other prophets or apostles 
of Allah (God). "359 Being a religious law, Kamali points out that the prohibition of 
blasphemy under Islamic law is mainly "to defend the dogma and belief-structure of 
Islam' 
. 
360 It is noteworthy that despite Islam's claim to being "the only religion acceptable 
to God"361, it however recognises the reciprocal rule with respect to other faiths under its 
prohibition of blasphemy. The Qur'an enjoins Muslims also "not to revile those whom they 
(non-Muslims) worship beside God, lest they (non-Muslims) revile God wrongfully without 
knowledge. Thus We (God) have made fair-seeming to each people its own doings; to their 
Lord is their final return and He shall inform them of all that they did. , 362 
The Shari 'ah prohibition of blasphemy as a limitation to freedom of expression thus 
aims at protecting the sensibilities and beliefs of the Muslim community in particular and 
that of other faiths in general. Seen in that perspective, that limitation is explicable within the 
proviso of Article 19(3)(b) of the ICCPR on the protection of public order or morals. The 
ability of blasphemous expressions to incite Muslims to public disorder is evidenced, for 
example, by the upheavals in many parts of the world that followed the publication of 
Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses, which was considered as being offensive to the religious 
357 See e. g. generally Appignanesi, L., and Maitland, S., The Rushdie File (1990); also Kidwai, A. R., and Ahsan, M. M., 
(eds. ) Sacrilege versus Civility: Muslim Perspectives on the Satanic Verses Affair (1991). 
358 See Karnali, (1997) supra, note 328 above, p. 217. Professor Karnali concluded after a detailed analysis of blasphemy 
under Islamic law that "The Qur'an has made no reference to the death penalty for blasphemy, and the text does not warrant 
the conclusion that it is a Qur'anic obligation, or a prescribed punishment or a mandate. On the contrary, we would submit 
that the general language of the Qur'an can only sustain the broad conclusion that the perpetrator of blasphemy disgraces 
himself and invokes the curse of God upon himself, and that it is a criminal offence which carries no prescribed mandatory 
punishment, and, as such, automatically falls under the category of ta'zir offences, whose punishment maybe determined by 
the head of state or competent judicial authorities. " See ibid, p. 244. 
359 Hastings, J., (Ed. ) Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, (1909) Vol. 2, p. 672. 
360 See Karnali, (1997) supra, note 328 above, p. 8. 
psi Q3: 19. 
362 Q6: 108. 
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sensibilities of Muslims not only by Muslims but even by non-Muslim religious leaders. 363 
There is need however in this realm to always carefully and objectively distinguish 
constructive reasonable intellectual critiques of religious interpretations from expressions 
that insult or revile the sensibilities of reasonable adherents of particular religions under the 
guise of freedom of expression. Maududi has pointed out in that regard that Islam does not 
prohibit decent intellectual debate and religious discussions, what it prohibits is evil speech 
that encroaches upon the religious beliefs of others. 364 Article 22 of the Cairo Declaration 
provides that: 
(a) Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as 
would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari'ah. 
(b) Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is 
good and warn against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic 
SharI'ah. 
(c) Information is a vital necessity to society. It may not be exploited or misused in 
such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, under moral and 
ethical values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith. 
Applying the margin of appreciation doctrine to a case of blasphemy under Article 10 of 
the European Convention, the European Court of Human Rights held in the case of Otto- 
Preminger-Institut v. Austria365 that the seizure and forfeiture of a blasphemous film in 
which God, Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary were ridiculed did not violate the author's 
freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 10 of the European Convention. The Court 
observed, inter alia, that: 
"The Court cannot disregard the fact that the Roman Catholic religion is the religion 
of the overwhelming majority of Tyroleans. In seizing the film, the Austrian 
authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that region and to prevent that some 
people should feel the object of attacks on their religious beliefs in an unwarranted 
and offensive manner. It is in the first place for the national authorities, who are 
better placed than the international judge, to assess the need for such a measure in the 
light of the situation obtaining locally at a given time. In all the circumstances of the 
present case, the Court does not consider that the Austrian authorities can be regarded 
as having overstepped their margin of appreciation in this respect. 99366 
It is submitted that the HRC should follow a similar approach in considering issues of moral 
and religious sensibilities. 
363 See e. g. Appignanesi, L., and Maitland, S., (1990) supra, note 357 above, pp. 235-236. 
364 See Maududi, A. A., (1993) supra, note 179 above, p. 30. 
365 (1994) Eur. Crt. Human Rights Reports, Series A, Vol. 295-A. 
366 ibid. Par. 56. 
168 
THE PROHIBITION OF PROPAGANDA FOR WAR AND INCITEMENT TO HATRED 
Article 20 
1. Any propagation for war shall be prohibited by law. 
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. 
Differences of race, nationality and religion are part of the realities of human society 
that do not by themselves create any problems. It is the advocacy or incitement to hatred on 
grounds of those differences that creates problems which lead to serious violations of human 
rights. Article 20 thus aims at the important objective of promoting tolerance, mutuality and 
peaceful co-existence despite human differences. 
This provision constitutes a further limitation on the freedom of expression guaranteed 
under Article 19 above. The HRC has opined that "these required prohibitions are fully 
compatible with the right of freedom of expression as contained in article 19 the exercise of 
which carries with it special duties and responsibilities. " The Committee has also stated that 
the propaganda prohibited under Article 20(1) "extends to all forms of propaganda 
threatening or resulting in an act of aggression or breach of the peace contrary to the Charter 
of the United Nations". 367 The object of Article 20(2) is also to combat the re-occurrence of 
the horrors of Nazism that resulted mainly from incitement of racial hatred. There is a 
positive obligation on States to enact laws prohibiting such propaganda of war and advocacy 
of hatred. 
The Shari `ah also prohibits aggression and mischief on earth, prohibits racial or 
religious hatred and incitement to discrimination, violence or hostility. The Qur'an 
condemns, in many verses, those who spread mischief on earth and incite to hatred. Prophet 
Muhammad had also stated in one of his Traditions that "Whoever incites to partisanship is 
not of us". 368 Article 22(d) of the OIC Cairo Declaration also provides that: "It is not 
permitted to arouse nationalistic or doctrinal hatred or to do anything that may be an 
incitement to any form of racial discrimination. " 
Islamic law however approves the call to war in case of self-defence and to counter 
aggression or persecution. The Qur'an states that "Permission to fight is given to those 
against whom war is made because they are wronged, and certainly God is most capable to 
aid them. "369 In that case the authority to call to war lies with the Head of State and not with 
367 General Comment 11, Par. 2. 
' Reported By Abü Däwüd. See e. g. Karim, F., (1994) supra, note 197 above, Vol. 1, p. 488, Hadith No. 244. 
'6' Q22: 39. 
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individuals. In similar vein the HRC has also stated that Article 20(1) of the ICCPR does 
"not prohibit advocacy of the sovereign right of self-defence or the right of peoples to self- 
determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. s370 
THE RIGHT OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY 
Article 21 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the 
exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public 
order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. 
Article 21 guarantees the right of peaceful assembly and prohibits any restriction of the 
right except as is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or 
public safety, public order, protection of public health or morals or protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. Such restriction where necessary must also be in conformity with the 
law. This aims at protecting the right of people to come together and peacefully pursue a 
common purpose. The right is usually related to political liberty. Nowak however observes 
that the limiting proviso "is so broad that more than enough possibilities are available to 
suppress assemblies critical of the regime or threatening to the State. , 
371 
The right of peaceful assembly is recognised under Islamic law by virtue of the Qur'anic 
provision enjoining co-operation in the pursuit of righteousness and goodness and not in 
nurturing transgression and hostility. 
372 There is nothing in the Shari `ah that prohibits the 
right to participate in peaceful assembly for a rightful cause of ones choice as long as it is not 
an incitement to aggression or public disorder as stressed in the proviso of Article 21. This 
same Islamic principle applies to the right to freedom of association addressed in Article 22 
below 
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
Article 22 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to 
form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
370 General Comment 11, Par. 2. 
371 Nowak, M., (1993) supra, note 5 above, p. 371 and p. 380-383 for an analysis of the permissible purposes for interference 
on freedom of assembly. See also Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000) supra, note 23 above, pp. 425-432. 372 Q5: 2. 
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2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall 
not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of 
the police in their exercise of this right. 
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour 
Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the 
law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention. 
Freedom of association is linked to freedom of assembly in Article 21 above. Freedom 
of association is here associated with the right to form and join trade unions, which is an 
economic right. 373 Although the right is subjected to similar restrictions imposed upon 
freedom of assembly, the State is granted the possibility of further restricting members of the 
armed forces and the police in the exercise of this right due to its link with trade unions. 374 
While the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association are not treated 
separately in the legal treatises of classical Islamic jurists, Kamali has pointed out that the 
Shari `ah certainly "takes an affirmative stand on rights and encourages association in pursuit 
of lawful objectives. " He further elaborated that "the Qur'änic principle of hisbah, that is 
commanding good and forbidding evil, the principle of nasihah, sincere advice, and shürd, 
consultation, can equally be quoted mutatis mutandis as the basic authority in the Shari `ah 
for freedom of association. "375 
Article 22 also mentions the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of the 
interest of workers. This is very legitimate under Islamic law considering the tendency of 
exploitation that often exists in the employer-employee relationships all over the world 
today. The Prophet had enjoined in one of his Traditions that the adequate wage of the 
employee should be paid by the employer before the labour-sweat of the employee dries out. 
There is no doubt that the individual employee is always the weaker party in every employer- 
employee relationship. It is through the formation of trade unions that the above injunction of 
the Prophet can be realised and the interest of employees adequately protected within modem 
economies. Within the modem economic practices that operate in modem Muslim States 
today, it will be inconsistent with the Islamic injunction of fair-dealing not to allow the 
formation of trade unions to protect the interest of employees as provided under Article 22. 
37 See Article 8 of the ICESCR in the next chapter. 
374 See Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000) supra, note 23 above, pp. 432-441. 
375 Karnali, M. H., (1997) supra, note 328 above, p. 73ff. 
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THE RIGHT TO MARRY AND FOUND A FAMILY 
Article 23 
1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State. 
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be 
recognized. 
3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of 
rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary 
protection of any children. 
Article 23 of the ICCPR is unique in the sense that it provides for an institutional 
guarantee. It recognises the family institution as "the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society" that is "entitled to protection by society and the State. " It also recognises the "right 
of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family", and makes 
mandatory "the free and full consent of the intending spouses" in every marriage. Neither the 
ICCPR nor the ICESCR gives a definition of family. The HRC has however stated that: 
"In giving effect to recognition of the family in the context of article 23, it is 
important to accept the concept of the various forms of family, including unmarried 
couples and their children and single parents and their children and to ensure the 
i376 equal treatment of women in these contexts... 
The recognition and importance of the family institution under Islamic law can not be 
over emphasised. However, marriage is the legitimate means of founding a family under 
Islamic law. In that regard paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of Article 23 are in full consonance 
with Islamic law, they in fact re-echo important principles of Islamic family law. 
There are however some apparent differences between the thresholds of Islamic law and 
international human rights law regarding equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses 
during marriage and at its dissolution under Article 23(4). Similar provision is found in 
Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women377 During the discussions of the draft Women's Convention in the Third Committee 
of the General Assembly, Muslim countries raised some objections with respect to Article 16 
and its conformity with principles of Islamic law on rights and responsibilities of spouses 
376 General Comment 28, Par. 27. The maters addressed here are further considered under family rights in Article 10 of 
ICESCR in the next Chapter. 
377 supra, note 60 above. 
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during marriage and at its dissolution. They succeeded in achieving only a few amendments 
to the original draft. 378 In consequence, most Muslim countries that ratified the Women's 
Convention entered a reservation to Article 16.379 The Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, believing that it would be useful for it to have material on 
the subject, requested the UN in its reports of 1987 and 1988 to "promote or undertake 
studies on the status of women under Islamic laws and customs". 380 The request was however 
turned down at the meetings of both the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the 
UN General Assembly due to objections by some Muslim States. 381 According to Lijnzaad 
this has so far made it difficult to "reconcile the cause of women's rights with Islamic 
law". 382 We will therefore elaborately examine here those specific areas of differences with 
regard to equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses under Islamic law. 
The first important issue in this regard is the concept of superiority of the male over the 
female in Islamic law. `Abd al `Ati has observed that almost all writers, Oriental and 
Occidental, classical and modern, have variously interpreted the following Qur'anic verses to 
mean the superiority of men (husbands) over women (wives) in Islamic law. 
"... And women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what 
is equitable; but men have a degree above them... ""' (emphasis added) 
"Men are the protectors and maintainers of women because God has given the one 
more strength than the other, and because they support them from their means... ""' 
(emphasis added) 
Ibn Qudamah in his highly esteemed legal treatise, al-Mugni, indicated the 
complementary role of the two genders but went on to state that the husband's rights were 
greater than the wife's because God says that "men have a degree above them". He also 
referred to a Tradition in which the Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said that if it 
were lawful for a human being to prostrate before another, wives would have been ordered to 
378 See UN Doc. A/C. 3/34. SR., pp. 70-73. See also Khaliq, U., "Beyond the Veil?: An Analysis of the Provisions of the 
Women's Convention and the Law as Stipulated in Sharl'ah", (1995) 2 The Buffalo Journal of International Law, p. 1. at 29. 
379For Texts of Reservations See e. g. Lijnzaad, L., Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties: Rath and Ruin? (1995) pp. 
320-322. See also Cook, R. J., "Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against 
Women" (1990) 30 Yale Journal of International Law, p. 644 at 687-706. See also UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: 
http"//www. unhchr. chlhtml/menu3/b/elcedaw. htm [17/2/2001]. 
380 See (1987) Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Sixth Session, UN Doc. 
A/42/38 (1987), par. 580, (Decision 4); and (1988) Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, Seventh Session, UN Doc. A/43/38 (1988), Par. 61. 
381 See UN Doc. E/1987/SR. 10-SR. 14 (1987); UN Doc. A/C. 3/42/SR. 22 (1987); UN Doc. A/C. 3/42/SR. 26-SR. 28 (1987) and 
UN Doc. A/C. 3/42/SR. 30 (1987). See also Byrnes, A. C., "The "Other" Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women" (1989) 14 Yale Journal of International Law, I at 53-55. 
382 See Lijnzaad, L., (1995) supra, note 379 above, p. 320. 
393 Q 2: 228. 
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prostrate to husbands due to the rights of husbands over wives. 
385 This has often been taken 
to mean a confirmation of the superiority of the husband over the wife under Islamic law. 
Thus the French writer Gaudefroy-Demombynes has asserted that Islamic law and customs 
"give the husband absolute authority over his wife and children.... The husband is superior to 
his wife: `men having a degree above them, ' says the Qur'an". 386 This idea of superiority of 
men over women is inferred from the "degree" that men are stated to have above women in 
Qur'an 2: 228. But what is meant by this "degree"? One observes that both classical and 
contemporary interpreters of the Qur'an differ on the meaning of this "degree". An example 
of the contrast in interpretations of the "degree" is found for instance, in the English 
interpretations of Yusuf Ali which says "... men have a degree (Of advantage) over themi387 
and that of Muhsin Khan which says "... men have a degree (of responsibility) over them". 388 
The parenthesising of the phrases "Of Advantage" and "of responsibility" by the respective 
interpreters indicate that those are not express statements of the Qur'an but the understanding 
of the content by the interpreters. `Abd al `Ati therefore pointed out that the interpretations 
are "probably better understood as a reflection of certain psychological dispositions or of the 
actual status of women, which has been low on the whole, at least on the surface", and that 
the "idea that men are superior to women and have power over them without reciprocity or 
qualifications stemmed from sources apparently alien to the spirit as well as the letter of' the 
Qur'anic verses. 389 
It is noteworthy that both Qur'an 2: 228 and Qur'an 4: 34 revolve around the family 
institution. Rather than advocating the superiority of one gender above the other, the verses 
must be understood in the context of the Islamic appreciation of role differentiation within 
the family. From sociological perspectives, authority and power are necessary elements of 
any group structure. The family structure is not an exception. Bernard quoting Allport 
pointed out that the concepts of status, authority, power, e. t. c., "run through all human and 
animal relationships", and that "the social psychologist sees ascendance-submission or 
; 84 Q 4: 34. 
385 See Ibn Qudämah, M. A., al-Mugni (Arabic) (1981) Vol. 7, p. 223. 
386 Gaudefroy-Demombynes, M., Muslim Institutions, Trans. MacGregor, J. P., (1968) p. 132 See also Honarver, N., "Behind 
The Veil: Women's Rights in Islamic Societies" (1988) 6 Journal of Law and Religion, p. 355 at 384-385. 
387 See Ali, A. Y., The Meaning of The Holy Qur'än (New Edition with Revised Translation and Commentary) (1992) p. 92. 
(emphasis added). In footnote 255 to the translation Yusuf Ali states that "The difference in economic position between the 
sexes makes the man's rights and liabilities a little greater than the woman's. Q. 4: 34 refers to the duty of the man to 
maintain the woman, and to a certain difference in nature between sexes. Subject to this, the sexes are on terms of equality 
in law, and in certain matters the weaker sex is entitled to special protection. " 
388 See Muhsin Khan, M., and Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali, M., Interpretations of the Meanings of the Noble Qur An in English 
Language: A Summarized Version ofAt-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi and Ibn Kathir with Comments from Sahih Al-Bukhari (1996) 
57. (emphasis added). 
89 `Abd al `Ati, H., (1977), supra, note 64 above p178-182. 
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dominance-compliance wherever two persons are in contact with each other. , 390 This 
explains why Islam required leadership in every group activity to ensure cohesion in human 
relationships. For instance in acts of worship involving two or more people, one of them 
who is more qualified will lead the others. Also when two or more people travel together, the 
Prophet instructed that one of them must be selected as leader of the group. In all these 
situations the leader is not considered as being superior to the others, it is only to ensure 
cohesion in the group. To enhance the success of family life therefore there arises the need 
to differentiate and identify roles within the family structure. The husband would necessarily 
be more influential in certain roles while the wife would be in others. Zeldich has pointed out 
that in most societies the instrumental and protective roles are played by the husband-father, 
while the wife-mother plays the expressive roles. 
391 It is in exceptional cases that the wife- 
mother assumes the protective role within the family structure. That perhaps explains the 
degree (of responsibility) that men have above women and which is consistent with the 
second verse that says: 
"Men are the protectors and maintainers of women because God has given the one 
more strength than the other, and because they support them from their means... "392 
The word interpreted here as protectors and maintainers (gawämün) is also sometimes 
translated as "guardians" which in that case involves some element of authority on the part of 
the husband. However the role of a guardian, protector or maintainer is substantially rather 
that of responsibility than of authority. It would be more consistent therefore to understand 
the "degree" that men are stated to have above women in Qur'an 2: 228 as a degree of 
responsibility. It is clear that neither the two verses under examination nor any other verse of 
the Qur'an mentions specifically that men are superior to women. It is also not mentioned 
directly that men have absolute authority over women. Where the husband/father adequately 
discharges the degree of responsibility placed upon him, some reflective rights will 
reciprocally ensue to him from the wife/mother in the family relationship. Thus the authority 
of the male is at best inferred only as a consequence of the structural role of the husband- 
father in the family. Authority and leadership is thus not really generalised or attached per se 
to the idea of the male being superior to the female. It relates to specific roles in the family 
structure and is delegated to the gender best suited for that role within Islamic teachings. 
390 See Bernard, J., American Family Behaviour (1942) p. 420. 
391 Zeldich, M., Family, "Marriage and Kinship" in Faris, R. E. L., Handbook of Modern Sociology (1964)p. 680 at 699 and 
703. 
392 Q4: 34. 
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Whether men are the best suited for that role than women is an open question subject to 
diverse cultural arguments. 
Marriage and the family institution are very strong traditions of Islam that cannot be 
neglected except for valid necessities. Islamic law does not promote celibacy and also 
generally prohibits sexual relations outside wedlock. The Prophet Muhammad is reported to 
393 
have said that marriage was part of his Traditions (Sunnah) which should not be neglected. 
Esposito has thus pointed out that: 
"Islam considers marriage, which is an important safeguard for chastity, to be 
incumbent on every Muslim man and woman unless they are physically or financially 
unable to lead conjugal lifei394 
Muslim jurists therefore tend to protect the family institution resolutely and are cautious 
in accommodating any norms that would tend to disrupt that tradition of Islam. Khan as 
quoted by Badawi expressed the fear of Muslim societies about disintegration of the family 
institution in the following words: 
"Of all the family problems in advanced countries, divorce tops the list. The fact that 
the majority of marriages in these countries end up in divorce has ruined family life 
completely, for children do no enjoy the love and care of parents who are still alive, 
whereas it was formerly only death which separated children from their parents. " 395 
The urge to protect the family institution while guaranteeing equality of the spouses is 
not peculiar to Islamic law. It was such considerations, inter alia, that defeated the 
ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment to the US Constitution by the American States in 
1982.396 Also as at December 2000 the United States of America had not ratified the 
Women's Convention on grounds, inter alia, that the Convention has the potential of 
prohibiting even "non-invidious gender distinctions. "397 
Meron has alluded to the wide scope of the Women's Convention with regard to the 
prohibition of religious inspired norms within the family and suggested that "religious 
practices within the family which have relatively less significance for women's ability to 
function as full human beings in society might be permitted even though those practices 
393 Reported by al-Bukhäri. See e. g. al-AsgalänI, Ibn Hajar, Bulugh al-Maram (With English Translations) (1996) p. 342, 
Hadith 825. 
394 Esposito, J. L. Women in Muslim Family Law (1982)p. 15. 
395 See e. g. Badawi, J. A., The Muslim Woman's Dress According to the Qur'an and Sunnah (nd) pp. 13-14. 
396 See Feinberg, R., The Equal Rights Amendment. An Annotated Bibliography of the Issues 1976-1985 (1986)p. 3. 
397 See Zearfoss, S., "The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Radical, 
Reasonable, or Reactionary? " (1991)12 Michigan Journal of International Law, p. 905. The USA signed the Women's 
Convention on 17 July 1980 but is yet to ratify it. 
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perpetuate stereotype roles while practices which impair women's ability to exercise their 
rights and foreclose opportunities to function outside stereotyped roles (for instance a 
prohibition on women working outside the home) must not be allowed. "398 He submitted 
that to require the elimination of sex-roles in the family structure as required by religious 
teachings could constitute coercion to alter religious practice or belief, contrary to Article 
1(2) of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief. 399 Of relevance is also the issue of abortion. The Women's 
Convention does not specifically sanction abortion but a wide interpretation of Article 
16(1)(e) of the Women's Convention which provides for the same rights to decide freely on 
the number and spacing of the couple's children can accommodate the right to abortion 
where the wife decides that she has had enough children and then finds that she is 
pregnant. 400 
With regard to equality of rights "as to marriage, within marriage and at its dissolution" 
under Article 23(4) the apparent areas of conflict with Islamic law are: the right of 
conditional polygyny for men with no right of polyandry for women; the right of Muslim 
men to marry women of the "people of the book" (i. e. Christian and Jewish women), but no 
similar right for Muslim women to marry men of the "people of the book" - i. e. female 
religious endogamy; the female's share in inheritance, and the right to divorce. We shall now 
examine these issues together with the juristic views and justifications advanced for them 
under Islamic law and possible reconciliation of the differences. 
Polygyny in Islamic Law and Equality of Rights as to Marriage 
The HRC observed in its General Comment 28 that polygamy is incompatible with 
equality of rights in marriage under the Covenant and that "it should be definitely abolished 
wherever it continues to exist. "40' Muslim scholars and jurists have advanced reasons such as 
demographic needs, economic factors, barrenness of the wife, chronic illness of the wife, 
higher sexual needs of men, e. t. c., in their attempt to justify the conditional permissibility of 
398 See Meron, T., Human Rights Law-making in the United Nations: a Critique of Instruments and Process (1986) p. 159, 
see pp. 62-66 and 153-160. 
399 ibid, pp. 159-60. 
40° See e. g. Meron, (1986) supra, note 398 above, p. 72. See also the issue of "unwanted pregnancy" and the presumption 
that the decision is that of the woman addressed at page 124-125 above. 
401 General Comment 28, Par. 24. See also the Committee's Concluding Observations on Nigeria (1996), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 65; Par. 291; Concluding Observations on Libya (1998), UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 101. Par. 17; 
Concluding Observations on Cameroon (1999), UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 116. Par. 10. See also CEDAW's General 
Recommendation 21, UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. I at 90 (1994). Par. 14. 
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polygyny in Islamic law. 402 Most of these justifications may be stiffly contested in the light 
of present day circumstances. Problems like the barrenness of the wife are however quite 
tenacious in the arguments for the justification of conditional polygyny in Islamic law. 
Similar arguments exist also in other cultures. In traditional African society for instance, 
procreation is usually the main purpose of marriage. Thus where the wife is found barren, 
the husband is usually inclined towards taking another wife, even though he does not divorce 
his barren wife. 403 The obvious question here is, what of when the man is the one barren? It 
is often assumed, albeit wrongly, amongst the local populace in many developing countries 
that the fault for lack of conception in marriage is always with the wife. Islamic law however 
recognises defects of the husband such as impotence, lack of semen or ejaculation during 
intercourse, lack of testicles and amputated sexual organ, all of which constitute grounds on 
which the wife may seek for a dissolution of the marriage. al-Zaylä'i, the twelfth century 
Hanafi jurist stated that since these defects defeat the very purpose of marriage i. e., 
satisfaction of sexual urge and procreation of children, the wife has a right to demand for a 
dissolution. 404 The same principle applies and the woman may seek dissolution where the 
man is found barren. The question then would be why a right to dissolution for the woman 
and not a right to polyandry like her male counterpart? The medieval Islamic jurist, Ibn 
Qayyim, has responded with a list of socio-legal arguments to this question. The most 
compelling perhaps of which is that polyandry can more easily lead to family and societal 
disintegration because both the concepts of legitimacy of offspring and family lineage would 
be impaired. There would always be a contest of legitimacy between the male spouses each 
time a child is born in a polyandrous union, which is not the case in a polygynous 
marriage. 405 
In case of a barren woman it is often argued that to take a second wife is better than 
either divorcing the barren wife or having offspring outside the marriage through adulterous 
relations with other women. For such exceptional reasons, some Muslim scholars have 
argued that "Islam permitted polygamy - as a remedy for some social diseases - under 
certain conditions without which plurality of wives shall be prohibited... (because, 
- 
see 
below) Islam, since the very beginning, favours monogamy. "406 According to `Abd al Ati, 
402 See e. g. Ibn Qayyim, A., Kitäb Akhbär al-Nisä' (Arabic) (1900) Vol. 2, pp. 85-87; Doi, A. R., (1984), supra, note 82 
above, p. 146, and al-Qaradawi, Y., (1984) supra, note 16 above, pp. 192-193. 
403 See Doi, (1984) ibid, p. 153-154 and footnote 15 thereof. 
404 See a]-Zaylä'i, Tabyin al-Hagä'iq: Shar Kanz al-Dagä'iq (Arabic) (1313AH) Vol. 3, p. 25. 
4°S Ibn Qayyim, A., supra note 402 above. See also `Abd al`Ati, (1977), supra, note 64 above, pp. 125-126. 
406 See e. g. El-Bahnassawi, S., (1985) supra, note 58 above, p. 157; and Al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 77 above, Vol. 
9., p. 6670. 
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polygyny should not be viewed entirely as a blessing for one sex and a curse for the other, 
but "as a legitimate alternative applicable to some difficult, "crisis" situations". 407 
The permissibility of polygyny in Islamic law is based on Qur'an 4: 3 which provides 
that: 
"... marry women of your choice, two three, or four; but if you fear that you shall not 
be able to deal justly (with them) then only one, or (a captive) that your right hands 
possess. That is nearer to prevent you from doing injustice". 
Men are thus allowed to have a maximum of four wives at a time. Both classical and 
contemporary Muslim jurists generally agree that the ability to treat co-wives justly, as stated 
in the Qur'anic verse above, is a prerequisite to this permissibility of polygyny. 408 Some of 
the classical jurists such as Imam al-Shäfi`i, the eponym of the Shäfi'i school of Islamic 
jurisprudence, did not consider the requirement for doing justice between co-wives as an 
essential legal requirement but only as a "moral exhortation binding on the husband's 
conscience". 409 Many contemporary scholars and jurists however hold that the mere 
apprehension of not being able to deal justly between co-wives removes the permissibility of 
polygyny and advocates monogamy. They refer to the concluding sentence of the Qur'an 4: 3 
above, which says: "... That (monogamy) is nearer to prevent you from doing injustice", and 
conclude that monogamy is the rule while polygyny is only an exception. The view that the 
ability to deal justly between co-wives is a legal prerequisite to polygyny had been further 
argued by other scholars and taken together with Qur'an 4: 129, which says "You will never 
be able to do perfect justice between wives even if it is your ardent desire... ", to reach a 
conclusion that polygyny is actually prohibited under Islamic law. According to that view the 
Qur'an itself confirms the inability of men to fulfil that prerequisite of dealing justly with co- 
wives. The pioneer advocate of that interpretation was the nineteenth century Egyptian 
jurist, Muhammad Abduh, who, at the close of that century, argued that the abuse of 
polygyny created injustice to women and he advocated its proscription through a combined 
interpretation of those two Qur `änic verses. However, that view was and is still strongly 
opposed by Muslim scholars who support the traditional interpretation that permits polygyny 
provided that justice is ensured between co-wives 410 Despite that the trend in the Muslim 
world today generally favours, at least, a restricted polygyny if not outright monogamy, most 
407 `Abd al`At?, (1977), supra, note 64 above, p. 126. 
408 See e. g. Tanzil-ur-Rahman, A Code of Muslim Personal Law (1978), Vol. 1, pp. 92-101; and Al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) 
supra, note 77above, Vol. 9., pp. 6669-6670. 
See Coulson, N. J. History of Islamic Law (1964)p. 208. 
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Muslim scholars and jurists would hesitate to declare its outright prohibition for the fear of 
violating the sanctity of its Qur'anic permissibility. 
The combined interpretation of Qur'an 4: 3 and Qur'an 4: 129 as advocated by 
Muhammad Abduh was subsequently relied upon by some Muslim States to either restrict or 
abrogate polygyny. In 1956 Tunisia enacted the Tunisian Code of Personal Status411, which 
provided that: 
"Polygamy is forbidden. Any person who, having entered into a bond of marriage, 
contracts another marriage before the dissolution of the preceding one, is liable to 
one year's imprisonment or to a fine... ". "' 
That prohibitory approach has been controversial under Islamic law and it has been 
criticised as contravening the Qur'an. 
413 This has been particularly so because the Tunisian 
code criminalised polygyny with a sentence of one year's imprisonment, despite the fact that 
some schools of Islamic jurisprudence consider it permissible in exceptional circumstances. 
Iraq had also followed the prohibitory approach in 1959 and specified imprisonment and a 
fine for any violator. Due to strong opposition and non-compliance by Muslims who 
considered it as contrary to Qur`anic provisions, the law was revised in 1963 and the article 
prohibiting polygamy was removed. The Tunisian code was however retained despite similar 
opposition 414 Syria had also in 1953 enacted the Syrian Code of Personal Status restricting 
the right to polygyny. Article 17 of the Syrian Code, which remains operative, provided that: 
"The judge is empowered to refuse permission to a married man to marry another 
woman if it is established that he is not in a position to support two wives 
. 
19415 
Although this is substantively a restrictive approach, it could almost serve as a procedural 
means of closing the door to polygyny since the discretion of determining the ability to do 
justice is taken away from the husband and placed with the judiciary. 116 
In many of the Muslim societies where polygyny is practised, the prerequisite of being 
able to do justice between co-wives is seldom given any consideration by men. The 
410 See e. g. Doi, (1984), supra, note 82 above, pp. 149-154; and Al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 77 above, Vol. 9., 
m. 6670- 
Law of 13/8/1956 (as amended). 
412 ibid. Art. 18. 
413 See Qadri, A. A., (1986) supra, note 22 above, p. 368; and Doi, A. R., (1984), supra, note 82 above, p. 149-154. 
414 See Khadduri, M., "Marriage in Islamic Law: The Modernist Viewpoints" (1978) 26 American Journal of Comparative 
Law, p. 213 at 216. 
ais See also the Moroccan Code of Personal Status of 1958 and the Pakistan Family Law Ordinance of 1961. See also 
Mahmood, T., Statutes of Personal Law in Islamic Countries, History, Texts and Analysis (2"d Ed. 1995) pp. 246 
-248. 
416 See e. g. Al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 77 above, Vol. 9, p. 6674 for a critique of this approach. 
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permissibility of polygyny is often abused in a way that actually works against the family 
institution itself. Quoting Ibn al-Qayyim, `Abd al-'Ati, has observed that "polygamy in 
Islam is no more and no less than that of a permissible act, (which) like any other act lawful 
in principle, it becomes forbidden if it involves unlawful things or leads to unlawful 
consequences such as injustice. ""' It is arguable on the above grounds that the permissibility 
could be controlled under Islamic law for reasons of public welfare. 418 It is noteworthy 
however that most discussants of women's rights proceed from the premise that there is only 
one way of redressing the inequality and abuse of polygyny, that is, by "equalising down" 
through a direct prohibition to strip men of that right. Under Islamic law this will continue to 
be controversial in view of its Qur'anic permissibility. Are there other means through which 
Muslim countries may therefore address the problem of polygyny within acceptable limits of 
Islamic law to remove the disadvantage against women and also satisfy their obligations 
under international human rights law? One approach that has not been fully utilised and 
which could prove realistic is the "equalising up" approach of redressing inequality. 
There are normally two alternative routes to redress situations of inequality or 
disadvantage; 
- 
either by raising the rights of victims of the inequality, i. e. "equalising up" or 
by lowering the rights of those advantaged, i. e. "equalising down". 419 Will situations where 
women have a right to polyandry similar to that of men to polygyny not satisfy the 
requirements of equality of rights to marriage? Although that could satisfy the requirements 
because nothing prohibits polyandry in international law, practical considerations indicate 
that most societies would not endorse such alternative as a solution to polygyny. 420 Islamic 
law actually prohibits polyandry by ijmä ` (legal consensus), so "equalising up" in that 
manner is not legally possible under Islamic law, and that is not what is suggested here 
either. Rather, there are provisions within Islamic law that allow for a sort of "equalising up" 
by legally activating the rights of women to "suspended repudiation" (ta `läq al-taläq) and/or 
"delegated repudiation" (tafwId al-taldq) of marriage. The legal activation of such rights will 
not only redress the disadvantage and abuse of polygyny against women but also lead to a 
417 `Abd al`Ati, (1977), supra, note 64 above, p. 119. He made reference to Ibn al-Qayyim's, Kitäb Akhbär al-Nisd (1900) 
supra note 402 above, and observed that Ibn Qayyim "cites ninety-nine cases in confirmation of this principle and makes 
extensive reference to the Qur'an and Sunnah, and the rulings of leading jurists. " See endnoie 44 thereof. 
418 However, for the doctrine of public welfare (maslahah) to apply the abuse that makes such control necessary need to be 
sufficiently established. 
419 See e. g. Harris, D. J., and Joseph, S., (eds. ) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and United Kingdom 
Law (1995)p. 594. 
420 See e 
. 
g. Dietmar Pauger v. Austria, Communication 415/1990, See also Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000) supra, 
note23 above, p. 570. 
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smooth harmonisation of the conflict in this area between Islamic law and international 
human rights law. How can that be achieved? 
There is consensus in Islamic law that polygyny can neither be imposed upon a woman 
or a man, it is only a permissible act. Also all the schools of Islamic law, except the Shi ` ah, 
endorse the doctrines of "suspended repudiation" (ta 7iq al-taläq) and "delegated 
repudiation" (tafwid al-taläq). 421 By the first doctrine of "suspended repudiation", the 
husband stipulates at the time of marriage that the marriage becomes repudiated if he does 
certain things unfavourable to the wife, such as taking another wife. By the second doctrine 
of "delegated repudiation" the wife is vested, by the husband, during the marriage contract 
with the right to divorce herself should there arise circumstances unfavourable to her, such as 
the husband taking another wife. 422 The wife has a right under Islamic law to make 
stipulations in the marriage contract. It is possible therefore for Muslim countries, for reasons 
of public welfare, to enact that women shall be specifically informed of these rights during 
the marriage contract, and thus have the discretion either to utilise it or not. 423 The State 
would have in that way legally activated the rights of women and "equalised up" their 
formerly available but suppressed rights against the rights of men to polygyny, and thus give 
them a choice in the matter. Supplementary to this, women should also be adequately 
educated of the existence of such right to them in law. The importance of educating Muslim 
women about their rights in Islamic law, is manifested in the observation of Coulson that: 
"There has perhaps been a natural tendency in recent years to exaggerate the picture 
of Muslim wives labouring under the shackles of the traditional law. Miserable 
though the lot of Muslim wives may have been in practice, this was often not so 
much the direct result of the terms of the law itself as the responsibility of society. 
The customary seclusion of women, and especially the lack of educational facilities, 
left them ignorant of their rights and unable to insist upon the proper use of 
machinery which the law had provided for their protection. "424 
Any disadvantage of polygyny could thus be redressed by women utilising an alternative 
legal right available to them in Islamic law, while at the same time the liberty of women who 
421 See e. g. Al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 77 above, Vol. 9, p. 6935-6941; and `Abd al'Ati, (1977), supra, note 64 
above, p. 119. The Shi'ah (Twelvers) recognise the right of the husband to delegate his right of divorce to his wife, by 
appointing her as an agent to do so. This is called Tawk? l. Although the rules differ technically, this can also achieve similar 
results with Taf vid and Ta'lig. See e. g. Mir-Hosseini, Z., "The Delegated Right To Divorce: Law and Practice in Morocco 
and Iran", in Carroll, L, and Kapoor, H., (eds. ) Talag-i-Tafwid: The Muslim Woman's Contractual Access to Divorce (1996) 
pp. 121-133. 
°2 See Ibn Qudämah, M. A., al-Mugni (Arabic) (1981) Vol. 7, p. 13; `Abd al'Ati, (1977), ibid, pp. 1 19-120 and Coulson, N. J., 
(1964) supra, note 409 above, p. 207. 
423 Similar rules can be found in the Jordan, Morocco and Egypt Personal Status Laws respectively, allowing the wife to 
stipulate that the husband shall not take another wife and entitles her to sue for divorce if he does. See Generally Carroll, L, 
and Kapoor, H., (1996) supra, note 421 above. 
424 Coulson, N. J., (1964) supra, note 409 above, p. 207. 
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may still like to be co-wives, when exceptional circumstances so demand, would still be 
guaranteed without the law interfering in their way by the prohibitory approach. Neither 
monogamy nor polygyny would then be an imposition upon men and women respectively, 
but would actually be put in its correct perspective under Islamic law as a matter of choice. 
This would not contravene the Shari `ah in any way and should also indirectly satisfy the 
obligations of the Muslim States to ensure equality of rights in marriage. This way the focus 
of international human rights law will be seen to be specifically on human rights and not on 
questioning the basis of religious teachings per se, and thus promote a complementary 
approach to solving human rights problems. 425 
Female Endogamy in Islamic Law and Equality of Rights as to Marriage 
Based on Qur'an 2: 221 and Qur'an 60: 10 there is consensus among both Sunni and 
Shi'ah jurists that a Muslim woman is prohibited under Islamic law from marrying any non- 
Muslim man. 426 Conversely, Qur'an 5: 5 permits Muslim men to marry "women of the people 
of the Book" (i. e. Christian and Jewish women). In international' human rights law this will 
be considered discriminatory against women. The HRC has observed in that regard that: 
"... the right to choose one's spouse may be restricted by laws or practices that 
prevent the marriage of a woman of a particular religion with a man who professes 
no religion or a different religion. States should provide information on these laws 
s427 and practices and on the measures taken to abolish the laws and practices... 
Muslim jurists have also advanced some justifications for this provision under Islamic 
law 428 The foremost being that, under Islamic law a Muslim man who marries a Christian or 
Jewish woman has a religious obligation to honour and respect both Christianity and 
Judaism. Thus the woman's religious beliefs and rights are not in jeopardy through the 
marriage, because she would be free to maintain and practice her religion as a Christian or 
Jew. Conversely, a Christian or Jewish man who marries a Muslim woman is not under such 
obligation within his own faith, so allowing a Muslim woman to marry a Christian or a 
Jewish man may expose her religious beliefs and rights to jeopardy. This justification is 
therefore hinged mainly on wanting to protect the religious beliefs and rights of Muslim 
women. al-Qaradawi has thus argued that: 
425 See Levitt, M. A., "The Taliban, Islam and Women's Rights in the Muslim World" (1998) 22 The Fletcher Forum, p. 113 
at 115. 
426 See e. g. Nasir, J. J., The Islamic Law of Personal Status (1990) 2°d Ed., pp. 69-70. 
427 General Comment 28, Par. 24. 
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".. while Islam guarantees freedom of belief and practice to the Christian or Jewish 
wife of a Muslim, safeguarding her rights according to her own faith, other religions, 
such as Judaism and Christianity, do not guarantee the wife of a different faith 
freedom of belief and practice, nor do they safeguard her rights. Since this is the 
case, how can Islam take chances on the future of its daughters by giving them into 
the hands of people who neither honor their religion nor are concerned to protect 
their rights? " 429 
On grounds of the guarantee of freedom of thought, conscience and religion under 
international human rights law, it is arguable that other religions, such as Judaism and 
Christianity would now also be under an international obligation to guarantee the freedom of 
belief and religion to a Muslim wife and thus safeguarding her rights according to her own 
faith. If so, will this remove the prohibition of Muslim women from marrying men of the 
"people of the book" (i. e.. Christians and Jews)? 'Abd al `Ati, has contended that the honour 
and reverence that the Muslim must give to the faith of his Christian or Jewish counterpart is 
an integral part of the Islamic faith while the same "reciprocity" is not an integral part of 
either the Christian or Jewish faith. The required unreserved honour and reverence is a matter 
of faith that can not be imposed by law. For the same reason the Muslim male is prohibited in 
Islamic law from marrying an idolatress because of the psychological factors involved. Faith, 
concluded `Abd al `Ati, "is the most private relationship between man and God; it cannot be 
imposed or conferred. Nor is it the question of discrimination between men and women in 
Islam"430 Can this then be categorised as "differentiation" for the purpose of protecting the 
religious rights of Muslim women instead of discrimination?. We will then have to also 
consider whether the prohibition causes any disadvantages to women. Love do transcend 
religious boundaries, the prohibition under Islamic law may therefore, on some occasions, 
deny a Muslim woman from marrying a man she loves, where he happens to be a non- 
Muslim. According to `Abd al `Ati, "Of course, love may be invoked 
... 
as omnipotent, 
capable of solving all problems, emotional, ideological, or social. But love is perhaps one of 
the most abused words; and if it were so omnipotent as is sometimes claimed, social 
interaction would be much simpler and human life much less problematic. " 431 The socio- 
legal arguments are quite broad and can no doubt be continued, for and against, ad infinitum. 
Naturally, every religion, ideology or cult treasures its adherents and will have rules that 
close the door to or at least minimise deflections. Such rules may often be contrary to the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under international human rights law. 
429 See e. g. `Abd al `Ati, H., (1977) supra, note 64 above, pp. 140-145. 
429 See e. g. al-Qaradawi, Y., (1984) supra, note 16 above, p. 184-186. 
430 See `Abd al `Ati, H., (1977) supra, note 64 above, p143. 
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The prohibition of Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men thus seem to be one of 
the areas where achieving complete equality is difficult between Islamic law and 
international human rights law for the reason stated by al-Qaradawi above. No non-secular 
Muslim State has enacted any law to abrogate that prohibition of Islamic law. Nasir, has thus 
observed that: 
"Under the Sharia and all modem Islamic laws, both for the Sunni and Shia sects, a 
marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man is null and void, even if it is 
validly solemnized according to the laws of any given non-Muslim state. For such a 
marriage to be valid the man must have converted to Islam at the time of the 
contract". "' 
However, the juristic view of some contemporary Muslim jurists is that since Muslim women 
are prohibited completely from marrying non-Muslim men, the Muslim men would also be 
temporarily prohibited from marrying women of the "people of the book" in a situation 
where there is apprehension of a high number of Muslim women remaining unmarried, until 
the situation is remedied. 433 This is based on the doctrine of public welfare (maslahah) under 
Islamic law. 
Female's Share in Islamic Inheritance and Equality of Rights in Marriage 
While advocates of Islamic law contend that the "Islamic inheritance scheme contains 
one of the most comprehensive and detailed systems of succession known to the world"a3a 
the female's share in the Islamic law of inheritance is viewed under international human 
rights law as being inconsistent with the principles of equality of women. According to the 
HRC, "Women should have equal inheritance rights to those of men when the dissolution of 
marriage is caused by the death of one of the spouses". 435 Basically, under Islam law the 
male heir receives double the share of the female heir. This is based on the Qur'anic 
provision which states that: 
"God (thus) directs you as regards your children's (inheritance): to the male, a 
portion equal to that of two females... "436 
431 ibid, p. 142. 
432 Nasir, J. J., (1990) supra, note 426 above, p. 84 also pp. 69-70. 
433 See e. g. al-Qaradawi, Y., (1984) supra, note 16 above, p. 184. 
434 See Chaudry, Z., (1997) supra, note 58 above, p. 511 at 527. 
435 General Comment 28, Par. 26. 
436 Q 4: 11. 
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This rule of double share of the male does not however apply in all cases under Islamic 
law. 37 There are some instances where the female gets the same share of inheritance as the 
male. For example a father and mother gets equal share (a sixth each) when they survive and 
inherit their deceased son in the same capacity as parents; 438 the uterine sister gets equal 
share (in the same capacity) with her uterine brother; 439 and where the sole inheritors are a 
husband and a full sister of the deceased, the husband gets one-half and the full sister of the 
deceased equally gets one-half. There are also instances where the female could receive 
double the share of the male. 440 The female will also receive the entire estate if she inherits 
alone. 41 This contradicts any emphatic allegation of unqualified discrimination on grounds 
of sex in the scheme of Islamic inheritance. Historically, Islamic law was the first legal 
system to grant women a fixed portion in inheritance either as a mother, wife, daughter or 
sister at a time when such a right was not available to them in any civilisation or under any 
legal system. This was on the basis of the Qur'anic verse which provided that: 
"From what is left by parents and those nearest related, there is a share for men and a 
share for women, whether the property be small or large 
-a determinate share 
. 
11442 
Muslim scholars contend that Islamic law must actually be seen as having removed the 
pre-Islamic discrimination that the female was subjected to in every society which had 
denied her of any inheritance alongside her male counterpart. The fact that there are instances 
when the female obtains equal share in the same capacity with the male, and can also obtain 
a higher share than the male in some instances, shows that the basic rule of double share for 
the male is not an indication of superiority of the male above the female nor discrimination 
on grounds of sex. Badawi summarises the justifications for the rule as follows: 
"The variation in inheritance rights is only consistent with the variations in financial 
responsibilities of man and woman according to the Islamic Law. Man in Islam is 
fully responsible for the maintenance of his wife, his children, and in some cases of 
his needy relatives, especially the females. This responsibility is neither waived nor 
reduced because of his wife's wealth or because of her access to any personal income 
gained from work, rent, profit, or any other legal means. 
Woman, on the other hand, is far more secure financially and is far less burdened 
with any claims on her possessions. Her possessions before marriage do not transfer 
437 See generally Chaudry, Z., (1997) supra, note 58 above. 
4311 Q 4: 11. 
439 Q 4: 12. 
°40 An instance is where the inheritors are a husband, one daughter and one full brother. In that case, the husband gets one 
quarter of the estate, the daughter as an only child gets one-half and the full brother gets the remaining one-quarter. See 
Chaudry, Z., (1997) supra, note 58 above, 535-536. 
°41 See e. g. Nasir, J. J. (1990) supra, note 426 above, p. 253. 
442 Q 4: 7. 
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to her husband. She has no obligation to spend on her family out of such properties 
or out of her income after marriage. She is 'entitled to "Mahr" (Dowry) which she 
takes from her husband at the time of marriage. If she is divorced she may get an 
alimony from her ex-husband. 
An examination of the inheritance law within the overall framework of the Islamic 
Law reveals not only justice but also an abundance of compassion for woman. "443 
Thus while the share of the male and the female, where the double share applies, appears 
arithmetically unequal, Muslim scholars contend that the shares are morally equitable in the 
final analysis, considering the varied financial responsibilities of each gender. 444 This 
argument indicates that the variation in the Islamic inheritance scheme takes the overall 
family structure under Islamic law into consideration. From that perspective, will counter 
arguments that the family structure has already changed, that the nuclear family is now 
dominant even in many Muslim countries, that many women for one reason or the other are 
bread-winners of the family, coupled with feminist calls for the empowerment of women and 
the promotion of their non-dependence on men, make any difference? This relates to the 
economic, social and cultural rights of women. It is important to note here that the financial 
responsibilities of men within the family structure of Islamic law are without prejudice to the 
financial independence of the women. 445 While it is reasonable and appreciative that a 
financially buoyant wife can assist with the financial responsibilities of the family, Islamic 
law does not impose this responsibility on her. Such responsibility is legally placed on the 
husband and where he fails to discharge it without necessity, the man becomes an 
irresponsible husband under Islamic law, against whom the wife has a right of dissolution on 
grounds of lack of maintenance. 446 
In addressing any problem of inheritance, succession rules can hardly be imposed upon 
any person who does not intend to follow such rules. There is always a way of 
circumventing any such imposition. The most legally approved of which is gifting away the 
estate to whomever one pleases during one's lifetime. It is the belief in the divine basis of 
the Shari `ah rules on Islamic inheritance that keeps Muslims attached to it. If the Islamic 
law of succession is considered generally, it would be observed that the fixed-shares actually 
make it impossible for some certain heirs to be completely disinherited for any reason. A 
displacement of Islamic law will therefore actually expose those secured heirs, which include 
443 Badawi, J., The Status of Woman i Islam (1971) 8 Al-Ittihad, No. 2, September, 33. 
4" See e. g. `Abd al `Ati, (1977) supra, note 64 above, p. 268. 
d45 See ibid, pp. 269-270. See also Chaudhry, Z., (1997) supra, note 58 above, 544-545. 
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women, to the possibility of being completely disinherited through testamentary dispositions 
and put them at a greater disadvantage. 447 It may actually be more difficult to compel any 
individual through secular law to dispose his estate equally and non-discriminatorily among 
his male and female heirs. People usually prefer to distribute their estate as it pleases them. 
What Islamic law has successfully established through the fixed-shares is to ensure that 
certain close relations are not disinherited by the testator. That does not however prevent 
testators from exercising their discretion to make a gift of any part of their estate during their 
lifetime to any of their heirs (male or female) through the doctrine of hibah which is an in- 
built mechanism in Islamic law for legally tilting the balance of the fixed-shares as one 
pleases during one's lifetime 448 
In 1959 Iraq enacted the Personal Status Act giving equal shares to males and females in 
all cases. Due to its unpopularity the provision was abrogated in 1963 and the Shari 'ah 
provisions restored. 449 Islamic inheritance rules continue to apply to Muslims within the 
personal law codes of most Muslim States 
450 During the consideration of its initial report 
before the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Saudi Arabian representative, Mr. Al- 
Nasser, stated that "because Saudi inheritance law was taken directly from the Koran, it was 
considered to be the word of God, hence there was no room for interpretation or the adoption 
of another system" and that "in some cases, a woman's entitlement could be much greater 
than that of a man". 451 
Dissolution of Marriage in Islamic Law and Equality Rights of Women 
In its General Comment 28, the HRC observed that in the dissolution of marriages 
States must ensure that "grounds for divorce and annulment should be the same for men and 
women". 
452 
Marriage may be dissolved under Islamic law either through Unilateral Repudiation 
(taldq), Discharge at wife's request (khul) Dissolution by Mutual Agreement (mubara `ah), 
or Dissolution through Judicial Order (faskh). Unilateral Repudiation (taldq) is a right of the 
°46 See e. g. Tanzil-ur-Rahman, (1978) supra, note 408 above, Vol. 1., pp. 641-652. Note the observation of the HRC that: 
"Equality during marriage implies that husband and wife should participate equally in responsibility and authority within the 
family". General Comment 28, Par. 25. 
447 See e. g the Nigerian case of Adesubokan v Yinusa (1971) Northern Nigerian Law Reports, 77. 
d48 See e. g. Powers, D. S., "The Islamic Inheritance System: A Socio-Historical Approach" in Mallat, C., and Connors, J., 
Islamic Family Law (1990) p. 11 at 19-21 and Chaudry, Z., (1997) supra, note 58 above, p. 546 
449 See Anderson, J. N. D., "Modem Trends in Islam: Legal Reform and Modernisation in the Middle East" (1971) 20 
International and Comparative law Quarterly, p. 1 at 11. 
450 See e. g. Art. 139-179 of the Algerian Family Code (1988). See also Mahmood, T., (1995) supra, note 415 above. 
451 See Summary Record of the 680 Meeting of CRC: Saudi Arabia, UN Doc. CRC/C/SR. 688 of 24/01/2001, Par. 59. 
452 General Comment 28, Par. 26. 
188 
husband while the other three forms (khul , mubara'ah and faskh) are invocable by the wife. 
Unilateral Repudiation (taläq) is however the simplest method of marriage dissolution and 
can be legally exercised exclusively by the husband at his discretion for any or no reason at 
all. Thus, although it may be morally wrong or even sinful in some circumstances, a husband 
could legally divorce his wife by a simple statement such as "I divorce you". Conversely, 
the wife can dissolve the marriage through either a Discharge (khul ), Mutual Agreement 
(mubära `ah) with the husband's consent or through a Judicial Order (faskh) on grounds of 
certain legal circumstances only. According to Jeffery therefore, "The Qur'an grants man 
complete liberty of divorce and demands of him no justification for divorcing his wife. Thus 
he can divorce her at his own caprice, but no such facility exists for her. "4s3 While it may be a 
misconception to state that men have an exclusive right of marriage dissolution under Islamic 
law, it will also be misleading to contend that men and women have "equal" or the "same" 
rights of divorce under Islamic law. Men certainly have an advantage over women in the 
procedure of marriage dissolution. This is most probably connected to the fact that it is men 
who ordinarily propose marriages and pay the dowry and are also expected to be able to act 
more resolutely when difficulties arise in the marriage relationship. 
Although the Qur'anic verses permitting marriage dissolution begin and end with strong 
moral admonitions for husbands to safeguard their wives' welfare in the matter of divorce, 454 
and the Prophet Muhammad had also declared that "In the sight of God, divorce is the most 
hateful of all lawful things"455 
, 
yet the right of Unilateral Repudiation (taläq) had been 
abused by men from as far back as the second decade of Islam ash Furthermore, even though 
divorced women are free to remarry under Islamic law, men in many Muslim countries 
consider it as a taboo to marry divorced women. They are thus often subjected to misery and 
destitution. On the other hand even in the exercise of the right to Discharge (khul) by a wife, 
the husband may, in bad faith, also withhold consent and thus continue to punish the woman 
and keep her under retention. 57 Thus the woman will be left only with the alternative of 
seeking a Judicial Order of dissolution (faskh) which she may also not be able to obtain if her 
grounds of dissolution fall outside the traditional legal limits for granting such order. As 
observed by Coulson above458, this was certainly not the spirit by which Islamic law was 
ordained to be applied, rather it is the men who have often failed to meet the moral 
453 Jeffery, A., "The Family in Islam" in Anshen, R. N., (ed. ) The Family: Its Future and Destiny. (1949) p. 39 at 60. 
as° Q 2: 229-232. 
455 Reported By Abü Däwüd. See e. g. Karim, F., (1994) supra, note 197 above, Vol. 2, p. 688, Hadith No. 137. 
456 See `Abd al `Ati, H., (1977) supra, note 64 above, p. 220-221. 
457 It is however morally wrong and very sinful to do so in Islam. 
459 See note 424 above and text thereto. 
expectation of Islam with respect to piety and prudence in the exercise of their procedural 
advantage in marriage dissolution. It is evidenced that the abuse of this procedural advantage 
by men in marriage dissolution had in fact been a matter of concern as early as the seventh 
century during the rule of Umar ibn al-Khatäb, the Second Caliph, who legislated against its 
abuse by men. Ibn Taimiyyah also addressed it in the fourteenth century, 
459 and the problem 
persists in many Muslim societies today. There is reasonable ground therefore to argue for 
the need to combine the moral content with the procedural aspect of marriage dissolution in 
Islamic law. 
Some Muslim States already have sections in their Personal Status Laws that modify, in 
a variety of ways, the traditional rules of marriage dissolution under Islamic law. "' The most 
radical modifications prohibit the husband's right to divorce his wife extra judicially through 
Unilateral Repudiation (taläq). For example Article 30 of the Tunisian Code of Personal 
Status (1956) provides that "Divorce outside a court of law is without legal effect". 46' This 
was achieved by reference to the Qur'anic verse which provides that "If you fear a breach 
between the two of them (husband and wife), appoint two arbiters... it. 462 The Court is placed 
in the position of "two arbiters" to ensure a combination of the moral content and procedural 
aspect of the divorce and thus placing the couple on the same procedural footing in the 
dissolution of marriage. In other countries such as Morocco, Syria, Algeria and Iran, the 
court is empowered to order the husband to pay compensation to the wife where the 
Unilateral Repudiation (taläq) is for no just cause. 463 In Pakistan Unilateral Repudiation 
(taläq) by the husband will only be effective 90 days after it has been reported to an 
Arbitration Council, which tries to reunite the couple during the period. 464 
Considering the consensus of Muslim jurists that divorce is recommended only as a last 
resort when it has become clearly impossible for the couple to remain together, and the 
Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad that "In the sight of God, divorce is the most hateful of 
all lawful things"465, coupled with a finding that the procedural advantage enjoyed by men 
over women in the matter of divorce has often been misused, the control of marriage 
459 See e. g. `Abd at `Ati, 1977) supra, note 64 above p. 221 and Coulson, N. J., (1964) supra, p. 194-195. 
460 See Mahmood, T., (2" Ed. 1995) supra note 415 above. 
46' See also Art. 49 of the Algerian Family Code (1988). 
462 Q4: 35. This verse however mentions specifically that the arbiters shall be: "one from his (husband's) family and one 
from her (wife's) family) ". Here the State considered itself best to take over that role through its judiciary on grounds of 
public interest. 
4e3 Perhaps as a deterrent for unjustifiable use of the right of Unilateral Repudiation (taldq) by the man. See e. g. Art. 49 of 
Algerian Family Code (1988) and Art. 117 Syrian Code of Personal Status (1953) (As amended). See also Al-Zuhayli, W., 
(1997 )supra, note 77 above, Vol. 9, p. 7065-6. 
"' This is more like a supervisory role over the traditional waiting period under Islamic law after the taläq has been 
pronounced. See further Chapter 8 below. 
465 supra. 
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dissolution through judicial control by the State can be as well justified under the doctrine of 
public welfare (maslahah). 466 The doctrine of hisbah could also be relied upon here, so that 
the State would be seen as encouraging good and preventing evil by such judicial control 
whereby marriage dissolution is restricted to dissolution by Judicial Order to facilitate the 
amalgamation of both the moral and legal content of the rules of divorce. Since dissolution 
by Judicial Order (faskh) is a method sanctioned already by Islamic law, this will not amount 
to making any new law but the removal of a procedural advantage which has been generally 
subjected to abuse. However Khallaf considered such abrogation of men's right of Unilateral 
Repudiation and vesting dissolution of marriages entirely in the courts as dubious and non- 
genuine welfare (i. e. maslahah wahmiyyah). 467 One could disagree with this view of Khallaf, 
on grounds that the approach does not violate or come in conflict with any direct Qur'anic 
verse on Unilateral Repudiation (taläq). The approach is consistent with the Prophet's 
Tradition which states that: "There should be no harming nor should any harm be remedied 
with another harm". 468 It removes genuine hardship from women without placing any 
consequential hardship on men, since it does not totally block every avenue to divorce for 
men, but only ensures that they divorce for justifiable reasons. 
An alternative approach is through the exercise of the right of stipulation by women 
during the marriage contract. This is known in Islamic law as khiyär al-taläq meaning the 
option (of the wife) to divorce. Under traditional Islamic law, the wife has a right to stipulate 
during the marriage contract that the husband delegates to her, absolutely or conditionally, 
the right of Unilateral Repudiation whereby she will have a right to invoke it when absolutely 
necessary. This does not divest the husband of his own original right to divorce. Both he and 
the wife can then exercise the right unilaterally. 469 Fyzee has observed that: "This form of 
delegated divorce is perhaps the most potent weapon in the hands of a Muslim wife to obtain 
her freedom without the intervention of any court and is now beginning to be fairly common 
in India. s470 As stated in the case of polygyny above, the same approach could be adopted in 
the case of divorce whereby the State will make it mandatory under law that the wife shall be 
informed during the marriage contract, of this right to stipulate. Supplementary to that is the 
466 See e. g. the reported view of Sheikh al-Qaradawi by Heba Raouf Ezzat on the possibility of the control of the abuse of 
the power of divorce by men through the doctrine of maslahah, in Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, Islam and Justice 
(1997) p. 122-3. 
467 Khallaf, A. W., 'Jim Usülal-Figh (1398AH) p. 86. 
468 Reported By Ibn Mäjah. See e. g. Ibrahim, E., and Johnson-Davies, D., (Trans. ) Forty Hadith, An-Nawawi's (1985) 
pp. 106-107, Hadith 32. 
9 See e. g. Ibn kbidin, M. A., Radd al-Muhtär (Arabic) (1994) Vol. 2., p. 497. 
470 Fyzee, A. A. A., outlines of Muhammadan Law (1974) 4`h Ed. p. 159. This is still true today. See generally Carroll, L., 
and Kapoor, (1996) supra, note 421 above. 
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need to create awareness and educate women of this legal right under Islamic law. 471 There 
is nothing under the Shari `ah that prohibits the State from ensuring that women are 
adequately informed about their rights under the law, especially if it is for removing 
difficulties from them within society. In fact they have a right to be informed if they are so 
ignorant to know. 
Concluding Observation 
The above analysis reveal that the questions raised by gender equality and rights are not 
so simple to answer and that they do raise socio-legal justifications for some differences that 
may exist between Islamic law and international human rights law. The issues are of great 
socio-legal importance and a great demonstration of good faith is required in addressing them 
from both the Islamic law and international human rights perspectives. Only a superficial 
view of Islamic law or a very restrictive interpretation of its sources gives an impression of 
total deadlock between Islamic law and international human rights law on the issues of 
gender equality. But the differences are not trivial as well. There are certainly issues to be 
resolved but which may not be possible if addressed monologically from either the single 
perspective of secular international human rights jurisprudence or the single perspective of 
hard-line traditional Islamic jurisprudence. There is need for complementary understanding 
of the issues. Feminist human rights advocates need to appreciate the importance of the 
family institution to Islamic society and the importance of the female gender to its 
subsistence. The obvious question here may be, why must it be women that have to bear the 
brunt for the subsistence of the family institution. In redressing the disadvantages and 
inequalities that has existed against women, it is important not to swing from one extreme to 
another in a manner that may create a conflict of cultures or portray the arguments as an 
attack against Islamic institutions rather than against non justifiable discriminations. The 
socio-legal justifications of Muslim jurists in the instances where differences exist must be 
examined in good faith. Some of the arguments are certainly rebuttable. Many others are 
without consensus and not really absolute. A study of them from a combined pragmatic and 
transcendental perspective will certainly help to argue the unsustainable ones out. While it is 
true that the male gender enjoys some role-advantage under Islamic law in accordance with 
the structural roles within the Islamic family institution, such role-advantage is meant for the 
cohesion and success of the family. Conversely there are in-built rights within Islamic law 
471 See generally Carroll, L., and Kapoor, (1996) supra, note 421 above, See also Tanzilu-ur-Rahman, (1978) supra, note 
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that may be activated for the benefit of the female gender whenever there is apprehension of 
abuse of the role-advantage enjoyed by the male. The debilitating factor is that women are 
generally ignorant of their rights under Islamic law and men often callously abuse that 
ignorance. 
The Shari ah promotes the normative equality of both sexes and women have rights 
within Islamic law that have been suppressed over the centuries due to ignorance on their 
part and callousness on the parts of men in many Muslim countries. 472 However, in recent 
times due to the challenges of the international human rights movement women in many 
parts of the Muslim world are becoming more aware of their rights within the legal sources 
of Islamic law through education and enlightenment. It is important therefore to take both the 
Islamic law and international human rights law discourses seriously if the inequalities against 
women in Muslim States must be realistically redressed. It is believed that as more women 
become aware of Islamic legal sources that support their equal status they will not fail to 
utilise it to their advantage in order to activate their inherent rights within Islamic law. Where 
they do, the barriers of discrimination and inequality will definitely be broken. 
Protection of Children 
Article 23(4) of the ICCPR also provides that in case of dissolution of marriage, 
"provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children". Islamic law also fully 
recognises the need for the necessary protection of any children in case of marriage 
dissolution. Under the rules of hidänah (Child custody) in Islamic family law, there are 
elaborate rules for the protection of children in case of divorce, which essentially reflect 
consideration for the best interest of the child 473 
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
Article 24 
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of 
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and 
the State. 
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name. 
408 above Vol. ], pp. 339-352. 
472 See generally Bouthaina, S., "The Muted Voices of Women Interpreters" in Afkhami, M., (ed. ) Women's Human Rights 
in the Muslim World (1995) pp. 61-77. 
473 See e. g. Qadri, A. A., (1986) supra, note 22 above, pp. 406-409; and Doi, A. R., (1984) supra, note 82 above, p. 214. 
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3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. 
Despite that all the other provisions of the Covenant apply mutatis mutandis to children, 
Article 24 provides further for the special protection of children due to their vulnerability as 
minors. 74 Article 24(1) places the responsibility of protecting the child on family, society 
and State. As to how this obligation is to be fulfilled between family, society and State, the 
HRC Committee has observed that: 
"Responsibility for guaranteeing children the necessary protection lies with the 
family, society and the State. Although the Covenant does not indicate how such 
responsibility is to be apportioned, it is primarily incumbent on the family, which is 
interpreted broadly to include all persons composing it in the society of the State 
party concerned, and particularly on the parents, to create conditions to promote the 
harmonious development of the child's personality and his enjoyment of the rights 
recognized in the Covenant. However, since it is quite common for the father and 
mother to be gainfully employed outside the home, reports by States parties should 
indicate how society, social institutions and the State are discharging their 
responsibility to assist the family in ensuring the protection of the child. Moreover, in 
cases where the parents and the family seriously fail in their duties, ill-treat or neglect 
the child, the State should intervene to restrict parental authority and the child may be 
separated from his family when circumstances so require. If the marriage is 
dissolved, steps should be taken, keeping in view the paramount interest of the 
children, to give them necessary protection and, so far as is possible, to guarantee 
personal relations with both parents. The Committee considers it useful that reports 
by States parties should provide information on the special measures of protection 
adopted to protect children who are abandoned or deprived of their family 
environment in order to enable them to develop in conditions that most closely 
resemble those characterizing the family environment. 9A75 
Article 24 together with other provisions on children rights guarantees a secure 
foundation for the proper development of the child and in that regard the best interest of the 
a'6 
child is always paramount. 
Being religious based, Islamic law obviously also recognises the need for special 
protection of children due to their vulnerable nature. The Qur'an describes children as the 
"comfort of our eyes"477 and there are many verses of the Qur'an and Traditions of the 
Prophet that remind parents and society about their responsibility to children. Islam 
emphasises that children are born innocent and should therefore not be made part of the 
conflicts and viciousness of adult society. The right of the child to have a good name is 
474 See General Comment 17, Par. I. 
475 General Comment 17, Par. 6. 
476 See the Convention on the Rights of the Child(1989), 1577 UNTS 3; and generally Van Bueren, G., The International 
Law on the Rights of the Child (1995). See also Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000) supra, note 23 above, pp. 467-494. 
477 Q 25: 74. 
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specifically stated by Prophet Muhammad in one of his Traditions478 and this accommodates 
the right to be registered after birth. From the context of the Qur'an and the Prophet's 
Traditions, Omran has identified that children have at least "ten cardinal rights" under 
Islamic law, which he listed as: 
1. The right (of the child) to genetic purity. 
2. The right (of the child) to life. 
3. The right (of the child) to legitimacy and good name. 
4. The right (of the child) to breast-feeding, shelter, maintenance and support, 
including health care and nutrition. 
5. The right (of the child) to separate sleeping arrangements for children. 
6. The right (of the child) to future security. 
7. The right (of the child) to religious training and good upbringing. 
8. The right (of the child) to education, and training in sports and self-defence. 
9. The right (of the child) to equitable treatment regardless of gender or other 
factors. 
10. The right (of the child) that all funds used in their support come only from 
legitimate sources. 479 
Although all Muslim States have ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) many of them have however entered reservations on grounds of Islamic law or 
Many of the reservations are in respect of the issue of adoption. Instead of Shari'ah 480 481 
adoption, Islamic law provides for a guardianship system (kaf(ilah) to provide alternative 
family-care for children deprived of natural parental care. 482 Another area of possible conflict 
is the position of Islamic law on the status of children conceived out of wedlock, which has 
been raised by the HRC in its concluding observations on many Muslim States. 483 
Nevertheless, Muslim States generally believe that "the provisions set forth in (the 
Children's) Convention are in conformity with the teachings of Islamic law concerning the 
need to fully respect the human rights of the child". 
84 Thus Article 7 of the OIC Cairo 
Declaration provides that: 
478 See. Karim, F., (1994) supra, note 197 above, Vol. 2, p. 620, Hadith No. 379w. 
479 Omran, A. R., (1992) supra, note 140 above, p. 32. 
480 See UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: http: //www. unhchr. ch/htnil/menu3/b/treatyi5 asp. htm [17/2/2001]. 
481 See also Leblanc, L. J., "Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Macroscopic View of State 
Practice" (1996) 4 International Journal of Children's Rights 357-381. 
482 See e. g. The Initial Report of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the CRC, UN Doc CRC/C/Add. 2, (29/3/2000) Par. 60. 
Kafalah is recognised under Art. 20(3) and Art. 21 of the CRC, supra, note 476 above. 
483 This issue is addressed in the next chapter under Article 10(3) of the ICESCR, pp. 235-38 below. 
4'80 See Initial Report of Saudi Arabia to the CRC, supra note 482 above, Par. 27. See also the General Statement of the 
United Arab Emirates during the drafting of the CRC that: "The provisions of the draft Convention contradict neither the 
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(a) As of the moment of birth, every child has rights due from the parents, society 
and the state to be accorded proper nursing, education and material, hygienic and 
moral care. Both the fetus and the mother must be protected and accorded 
special care. 
(b) Parents and those in such like capacity have the right to choose the type of 
education they desire for their children provided they take into consideration the 
interest and future of the children in accordance with ethical values of the 
principles of Shari'ah. 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 
Article 25 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the restrictions 
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions; 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the 
will of the electors; 
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country. 
The only provisions of the ICCPR on political rights in the strict sense of the word are 
those contained in Article 25. The provisions reflect a democratic process that calls for the 
right and opportunity of every citizen to participate directly or indirectly in the conduct of 
public affairs of State. Thus autocratic regimes "which offer no opportunities for political 
participation by citizens" are incompatible with Article 25.485 The HRC has indicated that: 
"The conduct of public affairs, referred to in paragraph (a), is a broad concept which relates 
to the exercise of political power, in particular the exercise of legislative, executive and 
administrative powers. It covers all aspects of public administration, and the formulation and 
implementation of policy at international, national, regional and local levels. The allocation 
of powers and the means by which individual citizens exercise the right to participate in the 
conduct of public affairs protected by article 25 should be established by the constitution and 
other laws" 
486 It is important to note that the political rights, unlike the civil rights, do not 
apply to every individual but only to citizens of particular States. The Covenant does not 
prescribe the criteria for citizenship of State Parties but the HRC has indicated that "State 
principles of Islamic law nor the provisions of the Provisional constitution of the United Arab Emirates. " Detrick, S. (ed. )
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the "Travaux Preparatoires" (1992) 50. 
485 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, (2000) supra, note 23 above p. 498. See also Steiner, H., "Political Power as a Human Right" 
(1988) 1 Harvard Human Rights Yearbook, 77. 
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reports should outline the legal provisions which define citizenship in the context of the 
rights protected by Article 25", and that "(n)o distinctions are permitted between citizens in 
the enjoyment of these rights on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other statusi487 
The discussion of political principles is often very topical from an Islamic perspective. 
This is due to the fact that the Qur'an and Sunnah has not laid down any specific political 
ideology for the Islamic State. The Shari `ah only emphasises good governance based on 
justice, equity and responsibility but leaves its actual administration in the hands of the 
community. There is evidence within the Shari `ah however that the community has the right 
to elect its leaders either directly or indirectly. 488 The Qur'an states in many verses that 
sovereignty of the heavens and earth belongs to God489 but also mentions in other verses that 
God has made human beings agents and representatives on Earth. 49° Islamic scholars and 
jurists agree that this representative capacity of human beings is conferred upon all human 
beings alike. Based on these Qur'anic provisions and with reference to the practices of 
election of Caliphs after the demise of Prophet Muhammad, almost all contemporary Islamic 
legalists concur that every Muslim has the right and the opportunity to participate, either 
directly or indirectly in the public affairs and electoral processes of the State. For example 
Maududi, writing on the right of Muslims to participate in the public affairs of the Islamic 
State, stated as follows: 
"According to Islam, governments are representatives (khalifa) of the Creator of 
the universe: this responsibility is not entrusted to any individual or family or to any 
particular class or group of people, but to the entire Muslim community. The Holy 
Qur'an says: "God has promised to appoint those of you who believe and do good 
deeds as (His) representatives on earth" (24: 55). This clearly indicates that khildfa 
(representation) is a collective gift of God in which the right of every individual 
Muslim is neither more nor less than the right of any other person. 
The method recommended by the Holy Qur'an for running the affairs of the state 
is as follows: "And their business is (conducted) through consultation among 
themselves" (Q43: 38). According to this principle it is the right of every Muslim 
either to have a direct say in the affairs of the state or to have a representative chosen 
by him and other Muslims to participate in the running of the state. 
Under no circumstances does Islam permit an individual or a group or party of 
individuals to deprive the common Muslims of their rights or usurp powers of the 
state. Nor does Islam regard it as right and proper for an individual to put on a false 
show of setting up a legislative assembly and by means of such tactics as fraud, 
persecution, bribery and so on, get himself and men of his choice elected to the 
496 General Comment 25, Par. 5. 
487 General Comment 25, Par. 3. 
48$ See e. g. Zaidan, A. K., Individual and the State in Islamic Law (1982) ppl6-26. 
489 See e. g. Q3: 189- 
490 See e. g. Q 24: 55. 
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assembly. This is not only treachery against the people whose rights are illegally 
usurped, but also against the Creator who has entrusted Muslims to rule on earth on 
His behalf, and has prescribed the procedure of an assembly for exercising these 
powers. 
The shard or legislative assembly should embrace the following principles: 
1. The executive head of the government and the members of the assembly should 
be elected by free and independent choice of the people. 
2. The people and their representatives should have the right to criticize and freely 
express their opinions. 
3. The real conditions of the country should be brought before the people without 
suppression of fact so that they are in a position to judge whether the government 
is working properly or not. 
4. There should be adequate guarantee that only those people who have the support 
of the masses should rule over the country and those who fail to win this support 
should be removed from their position of authority. 9A91 
The Qur'anic principle of consultation (shürä) to which Maududi referred above, has 
been interpreted by most contemporary Islamic legalists to accommodate the process of 
democratic free and fair elections for the selection of leaders. In fact some Islamic scholars 
consider free and fair elections as the best way to reflect the principle of shürä, because this 
involves the participation of all citizens in selecting their ruler and giving him the contract to 
govern them known as bay `ah (allegiance) under Islamic law. 492 This clearly indicates that 
the democratic process of societal participation in governance and state affairs envisaged 
under Article 25 is compatible with Islamic principles of justice, equity and good 
governance. Thus Article 23(b) of the OIC Cairo Declaration provides that: 
"Everyone shall have the right to participate directly or indirectly in the 
administration of his country's public affairs. He shall also have the right to assume 
public office in accordance with the provisions of Shari'ah. " 
Two issues remain to be examined here. It is often assumed that the political rights of 
non-Muslims and women are totally constrained under Islamic law and thus inconsistent with 
the opening clause of Article 25 which provides that every citizen shall have the right and the 
opportunity to exercise the political rights "without any of the restrictions mentioned in 
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions". With respect to voting and taking part in the 
conduct of public affairs of the State, there is nothing under Islamic law that prohibits 
women or non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic State from voting and participating in the 
491 Maududi, A. A., (1993), supra, note 179 above, p. 33-34. 
492 See e. g. Hussein, G. M., "The Shura and Human Rights in Islamic Law", Paper delivered at the Cairo Conference on 
Democracy and the Rule of Law, (Dec. 7`h 
- 
9th 1997) p. 5-6; and also, Chaudhry, M. S., (1995) supra, note 82 above, pp. 56- 
60. 
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public affairs of the State. The contemporary problem with the status of non-Muslims under 
Islamic law is principally due to the traditional interpretation of Islam as both a religion and a 
nationality. Thus a Muslim subject was traditionally considered as possessing full religious 
and political nationality in the Islamic State while the non-Muslim subject was considered as 
possessing only the political nationality but not the religious nationality. 493 Doi has therefore 
pointed out that the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims was and remains merely 
that of political administration and not of human rights, and concluded that: "It is wrong 
presumption that since an Islamic State is based on a definite ideology, the State will 
annihilate the non-Islamic elements within its fold" 494 The lack of religious nationality by 
non-Muslims in the Islamic State only exempted them from both duties and rights that 
involved the religious aspects of the State and "not due to a tendency of imposing on them an 
inferior social position nor minimising the humane treatment they are entitled to. 495 The 
situation is comparable to the issue of citizenship and the prohibition of all forms of racial 
discrimination in international human rights law. Although the International Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 496 prohibits "any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has 
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life, " it exempted "distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or 
preferences made 
... 
between citizens and non-citizens. " 497 The distinction, that traditional 
Islamic law made between Muslims and non-Muslims in aspiring to leadership of the Islamic 
State was therefore in the nature of the distinction made between citizens and non-citizens in 
a secular State. al-Ghunaimi thus contended that: 
"The conditions of acquiring the nationality of a particular state is a matter of its own 
discretion. It is not to be construed as an indication of contempt of those who could 
not acquire the necessary qualifications. 
... 
Consequently, in a modern state, we 
often come across restrictions imposed on non-nationals, in one way or another, for a 
better organization of the society. This is likewise with the rights of the dhimmis in 
the Islamic state. "498 
Under traditional Islamic law, the theory was that of totality of religious citizenship 
whereby "as soon as a Muslim migrates from his non-Muslim home and comes to Islamic 
493 See generally al-Qardäwi, Y., Non Muslims in the Islamic Society, Hamad, K. M., and Shah, M. A., (Trans. ) (1985). 
494 Doi, A. R., (1984) supra, note 82 above, p. 427. 
495 See A1-Ghunaimi, M. T., The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach (1968) p. 189. 
496 660 UNTS 195. 
497 ibid. Art. 1(1)(2). 
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territory with the intention of residing there, he at once becomes a full-fledged Muslim 
citizen of the Muslim state; he has the same rights as the other Muslim citizens and the same 
obligations as they"499. However, all modern Muslim States of today seem to have departed 
from the traditional theory of totality of religious citizenship to the extent that a foreign 
Muslim does not today acquire citizenship of any modern Muslim State for merely being a 
Muslim. Citizenship is generally based on national and geographical grounds in the Muslim 
countries of today. Conversely, neither the religious nationality nor the political nationality is 
enough on its own for the enjoyment of certain political rights within many Muslim States 
today. Only through the combination of both religious and political nationality in an 
individual may he, for instance, have a right to the highest political office in many Muslim 
States of today. It is noteworthy that, all the Qur'anic verses on leadership and authority do 
not merely emphasise religiosity but equally emphasise righteousness to all and upholding 
justice for all. Thus while for ideological reasons the ideal is to have a Muslim as the Head of 
State in an Islamic State, there are otherwise many instances right from the time of Prophet 
Muhammad of non-Muslims being appointed to very important public offices. 500 
Next is the question of the political rights of women under Islamic law. The question 
whether Islamic law prohibits women from voting, having a say or participating in the public 
affairs of the State is often misrepresented by the practice in some Muslim States. At its 
ratification of CEDAW, Kuwait for instance entered a reservation "regarding article 7(a), 
inasmuch as the provision contained in that paragraph conflicts with the Kuwaiti Electoral 
Act, under which the right to be eligible for election and to vote is restricted to males". 501 
That reservation, as it clearly stated, is on grounds of Kuwaiti Electoral Act and not Islamic 
law. On the rights of women under the Shari `ah to vote and to participate in the shürä and 
generally in the public affairs of the State, Hussein has summarised the position as follows: 
"Nowhere in the Qur'an or Sunna does exist any verse or rule which prevents or can 
be construed to prevent women from participating in the Shura process. Women did 
do participate in the Shura and participated and continue to participate in the running 
of the affairs of various Islamic states through the holding of various governmental 
top positions and through the Shura process. 
Those who do not support women's participation in the Shura process and in 
running the affairs of the state base their views not on the principles and rules of the 
Islamic religion and the Islamic Shari 'a but on mere social concerns and fears which 
do not rest on any Islamic principle or rule. Of course, social concerns and fears do 
498 Al-Ghunaimi, (1968) supra, note 495 above, p. 189. 
499 Hamidullah, M., (7`h Revised Ed. 1977) supra, note 190 above, p. 110-111, Par. 199. 
S0° See e. g. Ramadan, S., Islamic Law, Its Scope and Equity, (1970) p. 144-145. See also al-Qardäwi, Y., (1985) supra, note 
493 above, pp. 12-14. 
sot See UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: http: //www. unhchr. chfhtmi/mcnu3/b/treaty9 asp. htm [17/2/2001]. 
200 
change from state to state, and from time to time within the same state. It should be 
stressed that most recent writers on the topic support the right of women to 
participate in the Shura process and in running the affairs of their own countries. It is 
therefore, an Islamic principle that women do indeed have the right to participate in 
the Shura process and in running the public and governmental affairs of their 
states. "502 
However with respect to the right of being elected to the highest public office, Islamic 
jurists differ on whether a woman can be elected to head an Islamic State. The differences of 
opinion arise from the interpretation of a Tradition in which it is reported that when the 
Prophet heard that the Persians had enthroned a daughter of the Chosroe as their Queen he 
said: "Any nation that leaves its affairs in the hands of a woman would not prosper". 503 
Although the wording of the Tradition does not specifically contain a prohibition on a 
woman being elected as a head or leader in an Islamic State, one school of thought construes 
from it such a prohibition on the argument that consideration of the nation's prosperity is an 
important determinant of who is elected to its leadership. Some scholars however considered 
it to be an isolated Tradition (ahäd) and some others have expressed doubts about its 
authenticity on the grounds, inter alia, that the Tradition was reported by Abü Bakratah 
during the "Battle of the Camel" in which Ai'shah, the widow of Prophet Muhammad led 
and commanded an army against Ali ibn Abi Tälib, the fourth Caliph. Usmani argues that 
despite its report on the said occasion many of the illustrious companions of the Prophet still 
participated in the battle under the leadership of Ai'shah without anyone disclaiming her 
leadership. He thus concluded that the Tradition did not connote a prohibition of the 
appointment of a woman as Head of State but it is generally advice indicating that it may not 
be advisable to appoint a woman as Head of State. 504 
On the basis of that Tradition, a petition was brought before the Federal Shariat Court of 
Pakistan in 1982 challenging the appointment of women judges as being violative of Islamic 
law. In his judgement, the Chief Judge of the Court, Aftab Hussain, CJ, extensively 
examined the different opinions of Islamic jurists on the Tradition. The learned judge cited a 
list of classical and contemporary Islamic legal works505 to establish that Imam Ibn Jarir al- 
Tabari, for instance, favoured the appointment of a woman both as a judge and as a Head of 
State and that a similar view was attributed to Imam Malik, which was favoured by the 
MälIki jurists as well. In dismissing the petition the learned judge observed, inter alia, that: 
5°2 Hussein, G. M., (1997) supra, note 492 above, at 5. 
503 Reported By al-Bukhäri. See e. g. Karim, F., (1994) supra, note 197 above, Vol. 2., p. 570, Hadith No. 7. $04 Usmani, U. A., Figh al-Qur'an, Vol. 111, pp. 286-287 and Usmani, U. A., I'1ä al-Sunan, Vol. 15, p. 28 cited in the judgement 
of Aftab Hussain, CJ, in Ansar Burney v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1983 Federal Shariat Court, 73 at 86. 
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"It is on account of this Hadis (Tradition) that in the 22 points of the Ulema (learned 
jurists) of Pakistan which were presented to the Government as necessary 
preliminaries to the framing of a Constitution, point No. 12 specifically said that the 
Head of the State will be a Muslim male. This point was re-examined during the 
course of campaigne (sic) for the Presidential Elections of 1964 in which Miss 
Fatima Jinnah was nominated by the opposition parties to fight the election to the 
office of the President of Pakistan against Field Martial (sic) Muhammad Ayub 
Khan. After a research the view as about a woman being qualified for the office of 
the Head of the State was changed on the basis of opinions of two of the most 
renowned Ulema of the 20th Century in Indo Pakistan, namely Maulana Ashraf Ali 
Thanvi and Allama Syed Sulaiman Nadvi. The Jamait-e-Islamia Pakistan endorsed 
this view after retracting its earlier stand on the matter which was reflected in the 
above-mentioned point No. 12. Maulana Maudoodi was severely criticised for this by 
Kalim Bahadur in his book "Jamait-i-Islami of Pakistan". But this criticism was not 
justified since it is duty of a Muslim to accept the truth and to change and retract his 
earlier view. In technical parlance this is known as the doctrine of (Raju' or 
retreat). "sob 
There is no verse of the Qur'an that specifically prohibits a woman from being elected to 
any public office under Islamic law. The wording of the Tradition itself leaves room for the 
different opinions that have been expressed by Islamic jurists concerning its interpretation. 
This provides flexibility on the matter as was demonstrated by the change of the initial view 
of the Pakistani religious scholars in 1964 as expressed in Justice Hussain's judgement 
above. 
The controversy surrounding the election of women to the highest political office of the 
State is not unique to Islam. The problem exists in almost all societies of today in different 
forms. The provisions of Article 25 however only demands that their right and opportunity to 
be elected be not denied, which the Tradition of the Prophet quoted above does not 
specifically deny as rightly opined by some of the Islamic jurists. 
THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW 
Article 26 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee 
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. 
505 e. g., Purr al-Muhtdr, Sharh al-Wagäyä, Fath al-Bär?, Hedaya, al-Muhalld and Ahkäm al-Sultiyyah. 
506 Ansar Burney v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1983 Federal Shariat Court, 73 at 85. 
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Reference has earlier been made to Article 26 together with Articles 2(1) and 3 on right 
to equality and non-discrimination. 507 Article 26 is more general and extends further than 
Articles 2(1) and 3. The HRC has observed that Article 26 is not limited to the rights 
provided under the Covenant but "prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any field 
regulated and protected by public authorities". 508 It prohibits discrimination in both the 
legislation and application of laws by State parties. Article 26 fortifies the right to 
recognition as a person before the law guaranteed under Article 16. While Article 16 
guarantees a standing in law for every individual, Article 26 goes further to guarantee an 
equal standing before the law for every individual. Judges and public administrators must 
thus apply the law without discrimination. 
The Committee has however observed also that "not every differentiation of treatment 
will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and 
objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant". 509 
The HRC has addressed the question of reasonable and objective differentiation on a case- 
by-case basis 
. 
510 The onus however lies on a State Party to prove the reasonableness and 
objectivity of any differentiation under the Covenant. 
A State Party may also need to take affirmative action to redress existing discrimination 
against some members of society. The HRC has observed in that regard that: 
"... the principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative 
action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate 
discrimination prohibited by the Covenant. For example, in a State where the general 
conditions of a certain part of the population prevent or impair their enjoyment of 
human rights, the State should take specific action to correct those conditions. Such 
action may involve granting for a time to the part of the population concerned certain 
preferential treatment in specific matters as compared with the rest of the population. 
However, as long as such action is needed to correct discrimination in fact, it is a 
case of legitimate differentiation under the Covenant". '" 
The general notion of equality and non-discrimination is also quite fundamental in 
Islamic law. The Shari'ah recognises that all human beings are created equal. The Prophet 
Muhammad had declared in his farewell sermon as follows: 
507 See p. 109 above. 
508 General Comment 18, Par. 12. See also Zwaan-de Vries 
. 
v. The Netherlands, and Broeks. v. The Netherlands, 
Communication No. 172/1984,42 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 139, U. N. Doc. A/42/40 (1987), Par. 12.3. 
509 General Comment 18, Par. 13. See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka in the ICJ South West Africa Cases 
(1966) ICJ Report ofJudgements p. 305 and McKean, W., Equality and Discrimination Under International Law (1983) 
260. 
1° See Joseph, Scultz and Castan (2000) supra, note 23 above, pp540-556. 
51 General Comment 18, Par. 10. See also Art. 2(2) of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1966), 660 UNTS 195. 
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"0 People! be aware: your God is One..., No Arab has any superiority over a non- 
Arab and no non-Arab any superiority over an Arab, and no white one has any 
superiority over a black one nor any black one over a white one, except on the basis 
of piety. The most honourable among you in the Sight of God is the most pious and 
righteous. " 
The Shari ` ah does accord additional honour (in the sight of God) to the most pious and 
righteous. As observed in Chapter 4, this is a special right conferred by God on those who 
worship Him. 512 This additional honour is "in the sight of God" because the determination of 
the "most pious and righteous" lies exclusively with Him. Article 19(a) of the OIC Cairo 
Declaration provides that "All individuals are equal before the law, without distinction 
between the ruler and the ruled". 
The right to equality before the law for every individual under Islamic law has been 
discussed extensively under the right to fair hearing and due process in Article 14 above. We 
have also examined the differences between Islamic law and international human rights law 
regarding equality and non-discrimination on grounds of sex and religion under other 
s'3 
relevant articles in this chapter. 
THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS OR LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 
Article 27 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their 
own language. 
Unfortunately there is today in every part of the world some minority group that is being 
denied some right for the mere fact of being in minority. While the general prohibition of 
distinction on grounds of race, religion, language and other status aims also at guaranteeing 
that individuals belonging to minority groups enjoy all the rights under the Covenant in the 
same manner as every other human being, Article 27 additionally guarantees the right of 
individuals belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture, 
profession and practice of their own religion and/or the use of their own language. 514 
Notwithstanding the vagueness and non-definition of the term "minority" in the Covenant, 
S12 See pp. 50 above. 
513 See e. g. pp. 172-93 above 
$14 For a full discussion on Article 27 see e. g. Sohn, L. B., The Rights of Minorities, in Henkin, L., (1981) supra, note 6 
above, pp. 270ff. 
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the provision in Article 27 reflects an appreciation of the diversity in human nature and 
culture, which must be respected. 
The HRC has observed that "this article establishes and recognizes a right which is 
conferred on individuals belonging to minority groups and which is distinct from, and 
additional to, all the other rights which, as individuals in common with everyone else, they 
are already entitled to enjoy under the Covenant", and that "the persons designed to be 
protected are those who belong to a group and who share in common a culture, religion 
and/or a language. " The Committee also pointed out that "the individuals designed to be 
protected need not be citizens of the State party". 515 
From an Islamic perspective, the Qur'an specifically recognises this diversity in human 
nature and culture and also prohibits the employment of this diversity as basis for 
discrimination amongst human beings. Rather human diversity is indicated as basis for 
identification and appreciation of the powers and divine wisdom of God, the Creator of 
humanity. 
In respect of ethnic differences the Qur'an states that: 
"0 Mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and female, and made 
you into nations and tribes that you may know each other (not that you may despise 
[or discriminate against] each other). The most honoured of you in the sight of God is 
he who is most righteous amongst you. And God has full knowledge and is well- 
acquainted with all things. "s'6 
In respect of religious differences the Qur'an states that: 
"Say: (0 Muhammad to the non-believers): "0 you that reject faith! I worship not 
that which you worship. Nor will you worship that which I worship. And I shall not 
worship that which you are worshipping. Nor will you worship that which I worship. 
To you be your religion, and to me my religion. "s" 
And in respect of linguistic differences the Qur'an states that: 
"And among His (God's) signs is the creation of the heavens and earth, and the 
difference of your language and colours. Verily in that are indeed signs for men of 
sound knowledgei51' 
Apart from the above verses that clearly point towards appreciation of differences 
among humans, there are also many Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad that enjoin the 
protection of the rights of minorities under Islamic law. 519 
sus General Comment 23, Par. I and 5.1. See further Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000) supra, note 23 above, pp. 572-595. 
516 Q49: 13. 
517 Q109: 1-6. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have endeavoured in this chapter to elaborately examine the substantive guarantees 
of the ICCPR in the light of Islamic law, and have shown that the Covenant is for the most 
part not inconsistent with Islamic law. The myth that the Shari 'ah is an antithesis to civil and 
political rights has been sustained for so long mainly due to the confrontational approach 
often adopted in comparisons between Islamic law and international human rights law. The 
investigative approach adopted here opens the door for a better understanding of the socio- 
legal problems and how to handle them in a manner that promotes the noble objective of 
enhancing human dignity and fostering an ideal human community, which are common 
objectives of both the Shari `ah and international human rights law. 
The analyses reveal that the Shari ah does not oppose or prohibit the guarantee of civil 
and political rights, liberal and democratic principles or the liberty and freedom of, 
individuals in relation to the State. The areas of conflict identified, particularly concerning 
the scope of equality of rights between men and women, prohibition of inhuman and 
degrading punishments, freedom of religion and some death penalty cases are also shown to 
be not insurmountable where addressed open-mindedly and in a well-informed manner. 
With a better understanding of the socio-legal problems as expounded herein, Islamic law, 
being the domestic law of many Muslim States, can serve as a vehicle for the full realisation 
of the civil and political rights guaranteed under the ICCPR with the result that Muslim 
States would not only consider themselves under international legal duty but also under a 
religious obligation to respect and ensure the civil and political rights guaranteed under the 
Covenant. 
The most practical approach, as will be fully argued in the concluding chapter of this 
thesis, is that the HRC should, in appreciation of the varied social values and ideological 
varieties of its Member States, adopt the margin of appreciation doctrine in its interpretation 
of the Covenant. The doctrine has been vindicated in practice within the European Human 
Rights regime. It will enable the Committee to maintain a reasonable universal standard of 
the rights guaranteed under the Covenant and at the same time respect reasonable and 
justifiable social and moral values of all its State Parties. Correlatively, Muslim States that 
apply Islamic law also have a duty to demonstrate the highest humanitarian and political will 
sis Q30: 22. 
519 See e. g. Ramadan, S., (1970) supra, note 500 above, pp. 146-148. See also Article 25 above for the discussion of the 
recognition of the political rights of non-Muslim minorities. The right to the enjoyment of cultural life under Islamic law is 
further addressed under Article 15 of the ICESCR in the next Chapter. 
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in respect of their obligations under the Covenant through a constructive interpretation and 
implementation of the Shari `ah. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in the Light of Islamic Law 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
As the ICCPR does for civil and political rights, so does the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) constitute the positive law on economic, 
social and cultural rights within the international human rights objective of the UN. It entered 
into force on 3 January 1976 and has up to date been ratified by 143 States, including 39 of 
the 56 Member States of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). 1 Of the six Muslim 
States selected for case study in this research, three (Iran, Tunisia and Sudan) have ratified 
the ICESCR while the other three (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey) have not. 2 
The UN Charter had provided the basic foundation for economic, social and cultural 
rights in its Article 55 which provided, inter alia, that the UN shall promote: 
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic 
and social progress and development 
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; 
and international cultural and educational co-operation. 
Articles 22-27 of the UDHR also followed with some general provisions on economic, 
social and cultural rights. The adoption of the ICESCR as part of the UN International Bill of 
Rights legally put to rest, at least for the States parties thereto, the old opposing argument 
that economic, social and cultural rights were not human rights per se. 
3 Although economic, 
social and cultural rights are still often termed "second generation" rights this does not 
suggest that they are in any way "second class" rights to the civil and political rights. Many 
human rights scholars argue strongly that economic, social and cultural rights are very 
' See the Status of Ratification of the ICESCR at the UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: 
ht! p: //www. unhchr. cbfhtmi/menti3/b/a cescr. htm [15/2/ 2001]. 
2 Turkey signed the ICESCR on 15 August 2000 but is yet to ratify it. 
3 e. g. See Arambulo, K., Strengthening the Supervision of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Theoretical and Procedural Aspects (1999) Especially Chapters III and IV, for an analyses of the arguments against 
and in support of the human rights character of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
208 
essential for the full realisation and. enjoyment of civil and political rights. In his State of 
Union address in 1944 the US President Roosevelt had observed that: 
"... true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and 
independence. `Necessitous men are not free men. ' People who are out of a job are 
the stuff of which dictatorships are made. "4 
Given the choice, most individuals in developing nations would practically choose a 
genuine guarantee of economic, social and cultural rights before thinking of civil and 
political rights. Shue thus considered economic, social and cultural rights as basic rights and 
argued that "(n)o one can fully, if at all, enjoy any right that is supposedly protected by 
society if he or she lacks the essentials for a reasonably healthy life. "5 Craven has submitted 
similarly that "freedom of expression, for example, has little importance to the starving or 
homeless. "6 Realistically, no human right or dignity can still be said to be inherent in a 
hungry, sick, homeless, jobless, illiterate, and impoverished human being, except perhaps 
only the right to the life that still flows in him, which under those circumstances can hardly 
be a life of dignity. The relevance and importance of the ICESCR in developing nations 
cannot therefore be over-emphasised. 
All the countries of the Muslim world today fall within the category of developing 
nations. The promotion of the ICESCR in the Muslim world is thus very important if the 
dignity of the individual must be enhanced and even if the civil and political rights must be 
ensured. 
Following the approach of the last chapter, this chapter will equally examine the 
ICESCR in the light of Islamic law. We will endeavour to determine whether the Sharjah 
contradicts the provisions of the ICESCR or whether it can serve as a vehicle for the full 
realisation of the rights recognised under the Covenant in Muslim States that apply Islamic 
law fully or as part of domestic law. Reference shall be made to the General Comments and 
practice of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) and 
to other scholarly expositions on the Covenant. The reporting guidelines formulated by the 
ESCR Committee will also be used as an interpretational guide for relevant Articles of the 
° See Eleventh Annual Message of Congress (Jan. 11 1944) in Israel. J., (ed) The State of the Union Messages of the 
Presidents (1966), Vol. 3, pp. 2875, and 2881. 
s Shue, H., Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence, and U. S. Foreign Policy (1979) p. 24-25. 
6 Craven, M. C. R., The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development 
(1995) p. 13. 
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Covenant. 7 We will analyse each of the substantive rights from an international law 
perspective followed by an Islamic law perspective as was done in the last chapter. Reference 
will also be made to the OIC Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam and reports of 
Muslim States parties to the Covenant where relevant. 
THE RIGHTS "RECOGNIZED" UNDER THE ICESCR 
Apart from the right of self-determination in Article 1 and the equality of rights between 
men and women in Article 3, the ICESCR "recognizes" nine substantive economic, social 
and cultural rights. They are: 
Article 6 The right to work. 
7 The right to enjoy just and favourable conditions of work. 
8 Trade Union rights. 
9 The right to social security and social insurance. 
10 Family rights. 
11 The right to adequate standard of living. 
12 The right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health. 
13-14 The right to education. 
15 The right to cultural life and benefits of scientific progress. ' 
The provisions in Article 1 on the right of self-determination and Article 3 on equality of 
rights between men and women are identical with that of the ICCPR already examined in the 
last chapter. 9 Those two articles will thus not be re-addressed in this chapter, rather their 
analysis in the last chapter will be applicable here mutatis mutandis. Again we will first 
identify the fundamental purpose of the ICESCR and also analyse the obligation of State 
Parties under Article 2 before proceeding to examine the substantive rights. 
7 See Revised General Guidelines Regarding The Form and Contents Of Reports To Be Submitted By States parties Under 
Articles 16 And 17 Of The International Covenant On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (Basic Reference Document) 
UN Doc E/C. 12/1991/1 of 17 June 1991 (Hereinafter referred to as Revised Guidelines). 
s All these rights are contained in Part III of the ICESCR. 
'See pp. 105 and 109 above. 
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THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE COVENANT 
The object and purpose of the ICESCR is similar to that of the ICCPR in the sense that it 
guarantees the recognised economic, social and cultural rights of the individual from the 
States parties to it. The preamble of the ICESCR refers to the fact that the rights recognised 
in it derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and that enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights will lead to the realisation of "the ideal of free human beings 
enjoying freedom from fear and want. "10 Economic, social and cultural rights deal essentially 
with subsistence and basic needs of human beings, thus the principal purpose of this group of 
rights is the realisation of an adequate and dignified standard of living for every human 
being. The purpose and ethical basis of the ICESCR are thus very laudable and 
commensurate with the overall objectives of the Shari `ah and the purpose of Islamic law. 
They are ideals which any Muslim State that purports to pursue the noble objectives of the 
Shari `ah has both a moral and legal obligation to uphold under its application of Islamic law. 
The Qur'an states that all the good things and rich resources of the universe are created for 
the basic needs of humanity" and it specifically alluded to the significance of freedom from 
hunger and from fear to human existence as follows: 
"(It is) He Who provided them with food against hunger, and with security against 
fear. " 12 
OBLIGATIONS OF STATES PARTIES UNDER THE ICESCR 
Article 2 
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights 
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind 
as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. 
3. Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may 
determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the 
present Covenant to non-nationals. 
10 See generally the Preamble of the ICESCR. 
II See e. g. Q2: 29 and Q31: 20. 
12 Q106: 4. 
211 
The description of the obligations of States parties to the ICESCR differs significantly 
from that of the ICCPR. The obligations of States Parties are recognised under the ICESCR 
as being subject to the availability of resources and require only the "progressive realisation" 
of the recognised rights. 13 This tends to remove the steam from the speedy realisation of the 
economic, social and cultural rights, especially in developing nations. The ESCR Committee 
has endeavoured through its General Comment 3 to impress the point that these differences 
must not be seen as watering down the obligations of States under the Covenant. 
14 It noted 
that "while the Covenant provides for progressive realization and acknowledges the 
constraints due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes various obligations which 
are of immediate effect". 
15 For example, the obligation to ensure the right of everyone to 
form and join a trade union (Article 8) is of immediate effect. The obligations of States 
under the Covenant are thus a combination of "obligations of conduct" and "obligations of 
result". 16 While the undertaking of State Parties "to take steps" under Article 2(1) to realise 
the rights protected in the Covenant is an "obligation of conduct" and has immediate 
application, the realization of the relevant rights, in most cases, is an "obligation of result" 
that may be achieved progressively. '7 The ESCR Committee has interpreted the obligations 
of States Parties under Article 2(1) by first stressing the "obligations of conduct" as follows: 
"... while the full realization of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, 
steps towards the goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the 
Covenant's entry into force for the States concerned. Such steps should be 
deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the 
obligations recognized in the Covenant. The means which should be used in order to 
satisfy the obligation to take steps are stated in article 2(1) to be "all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures". 'S 
The Committee then went on to explain the "obligation of results" and the progressive 
realisation of the rights as follows: 
"... the fact that realization over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen 
under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all 
meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the 
" See Steiner, H. J., and Alston, P., International Human Rights in Context: Law Politics Morals (2"d Ed. 2000) p. 246. 
14 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3; UN Doc. HRI\GEN\l\Rev. I at 45 (1994) in 
E/1991 /23. (The Committee's General Comments will hereinafter be referred to as General Comment followed by its 
number). All the Committee's General Comments are available Online at: http: //www. unhchr. ch/tbs/doc. nsf [18/2/2001]. 
IS General Comment 3, Par. 1. 
16 See e. g. Report of the International Law Commission (1977) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 20, Par. 8. 
See also Alston, P., and Quinn, G., "The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations under the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly, 156 at 165-166; and Craven, M. C. R., (1995) 
supra, note 6 above, pp. 107-109. 
17 See Alston, P., and Quinn, G., (1987), ibid. 
11 See General Comment 3, Par. 2 and 3. 
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realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the phrase 
must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the rasion d'^tre, of the 
Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the full 
realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, any 
deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful 
consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the 
rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum 
available resources. "9 
Although the Committee also confers upon itself "the ultimate determination as to 
whether all appropriate measures have been taken" in respect of the above obligations, 
20 
there is no doubt that in respect of both "obligations of conduct" and "obligations of result" 
much will still depend on the humane volition and good faith of the States Parties to take the 
appropriate steps towards the realisation of the economic, social and cultural rights. In 
appreciation of the onerous and resource-demanding nature of economic, social and cultural 
rights, Article 2(1) states the obligation of contracting parties to "take steps individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical" to 
realise the rights guaranteed. Developing nations would certainly favour the argument that 
this places some level of obligation on the international community, especially on the 
developed and wealthy nations to assist and co-operate with the poor and developing nations 
in the realisation of the economic, social and cultural rights 
. 
21 The ESCR Committee also 
seemed to have suggested this when it emphasised in its General Comment 3 that: 
"... in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, with 
well-established principles of international law, and with the provisions of the 
Covenant itself, international cooperation for development and thus for the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States. It is 
particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a position to assist others in 
this regard. The Committee notes in particular the importance of the Declaration on 
the Right to Development adopted by the'General Assembly in its resolution 41/128 
of 4 December 1986 and the need for States parties to take full account of all of the 
principles recognized therein. It emphasizes that, in the absence of an active 
programme of international assistance and cooperation on the part of all those 
States that are in a position to undertake one, the full realization of economic, social 
and cultural rights will remain an unfulfilled aspiration in many countries (emphasis 
added). 2 
19 ibid, Par. 9. 
2' ibid, Par. 4. 
21 See e. g. Chile's argument during the drafting of the Covenant that "international assistance to under-developed countries 
had in a sense become mandatory as a result of commitments assumed by States in the United Nations". E/CN. 4/SR. 1203, at 
342, Par. 10 (1962) cited in Craven, M. C. R., (1995), ibid., at 148. 
22 General Comment 3, Par. 14. See also the Committee's GC2 on International Technical Assistance Measures; UN Doc. 
I-IRI\GEN\11Rev. I at 45 in E/1990/23. 
213 
Developed nations do not however, seem to accept that they are under a legal obligation 
under the ICESCR to provide international assistance to developing nations or co-operate 
with them for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. In their view, while 
developing nations may seek the assistance or co-operation of developed nations, they can 
not claim it as a legal right in the strict sense of the word. They make reference, for example, 
to the wording of Article 11 of the ICESCR which, in recognising the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living, also recognises that international co-operation in that regard is 
"based on free consent" of States. 23 The full realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights in developing States tends therefore to depend on an ethical duty and the humane 
volition of developed States rather than any international legal obligation on their part. 
Ethical and religious values can therefore give the legal obligations under the Covenant a 
human face that will contribute to the effective realisation of those rights, especially in 
developing nations. 
From an Islamic legal perspective, the Shari 'ah places both a moral and legal obligation 
on the State to ensure the economic, social and cultural welfare of individuals. Limitation of 
resources should not be an excuse for the neglect of the welfare of the people by the State. 
Under Islamic law, the State must always sincerely strive to ensure the people's welfare 
within its available resources. The general Qur'anic principle here is for the wealthy State to 
provide according to its means and the poor State according to its means, 24 performed 
expeditiously, with prudence and the intention to do what is best. This is consistent with the 
principle of "minimum core obligation" established by the ESCR Committee, which is to the 
effect that: 
"... a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. 
Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is 
deprived of essential foodstuffs, or essential primary health care, of basic shelter and 
housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge 
its obligations under the Covenant. 1125 
There is nothing under the Shari 'ah that contradicts the above eagerness to oblige States 
parties to ensure the minimum possible enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights 
even in the face of resource constraints. As will become evident below, the sensitivity to the 
injunctions of the Shari `ah had spurred the early Caliphs to fulfil the economic, social and 
7' See Craven, M. C. R. (1995), supra, note 6 above, at 148-150. 
24 See e. g. Q 2: 236. 
" General Comment 3, Par. 10. 
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cultural rights of individuals in the early Islamic State even in very difficult periods of its 
history. Also, the notion of international assistance and co-operation under Article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR is equally tenable under the Qur'anic principle of co-operation for the realisation of 
human well being. 26 Islamic law thus generally accommodates the obligations undertaken by 
States Parties under Article 2 for the realisation of the rights recognised under the ICESCR. 
More so when the rights, as will become evident from their analyses below, are well 
substantiable within the provisions of the Shari `ah. The legislative obligation of State Parties 
reflected in Article 2(1) and the obligation of non-discrimination in Article 2(2) have already 
been addressed in the last chapter. 
THE RIGHT TO WORK 
Article 6 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes 
the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely 
chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right. 
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training 
programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural 
development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding 
fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual. 
Work is traditionally recognised as the legitimate means of earning a livelihood in every 
human society. Sieghart has thus rightly pointed out that work is "an essential part of the 
human condition. 27 It is through work that a dignified source of income is often guaranteed 
and the material well being of an individual and a harmonious development of his personality 
may be realised. The popular saying that "there is dignity in labour" substantiates the fact 
that the right to work is fundamental to the maintenance of the dignity of the individual. 
Article 6 therefore recognises the value of work as "an element integral to the maintenance of 
the dignity and self-respect of the individual". 28 
While the intendment of Article 6 may not be to guarantee full employment and total 
elimination of unemployment (as States may argue), it places an obligation on the States 
parties to at least provide the opportunity of work for everyone who wants to work and 
26 See Q 5: 2. 
27 Sieghart, P., The Lawful Rights of Mankind: An Introduction to the International Legal Code of Human Rights (1986) 
123. 
Craven, M. C. R., (1995) supra, note 6 above, at 194. 
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narrow the channels of unemployment. 29 Also, while the right to work under Article 6(1) 
may be subject to progressive realisation, as is the case with most of the rights recognised 
under the ICESCR, Article 6(2), as read with Article 2(1), provides that certain steps must 
be taken by the States Parties to achieve the full realisation of the right. Such steps, which 
include "technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques 
to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive 
employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to 
the individual", are very demanding for many developing nations and are obligations of 
result that may take some time to be achieved, depending on available resources. 
The wording of Article 6(1) indicates that the recognition of the right to work includes 
freedom of choice of employment by everyone. This excludes forced labour or forced 
employment upon any individual. 30 Article 6 would however not accommodate a choice by 
an individual of "work" or "trade" legally prohibited by the State. Drzewicki has also pointed 
out that the freedom of choice in the right to work may be limited by "provisions designed to 
prevent vulnerable persons, such as women, children and young persons, from working in 
certain conditions. "31 Conversely, Articles 2(2) and Article 3 of the ICESCR would prohibit 
any discriminatory legislation or practice that inhibits certain groups such as women, the 
elderly or the disabled from employment. 32 Other aspects of this right include right not to be 
arbitrarily dismissed from work. 
33 
The right to work and dignity of labour is fully recognised under Islamic law. This is 
evidenced by many verses of the Qur'an and by the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad that 
extol the value of labour and work. 
34 For example the Qur'an states categorically that God 
has ordained the daytime for seeking sustenance (through work) by humans, 35 and has also 
29 See Art. 23(1) of the UDHR which provides that "Everyone has the right to work 
... 
and protection against 
unemployment". 
30 Art. 8(3)(a) of the ICCPR provides that "No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour". See also Art. 
I of the ILO Abolition of Forced Labour Convention No. 105 of 1957. See ILO Treaty Website at: 
http: //ilolex. ilo. ch: 1567/public/english/docs/convdisn. htm [18/2/2001]. 
31 e. g. ILO Convention No. 45 prohibiting underground work for women and ILO Conventions Nos 5,10,33,59,60,123 
concerning minimum age for admission to employment. See Drzewicki, K., "The Right to Work and Rights in Work", in 
Eide, A., Krause, C., and Rosas, A., (ed. ) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (1995) p. 169 at179. 
32 For example, agitation about the discriminatory effects of the ILO Convention No. 89 of 1948, which excluded women 
from night work, led the ILO to adopt a Protocol in 1990 amending the earlier provisions of Convention No. 89. See 
Drzewicki, K., (1995) ibid. 
33 See generally Craven, M. C. R., (1995) supra, note 6 above, pp. 194-225 for a detailed discussion of the right to work in the 
context of the ICESCR. 34 See e. g. al-Ghazäli, M., Huqüq al-Insän Bayn T'älIm al-Islam Wa I'Idn al-Umam al-Mutahidah (Arabic)(I 993) pp. 177- 
203; Al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 34 above, Vol. 7, pp. 4986-4989 and Uthman, M. F., Huquq al-Insän Bayn al- 
Shar? 'ah al-Islämiyyah Wa al-Fikr al-Qänüniy al-Garbiyy (Arabic) (1982) pp. 151-155; where the authors discuss many 
Qur'anic verses and Prophetic Traditions on dignity of labour and work in Islamic law. 
31 See Q 78: 11. 
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made trading lawful. 36 The Prophet himself set many examples on the dignity of labour both 
in deeds and words. In one Tradition he is reported to have said: "There is no better way of 
sustenance than through the labour of one's own hands, because even the Prophet David used 
to feed from the labour of his own hands. "37 And in answer to a question put to him as to 
which was the best means of sustenance the Prophet gave a similar answer that: "... the best 
means of sustenance is through the labour of your own hands or through lawful trade. , 38 He 
also stated in another Tradition that it is better and dignifying for an individual to earn a 
living by cutting and selling fire-wood than through begging. 39 The Prophet himself is 
recorded to have worked for his livelihood. 
It is clear from the above Traditions that Islam discourages begging and dependence 
upon others but rather encourages labour and working for one's sustenance. The State 
therefore has a duty under Islamic law to respect the right of every individual to work, and in 
fact encourage them to do so. The duty of the State to recognise the right to work and to take 
steps to ensure the provision of opportunity for work and the protection of individuals from 
unemployment is often inferred by Muslim scholars from a precedent laid by Prophet 
Muhammad when a man came to him begging for alms. The Prophet asked the man to bring 
two items from his house, which he sold for two silver coins. He then gave the coins to the 
rnan instructing him to feed his family with one of the coins and to buy an axe with the other 
coin. The Prophet fixed a handle to the axe and gave it to the man saying: "Go, cut wood and 
sell it, and do not come back to me for fifteen days. " The man did as he was told and 
returned thereafter to the Prophet having earned up to ten silver coins from few days' work, 
and was able to fulfil his needs conveniently from his own labour. The Prophet then advised 
him that this was better and more dignifying for him than begging. Based on this precedent 
of the Prophet of Islam, as an embodiment of the State during his time, Chaudhry concluded 
that the "Islamic State is, thus, responsible to provide employment to its citizens if they have 
no employment or occupation to earn their livelihood". 
40 Al-Zuhayli reached the same 
conclusion by reference both to this Tradition] and also'through another Tradition in which 
36 See Q 2: 275. 
37 Reported by al-Bukhäri, See e. g. Karim, F., Al-Hadis, An English Translation and Commentary of Mishkat-ul-Masabih 
With Arabic Text, 3rd Ed. (1994) Vol. 1, p. 403, Hadith No. 109. 
;$ Reported by Ahmad, See Karim, F., ibid, p. 406, Hadith No. 131w. 
39 Reported by al-Bukhäri, See e. g. Karim, F., (1994) ibid, Hadith No. 108. 
40 Chaudhry, M. S., Islam's Charter of Fundamental Rights and Civil Liberties (1995) 41. See also Uthmän, F., (1982) 
supra, note 34 above, p. 153. and Karim, F., supra, note 37 above, p. 401, Hadith No. 107. 
41 See Al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 34 above, Vol. 7 p. 5010. 
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the Prophet stated that the ruler (i. e. State) is like a shepherd over the people and is thus 
responsible for the affairs of the people. 2 
Scholars also argue from the facts of the above precedent of the Prophet that there is a 
corresponding duty to work on every individual who has the capacity to do so under Islamic 
law. As is the case under Article 6 of the ICESCR this corresponding duty to work would not 
accommodate forced labour, the prohibition of which is evidenced by the verse of the Qur'an 
that says: "God does not burden a person beyond his scope... "43 Tabandeh has also cited a 
precedent of the fourth Caliph, Ali ibn Abi Tälib to show that forced labour has no place 
under Islamic law. One of the governors under the Caliph was reported to have requested the 
Caliph's permission to force people to work for the repair of a canal to improve the flow of 
water in the province for agricultural purposes. The Caliph was reported to have replied: "I 
would never compel a single person to do any work he has not a mind to do. If the stream 
and its canal are in the condition you describe, invite the people to do the work needed 
voluntarily, and give them every encouragement, promising that the water of the stream shall 
afterwards be the property of anyone who worked on it, but that such people as did not work 
shall have neither lot nor portion in its water. "44 
Under Islamic law, the rights of the individual to do any work which he freely chooses 
and accepts will not include the right to choose any "work" prohibited by the Shari `ah such 
as prostitution, gambling, usury and alcohol business. These are all prohibited "work" under 
Islamic law and are considered as detrimental to both the ultimate well being of the 
individual and that of society at large. It is on that basis for example, that Article 14 of the 
OIC Cairo Declaration while providing that "Everyone shall have the right to legitimate 
gains without monopolization, deceit or harm to oneself or to others", added also that "Usury 
(riba) is absolutely prohibited". As earlier argued above, Article 6 of the ICESCR does not 
seem to restrain a State from prohibiting certain types of work considered to be against 
public interest as long as such prohibition is not discriminatory and does not inhibit certain 
groups from legitimate work. 
Regarding non-discrimination in the right to work, the right of women under Islamic law 
to freely choose or accept work of their own choice becomes relevant. For instance, the 
ESCR Committee expressed concern in its concluding observations on the initial report of 
42 See ibid, p. 4989. The Tradition in reference here is further discussed more elaborately below under the right to social 
security, p. 229 below. 
43 Q 2: 286. 
44 Tabandeh, S., A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1970) 77. See also Chapter 4, pp. 
59-61 and 142-143 above on the prohibition of slavery. 
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the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1993 at the prohibition of women from magisterial 
appointments in Iran 
. 
45 The 2000 report of the Special Representative on the situation of 
human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran also questioned the requirement in the Iranian 
Civil Code for "women to obtain the permission of their husbands to take jobs. "46. The report 
however acknowledged that "the provision is widely disregarded and can... be circumscribed 
by a suitable provision in a marriage contract". The Representative of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran had in his answer to questions on the issue at the 8th Session of the ESCR Committee 
stated that the situation was being corrected and "a text had been submitted to the 
Government" in that regard. 47 
Under traditional Islamic jurisprudence, jurists hold different opinions on the question of 
appointing women as judges. While a majority of the traditional jurists excluded women 
from the bench, Imam Abü Hanifah, held the view that a woman can be appointed as a judge 
in civil matters. Other jurists like Ibn Jar1r al-Tabari and Ibn Hazm however held the view 
that a woman can be appointed as a judge in all cases as her male counterpart. al-Tabarl's 
argument was that since a woman could be appointed as a jurisconsult (mufti) then she can 
equally be appointed as a judge. We have earlier pointed out in the last chapter that there is 
neither a verse of the Qur'an nor a Tradition of the Prophet that specifically prohibits the 
appointment of women as judges. On that basis, the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan when 
faced with this question in the case of Ansar Burney v Federation of Pakistan48 in 1982, held 
that women could be appointed as judges under Islamic law. The court preferred the views of 
al-Tabari and Ibn Hazm to that of other jurists who exclude women from being appointed as 
judges. 
Generally, one finds nothing within the Qur'an and Sunnah that specifically excludes 
women from doing any work of their choice provided they possess the required skills and 
expertise and are not exposed to any hazards therefrom. As stated in the last chapter, 49 the 
Shari `ah recognises the independence of women within basic moral and ethical rules that 
equally apply to men. Most contemporary Muslim scholars support the view that women 
may not be legally discriminated against in the right to work and choice of profession. For 
instance, Hamidullah has observed that: 
45 See Concluding Observations on Islamic Republic of Iran, (1993), UN. Doc. E/C. 12/1993/7. Par. 6. 
°b UN Doc. E/CN. 4/2000/35 of 18`" January 2000, Par. 22. 
" See Summary Record of 8`h Meeting: Iran (Islamic Republic of) E/C. I2/I993/SR. 8 of 20/12/93 Par. 36 and 40. See further 
Chapter 8 below. 
48 (1983) 65 PLD (FSC) 73. 
49 See pp. 115-6 above. 
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"In every epoch of Islamic history, including the time of the Prophet, one sees 
Muslim women engaged in every profession that suited them. They worked as 
nurses, teachers, and even as combatants by the side of men when necessary, in 
addition to being singers, hair-dressers, cooks, etc. Caliph `Umar employed a lady, 
Shifa' bint `Abdullah as inspector in the market at the capital (Madinah) as Ibn Hajar 
(Isabah) records. The same lady had taught Hafsah, wife of the Prophet, how to 
write and read. The jurists admit the possibility of women being appointed as judges 
of tribunals, and there are several examples of the kind. In brief, far from becoming 
a parasite, a woman could collaborate with men, in Muslim society, to earn her 
so livelihood and to develop her talents" 
Similarly Abdulati, has also stated that: 
"Historical records, show that women participated in public life with the early 
Muslims, especially in times of emergencies. Women used to accompany the 
Muslim armies engaged in battles to nurse the wounded, prepare supplies, serve the 
warrior, and so on. They were not shut behind iron bars or considered worthless 
creatures and deprived of souls. Islam grants woman equal rights to contract, to 
enterprise, to earn and possess independently. s51 
Badawi, while also subscribing to the legal view that there is no decree in Islam which 
forbids women from seeking employment, added that: 
"with regard to the woman's right to seek employment it should be stated first that 
Islam regards her role in society as a mother and a wife as the most sacred and 
essential one. Neither maids nor baby-sitters can possibly take the mother's place as 
the educator of an upright, complex free, and carefully-reared children (sic). Such a 
noble and vital role, which largely shapes the future of nations, cannot be regarded as 
"idleness". s52 
Badawi's observation above expresses a moral consideration upon which Muslim 
scholars discourage women from choosing any work capable of preventing them from 
fulfilling their important role as mothers and wives. Reciprocally, the man is also prevented 
from choosing any work capable of preventing him from fulfilling his role as a father or 
husband. It is upon the same basis that both spouses may confer not only on choice of work 
but on all aspects of the family relationship. Ideally it is not a question of consent or 
permission but mutual agreement between the couple in the best interest of the family. In a 
strict Islamic legal sense, the right to work and to freely choose or accept work of one's 
choice is very much sustainable within the provisions of the Shari `ah and general principles 
5' Hamidullah, M., Introduction to Islam (1982)p. 139. 
51 Abdulati, H., Islam in Focus (1997) 364-5; See also generally Badawi, J., "The Status of Woman In Islam" (1971) 8 Al- 
Ittihad, No. 2, September, p. 33. 
52 Badawi, J. A., ibid. 
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of Islamic law, and is applicable both to the male and female gender without discrimination. 
Article 12 of the OIC Cairo Declaration thus provides that: 
"Work is a right guaranteed by the State and society for each person able to work. 
Everyone shall be free to choose the work that suits him best and which serves his 
interests and those of society. The employee shall have the right to safety and 
security as well as to all other social guarantees. He may neither be assigned work 
beyond his capacity nor be subjected to compulsion or exploited or harmed in any 
way.,, 53 
In that regard most Muslim States need to redress the misconception about the right of 
women to work and also ensure their safety and security in that respect both in the private 
and public sectors of society. 
THE RIGHT TO JUST AND FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK 
Article 7 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: 
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: 
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without 
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not 
inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; 
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of 
the present Covenant; 
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions; 
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate 
higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence; 
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, 
as well as remuneration for public holidays 
If the individual is not to be exploited in the enjoyment of his right to work, and if work 
is to fulfil its role as a crucial source of income upon which the material well being and the 
harmonious development of the individual's personality depends, then the right to work must 
be enjoyable under some minimum favourable and just conditions. As stated earlier, labour is 
not to be considered merely as a commodity but must be linked with human dignity. Thus 
while Article 6 provides for the right to work, Articles 7 and 8 provide for rights in work. " 
53 Note that the pronouns "he", "his" and "him" are generically used for both male and female throughout the Declaration. 
Sd See e. g. Craven, M. C. R., (1995) supra, note 6 above, pp. 226-247 for elaborate analysis of these provisions. 
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The reporting guidelines formulated by the ESCR Committee in respect of Article 7 
make reference to some Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). 55 That 
is because the precedent of recognising the right to just and favourable conditions of work 
had been laid earlier by the ILO through the adoption of many Conventions and 
Recommendations such as: Hours of Work (Industry) Convention (No-1) of 1919; Weekly 
Rest (Industry) Convention (No. 14) of 1921; Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention 
(No. 26) of 1928 and (No. 131) of 1970; Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention 
(No. 106) of 1957; Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100) of 1951; Safety Provisions 
(Building) Convention of 1937; Holidays With Pay Convention (No. 52) of 1936 and 
(No. 132) of 1970.56 This early formal recognition of rights in work by the ILO arose from 
revolutionary unrest that swept across Europe after the First World War and the appreciation 
of the "interdependence between labour conditions, social justice and universal peace. s57 By 
the establishment of these rights in work as full-fledged human rights, the individual worker 
is depicted as a subject and not an object of labour under the Covenant. As clearly stated 
under the provision of Article 7, the rights in work mainly aims at ensuring fair wages, 
decent living, safety at work, equal treatment and adequate rest and leisure for every worker, 
which all contribute to enhance the dignity of the working human being. 
Although the right to just and favourable conditions of work has not been specifically 
codified and itemised as such under traditional Islamic law, it is very much sustainable and 
recognised within the provisions of the Shari `ah. The Shari `ah injunctions on non- 
exploitation, equity, humane treatment of peers and underlings e. t. c., provide the basis in 
Islamic law for, in the words of Qadri, "social controls and administrative techniques for the 
general welfare, social security, wages of labour and hours of work together with the rules on 
the relations of the employees and the employers". 58 For example the Qur'an provides that: 
"Woe to those who give less in measure and weight. Those who, when they receive 
from Men demand full measure; But when they have to give by measure or weight, 
give less than due. s59 
55 See Revised Guidelines, supra, note 7 above, Art. 7(1). 
56 Many of the modem Muslim States have ratified these and other ILO Conventions. Of the 6 countries used for case 
studies in this research, only Iran has not yet ratified any of the ILO Conventions cited as example here. See the ILO Treaty 
Website for these and similar Conventions and their status of ratification at: 
http: //ilolex. ilo. ch: 1567/public/english/docs/convdisp. htm [visited 18/2/2001]. 
57 Drzewicki, K., (1995) supra, note 31 above, p. 169. For e. g. the 2"d preambular paragraph of the ILO Constitution 
recognised the capability of "conditions of labour involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of 
people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the word are imperilled. " See ILO Treaty Website: 
httn"! /www ilo. ore/public/enelish/about/iloconst. htm for the ILO Constitution [18/2/2001]. 
51 Qadri, A. A., Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World (1986) p. 306. 
59Q 83: 1-3. 
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"... Give just measure and weight, and do not withhold from people things that are 
their due and do not do mischief on earth after its perfection, that is best for you if 
"bo you had faith. 
The above verses serve as basis for fair trade, fair and equitable wages for workers as 
well as equal remuneration for work of equal value under Islamic law. The injunctions here 
are for equity and fairness in labour transactions generally. There are also many Prophetic 
Traditions that specifically encourage equity and fairness in wages of workers. In one 
Tradition the Prophet is reported to have enjoined that: "When anyone of you hires a worker 
he should inform him of his wages" 61, and in another he enjoined that the employee should 
be paid his or her wages before the sweat of his labour dries out. 62 The Prophet also warned 
that in the hereafter God would be displeased with an employer who engaged an employee 
and enjoyed his full labour but failed to pay him his fair wages. 63 Another Tradition which 
says: "Good treatment of persons under one's control brings fortunes while their bad 
treatment brings misfortune"64 reflects the wisdom that ensuring just and favourable 
conditions of work increases the well being of workers which in return improves productivity 
and brings fortunes to the employer and society at large. The Prophet thus generally enjoined 
the good and humane treatment of servants, employees and workers. Correlative to the right 
of the worker to a fair wage and favourable working conditions is his duty to also discharge 
his contract properly and justly. The Qur'anic rule in employer/employee and human 
relationships generally is that "Deal not unjustly and you shall not be dealt with unjustly". 65 
The Prophet is also reported to have stated that: "God loves to see that when someone does 
some work he does it perfectly". 
66 From the above provisions and principles, Weeramantry 
has correctly identified that under Islamic law "work (is) looked upon more as a partnership 
between employer and employee than as a relationship of superiority and subordination" and 
that the "right to a fair wage and of the employer's obligation to implement the contract 
justly are deeply ingrained in Islamic doctrine. , 67 
The recognition of rest and leisure in relation to work under Islamic law is evidenced in 
the Quranic verses which states that "We have made your sleep for rest 
... 
And made the day 
60 Q 7: 85. 
Reported by al-Bayhagi, See al-Shawkäni, M., Nay! al-Awtär (Arabic) (n. d. )Vol. 5-6, p. 292-3. 
62 Reported by Ibn Majah, See e. g. Karim, F., (1994) supra, note 37 above, Vol. 2, p. 301, Hadith No. 6. 
63 Reported by al-Bukhäri, See e. g Karim, F., (1994) ibid, p. 299, Hadith No. 3. 
" Reported by AbO Däwud, See e. g. Karim, F., ibid, Vol 1, p. 228, Hadith No. 96. 
6s Q2: 279- 
66 Reported By al-Bayhägi. See e. g. AI-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 34 above, Vol. 7., p. 5011. 
67 Weeramantry, C. G., Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (1988) pp. 63 and 64. 
223 
as a means of (seeking) subsistence". 68 Over-working without rest and lack of leisure 
certainly results in stress and weakness, which is detrimental to workers. This is prohibited 
within the provision of the Qur'anic verse which says: "... let there be transactions (between 
you) by mutual good will, and do not kill (or destroy) yourselves.. 
.,, 
69 The Prophet had also 
admonished that the human body has a right of rest and leisure that must be respected. 70 
Tabandeh has, in that regard, referred to an Islamic Tradition which recommends the division 
of the 24 hours of a day into three periods "viz: 8 hours for work; 8 hours for worship, food 
and recreation; 8 hours for sleep and repose" as a demonstration of Islam's recognition of the 
right to rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours. 71 
Islamic law thus fully recognises and strongly encourages the right of everyone to enjoy 
just and favourable conditions of work as provided under Article 7 without discrimination of 
any kind. This is acknowledged in Article 13 of the OIC Cairo Declaration that: 
"... The employee shall have the right to safety and security as well as to all other 
social guarantees. He may neither be assigned work beyond his capacity nor be 
subjected to compulsion or exploited or harmed in any way. He shall be entitled 
- 
without any discrimination between males and females 
- 
to fair wages for his work 
without delay, as well as to the holidays allowances and promotions which he 
deserves. For his part, he shall be required to be dedicated and meticulous in his 
work. " 
The provisions on the rights and duties of the employee apply to both the private and 
public sectors of labour. Based on the Tradition in which the Prophet described the ruler (i. e. 
the State) as being the "shepherd" that is responsible for the affairs of the "flock" (i. e. the 
people), the State has the duty under Islamic law to ensure that the right of everyone to enjoy 
just and favourable conditions of work are ensured both in the private and public sectors of 
labour. The State may enact legislation and create institutions through which the rights of 
workers can be ensured. For example, the public institution called al-hisbah is an important 
organ in Islamic law under which the muhtasib (i. e. officer for public order) is conferred with 
a broad jurisdiction to, inter alia, monitor and control trade and labour standards, investigate 
trade and labour disputes and generally ensure fair practices in trade, the welfare and rights 
of consumers and labourers under Islamic law. 
72 This strongly complements the obligation of 
6S Q 78: 9-11. 
69 Q 4: 29. 
70 Reported By a]-Bukhari and Muslim, See Karim, F., (1994) supra, note 37 above, Vol. ], p. 431-432, Hadith No. 146. 
71 See Tabandeh, S., A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1970) p. 78. 
72 See e. g. al-Mäwardi, A., al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah, The Laws of Islamic Governance, Trans. Yate, A., (1996) p. 33711. 
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Muslim States under the Covenant to ensure that the rights of employees are fully guaranteed 
both in the private and public sector. 
TRADE UNION RIGHTS 
Article 8 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: 
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, 
subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection 
of his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this 
right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others; 
(b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the 
right of the latter to form or join international trade-union organizations; 
(c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; 
(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the 
particular country. 
2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these 
rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the 
State. 
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour 
Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the 
law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention. 
The recognition of the right of all workers to just and favourable conditions of work 
under Article 7 does not often come easy and must sometimes be negotiated and pressed for 
collectively. Sieghart has observed that although "work continues to be an essential part of 
the human condition" it also "continues to be one of the most persistent occasions for the 
exploitation of human beings by their own kind. "73 Trade unions are thus essentially meant 
for the promotion and protection of the economic and social interests of workers. During the 
drafting of the Covenant, the Lebanese and Pakistani representatives emphasised that trade 
union rights were a "necessary instrument for implementing economic, social and cultural 
rights" and "satisfactory working conditions in particular". 74 It is important to note that the 
13 Sieghart, P., (1986) supra, note 27 above. 
74 See Malik (Lebanon) E/CN. 4/SR. 298, at 8 (1952); and Chaudhury (Pakistan), A/C. 3/SR. 719 at 199, par. 19 (1956) cited 
in Craven, M. C. R., (1995) supra, note 6 above, p. 250. 
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States Parties do not merely recognise the right to form and join trade unions but undertake 
in Article 8 to ensure this right. The obligation here is therefore seen to require positive 
action, is immediate and not progressive. 75 The ESCR Committee has observed that this 
Article was capable of immediate application and that any suggestion to the contrary would 
be difficult to sustain. 76 
While, like the general right to freedom of association guaranteed under Article 22 of 
the ICCPR, everyone is free under Article 8 of the ICESCR "to form trade unions and join 
the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned", the 
inclusion that trade unions are "for the promotion and protection of (workers) economic and 
social interests" tends to restrict trade unions from being used as political instruments. 77 
Article 8(2) also allows the State to impose lawful restrictions on the trade union rights of 
members of the armed forces, the police and members of the administration of State. 
There are no direct provisions on trade unionism within the Shari `ah. The Qur'an 
however enjoins co-operation (ta `äwun) 
- 
and thus organisation 
- 
for good purposes (al-birr) 
and common causes. 78 There is also no provision for the right to form or join trade unions or 
the right to freedom of association in the OIC Cairo Declaration. That leaves a big gap to be 
filled in respect of those rights. Article 13 of the Declaration only provides that: 
"... Should workers and employers disagree on any matter, the State shall intervene to 
settle the dispute and have the grievances redressed, the rights confirmed and justice 
enforced without bias. " 
While the above provision appreciates the possibility of disagreement between workers and 
employers, it fails to provide a legal basis for the formation of trade unions that can formally 
represent workers to promote and protect their economic and social interests. If the argument 
is that the State has a duty under Islamic law to intervene and protect the confirmed rights of 
workers in such instances, the problem with that is, this can hardly be guaranteed where the 
employer is the State itself. Where there is no opportunity of unionism, workers would then 
have to pursue their rights in work on an individual basis, which then denies them the benefit 
and strength in collectivity. 
Nevertheless nothing in the Shari `ah prohibits trade unionism for the promotion and 
protection of the economic and social interests of workers as specifically indicated in Article 
8(l)(a) of the ICESCR. Kamali has argued that both the Qur'an and Sunnah "enjoin co- 
75 See e. g. Craven, M. C. R., (1995) supra, note 6 above, p. 251. 
76 See General Comment 3 Par. 5. 
77 See Craven, M. C. R., (1995) supra, note 6 above, p. 254. 
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operation (ta `äwun) in good and beneficial work", and stressed that "co-operation in good 
work (al-birr) 
... 
is a broad concept which can apply to all forms of beneficial co-operation, 
whether in the form of a political party, a professional association, or a workers' union which 
aims at ensuring fair practices in trade and the equitable treatment of workers. "79 Considering 
the tendency of exploitation that often exists in the employer-employee relationships all over 
the world today, the right of trade unionism for the purpose of promoting and protecting the 
economic and social interests of workers is very legitimate under Islamic law. As earlier 
indicated above, the Prophet of Islam has in many ways enjoined the welfare of workers. It is 
a fact that the individual worker is always the weaker party in every employer-employee 
relationship. It is only through trade unionism that the welfare of workers may truly be 
realised and the interest of employees adequately protected, especially within the capitalist 
oriented economy that exists in most parts of the modern world. Since modern Muslim States 
participate in the capitalist oriented economy, it will be inconsistent with the Islamic 
injunction of fair-dealing not to allow the formation of trade unions to protect the interest of 
workers against any exploitative tendencies of employers. Apart from the confrontational 
trait often associated with trade unions, they also are necessary vehicles for the social, 
cultural and professional interaction of workers both nationally and internationally, which 
goes a long way in improving their productivity. 
Many Muslim States have ratified the ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948)80 and Convention No. 98 Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949), 81 which are the two key trade union 
Conventions. It is important to note in this regard that the States have an important obligation 
to ensure that the rights of workers to form trade unions and join trade unions of their choice 
are ensured within both the public and private sectors of the State. 
THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL INSURANCE 
Article 9 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, 
including social insurance. 
78 See also under Art. 22 of the ICCPR in the last Chapter, p. 171 above. 
79 Karnali, M. H., Freedom of Expression in Islam (1997) p. 79. 
80 34 of the 56 Member States of the OIC have ratified this ILO Convention. See ILO Treaty Website at: 
http: //ilolex. ilo. ch: 1567/scripts/convde. pl? query=C87&query0=87&submit=Display [visited 4/2/2001). 
81 41 of the 56 Member States of the OIC have ratified this ILO Convention. See ibid. 
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Apart from the general statement that social security includes social insurance, the scope 
and nature of social security is not defined under the Covenant. Article 22 of the UDHR also 
provides that: "Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is 
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and 
cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality", but 
fails to define the scope of social and economic rights indispensable for the dignity and free 
development of the individual. The reporting guidelines for Article 9 of the ICESCR 
however refer to the ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention (No. 102) of 
195282 and also request each State Party to indicate which of the following branches of social 
security existed in their country, viz: Medical care; Cash sickness benefits; Maternity 
benefits; Old-age benefits; Invalidity benefits; Survivors' benefits; Employment injury 
benefits; Unemployment benefits; and Family benefits. 83 This list clearly indicates that the 
social security system is meant to be an alleviative arrangement for ensuring a guaranteed 
income and basic sustenance from the State to "labour inactive" members of society who 
may for obvious reasons not be able to earn income or sustenance through work. This in 
essence is aimed at protecting the dignity of the individual in such situations and prevent him 
from having to engage in the undignified act of begging or resorting to other degrading and 
unacceptable means of sustenance. 
Scheinin has noted that "(i)n developing countries, the economic protection of other, 
`inactive', persons may be seen more as a moral duty of the family than as a legal right of the 
individual in relation to public authorities. " He however argued that "(t)he place of the right 
to life in the international code of human rights certainly puts limits on leaving the 
responsibility of the basic well-being of the members of society to families. i84 While 
Scheinin's observation in respect of the concept of social security in developing countries 
describes what one finds as well today in all modern Muslim States, there are precedents in 
early Islamic State practice where responsibility for the basic well-being of everyone and 
especially the economic protection of labour inactive persons was taken as an obligation of 
the State. 
82 See ILO Website at: http: //ilolex ilo. ch: 1567/scripts/convde iI? query=C102&gueryO=102&subniit=Display [02/02/2001]. 83 These are exactly the nine specific branches of Social Security covered by the ILO Social Security (Minimum Standard) 
Convention (No. 102) of 1952. See Revised Guidelines, supra, note 7 above. 84 Scheinin, M., "The Right to Social Security", in Eide, A., Krause, C., and Rosas, A., (ed. ) (1995) supra, note 31 above, 
p. 59 at 161. 
228 
The Shari `ah in fact enjoins the concept of social security as a State policy rather than 
purely a family responsibility. The Zakät tax is, for example, an obligatory State institution 
basically for ensuring the social security of indigent individuals within the Islamic State. The 
State has the legal responsibility of collecting the Zakät which must only be expended for the 
specific category of indigent persons to ensure their social security within the State. Apart 
from that, the State itself has a primary responsibility under the Shari `ah, to provide 
members of the society with the economic and material welfare "necessary for the 
maintenance of human happiness and dignity". 85 This is evidenced by the oft-quoted 
Tradition of Prophet Muhammad in which he says: 
"Behold, every one of you is a shepherd; and everyone of you is responsible for his 
flock. The ruler (i. e. the State) that governs over a people is a shepherd, and is 
responsible for his flock (i. e. the people); The man is a shepherd over his family and 
is responsible for his flock; The woman is a shepherdess over her husband's 
household and children, and is responsible for them; The servant is a shepherd over 
his master's property, and is responsible for it. Behold, everyone of you is a 
shepherd, and everyone of you is responsible for his flock. s86 
Analysing the above Tradition, Muhammad Asad has pointed out the need to note that 
the ruler's (i. e. the State's) responsibility to the people "has been put at par with a father's or 
a mother's responsibility toward their children". Just as the father and mother are 
"shepherds" and are morally and legally responsible for the well being of their family, the 
State is also morally and legally responsible for the economic and social well-being of its 
people. "It follows, therefore, " Asad concluded, "that a state, in order to be truly Islamic, 
must arrange the affairs of the community in such a way that every individual, man and 
woman shall enjoy that minimum of material well-being without which there can be no 
human dignity, no freedom and, in the last resort, no spiritual progress. , 87 
There are numerous recorded precedents of social security arrangements for the welfare 
of the labour inactive members in the history of the early Islamic State. For example, 
Hamidullah (quoting the great 8th century Hanafi Jurist, Imam Abü Yüsuf), has documented 
the position in his well-known work, The Muslim Conduct of State, first published in 1941, 
as follows: 
"Social security in favour of non-Muslim subjects, at the expense of the Central 
Exchequer, was introduced as early as the time of Abü Bakr. In a State document, 
the commander, Khälid ibn al-Walid informs the Caliph of the conquest of the city of 
85 See Asad, M., The Principles of State and Government in Islam (1980) p. 87. 86 Reported by al-Bukhäri and Muslim, See e. g. Karim, F., (1994), supra, note 37 above, Vol. 2, p. 567, Hadith No. 1. 87 Asad, M, (1980) supra, note 85 above, at 88. 
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al-Hirah, and says: "I counted the male population. They were seven thousand. On 
further examination, I found that one thousand of them were permanently sick and 
invalid. So I excluded them from the imposition of the jizyah (tax); and those 
susceptible of the tax thus remained six thousand... I have accorded them that any 
old man who could no more earn his livelihood for his weakness, or who should 
otherwise be afflicted by a calamity, or one who was rich but became poor to the 
extent that he requires the charity of his co-religionists, I shall exonerate him from 
the jizyah (tax) and he and his family will be supported by the Muslim treasury so 
1188 long as he lives in the Islamic territory... 
The second Caliph, `Umar ibn al-Khatäb, also laid a formal precedent in that respect by 
demonstrating clearly during his rule that the State has an obligation under the Shari ah to 
ensure the social security and welfare of every member of the society, especially that of the 
"labour inactive" along the lines envisaged under Article 9 of the ICESCR. `Umar is 
recorded to have issued formal instructions during his Caliphate that grants must be provided 
from the State treasury (bayt al-mä1) to the elderly and to the sick in the State without 
discrimination. Abü Yüsuf has documented in his Kitäb Kharäj that the Caliph Umar once 
"passed along a street where somebody was asking for charity. He was old and blind. `Umar 
tapped his shoulder from behind and said: From which community art thou? He replied: A 
Jew. He said: And what hath constrained thee to what I see thee in? He replied; I have to pay 
the capitation tax: I am poor; and I am old. At this `Umar took him by the hand and led him 
to his own house and gave him something from his private coffers. Then he sent word to the 
cashier of the baytu'1 mal (State Treasury): Look at him and his like. By God! We should 
never be doing justice if we eat out of his youth and leave him deserted in the old age. `The 
government taxes are meant for the poor and the indigent. " 89 Al-Balädhuri is also quoted to 
have recorded that when Umar came to a city called al-Jäbiyah "he passed en route by some 
Christians suffering from leprosy, so he gave order that they should be aided out of sadagät, 
i. e. zakät, and that they should be given a life pension. i90 
Describing the precedent of Caliph Umar in respect of the formal inauguration of the 
concept of social security in the early Islamic State, Muhammad Asad observed exhaustively 
as follows: 
"If some readers suppose that the idea of... a social insurance scheme is an invention 
of the twentieth century, I would remind them of the fact that it was in full swing 
many centuries before its present name was coined, and even before the need for it 
became apparent under the impact of modern industrial civilization: namely, in the 
88 Hamidullah, M., The Muslin: Conduct of State, (7`h Revised Ed., 1977) p. 117, Par. 211. See also Abü Yüsuf s Kitdb al- 
Kharaj, Trans. Ali, A. A., (1979) pp. 289-90. 
89 ibid, pp. 113-114. 
90 al-Balädhuri, Futüh al-Buldän, (Arabic) p. 1 29, cited in Hamidullah, M., (1977) supra, note 88 above, p. 114. 
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Islamic Commonwealth, at the time of the Right-Guided Caliphs. It was `Umar the 
Great who, in the year 20A. H., (643CE) inaugurated a special government 
department, called diwän, for the purpose of holding a census of the population at 
regular intervals. On the basis of this census, annual state pensions were fixed for (a) 
widows and orphans, (b) all persons who had been in the forefront of the struggle for 
Islam during the lifetime of the Prophet, beginning with his widows, the survivors of 
the Battle of Badr, the early muhäjirs, and so forth, and (c) all disabled, sick and old 
persons. The minimum pension payable under this scheme amounted to two hundred 
and fifty dirhams annually. In time, a regular allowance, payable to their parents or 
guardians, was settled even on children (on the principle that they were unable to 
fend for themselves) from the moment of their birth to the time when they would 
reach maturity; and during the last year of his life, `Umar said more than once: "If 
God grants me life, I shall see to it that even the lonely shepherd in the mountains of 
San`ä' shall have his share in the wealth of the community. " With his characteristic 
grasp of the practical issues, `Umar even went so far as to make experiments with a 
group of thirty people with a view to finding out the minimum amount of food an 
average person needed to maintain full health and vigor; and on the conclusion of 
these experiments he ordained that every man and woman in the country should 
receive from the government storehouses (in addition to the monetary pension of 
which he or she might be a recipient) a monthly allowance of wheat sufficient for 
two square meals a day. s9' 
Most Muslim States today hardly operate a full social security scheme in the manner 
contemplated under Article 9 of the ICESCR. Asad has thus posed a question to Muslim 
States, based on the precedent of `Umar narrated above, that: "Is it not our duty (i. e. the 
Muslim States), with thirteen centuries (now fourteen) of historical experience at our 
disposal, to rectify that shameful negligence and to bring `Umar's work to completion? 902 
This clearly indicates that the social security scheme is very much accommodated under 
Islamic law and in fact a strong obligation upon the Islamic State within available economic 
resources. The obligatory zakät fund is specifically meant for that purpose as specifically 
enjoined by the Qur'an. Thus if Muslim States can properly organise and utilise this 
important public institution, the social security system in the Muslim world would be greatly 
reformed and enhanced. Notably, the challenges of international human rights seem to spur 
some Muslim States into action in that respect. For instance, Libya in its initial report on the 
ICESCR, reiterated the importance of social security in promoting human welfare especially 
of labour inactive persons and further stated that an important distinguishing feature of the 
country's social security scheme was that: 
"It is an Islamic scheme founded on the modern scientific and organizational 
experience of the developed countries. The underlying principles of the scheme were 
inspired by the magnanimous Islamic Shari'a, which ensures social solidarity and 
91 Asad, M., (1980), supra, note 85 above, p. 92. 
' ibid. 
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communal concern and promotes reform of the individual and the community based 
on justice, mercy and fellowship. s93 
In a similar vein Morocco also stated in its second periodic report on the ICESCR that it 
intends a thorough reform of its social strategy to benefit the most deprived members of 
society and that the country's "social strategy will be reinforced by a social development 
fund and the establishment of a transparent mechanism for mobilizing the zakat. "94 
As stated during examination of the right to work above, the able-bodied individual has 
a correlative duty to work under Islamic law. The individual is urged to work to earn a living 
whenever he can rather than depend totally on benefits from the State. Islam discourages any 
form of parasitical or indolent way of life for the fit and able. The upper hand, (i. e. the giving 
hand) according to the Prophet, is always better than the lower hand (i. e. the receiving hand). 
The OIC Cairo Declaration contains no specific provision on right to social security and 
social insurance. 
FAMILY RIGHTS 
Article 10 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that: 
1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, 
which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its 
establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent 
children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending 
spouses. 
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before 
and after childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid 
leave or leave with adequate social security benefits. 
3. Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all 
children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or 
other conditions. Children and young persons should be protected from economic 
and social exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health 
or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development should be 
punishable by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid 
employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law. 
The recognition of the family as an important natural unit of society and its role in the 
positive development of the individual can be found in most human rights instruments. For 
example, the African Charter identifies the family as "the custodian of morals and traditional 
93 See Initial Report: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1996), UN Doc. E/1990/5/Add. 26, Par. 55(a). 
94 See Par. 210 of Second Periodic Report: Morocco, UN Doc. E/1990/6/Add. 20 of 9 January 1999. 
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values recognized by the community"95 and the European Social Charter identifies the family 
as "a fundamental unit of society" 96. Also Article 17 (1) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, Article 16(3) of the UDHR and Article 23(1) of the ICCPR all recognise that 
"(t)he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection 
by society and the State. " 
It is in the same vein that Article 10(1) of the ICESCR not only recognises the family as 
"the natural and fundamental group unit of society", but also recognises it as "responsible for 
the care and education of dependent children. " 
There is however no treaty definition for the term "family" in international human rights 
law. This raises the problem of identifying which model or family structure would be entitled 
to the above protections by society and the State. Lagoutte and Amason have argued that 
reference to the family in almost all human rights instruments as a "natural" unit also refers 
to natural law, which they further argued, "is a direct translation of the anthropological 
theorization of kinship". 97 Apart from the traditional classification of family into the nuclear 
and extended types, new notions of family have today emerged in many societies other than 
those based on natural and traditional heterosexual biological relations. There are today new 
reproductive means like artificial insemination, surrogacy and, more controversially, same- 
sex relationships through which "families" are formed. The ESCR Committee has not 
adopted any specific definition of family under the ICESCR, but seems to appreciate the 
possibility of differences in the concept of family under its reporting guidelines for Article 
10. It requires States Parties to indicate in their report "what meaning is given in your society 
to the term `family'. "98 The HRC had also noted in its General Comment 19 issued in 1990 
on Article 23 of the ICCPR that: 
"the concept of the family may differ in some respects from State to State, and even 
from region to region within a State, and that it is therefore not possible to give the 
concept a' standard definition. However, the Committee emphasizes that, when a 
group of persons is regarded as a family under the legislation and practice of a State, 
it must be given the protection referred to in article 23. Consequently, States parties 
should report on how the concept and scope of the family is construed or defined in 
their own society and legal system. "99 
95 Art. 18(2) African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights (1981). 
9' Art. 16 European Social Charter (1961). 
97 Lagoutte, A., and Amason, A. T., "Article 16" in Alfredsson, G., and Eide, A., (ed. ) The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: A Common Standard ofAchievement (1999) 324 at 338. 
9s See Revised Guidelines, supra, note 7 above, Par. 2. 
'9 General Comment 19, Par. 2. 
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Also in the case of Shirin Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 Other Mauritian Women v. 
Mauritius 100 the HRC had earlier observed inter alia that the "legal protection or measures 
that a society can afford to the family may vary from country to country and depend on 
different social, economic or cultural conditions and traditions. "' 01 That view placed the 
scope of definition of family under both the ICCPR and ICESCR upon each State and legal 
system concerned. The HRC has however moved further from that view by observing in its 
General Comment 28 issued in 2000 on Article 3 of the ICCPR that: 
"... in giving effect to the recognition of the family in the context of article 23 (of the 
ICCPR), it is important to accept the concept of the various forms of family, 
including unmarried couples and their children and single parents and their children 
and to ensure the equal treatment of women in these contexts... i102 
Although this current broad interpretation of "family" by the HRC is said to be "in the 
context of article 23" of the ICCPR, it can be equally relative to Article 10 of the ICESCR 
due to the similarity in wording of both Articles on family. This broad interpretation is 
however contrary to the concept of family under Islamic law as will emerge below. 
Generally, the importance of the family and its protection is very well established under 
Islamic law. It is an important institution within Islamic society that is closely guarded, and 
family rights and duties are specifically defined under Islamic family law and jurisprudence 
for its establishment and protection. 103 Every Muslim individual is encouraged to be family- 
oriented and to assist in the realisation of a socially stable society through the establishment 
of a stable family. The Shari 'ah also places responsibility on both the society and State in 
respect of protecting the family institution. There should therefore be no problem in 
reconciling the general protection and assistance of the family recognised under the ICESCR 
with Islamic law principles. The Prophet is reported to have stated in one Tradition that: 
"The best of you are those who are best to their families and I am best to my family. " 104 The 
Tradition earlier cited under Article 9 above in which the Prophet described the ruler, the 
father and mother as shepherds in respect of the people and family respectively, also 
illustrates the recognition of the duty to protect and assist the family under Islamic law. 
There are also precedents of practical demonstration by the Prophet and the early Caliphs 
after him of the State's duty to protect and support the family, especially its vulnerable 
10° Communication No. 35/1978 (9 April 1981), UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/l at 67 (1984). 
"'ibid., Par. 9.2(b)2(ii)1. 
102 HRC General Comment 28, Par. 27. 
103 See generally e. g. Pearl, D., and Menski, W., Muslim Family Law (1998) and generally Abd at `Ati, H., The Family 
Structure in Islam (1977). 
104 Reported by Tirmidhi and Ibn Mäjah, See Karim, F., (1994), supra, note 37 above, Vol. 1, p. 200, Hadith No. 35. 
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members such as children, the elderly, the handicapped, the widowed and divorced. 105 
Article 10(1) of the ICESCR recognises the institution of marriage and provides that 
marriage "must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses". The 
requirement of free consent of intending spouses is also an important condition of marriage 
under Islamic law. It is reported that a lady called Khansä'a bint Khidhäm was given in 
marriage by her father, she disliked it and so complained to the Prophet Muhammad. The 
Prophet annulled the marriage. 106 Also in another Tradition it was reported that a girl came to 
the Prophet to complain that her father had given her in marriage against her will. The 
Prophet gave her the option of annulment. 107 On the basis of this Tradition, a girl forced into 
marriage before maturity has the option to revoke such marriage on reaching maturity under 
Islamic law. This is what is termed "option of puberty" (khiyär al-bullig) under Islamic 
family law. 108 
In Islamic societies the definition of family is based on principles prescribed by the 
religion, reinforced by law and observed by individuals as a religious obligation. For 
example the Egyptian Constitution provides that "The family is the basis of the society 
founded on religion, morality and patriotism. "' 09 Article 5 of the OIC Cairo Declaration also 
provides that: 
(a) The family is the foundation of society, and marriage is the basis of its formation. 
Men and women have the right to marriage, and no restrictions stemming from 
race, colour or nationality shall prevent them from enjoying this right. 
(b) Society and the State shall remove all obstacles to marriage and shall facilitate 
marital procedure. They shall ensure family protection and welfare. 
This clearly states the Islamic law position that "marriage is the basis of its (family) 
formation". The concept of family is thus strictly limited within the confines of legitimate 
marriage under Islamic law. There are defined rules for legitimate marriage through which a 
legitimate family may be formed. 110 The husband/father and wife/mother constitute the 
primary actors, and only the consequential natural blood-ties of such relationship can create a 
legitimate family under Islamic law. "' Same-sex relationships and sexual relationships 
105 See e. g. Uthmin, M. F., (1982), supra, note 34 above, pp. 137-140. 
106 Reported by al-Bukhari. See e. g. Karim, F., (1994) supra, note 37 above, Vol. 2., p. 635, Hadith No. 37. 
107 Reported by Abu Dawud. See Karim, F., ibid, Hadith No 36. 
108 See ibid., p. 635- 
109 See Art. 9 The Constitution of the Arab Republic Of Egypt (1971). 
1° See e. g. Abd at `Ati, H., (1977) supra, note 103 above, pp. 50-145. 
"' See e. g. 3`d Periodic Report on Implementation of the ICESCR by Syrian Arab Republic. UN Doc. E/1994/104/Add. 23 of 
17/11/99, Par. 111. 
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outside marriage are prohibited and not tolerated as basis for family. 112 Interpreted within an 
appreciation of the different concepts of family from State to State, this Islamic conception of 
family would generally raise no problem under the provisions of Article 10 of the ICESCR. 
The current broader view of the HRC in its General Comment 28 would however raise 
questions about recognising unmarried couples and their children as a family. Article 10(3) 
of the ICESCR also provides that all children and young persons should enjoy special 
protection and assistance "without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other 
conditions". This also raises the issue of the right of children conceived out of wedlock to 
enjoy such protection and assistance under Islamic law. For example, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child observed in its concluding observation on Kuwait's initial report on the 
Convention on the Right of the Child that: 
"The Committee is concerned at the potential for stigmatization of a woman or 
couple who decide to keep a child born out of wedlock, and at the impact of this 
stigmatization on the enjoyment by such children of their rights. ""3 
In response the Kuwait representative indicated that: 
"extramarital sex was proscribed by Islamic law, and sex with a minor under 18 years 
of age was considered a crime, even with the girl's consent. In cases where it did 
occur and a child was born as a result, the tendency was for the parents to rid 
themselves of the child, since they were forbidden under Islamic law to keep a child 
conceived out of wedlock. In that event, the child was initially provided for by the 
Ministry of Public Health, and subsequently by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labour. " 4 
Islamic law emphasises a child's right to legitimacy and that a child shall be linked 
naturally to only one mother and one father. But while maternity is naturally conspicuous, 
paternity can be subjected to doubt. Apparently, Islamic law considers maternal legitimacy as 
an inalienable right of legitimacy because a child can naturally have only one mother, 
conspicuous by the fact of birth. 
115 Islamic law also emphasises that every child shall have 
one natural father only, and in order to shut out any iota of doubt about paternity, the father's 
legitimacy is restricted within the confines of marriage, excluding any other man. Thus any 
12 See e. g. Abd al `Ati, H., (1977) supra, note 103 above pp. 50-145. 
"'See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Kuwait (1998) UN. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add. 96, 
Par. 23; See also Concluding Observations of the ESCR Committee: Morocco (2000) UN. Doc. E/C. 12/l/Add. 55, Par. 23. 
"^ See Par. 2 of Summary Record of 489`h Meeting: Kuwait. CRC/C/SR. 489 of 2 October 1998. 
15 Thus although Islamic law prohibits conception outside wedlock, it does not legally forbid the mother from keeping a 
child conceived outside wedlock as stated in the Kuwait Report above. In one Tradition the Prophet Muhammad was 
reported to have instructed a woman who conceived and delivered a baby outside wedlock to keep and look after the child 
and postponed her punishment for zind till after the child had fully weaned. It is the societal stigmatisation, as observed by 
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conception that begins within marriage is presumed paternally legitimate until the contrary is 
proved. Once the father's legitimacy is established within marriage, an inalienable right of 
paternal legitimacy is created also in respect of father and child. Consequently, 
fornication/adultery is correlatively prohibited to, inter alia, promote and ensure an active 
sense of moral and familial responsibility within Islamic society. To protect the institution of 
marriage and the concept of legitimacy within marriage, a child conceived outside wedlock is 
considered under Islamic jurisprudence as a "child of fornication/adultery" and its "descent 
will derive from the mother only, while the adulterer, the father, will be denied paternity as a 
punitive measure for his misconduct". 116 The main consequence of this under Islamic 
jurisprudence is that, while the child sustains its maternal legal inheritance rights to the 
mother, it is deprived of legal paternity and barred from paternal inheritance rights to the 
adulterous father. 117 
While the Qur'an does specifically prohibits fornication/adultery and prescribes 
punishment for the direct offenders, it does not contain any direct provision on the status of a 
child conceived outside wedlock. However, the Prophet is reported to have stated in one 
Tradition that: "Any man who commits fornication/adultery with either a free woman or a 
slave-girl, the child (of such relationship) is a child of fornication/adultery who has no right 
of inheritance. " 118 `Abd al `Ati has thus raised the tangible question of "why should the 
child be deprived of a legal father or denied a father's name? The child has committed no 
offence, and it is unjust to "penalize" an innocent party. "' 19 
It is apparent from the juristic views on this question that the denial of legal paternity in 
this case is intended only as a punitive measure against the adulterous father and not against 
the child, and to deter against fornication/adultery in the Muslim society. In finding answers 
to this question, `Abd al `Ati has argued inter alia that since children were highly valued and 
eagerly sought after, the need to minimise disputes and confusion about their paternity 
justifies the Islamic rule that children "were to be conceived in wedlock, placed with, and 
entrusted to, devoted parents of unsuspected characters. " Bearing in mind that 
fornication/adultery is a crime under Islamic law and naturally abhorrent in most societies, he 
the Committee, that often prevents a mother from wanting to keep a child conceived out of wedlock. See arguments by Abd 
at `Ati against such stigmatisation against the child further below. 
116 See Abd at `Ati, H., (1977) supra, note 103 above, p. 191. 
117 According to Shi ah (Twelvers) jurisprudence, the child loses both maternal and paternal rights of inheritance. See e. g. 
Al-Zuhayli, W., (1997) supra, note 34 above, Vol. 10, p. 7905-6. See also for e. g. Article 43 of the Egyptian Inheritance Act, 
which provides that: "A child born out of wedlock inherits from his or her mother and maternal kin, who likewise inherit 
from the child", See Replies to List of Issues: Egypt, UN Doc. HR/CESCR/NONE/2000/6 of 28/03/2000. Article 18(2) of 
the Constitution of Kuwait also provides that: "Inheritance is a right governed by the Islamic Shari'ah ". 
118 Reported by al-Tirmidhi, See e. g. Karim, F,. (1994) supra, note 37 above, Vol. 2, p. 333, Hadith No. 50. 
119 Abd at 'Ati, H., (1982) supra, note 103 above, p. 192. 
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contended that those were conditions which "adulterers could hardly qualify for". 
120 While 
he thus concluded on one hand that it may be in the child's interest to deny it to a father of 
such questionable integrity and character, he argued on the other hand that: 
"This denial, however, does not affect the child's basic rights to security and full 
community membership. In fact, such a position may be a testimony to the child's 
own credit, to the society's openness, to the social response of the community, and to 
the degree of social integration. It would seem to reaffirm the basic principle that 
every Muslim individual has equal access to whatever is of value for Muslim society, 
hindered neither by a family name nor by the lack thereof. The chief criterion of 
excellence in the value system of Islam is personal piety and religio-moral 
achievement. No one may claim the credit of another nor is any one responsible for 
or penalized by the actions of anyone else. Whenever an offence is committed 
against God, e. g., adultery or fornication, it is only God Who exempts or forgives the 
offender. Thus, if there is any stigma of illegitimacy, it would cling not so much to 
the innocent child as to the guilty parents, and its effects shall not be allowed to hurt 
the innocent.... The stigma need not arise in the first place for an innocent party; but 
if it does, reparations obtain by way of giving the child complete access to equal life 
chances and the right to grow up free from prejudice or stigmas of any kind. 1421 
While the prohibition of fornication/adultery falls within the State's duty of protecting 
the family institution and public morality under Islamic law, the recognition and protection 
of the best interest of the child is also very well recognised. Coupled with the Quranic 
principle that "No bearer of burdens shall bear the burden of another" , 
122 the argument that 
the innocent child should not be vicariously imperilled as a consequence of the illegitimate 
act of its de facto parents is therefore a valid and strong argument that compels States to 
guarantee the special protection and assistance of every child without any discrimination for 
reasons of parentage or other conditions. Answering questions on the status of children 
conceived out of wedlock in Saudi Arabia, the country's representative, Dr. Bayari, informed 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child that: 
"Pregnancies outside wedlock were carried to term and a decision was taken on 
whether the family would keep the child or place it in an institution. Most families 
accepted to keep the child, who had the same right to name and nationality as 
children born in wedlock". 123 
Marriage is thus an important institution on the basis of which family rights are 
determined under Islamic law. While unmarried persons or children conceived out of 
wedlock may, as individuals, be entitled to other guaranteed individual rights they will not 
120 ibid., p. 195. 
121 ibid., p. 193. 
122 See Q6: 164; Q17: 15; Q35: 18; Q39: 7; Q53: 38. 
223 See Summary Record of the 688`h Meeting of CRC: Saudi Arabia, UN Doc. CRC/C/SR. 688., Par. 52. 
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qualify for family rights under Islamic law because family rights can only be claimed 
through the link of an Islamically legitimate marriage. This is a religio-moral principle that is 
evidently incompatible with the broad interpretation adopted by the HRC on the concept of 
family in its General Comment 28, and is reflective of the need for the adoption of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine by the UN human rights treaty bodies in resolving such 
differences with relevant States Parties to international human rights treaties. 
THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING 
Article 11 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will 
take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the 
essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone 
to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the 
measures, including specific programmes, which are needed: 
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full 
use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles 
of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to 
achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources; 
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, 
to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need. 
The importance of Article 11 cannot be overemphasised because it restates in general 
terms the overall purpose of economic, social and cultural rights, which is the realisation of 
an adequate standard of living for every human being. A specific definition is not given of 
what constitutes "adequate standard of living" but it is stated to include "adequate food, 
clothing and housing and 
... 
continuous improvement of living conditions. "124 This will 
essentially be interpreted to mean a standard of living that ensures the dignity of the human 
person. That is, the ability, inter alia, for every person to enjoy the basic necessities of life 
without resort to any degrading or dehumanising means in that regard. 125 
Food, clothing and housing are, without doubt, important basic necessities of life. The 
physical well being of an individual essentially depends, inter alia, on whether he has (i) 
adequate food to not only free him from hunger but also nourish and provide him with 
energy required for a healthy life; (ii) adequate clothing to cover and protect his body and 
124 See also Art 25 of the UDHR which provides that adequate standard of living includes "food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control". 
125 See e. g. Eide, A., "The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right to Food" in Eide, A., et al., (1995) 
supra, note 31 above, p. 89 at 90. 
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(iii) adequate shelter that provides him with security, peace of mind and dignity. Without the 
guarantee of these three rights the inherent dignity of the human person will be greatly 
imperilled and hardly can any other human right make sense to anyone denied of those three. 
They are basic subsistence rights that are absolutely necessary for human survival 
. 
126 
In furtherance of the right to food, the States Parties recognise also in Article 11(2) the 
`fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger" and they undertake to individually 
and through international cooperation, pursue measures and specific programmes to 
"improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of 
technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition 
and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most 
efficient development and utilization of natural resources". States shall also take into 
account "the problems of both food-importing and food-producing countries, to ensure an 
equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need. " It is noteworthy that the 
right of everyone to be free from hunger is recognised here as a fundamental right, which 
places an obligation on the State to recognise this right under all circumstances. 127 In its 
General Comment 12 the ESCR Committee affirmed that 
"... the right to adequate food is indivisibly linked to the inherent dignity of the 
human person and is indispensable for the fulfilment of other human rights enshrined 
in the International Bill of Human Rights. It is also inseparable from social justice, 
requiring the adoption of appropriate economic, environmental and social policies, at 
both the national and international levels, oriented to the eradication of poverty and 
the fulfilment of all human rights for all". '28 
The States Parties undertake "to take appropriate steps to ensure the realization" of the 
rights under Article 11. Eide has notably observed that "(t)he individual is also expected to 
use his/her own property or working capacity, to the best of his/her judgement, " to realise 
his/her right to an adequate standard of living. 129 Thus adopting Shue's typology of duties 
correlating to subsistence rights, the duties of the State in this regard are namely: (i) the duty 
to avoid deprivation, which places a duty on the State not to eliminate any individual's 
legitimate means of subsistence (ii) the duty to protect from deprivation, which places a duty 
on the State to protect individuals against deprivation of their available legitimate means of 
subsistence, and (iii) the duty to aid the deprived, which places a duty on the State to provide 
126 See generally Shue, H., (1979) supra, note 5 above. 
127 See Craven, M., (1995) supra, note 6 above, p. 307ff. 
128 General Comment 12, Par. 4. 
129 Eide, A., (1995) supra note 125 above, p. 100. 
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for the subsistence of those unable to provide for themselves. 130 Starting with General 
Comment 12 on right to food the ESCR Committee has adopted this tripartite view of States 
Parties obligations under the Covenant consisting of the obligations to respect, protect and 
fulfil, thus observing that: 
"The right to adequate food, like any other human right, imposes three types or levels 
of obligations on States parties: the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil. In 
turn, the obligation to fulfil incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an 
obligation to provide. The obligation to respect existing access to adequate food 
requires States parties not to take any measures that result in preventing such access. 
The obligation to protect requires measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or 
individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to adequate food. The 
obligation to fulfil (facilitate) means the State must pro-actively engage in activities 
intended to strengthen people's access to and utilization of resources and means to 
ensure their livelihood, including food security. Finally, whenever an individual or 
group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to adequate food 
by the means at their disposal, States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that right 
directly. This obligation also applies for persons who are victims of natural or other 
disasters". 13' 
Regarding international co-operation in respect of right to food, the ESCR Committee 
has also emphasised the duty of States not only to individually and collectively take positive 
steps to ensure the realisation of adequate right to food for every individual but also to 
"refrain at all times from food embargoes or similar measures which endanger conditions for 
food production and access to food in other countries. Food should never be used as an 
instrument of political and economic pressure". 132 
The duty in respect of right to housing seems much more bearing upon the State than the 
right to food and clothing. This is due to the resource-demanding nature of that right and the 
obvious fact that, unlike food and clothing, most individuals in developing States would not 
be able to afford to build or buy houses on their own. The ESCR has issued two General 
Comments (GC4 and GC7) on the right to adequate housing. '33 In its General Comment 4 the 
Committee noted that "(t)he human right to adequate housing, which is. 
. . 
derived from the 
right to an adequate standard of living, is of central importance for the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights. "134 The' Committee then indicated that "the right to 
housing should not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense which equates it with, for 
t3D Shue, H., (1979) supra, note 5 above, pp. 52-53. See also UN Centre for Human Rights, Right to Adequate Food as a 
Human Right (1989) pp. 21-50. 
131 General Comment 12, Par. 15. 
132 ibid, Par. 36-41. 
"; General Comment 4 issued in 1991 covers the right to adequate housing generally, and General Comment 7, issue in 
1997 addresses the problem of forced evictions. 
134 General Comment 4, Par. 1. 
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example, the shelter provided by merely having a roof over one's head or views shelter 
exclusively as a commodity" but "should be seen as the right to live somewhere in security, 
peace and dignity. 435 The UN "Global Shelter Strategy to the Year 2000" adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 1988 defines adequate shelter to mean "adequate privacy, adequate 
space, adequate security, adequate lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and 
adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities - all at a reasonable Cost.,, 
' 36 In 
guaranteeing the right to adequate housing, the ESCR Committee has therefore identified that 
the following seven aspects must be taken into consideration by States, namely: (i) legal 
security of tenure, (ii) availability of tenure, (iii) affordability; (iv) habitability, (v) 
accessibility, (vi) location, and (vii) cultural adequacy. 137 Another important observation of 
the Committee is that "the right to housing should be ensured to all persons irrespective of 
income or access to economic resources. " This obviously places a duty on the State to 
formulate national housing policies and strategies to alleviate homelessness. Where any 
steps being taken by a State to realise this right is considered to be beyond the maximum 
resources available to the State, the Committee has reiterated that "it is appropriate that a 
request be made as soon as possible for international cooperation in accordance with articles 
11(1), 22 and 23 of the Covenant, and that the Committee be informed thereof. "138 
In its General Comment 7 the Committee addressed extensively the problem of forced 
evictions, emphasising its incompatibility with the provisions of the Covenant. It identified 
this to include forced eviction of communities that occur during developmental projects such 
as construction of dams or other large-scale energy projects. ' 39 The Committee then pointed 
out the duty of the State to ensure, where eviction is considered justified, that such evictions 
"are carried out in a manner warranted by a law which is compatible with the Covenant and 
that all the legal recourses and remedies are available to those affected. s140 The Committee 
has also listed a set of procedural protections that must be guaranteed to the individual in 
case of any forced eviction. 
'4' 
Apart from the specific mention of right to food, clothing and housing, Article 11(1) 
also recognises the right of everyone to "the continuous improvement of living conditions". 
'35 ibid., Par. 7. 
'36 Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, UN Doc A/43/8/Add. 1. See also G. A. Res. 42/191 of 9 March 1988 and 
UN Doc. A/RES/43/181 of 20/12/1988. 
'}7 See General Comment 4, Par. 8, for the explanation of these elements by the Committee. See also Craven, M., (1995) 
supra, note 6 above, p335ff. 
13 General Comment 4, Par. 10. 
j; ' General Comment 7, Par. 8. 
10 ibid., par. 12. 
141 ibid., Par. 16. 
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This notably indicates that the right to adequate standard of living under the Covenant is 
generally not static but places a continuous dynamic obligation upon the State in line with 
economic and social developments. 
From the perspective of Islamic law, both the substantive provisions of Article 11 and 
the Committee's interpretations of the right to an adequate standard of living are 
commensurate with Shari `ah provisions and with the principles of Islamic law. The Qur'an 
confirms that the good things of life are created for the benefit and good living of human 
beings, 142 and it expresses disapproval at any attempt to deprive humanity of the good things 
of life that ensure an adequate standard of living for them. 
'43 Under Islamic law, the State 
must endeavour to prevent hardship and has a specific duty to ensure that everyone, 
especially the poor, enjoys an adequate standard of living. This is evident from the Quranic 
verse which states that: "And in their wealth there is a right for the indigent who ask and for 
him who does not ask. "144 The Prophet is also reported to have prayed as follows: "Oh God, 
give hardship to anyone who rules over my people and gives them hardship, and show mercy 
to anyone who rules over my people and shows them mercy. " 145 The enjoyment of an 
adequate standard of living was ensured in the early Islamic State through a proper 
implementation and application of the zakat (Compulsory Tax) and bays al-mä1 (State 
Treasury) institutions. 
There is ample provisions in both the Qur'an and Sunnah to support that everyone has a 
right to adequate food, clothing and housing within an Islamic State. For instance the 
Qur'anic verse which provides that: "And they feed, for the love of God, the indigent, the 
orphan and the captive. (Saying) We feed you for the sake of God alone; no reward do we 
desire from you nor thanks" 146 indicates clearly that no one is expected to go hungry in the 
Islamic State. The principle of freedom from hunger, from fear and from want stands 
established under Islamic law through the Qur'anic verse which stipulates that God has 
provided mankind "with food against hunger and with security against fear". 
147 Thus under 
Islamic law, feeding the poor and indigent is not considered as a favour to them, rather the 
Qur'an stipulates it as a right which the poor and indigent have in the wealth of the affluent 
142 See e. g. Q2: 29 which says "It is He Who created for you all things that are on earth" and Q28: 77 which says: "... And 
forget not your portion of lawful enjoyment in this world". 
143 Q7: 32 which says: "Who has forbidden the beautiful gifts of God which He has produced for His servants and the things 
clean and pure which He has produced for sustenance? 
144 Q51: 19. 
14' Reported by Muslim, See e. g. Karim, F., (1994), supra, note 37 above, Vol. 2. p. 569, Hadith No. 5. 
146 Q76: 8-9- 
147 Q 106: 4. 
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and in the resources of the State. 148 The Prophet corroborated this with his saying that no 
true Muslim goes to bed with a full stomach while his neighbour goes hungry. From an 
Islamic perspective, it is obnoxious that millions of people do starve and die of starvation in a 
world where there is naturally no food shortage. There is already an in-built institution under 
Islamic law for ensuring freedom from hunger for everyone, if well implemented. It is the 
obligatory agricultural tax whereby a fixed percentage of all agricultural produce and that of 
cattle is deductible every year for the maintenance of the poor and indigent as of right. This 
could be emulated both as a national and international humanitarian policy for promoting 
freedom from hunger and ensuring the right to food for even the most indigent persons of the 
world. Not only is the right to food substantiated within Islamic law, one finds that the 
Qur'an also often emphasises on wholesomeness whenever it makes reference to food or 
drink. For instance the Qur'an 2: 168 says: "Oh Mankind, eat of what is on earth, lawful and 
good... " and Qur'an 5: 88 says: "Eat of the things which God has provided for you, lawful 
and good... ". Lawful and good food, in the context of right to food, would include adequate, 
nutritious and wholesome food that ensures a healthy and dignified life for everyone. 
The second Caliph Umar is recorded to have demonstrated during his rule in the early 
Islamic State that the State has a duty to ensure the right of everyone to food. He went to 
great lengths to ensure that the populace was free from hunger. He would go round disguised 
on night patrol listening to comments and to find out about the welfare of the populace. On 
one of such patrols the Caliph was reported to have come to a house from wherein he heard 
the crying of children. He knocked the door to find out what was the cause and found a 
woman cooking something on fire with her children milling hungrily around her and crying 
in anticipation of the "meal" being cooked. Upon enquiry, the woman informed Umar that, 
having nothing to feed her children that night, she had only placed some stones in the pot on 
the fire to hoodwink the children that something was being cooked for them, hoping that they 
would eventually fall asleep while waiting for the "meal" to cook. The Caliph felt highly 
aggrieved and rushed to his palace and brought back a sack of wheat and some local butter 
from the State storage for the woman and her children. The Caliph was reported to have 
insisted on carrying the food personally to the indigent family, lamenting that he feared being 
questioned in the hereafter concerning anyone who was left to wallow in hunger during his 
rule as Caliph. 149 The Caliph was alluding to the Tradition of the Prophet earlier quoted 
148 See Q51: 19. 
'a9 This is a very well known incident during the Caliphate of Umar, which has been narrated in slightly different versions 
by most Islamic historians and traditionists. 
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which stated, inter alia, that the ruler (i. e. the State) is like a shepherd that would be held 
responsible for the welfare of his flock. He did not consider his action as a favour to that 
family but rather as a duty that correlatively ensured the right of the old woman and her 
children to food in the Islamic State as provided by the Shari `ah. 
The Prophet Muhammad also demonstrated refrain from using food embargoes as a 
weapon of political or economic pressure even against enemies. The Chief of Yamamah, 
Thumamah ibn Uthal had embraced Islam during the early period when Mecca was still very 
hostile to the Muslims. Yamamah was then the main source of grain supplies to Mecca. The 
Chief, after his embrace of Islam, decreed an embargo on grains from Yamamah to Mecca. 
The Prophet Muhammad however intervened and ordered the lifting of the embargo. 150 
In respect of right to clothing, evidence is found for example in the Qur'anic verse 
which says: "Oh Children of Adam, We have bestowed garments upon you to cover 
yourselves (screen your private parts) and also to serve as adornment. 
.. 
s151 and also in 
another verse which says: "... He (God) has provided you with garments to protect you from 
heat (and cold)... " 152. The stated purposes of clothing here, i. e. cover, adornment and 
protection, does certainly also depict the enhancement of human dignity. The Prophet also 
greatly encouraged the provision of clothing to those in need as a most rewarding religious 
obligation. Evidence for right to housing is equally found, for example, in the verse of the 
Qur'an which states that: "And God has made for you your homes as habitations of rest and 
quiet; and made for you out of the hides of cattle (tents) for dwelling, which you find so light 
(and handy) when you travel and when you stop in (your travels)... " 153 It is clear from the 
last verse that the right to habitation is not limited to the domiciled but extended even to 
those constantly on the move, like Nomads and Gypsies. 
In line with the above provisions, Article 17(c) of the OIC Cairo Declaration thus also 
recognises the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living by providing that: 
"The State shall ensure the right of the individual to a decent living which will enable 
him to meet all his requirements and those of his dependants, including food, 
clothing, housing, education, medical care and all other basic needs. " 
The Cairo Declaration also provides in Article 18(c) that neither shall a private residence be 
demolished, confiscated nor its dwellers evicted. 
150 See Hamidullah, M, The Muslim Conduct of State (Rev. 7`h Ed. 1977) p. 196, Par. 392. 
151 Q 7: 26. 
ist Q16: 81. 
153 Q16: 80. 
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RIGHT TO HIGHEST ATTAINABLE STANDARD OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH 
Article 12 
I. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) the provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for 
the healthy development of the child; 
(b) the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c) the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other diseases; (d) the creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness. 
The adage that "health is wealth" explains the importance of health to the well being of 
the human person. Apart from the right to food, clothing and housing, the right to health and 
medical care are also specifically mentioned in the UDHR as elements of an adequate 
standard of living for the individual and his family. 
154 The ESCR Committee has also 
observed that health is a "fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other 
human rights" and that every human being "is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity". 
tss Article 12(1) thus 
recognises "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health" and the States Parties undertake to take necessary steps for the 
full realization of this right. 
Article 12 creates two broad sets of norms in respect of health rights. The first is the 
guarantee of the rights of the individual to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health, while the second is the protection of public health as a necessary step for the 
realisation of the first. Sometimes, the protection of public health may however tend to 
restrict the liberty and freedom of movement of individuals. "' This could occur during the 
control of epidemic or endemic diseases by the State under Article 12(2)(c). Such restrictions 
would then have to be strictly for the protection of public health and in accordance with law. 
The maintenance of both individual and public health depends on a lot of other factors, 
such as waste disposal, environmental sanitation, nutrition and even housing provisions, 
which thus makes the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health quite complex. Apart from its demand for a great level of economic and 
154 See Art. 25 (1)UDHR (1948). 
155 General Comment 14, Par. I and Par. 3. 
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human resources, it also depends a lot on the developmental level of each State. In defining 
the normative content of this right the ESCR Committee has observed that the right to health 
in all its forms and at all levels will include elements of Availability, Accessibility, 
Acceptability and Quality, 157 and using its tripartite interpretation of States Parties 
obligations, the Committee has observed that: 
"The right to health, like all human rights, imposes three types or levels of 
obligations on States parties: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. In turn, the 
obligation to fulfil contains obligations to facilitate, provide and promote. The 
obligation to respect requires States to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly 
with the enjoyment of the right to health. The obligation to protect requires States to 
take measures that prevent third parties from interfering with article 12 guarantees. 
Finally, the obligation to fulfil requires States to adopt appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures towards the full 
realization of the right to health. i158 
It is manifest that the realisation of right to health in the above terms remains one of the 
greatest problems confronting developing nations. Although international co-operation is not 
specifically mentioned under Article 12, as it was mentioned under Article 11, such co- 
operation is very pertinent to the realisation of a reasonable standard of health care in 
developing nations. The international obligations in the realisation of the right to health is 
also emphasised by the ESCR Committee as follows: 
"To comply with their international obligations in relation to article 12, States parties 
have to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and to prevent 
third parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able to influence 
these third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations and applicable international law. Depending on the availability 
of resources, States should facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and 
services in other countries, wherever possible and provide the necessary aid when 
required. States parties should ensure that the right to health is given due attention in 
international agreements and, to that end, should consider the development of further 
legal instruments. In relation to the conclusion of other international agreements, 
States parties should take steps to ensure that these instruments do not adversely 
impact upon the right to health. Similarly, States parties have an obligation to ensure 
that their actions as members of international organizations take due account of the 
right to health. Accordingly, States parties which are members of international 
financial institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 
regional development banks, should pay greater attention to the protection of the 
right to health in influencing the lending policies, credit agreements and international 
measures of these institutions". "9 
'-%See e. g. Art. 12(3) of the ICCPR (1966). 
157 General Comment 14, Par. 12. 
" General Comment 14, Par. 33. 
159 ibid., Par. 39. 
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The Committee's comprehensive General Comment 12 broadens the perspective of the 
right to health in a manner that greatly envisages the enhancement of the quality of human 
life in relation to the enjoyment of good health. 
Islam also emphasises the importance of both mental and physical health. Great 
importance is attached to medical and health sciences as it is to religious sciences because 
without good health neither religious nor secular activities can be performed by anyone. The 
training of medical personal and establishment of hospitals was considered as an important 
duty of the State and was greatly encouraged very early in Islamic history. Isaacs has 
pointed out that: 
"Islam not only put medicine on a high level but also conferred the title of hakim 
(wise) on medical practitioners, a term used by Muslims up to the present day in 
many areas. The association of medicine with religious learning is noteworthy, and is 
a pleasing feature of Muslim life: for according to a Tradition of the Prophet: 
"science is twofold, theological science for religion and medical science for the 
body,,. 160 
Saud has also recorded that: 
"From the time of the Banü Umayyah rule the Muslims developed the institution of 
hospitals. During the reign of the `Abbäsi Caliph Härün al-Rashid, a hospital was 
built in Baghdad, which was the first in the history of this city. Many new hospitals 
were established shortly afterwards. Some of them had their own gardens in which 
the medicinal plants were cultivated. The large hospitals had medical schools 
attached to them. Beside such hospitals there were a large number of travelling 
hospitals in the Muslim world 
. 
s16' 
These were all in recognition of the importance of health and medical assistance within 
human society. The duty of ensuring the highest attainable standard of health in society 
through the adequate training of medical personnel and provision of necessary medical and 
health facilities remains binding upon modem Muslim States of today under Islamic law. 
Islamic law advocates both the preventive and curative approaches to health and 
encourages cleanliness as the best preventive approach to both mental and physical health. 
Both individuals and the State are thus encouraged to maintain personal and societal 
cleanliness as the natural and first step towards ensuring the highest attainable standard of 
both physical and mental health in society. The Prophet emphasised this by declaring that: 
"Cleanliness is half of faith". 162 This will include all aspects of personal, environmental and 
160 See Young M. J. L., et al (ed. ) Religion, Learning and Science in the 'Abbasid Period (1990) p. 342. 
16' Saud, M., Islam and Evolution of Science (1994) p. 95. 
162 Reported by Muslim, See e. g. Karim, F., (1994), supra, note 37 above, Vol.!, p. 663, Hadith No. 1. 
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industrial hygiene. There are Islamic instructions on the removal of dirt and prohibition of 
urination and defecation in open places or in stagnant waters. The prevention and control of 
epidemic and endemic diseases under Islamic law is also evidenced by a Tradition in which 
the Prophet is reported to have instructed that: "... When there is plague in any city don't enter 
it and when it breaks out in any city while you are there don't go out fleeing from it". 163 The 
State thus has a duty to control and protect public health to ensure the ultimate enjoyment of 
the right to health by individuals. 
The curative aspect of health is also stressed under Islamic law through the belief that 
there is a cure prescribed by God for every disease. The nursing, caring and treatment of both 
the physically and mentally ill is also considered as a very rewarding duty under Islamic law. 
It is thus an important duty of the State to ensure the availability of medical services and 
medical attention in the event of illness. In recognition of the above ideals Article 17 of the 
OIC Cairo Declaration provides that: 
(a) Everyone shall have the right to live in a clean environment, away from vice and 
moral corruption, an environment that would foster his self-development, and it 
is incumbent upon the State and society in general to afford that right. 
(b) Everyone shall have the right to medical and social care, and to all public 
amenities provided by society and the State within the limits of their available 
resources. 
THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
Articles 13 and 14 
13 (1) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the 
human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall 
enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, 
and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
(2) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving 
the full realization of this right: 
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; (b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational 
secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by 
every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free 
education; 
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, 
by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of 
free education; 
163 Reported al-Bukhari and Muslim, See e. g. Karim, F., ibid, Vol.!, p. 284 Hadith No. 44. 
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(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for 
those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their 
primary education; 
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an 
adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of 
teaching staff shall be continuously improved. 
(3) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of 
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, 
other than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such 
minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to 
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their 
own convictions. 
(4) No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of 
individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always 
to the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph I of this article and to the 
requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such 
minimum standards as may be laid down by the State. 
14 Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has 
not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its 
jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two 
years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive 
implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the 
principle of compulsory education free of charge for all. 
Education is the key to mental liberation which helps the individual not only to develop 
his own personality but also to be useful to his society. The right to education is thus 
comprehensively covered under Articles 13 and 14 of the ICESCR. Apart from recognising 
the right of everyone to education, the States Parties also agree under Article 13(1) that 
"education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense 
of dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" and 
"that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious 
groups and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. "164 
There is therefore a form of consensus among States Parties to the ICESCR on the fact that 
education is an important tool of individual and societal development. 
Apart from being a right in itself, education is also an essential tool for the exercise and 
full enjoyment of human rights. It has been described as an empowerment right. 165 Without 
some minimum level of education and literacy, an individual's awareness about his human 
rights would be greatly impaired. Article 13(1) states that education "shall strengthen the 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". This is achieved through both general 
1'4 See also Art. 26(2) of the UDHR (1948). 
165 See General Comment 13, Par. 1. 
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education and provision of specific human rights education in the educational curriculum. 
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action after the 1993 World Conference on 
Human Rights called on all States and institutions "to include human rights, humanitarian 
law, democracy and rule of law as subjects in the curricula of all learning institutions in 
formal and non-formal settings. "166 
The ESCR Committee has observed that the right to education in all its forms and at all 
levels shall exhibit the essential features of Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability and 
Adaptability. 167 Based on its tripartite interpretation of States Parties obligations, the 
Committee also observed that: 
"The right to education, like all human rights, imposes three types or levels of 
obligations on States parties: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. In turn, the 
obligation to fulfil incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to 
provide. The obligation to respect requires States parties to avoid measures that 
hinder or prevent the enjoyment of the right to education. The obligation to protect 
requires States parties to take measures that prevent third parties from interfering 
with the enjoyment of the right to education. The obligation to fulfil (facilitate) 
requires States to take positive measures that enable and assist individuals and 
communities to enjoy the right to education. Finally, States parties have an obligation 
to fulfil (provide) the right to education. As a general rule, States parties are obliged 
to fulfil (provide) a specific right in the Covenant when an individual or group is 
unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize the right themselves by the means 
at their disposal. However, the extent of this obligation is always subject to the text 
of the Covenant". 168 
Under Article 13 every State shall provide at least free compulsory primary education 
for all, and under Article 14 each State Party that has not yet attained the provision of free 
compulsory primary education for all, undertakes to work out and adopt a detailed plan of 
action for the progressive implementation of the principle of compulsory free primary 
education for all within a reasonable number of years. 169 Secondary and higher education 
shall also be made available and accessible to all with progressive introduction of free 
education at those levels as well. Article 13 covers both formal and informal education as 
well as fundamental education for those who for one reason or another misses out of primary 
education. It also recognises the need to improve the conditions of teaching staff to ensure 
the full achievement of the right to education. 
Although the State has an obligation to provide free and compulsory primary education, 
they undertake to respect the liberty of parents and legal guardians to enrol their children, in 
11 UN Doc A/CONF. 157/23. Part 11 Par. 79. 
167 General Comment 13, Par. 6. 
163 ibid, Par. 46-47. 
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conformity with their religious or moral convictions, in private institutions other than those 
established by the State, provided those private institutions conform with minimum 
educational standards approved by the State. The parents and guardians would be under 
obligation here to act in the best interest of the child. 170 The State shall also not interfere with 
the establishment of private institutions subject to their observance of required minimum 
standards and their pursuance of the principles of individual and societal development set out 
in Article 13(1). 171 
The Covenant does not contain a provision on academic freedom but the Committee has 
observed that academic freedom and institutional autonomy constitutes an important aspect 
of right to education and stated in that regard that: 
"Members of the academic community, individually or collectively, are free to 
pursue, develop and transmit knowledge and ideas, through research, teaching, study, 
discussion, documentation, production, creation or writing. Academic freedom 
includes the liberty of individuals to express freely opinions about the institution or 
system in which they work, to fulfil their functions without discrimination or fear of 
repression by the State or any other actor, to participate in professional or 
representative academic bodies, and to enjoy all the internationally recognized 
human rights applicable to other individuals in the same jurisdiction. The enjoyment 
of academic freedom carries with it obligations, such as the duty to respect the 
academic freedom of others, to ensure the fair discussion of contrary views, and to 
treat all without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds". 172 
These ideals and aspirations concerning the right to education under the ICESCR are 
very much in consonance with the Islamic ideals on education as well. There is consensus 
among all Islamic schools of thought that education is absolutely important and compulsory 
under Islamic law. Right from its inception Islam had laid great emphasis on the importance 
of education and its role in the development of the human person. The very first five revealed 
verses of the Qur'an were related to education and learning. The verses were as follows: 
"Read! In the name of your Lord Who created (everything). He created Man from a 
clot of congealed blood. Read! And your Lord is Most Generous. He has taught 
(writing) by the Pen. He has taught Man that which he knew not. A73 
These five verses continue to be the basic reference point for advocating the right to 
education under Islamic law. There are also many other references in both the Qur'an and 
Sunnah on the importance of education, the obligation of seeking knowledge, and the 
169 See also General Comment 11. 
10 See Art. 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) which provides that: "In all actions concerning 
children 
... 
the best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration. " 
171 See Art. 13(3-4). 
172 General Comment 13, Par. 39. 
173 Q96: 1-5. 
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superiority of scholarship. The Qur'an summarises the importance of education and 
scholarship with an affirmatory interrogative statement that: "... Can those who are learned 
be compared with those who are unlearned? It is those who are endowed with understanding 
that receive admonition". 174 The Prophet had also stressed the paramount value of education 
in many Traditions, a few of which are quoted below: 
"Whoever goes out seeking knowledge is on the path of God till he returns. 99175 
"Whoever follows a path seeking knowledge, God will thereby make it an easy way 
for him to Paradise". 176 
"The superiority of the scholar over the (mere) worshipper is like the superiority of 
the full moon over the stars. " 177 
The Prophet had emphatically stated in one Tradition that seeking of knowledge (i. e. 
education) is compulsory for both the Muslim male and female)78 Asad thus concluded that 
from an Islamic perspective "it is the citizens' right and the government's duty to have a 
system of education which would make knowledge freely accessible (and compulsory) to 
every man and woman in the state". 179 This recognition and emphasis on the importance of 
education under Islamic law thus fully accommodates the duty of the State under the 
Covenant to provide at least free and compulsory primary school education to everyone. In 
appreciation of the importance of right to education, Article 9 of the OIC Cairo Declaration 
provides that: 
(a) The quest for knowledge is an obligation and the provision of education is a duty 
for society and the State. The State shall ensure the availability of ways and 
means to acquire education and shall guarantee educational diversity in the 
interest of society so as to enable man to be acquainted with the religion of Islam 
and the facts of the Universe for the benefit of mankind. 
(b) Every human being has the right to receive both religious and worldly education 
from the various institutions of education and guidance, including the family, the 
school, the university, the media, etc., and in such an integrated and balanced 
manner as to develop his personality, strengthen his faith in God and promote his 
respect for the defence of both rights and obligations. 
The need for human rights education under Islamic law, is also buttressed by the 
common saying that: "A person will often oppose concepts that he knows nothing about". 
i"" Q39: 9. 
"s Reported by Tirmidhi, See e. g. Karim, F., (1994), supra, note 37 above, Vol. 1, p. 35 1, Hadith No. 38. 
176 Reported by Tirmidhi, AbO Däwud, See Karim, F, ibid, p. 348-349, Hadith No. 32. 
171 ibid. 
'78 Reported by Ibn Mäjah, See Karim, F, ibid., Vol. 1, p. 351, Hadith No., 37. 
X79 Asad, (1980) supra, note 85 above p. 86. 
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Lack of human rights education can (and do) create misconceptions about the international 
human rights objective and actually deny individuals the right to know their rights as human 
beings under both domestic and international law. Human rights education would certainly 
increase the awareness and the understanding necessary for the realisation of the rights that 
everyone is entitled to as human beings. This thus makes human rights education as 
important as the enjoyment of human rights itself. 
THE RIGHT TO CULTURAL LIFE AND BENEFITS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 
Article 15 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: 
(a) To take part in cultural life; 
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the 
development and the diffusion of science and culture. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from 
the encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the 
scientific and cultural fields. 
Cultural life has been described as "everything which makes life worth living" and "that 
which separates human society from its animal counterpart" and thus "closely related to 
human dignity". 180 Its enabling factors would thus include a host of other rights such as 
freedom of association, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, 
right of self-determination, right to be different, and right to education. Culture is however 
one of the distinguishing factors of human society, the scope of which is sometimes very 
difficult to determine. It may be perceived from different dimensions. It is often used to 
describe the way of life of a particular community referring to their customs, civilisation, 
spiritual and material heritage. For instance Article 27 of the ICCPR provides for the right of 
members of minorities "to enjoy their own culture" "in community with the other members 
of their group". Also Article 27 of the UDHR provides for "the right to freely participate in 
cultural life of the community". If this is understood to mean the cultural life of the 
community to which the individual belongs, then the group or community is the cultural 
180 See Adalsteinsson, R., and Thorhallson, P., "Article 27", in Alfredsson, G., and Eide, A., (ed) (1999) supra, note 97 
above, p. 575. 
254 
creator, and the right to cultural life would mean the right of individuals to lead their own 
way of life as members of that community in distinction from others. It in that sense signifies 
the right to be different. That is often the basis for cultural identity and cultural relativism, 
and is sometimes criticised as capable of jeopardising the universal concept of human 
rights. 181 As a matter of reality, it is impossible to deny the natural diversity of cultures 
among the human population of the world. Stavenhagen has pointed out that: "In some 
instances, all or most of a country's population share a common culture; in others, a State is 
made up of a variety of different cultures. s182 The recognition of cultural identity or cultural 
relativism should however not jeopardise the universality of human rights but rather enhance 
it. Article 1 of the UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co- 
operation of 1966,183 had identified that: 
1. Each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and preserved. 
2. Every people has the right and the duty to develop its culture. 
3. In their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal influences they exert on 
one another, all cultures form part of the common heritage belonging to all 
mankind. 
The universality of human rights is actually better projected through the recognition of 
the right to cultural life, because it signifies that individuals can still maintain their diverse 
cultural inclinations within the universal atmosphere of human rights. This is subject only to 
the proviso that discriminatory or other invidious elements of any traditional culture may 
have to be rejected in order to fit into the universal atmosphere of international human rights. 
The challenge that the right to cultural life poses in the context of cultural identity or cultural 
relativism is the need to adequately understand the different cultures and interpret them as 
instruments of universalism in human rights. In that respect and from an Islamic legal 
perspective, the Quranic verse which states that mankind has been created from a single pair 
of male and female and "made into nations and tribes that (they) may know each other" is 
very instructive. 184 
181 See e. g. Donnelly, J., Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (1989) pp. 109-124; and UN Dept. of Public 
Information, Is Human Rights in Jeopardy? (1987). 
182 See Stavenhagen, R., "Cultural Rights and Universal Human Rights", in Eide, A., et al., (ed. ) (1995) supra, note 31 
above, p. 63 at 66. 
183 Adopted on 4 November 1966. See UNESCO's Standard-Setting Instruments, Incorporating Supplement 1, (1982) IV. C. 
'$' Q 49: 13; See also generally Anyaoku, E., Managing Diversity in Our Contemporary World (1997); Mandela, N., 
Renewal and Renaissance: Towards a New World Order (1997); Annan, K., Dialogue of Civilizations And The Need ForA 
World Ethic (1999). 
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It is important to note that the wording of Article 15 (1)(a) of the ICESCR is however 
not qualified with "community", it provides simply for the right of everyone to "take part in 
cultural life". This tends to amplify the recognition of the right to cultural life as an 
individual right. The right to take part in cultural life can certainly also be perceived as "the 
process of artistic and scientific creation", in which case the individual is the cultural creator 
(as an artist, writer or performer) and has the right "to freely create (his own) cultural 
'oeuvres', with no restrictions, and the right of all persons to enjoy free access to these 
creations". 185 This is further expressed in Article 15(1)(c) through the recognition of the right 
of everyone "to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author". 186 It is also very much 
related to freedom of expression of the individual. 
The non-association, in Article 15, of the right to take part in cultural life with "the 
community" does not however de-emphasise the fact that cultural life will often be defined in 
relation to a particular social group or community. Stavenhagen has thus observed that 
cultural rights "can only be enjoyed in community with others and that community must have 
the possibility to preserve, protect and develop what it has in common. " He further stated that 
while the beneficiaries of cultural rights may be individuals, "their content evaporates 
without the preservation and the collective rights of groups. i187 The enjoyment of the right to 
take part in cultural life may thus be fully realised in relation to the identification of a 
particular community, (even if in minority) which preserves such culture and to which the 
individual associates. '88 The general nature of Article 15(1)(a) also has the potential of 
allowing a cross-border participation in cultural life. This would however raise the question 
of whether an individual in a particular State may have the right to practice within it a 
cultural life considered "alien" to that community. Due to their presumed vulnerability in the 
area of right to cultural life, attention is often emphasised on the protection of cultural rights 
of minorities and indigenous peoples. 
The right to cultural life can also be perceived in the universal sense of the accumulated 
material heritage and the universal civilisation of humanity as a whole, and the right of every 
individual to that heritage and civilisation. An extension of this perception would be the 
right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application as recognised 
under Article 15 (1)(b). This is an interpretation of cultural life in developmental terms. 
185 See Stavenhagen, R., (1995), supra, note 182 above, pp. 65-66. 
186 Art. 15(1)(c) ICESCR. 
`$' See Stavenhagen, R., (1995), supra, note 182 above, p. 68. 
`$ c. f. Eide, A., "Cultural Rights as Individual Rights" in Eide, A., et al., (ed. ) (1995), supra, note 31 above, p. 229-240. 
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UNESCO adopted a "Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural 
Life and Their Contribution to It" in 1976, in which it defined participation in cultural life as 
"the concrete opportunities guaranteed for all 
- 
groups or individuals 
- 
to express themselves 
freely, to communicate, act and engage in creative activities with a view to the full 
development of their personalities, a harmonious life and cultural progress of society". 189 It 
has been observed that "(t)his aspect of cultural rights has enormous potential for further 
development in law and society"190 because it would afford the opportunity for everyone to 
have access to and benefit from international scientific progress and thereby contribute to the 
overall enrichment of each individual culture and consequently narrow down the gap of 
diversity between the different cultures of the world. The guidelines for reports under the 
ICESCR suggests a comprehensive perspective by the ESCR Committee, which 
accommodates all the aspects of culture stated above. States Parties are required to provide 
information, inter alia, on: "Promotion of cultural identity as a factor of mutual appreciation 
among individuals, groups, nations and regions"; "Promotion of awareness and enjoyment of 
the cultural heritage of national ethnic groups and minorities and of indigenous peoples" and 
"Preservation and presentation of mankind's cultural heritage". 191 
There is scope within Islamic law for the recognition of the right to cultural life in all the 
contexts analysed above. Defined in terms of community, Islam identifies itself as a religio- 
cultural community (ummah) for every individual that professes to belong or attach to that 
community. It is a universal community that accommodates different tribes and peoples and 
thus transcends geographical and jurisdictional boundaries of the modern nation-state. The 
right to take part in cultural life with other members of the Islamic community could 
therefore often mean with a community beyond the jurisdiction of a State. Although there are 
general religio-cultural norms prescribed by the Shari `ah for the Islamic community, Islamic 
law also recognises the possibility of differences in some cultural practices of the community 
due to the diversity of its members. That was the basis for the recognition of `urf, (known 
practices) and `adät (Customs) of the different tribes and nations that make up the 
community as a subsidiary source of law by all Islamic schools of jurisprudence, and 
especially by the Malikz^ school, provided that such practices and customs are not 
contradictory to the norms of the Qur'an or the Sunnah. 192 Muslims are thus still able to 
'$' November 26,1976. See UNESCO Standard-Setting Instruments, Incorporating Supplement 1 (1982), IV. B. 7, 
Sec. 1(2)(b). 
190 Adalsteinsson, R., and Thorhallson, P., (1999) supra note 180 above, p. 593. 
"' See Art. 15 (1)(c) (d) (0 Revised Guidelines, supra, note 7 above. 
192 See e. g. Doi, A. R., Shari'ah: The Islamic Law (1984) p. 84. 
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maintain their local customs within the scope of the universal Islamic culture. 193 Islamic law 
also recognises the presence of other cultures apart from the Islamic culture. Thus non- 
Muslims are free and entitled to follow their own culture and way of life within the Islamic 
State, subject only to the protection of public order and morality, and in accordance with due 
process of law. Hamidullah has even argued that the traditional rule which prohibited non- 
Muslims from imitating Muslims in dress or other similar social manifestations within the 
Islamic State, was a rule that bolstered the communal culture of non-Muslims within the 
Islamic State, because it enabled them to maintain their own cultural and social 
manifestations within the Islamic State. 194 
The right of the individual to enjoy the benefit resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author is also recognised under Islamic law. So also is 
the right of everyone individually or as part of a group to participate and benefit from the 
accumulated material heritage and the universal civilisation of humanity as a whole. In 
respect of cultural rights, the OIC Cairo Declaration only provides for the right of the 
individual to "enjoy the fruits of his scientific, literary, artistic or technical production and 
the right to protect the moral and material interests stemming therefrom, provided that such 
production is not contrary to the principles of Shari'ah". 195 This does not however 
necessarily exclude the right to the other aspects of cultural life analysed above under Islamic 
law. What Islamic law would obviously prohibit in respect of cultural rights is any cultural 
practice that promotes obscenity and nudity in violation of the moral code of the Shari `ah, 
because the Qur'an has specifically prohibited the spread of lewdness within the Islamic 
society. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is deductible from the above expositions that the economic, social and cultural rights 
recognised under the ICESCR are generally compatible with the Sharjah and realisable 
within the principles of Islamic law. Thus, Islamic law can actually serve as a vehicle for the 
promotion and realisation of economic, social and cultural rights in Muslim States. The 
problem areas concern mainly the issues of women in employment and the concepts of the 
family and of children out of wedlock. While the issue of women in employment in most 
193 See e. g. Second Periodic Report of Jordan (1998), UN Doc. Eli 990/6/Add. 17, Par. 126, where it is stated, inter alia, that: 
"Cultured Jordanians feel that their cultural identity.. 
. 
is open to Arab and Islamic culture... ". 
194 Hamidullah, M, (1977) supra, note 88 above, p. 117-8. 
195 See Art. 16 of the OIC Cairo Declaration on Human Right in Islam (1990). 
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Muslim States has been circumscribed by custom rather than Islamic law per se, the issue of 
the family and children out of wedlock is strictly dictated by the Islamic religion and 
regulated by Islamic law. As has been shown, there is ample room within Islamic law for 
Muslim States to remedy the problem of women in employment and enhance their societal 
roles. However, the question of the family and children out of wedlock involves an Islamic 
religio-moral principle196 and requires the recognition of some margin of appreciation for 
Muslim States as is recommended in the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
For those Muslim States that have ratified the ICESCR, this chapter shows that they 
have an obligation under Islamic law as they do have under international law to respect and 
ensure the economic, social and cultural rights recognised under the Covenant. For those 
Muslim States that have not yet ratified the ICESCR, the foregoing exposition shows that 
their non-ratification does not absolve them from ensuring those rights under Islamic law. 
The analysis can also be of motivational value towards their ratification of the Covenant to 
participate in the international co-operation to ensure the universal guarantee of economic, 
social and cultural rights. 
191 Seep. 238 above. 
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PART THREE: 
Case Studies 
CHAPTER 8 
Case Studies of International Human Rights Policy and 
Practice in Modern Muslim States 
INTRODUCTORY REMARK 
A theoretical comparative between international human rights law and Islamic law is of 
limited value without an examination of the actual practice and policy of Muslim States in 
that regard. This chapter will thus examine the State practice of selected Muslim States as 
case studies on international human rights in modern Muslim States. 
In their practical application of Islamic law, the modern Muslim States may be roughly 
categorised into: (i) countries that fully apply Islamic law as State law, (ii) countries where 
the Shari ah is the underlying principle for the interpretation of statutory laws and codified 
legislation, (iii) countries that apply only Islamic personal law as part of State law, and (iv) 
countries that have adopted complete secularism and do not apply Islamic law as State law at 
all-' 
As it is impossible within the limits of this thesis to examine the State practice of all the 
Muslim States, six countries have been selected within the categories identified above for 
case studies. They are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
Republic of the Sudan, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Republic of Tunisia and the 
Republic of Turkey. These countries reflect almost all the phases of Islamic law application 
by modern Muslim States? As observed by Esposito, the vast majority of the modem 
Muslim States fall between the two poles of "secular" Turkey and "purist" Saudi Arabia. 3 
Saudi Arabia from its inception has been applying full Islamic law based on the traditional 
Sunni (mostly Hanbali) jurisprudence as State law. The Islamic Republic of Iran has also 
been applying full Islamic law based on the Shi `ah (Twelver Ja , fari) jurisprudence since 
cf. Hill E., "Comparative and Historical Study of Modem Middle Eastern Law" (1978) 26 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, p. 279 at 294. See also Arzt, D. E., "The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic 
States" (1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly, 202 at 204; and Karnali, M. H., "Law and Society" in Esposito, J. L., The Oxford 
History of Islam (1999) p. 107 at 151. 
2 The choice of these countries is also informed by the fact that the application of Islamic law has been directly or indirectly 
brought in question in their reports and arguments before the international human rights treaty bodies. 
3 See Esposito, J. L., "Contemporary Islam: Reformation Or Revolution? " in Esposito, J. L., The Oxford History of Islam 
(1999) p. 643 at 651-652. 
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1979. The Sudan re-introduced the full application of Islamic law as State law in 1983 along 
with its previous pluralistic legal system. Pakistan has also adopted the Shari `ah as its 
supreme law and tends to lean towards a moderate interpretation of Islamic law. Tunisia 
applies only Islamic personal law with many reforms as part of its State law. Turkey has 
formally adopted total secularism and does not apply Islamic law at all as State law, but the 
Muslim population still follow Islamic norms in their personal and private lives. This chapter 
will examine the State policy and practice of international human rights within the Islamic 
law dispensation of these Muslim States. The aim here is neither to compare the selected 
States in respect of violations or enforcement of international human rights, nor to research 
into the extent of human rights abuse in any of them. 4 Rather the focus here shall be on 
legislation, State policies and judicial interpretations in the selected countries as general case 
studies of how Muslim States have responded to international human rights law within their 
application of Islamic law. Reference will be made to UN human rights treaty bodies' 
practice and comments on the States where available. In monitoring the guarantee of 
international human rights in Muslim States that apply Islamic law, the specific areas of 
concern has often been constitutional rights, equality and non-discrimination, women's 
rights, and criminal justice. 5 These would thus be the main focus of the case studies followed 
by the general representations on human rights by each of the selected States. 
KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia occupies a very significant position in the Muslim world, 
being the site for the two most important holy mosques of Islam. It thus claims the status of a 
complete Islamic State that must protect Islamic traditional norms, 6 and has been described 
as being "closest to maintaining a `pure' Islamic legal system. "7 Being the cradle of Islam 
and coupled with its wealth, the kingdom has great influence in the Muslim world. Since its 
founding, it has generally retained adherence to the traditional juristic treatises of the four 
° There are already many constantly updated reports by different Human Rights Organisations on human rights violations of 
States. 
5 See e. g. HRC, Comments on Iran, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 23 (1993) and the December 1998 Report on the Situation of 
Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, submitted by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human 
Rights, Mr. Maurice Danby Copithorne, pursuant to Commission Resolution 1998/80, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1999/32. 
6 See Part 1, Par. 2 of Saudi Arabia's Initial Report to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/61/Add. 2 
of 29 March 2000, which states that: "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the cradle of Islam to which Muslims throughout the 
world turn in prayer. It occupies a special place in Muslims' hearts as the guardian of Islam's sacred places". See also Saudi 
Arabian Ministry of Information Internet Website at: http: //www. saudinf. com/main/c4. htm [25/2/2001] where the Islamic 
status of Saudi Arabia is reiterated. 
See Hill. E., (1978) supra, note I above, at 295. See also Walker, J. K., "The Rights of the Accused in Saudi Criminal 
procedure", (1993) 15 Loyola L. A. International and Comparative Law Journal, p. 863. 
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Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence particularly that of the Hanbali school in almost all 
aspects of its State law. 8 The courts however now issue judgements based on the Qur'an and 
Sunnah guided by and not limited to the opinion of any of the four Sunni schools. 9 The 
Kingdom has generally followed a traditional and conservative approach in its interpretation 
and application of Islamic law. 10 That approach had reflected in its State practice right from 
the inception of its participation in the human rights evolution of the UN. It was the only 
Muslim State that abstained in the voting at the UN General Assembly for the adoption of the 
UDHR in 1948 on Islamic grounds. Its representative at the Committee discussions on the 
draft UDHR had objected, inter alia, to the provision on religious liberty (Article 18) and the 
provision on equal rights in marriage (Article 16). The first was on the ground that Islamic 
law does not recognise the right of a Muslim to change his religion and the second on the 
ground that Islamic law prohibits a Muslim woman from marrying a non-Muslim man. I l 
Saudi Arabia's abstention from the adoption of the UDHR was however not to mean a 
total apathy towards the human rights regime of the UN. To date Saudi Arabia has become a 
party to at least 17 international treaties relating to human rights. 12 It has however not yet 
ratified either the ICCPR or the ICESCR. The kingdom follows a cultural relativist approach 
to international human rights and has consistently argued for "a need to develop current 
human rights concepts with reference to humanitarian values enshrined in the various 
religions, civilizations and cultures of the world", and that Islam could play a leading role in 
that regard by enriching "the concept of human rights through its noble moral values and 
principles and its comprehensive way of life, in which rights and obligations were defined in 
a just and equitable manner. "13 While it believes in a universal vision of human rights, the 
8 The Saudi Arabian Judicial Council decided in 1928 (1347A. H) that the jurisprudence of the other schools may also be 
adopted where public interest so demanded. See Qadri, A. A., Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World (1986) p. 464. 
9 See Saudi Arabian Information Website at: http: //www. saudinf. com/main/c2. htm [25/2/2001]. 
1° See e. g. Dudley, J., "Human Rights Practices in the Arab States: The Modem Impact of Shari'a Values" 12 (1982) GA 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 55. 
11 The Pakistani representative had disagreed with the Saudi Arabian representative on the first point relating to religious 
freedom See UN Official Records, 3rd Committee, 3rd Session, 1948-49, Pt. 120; cited in Little, D., Kelsay, J., and 
Sachedina, A., Human Rights and the Conflict of Cultures (1988) pp. 33-52. 
12 Slavery Convention (1926); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, The Slave Trade and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery (1956); Genocide Convention (1948); Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(1965); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); The 1949 Geneva Convention 1; The 1949 Geneva Convention 11; 
The 1949 Geneva Convention III; The 1949 Geneva Convention IV; The 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions; ILO Convention (No 29) Concerning forced Labour (1930); ILO Convention (No 100) Concerning 
Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (1951); ILO Convention (No 105) Concerning 
the Abolition of Forced Labour (1957); ILO Convention (No 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment 
and Occupation (1958). UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination In Education (1960); Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1979). See UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: http: //www, unhchr. ch/html/intlinst. htin 
[25/2/2001] and ILO Conventions Website at: http: //ilolex. ilo. ch: 1567/public/english/docs/convdisp htm [25/2/2001] and 
International Humanitarian Law Treaties Website at: http: //www. icre. orrg/ihl [25/2/2001]. 
See Summary Record of 30`h Meeting (561h Session) of the UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. 
E/CN. 4/2000/SR. 30 of 26 April 2000, Par. 2. 
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kingdom has argued that it "feels no compulsion to adopt" a Western perspective of it, and 
has thus called for a distinction between "legitimate universal rights" and "rights that are 
demanded by those espousing a permissive philosophy in a largely secular society". 14 
Constitutional Rights 
Saudi Arabia affirms the Qur'an as its constitution, 15 and did not have any separate 
statutory constitution or bill of rights prior to 1992. Generally formal laws are quite few in 
the kingdom. While this can actually make it easy for a flexible interpretation of law and 
tradition, 16 it can conversely make it difficult to determine the actual position of laws, 
especially in a system not based on judicial precedents. The previous absence of a formal 
constitution was apparently based on the traditional view that the act of legislation (tashri 
was that of God and thus the enactment of a separate constitution was considered as 
inconsistent with the Shari `ah. " A change of position occurred in 1992 with the enactment 
of the Saudi Arabian Laws of Government consisting of three statutes passed by royal 
decree. 18 Of the three statutes, The Basic Law of Government is the main constitutional 
document, which contains a chapter on rights and duties. This was not considered as new 
legislation (tashri ) but rather a codification (tagnin) of what already existed within the 
Islamic Shari `ah applied in the kingdom. In his speech introducing the statutes, the 
kingdom's monarch, King Fahd, stated that the constitutional reform was necessitated by the 
development of modem life and was "to strengthen something which (was) already in 
operation. " He asserted that despite the absence of a formal constitutional document before 
1992, the Kingdom had never known a "constitutional vacuum" and that "throughout its 
march it has been ruled according to guiding principles and bases and clear fundamentals to 
which judges, ulema and all those employed by the state refer. s19 Whatever way one looks at 
it, the enactment of the laws represents a new approach to the kingdom's interpretation of the 
limitation on legislative powers under Islamic law. This new approach seem to have now 
14 See Saudi Arabian Information Website at: http: //www. saudinf. com/main/x004. htm and also 
h! W: //www. saudiarabiahumanrights. orR/index. html [25/2/2001] for Saudi Arabia's position on Human Rights. 
15 See Art. I of the Saudi Arabian Basic Law of Government (1992). See also note 6 above, Part 1, Par. I (2)(ii). 
16 See Wynn, L., "Marriage Contracts and Women's Rights in Saudi Arabia" in WLUML, Special Dossier: Shifting 
Boundaries in Marriage and Divorce in Muslim Communities (1996) p. 106. 
17 See Aba-Namay, R., "The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia" (1993) 42 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly p. 295. 
18(1) The Basic Law of Government; (2)The Consultative Council Establishment Decree; and (3) The Regional Authorities 
Establishment Decree. 
19 See King Fahd's speech introducing the New Statutes reproduced in Bulloch, J., Reforms of the Saudi Arabian 
Constitution (1992) pp. 30-37. 
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recognised the possibility of legislating under Islamic law "(w)ithout in any way trespassing 
upon the function reserved exclusively for God of making law". 20 
Chapter 5 of the Basic Law21 (Art. 23-43) defines rights and duties within the kingdom 
and can be considered as the country's first and formal attempt of enacting a "bill of rights" 
in modem constitutional terms. The inclusion of a "bill of rights" in the Basic Law 
demonstrates a formal and definite recognition of the concept of constitutional rights within 
the kingdom's Islamic polity. Article 26 of the Basic Law however makes it clear that "The 
State shall protect human rights in accordance with Islamic Shari`ah. "ZZ This was reiterated 
in the introductory speech of King Fahd, that "(t)he pillar and source of the basic statute is 
the Islamic Shari'ah, as the statute has been guided by the Islamic Shari'ah in defining the 
nature, the objectives and the responsibilities of the state, and in defining other relationship 
between the ruler and the ruled". 23 This was to emphasise that the Shari `ah was still the 
grundnorm of the nation. A major importance of the Basic Law in modern constitutional 
terms is that it makes a definite statement on the obligations of the State and the rights of the 
individuals for which the State may be indicted for any violations. 
The Basic Law contains a list of only a few clear but important rights. Those related to 
civil and political rights are: right to private propert y24; the right to security for all citizens 
and residents; freedom from arrest, imprisonment and restrictions "except under the 
provisions of the law"25 ; the right to privacy- the home is declared inviolable and "shall not 
be entered without the permission of their owners, nor shall they be searched except in cases 
specified by the law", 
26 and "(a)ll forms of correspondence, whether conveyed by telegraph, 
post, or any other means of communication shall be considered sacrosanct, (t)hey may not 
be confiscated, delayed or read, and telephones may not be tapped except as laid down in the 
law". 27; freedom from criminal responsibility or penalty except in accordance with the law28; 
the right to political asylum29; the right to complain30 and the equal right to litigation. 31. 
Rights relating to economic, social and cultural rights that appear to be guaranteed by the 
20 See Faruki, K. A., Evolution of Islamic Constitutional Theory and Practice (1971) p. 4. 
21 The English version of the Saudi Basic Law of Government used in this research is the translation available on the Saudi 
Arabian Information Website at: http: /hvww. saudinf. com/main/c54l f htm [25/02/2001]. 
22 Article I had preceded with the provision that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State with Islam 
as its religion and the Holy Qur'an and the Prophet's Sunnah as its Constitution. 
23 See Bulloch, J., (1992) supra, note 19 above, p. 33. 
24 Art. 18 and 19 of the Basic Law. 
25 Art. 36 ibid. 
26 Art. 37 ibid. 
27 Art. 40 ibid. 
28 Art. 38 ibid. 
29 Art. 42 ibid. 
30 Art. 43 ibid. 
31 Art. 47 ibid. 
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Basic Law are: the right to social security (rights of the citizen and his family in cases of 
emergency, disease, disability, and old age); 32 the right to work (job opportunities to all able- 
bodied people); 33 the right to public education34 and the right to health care35. From both 
Islamic law and international human rights perspectives, the rights contained in the Basic 
Law are quite limited and incomplete. 
Many important human rights such as right to life; prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment; freedom of expression; freedom of association and assembly; 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion and women's rights are excluded from the Basic 
Law. The Kingdom may wish to contend that these are rights that are already covered and 
provided for within the Islamic Shari `ah which has been declared as the pillar and basis for 
the Basic Law. For instance, in 1990 before the enactment of the Basic Law, King Fahd in 
response to a question on human rights in the kingdom answered that "the freedom of the 
individual in this country is secured by the Islamic faith in practice. Expression, rights and 
duties, as long as they do not harm others, and not violate Islamic teachings or existing rules, 
are permitted". 36 However, since the kingdom had taken the bold step towards 
constitutionalism and adopted a bill of rights, which provide a definite codification of 
constitutional rights and duties, it would have greatly enhanced the Basic Law and the State 
practice of the kingdom in respect of international human rights to have included all possible 
rights available under the Shari `ah and which the kingdom guarantees. An important aspect 
of human rights guarantees is to be able to determine what the rights themselves are. It would 
be very contentious for the kingdom to claim either that those few rights listed in the Basic 
Law are the most important rights under the Shari `ah or that those are the only specific rights 
that the Shari `ah guarantees. During conferences on the Shari `ah and human rights held in 
Riyadh, Paris, Vatican City, Geneva and Strasbourg between 1972 and 1974 under the 
auspices of the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Justice, the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and 
the World Council of Churches in Geneva, eminent Saudi Arabian Islamic jurists and 
scholars had confirmed that the Shari 'ah guaranteed comprehensive human rights that 
obviously exceeds the present list of rights contained in the Basic law. 
37 
32 Art. 27 ibid. 
33 Art. 28 ibid. 
34 Art. 30 ibid. 
35 Art. 31 ibid. 
36 See BBC, Summary of World Broadcasting, 10 Nov., 1990 ME/0918 A/1 cited in Aba-Namey (1993) note 17 above, p. 
325. 
37 For a report of the proceedings of the Conferences See Al-Dawalibi, M. M., Nadäwät 'Ilmiyyah Hawl al-Shar? 'ah al- 
Islämiyyah Wa Huqüq al-Insänli al-Islam (Arabic) (n. d). See also Conference of Riyad on Moslem Doctrine And Human 
Rights In Islam [March 23,19721 at Saudi Embassy News Website: http: //www. saudiembassy. net/press release/hr- 
72. htm] [7/03/2001]. 
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The codification of all the possible rights guaranteed by the Shari `ah in the Saudi Basic 
law would certainly have produced a more complete bill of rights. Such an approach would 
have provided a positive guarantee by the State assuring that individuals could actually seek 
remedy for violation of any of all their rights guaranteed under the Shari `ah. From an 
international human rights perspective the need for the inclusion of all possible rights 
guaranteed by the Shari `ah in the Saudi Arabian Basic Law is further demanded by the fact 
that the kingdom has not yet ratified either of the two major international human rights 
covenants. Such codification of the full Shari `ah rights would have provided a constitutional 
guarantee and definite statutory point of reference in the event of any violations of the rights. 
With regard to enforcement, the Basic Law does not provide for any independent 
enforcement mechanism for the stated rights, but provides in Article 43 that: 
"The "Majlis" of the King and the "Majlis" of the Crown Prince shall be open to all 
citizens and to anyone who may have a complaint or a grievance. Every individual 
shall have the right to communicate with public authorities regarding any topic he 
may wish to discuss. " 
Bulloch has observed that this provision is "plainly a codification of the old tradition of 
the tribal meeting, but it does give any citizen a right to redress if he feels himself wronged, 
or if he wants to seek help. "38 The adequacy of this provision may be questionable in 
complex cases of human rights violations, especially where such violations arise from direct 
acts of State. That is, would the King or Crown Prince be gracious enough to find human 
rights violations against itself? Under traditional Islamic law, a Board of Grievances or 
Complaints Tribunal (mazälim) existed before the enactment of the Basic Law, with 
jurisdiction to hear and investigate grievances and complaints of individuals against 
government agencies and officials. 39 It was however divested of the jurisdiction to entertain 
grievances against any act of State in 1982.40 That restriction can be said to have deviated 
from the classical mazd1im rules, which gave wider powers that covered even the acts of the 
rulers. 41 Article 53 of the Basic Law however provides that: "The law defines the structure 
and jurisdiction of the Court of Grievances". This provision is exploitable to re-assert the 
38 Bulloch, J., (1992) supra, note 19 above, p. 6. 
39 The Board was established by Decree No. 2/13/9759 in 1955. See Long, D. E., "The Board of Grievances in Saudi Arabia" 
(1973) 27 Middle East Journal, p. 72. 
4° See Art. 9 Revised Regulations of the Board of Grievances. Decree M/51 of 1982. See also Aba-Namay, R., " (1993) 
supra, note 17 above, p. 321. 
41 See Chapter 4, pp. 66-68 above on Mazalim. See also Long, D. E., (1973) supra, note 39 above. 
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wide traditional prerogatives of the Court of Grievances (mazälim) as defined under 
traditional Islamic law. 42 
Despite obvious procedural difficulties and vagueness, it is deducible from a 
combination of Articles 43 and 47 of the Basic Law, as observed by Bulloch, that "any 
transgression (at least upon the rights contained in the Basic Law) can be taken up in the 
Courts" 43 This apparently provides a framework upon which the enforcement of human 
rights can be established. That would however require sincere political and humanitarian will 
from the State and courage on the part of the courts in redressing the violation of rights. The 
practical questions that arise here are: (i) whether the victims of violations would be 
courageous enough to test the provisions of the Basic law in the Courts, and (ii) what type of 
interpretations would the Courts place on the provisions even if they do. 44 The above 
analysis imagines positive interpretations of the provisions of the Basic Law. However, 
going by the fact that human rights advocacy is not common in the kingdom and coupled 
with the conservative approach of the courts, the adoption of hard-line interpretations of the 
Shari `ah could certainly claw back any rights that may be apparent in the Basic Law. For 
instance, the religious volunteers known as the mutaw `ah responsible for maintaining 
religious morals and norms within the society are reported to sometimes infringe upon the 
civil rights of people "in order to impose their own strict interpretation of Islam 
. 
"45 They are 
reported to raid private homes, incarcerate people for partying, and harass people in public 
for improper dressing and behaviour, e. t. c. 46 Complaints against such violations could 
certainly be brought under Articles 36 and 37 of the Basic Law to test the ability of the 
Courts in the enforcement of the constitutional rights guaranteed under the Basic Law. 47 
Equality and Non-discrimination 
The Saudi Arabian Basic Law of Governance does not contain a specific provision on 
equality and non-discrimination. However its initial report on the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child stated its policy on equality and non-discrimination as follows: 
42 See ibid. on the classical jurisdiction of the Court of Grievances (mazälim). 
"' Bulloch, J., (1992) supra, note 19 above p. 7. Article 47 of the Saudi Basic Law provides that: "Both citizens and foreign 
residents have an equal right to litigation. The necessary procedures are set forth by the law. " 
44 No such case has so far been recorded since the enactment of the Basic Laws in 1992. 
45 Aba-Namay, R., (1993) supra, note 17 above p. 326. 
46 ibid. 
47 Art. 36 provides that: "The State shall ensure the security of all its citizens and expatriates living within its domains. No 
individual shall be detained, imprisoned or have his actions restricted except under the provisions of the law. " and Art. 37 
provides that: "Houses are inviolable. They shall not be entered without permission of their owners, nor shall they be 
searched except in cases specified by the law. " 
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"In this context, (i. e. non-discrimination) it should be noted that the System of 
Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adopts two important principles: 
(i) Justice, equality and non-discrimination between kin and strangers, and non- 
bias towards the strong at the expense of the weak ('God commands justice, 
the doing of good... '). In the words of the Prophet: "By God, if my daughter 
Fatima were to steal, I would cut off her hand. " 
(ii) The application of Islamic law to all persons. Rights are guaranteed equally 
to all individuals irrespective of their race, sex or other considerations. The 
law is applicable to all without partiality and all the judicial, social and 
cultural systems are based on this principle. Moreover, the Kingdom shows 
due concern for children deprived of a family environment or afflicted with a 
disability with a view to ensuring their enjoyment of all their rights on an 
equal footing with other children. "4$ 
It then concluded that Saudi society is based on justice and equity and "strongly rejects 
all forms of discrimination. It never discriminates between the strong and the weak, man, 
woman or child. All of them enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the regulations, 
based on Islamic law, which are applicable in the Kingdom without discrimination of any 
kind, irrespective of their colour, sex, ethnic origin, age or religion. "49 The country's policy 
of non-discrimination was reiterated at the 56th Session of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights by the Saudi Arabian deputy minister for foreign affairs, who stated inter alia that in 
Saudi Arabia, "equal rights were granted to citizens and foreign residents", "exercise of 
freedom of expression and assembly was not prohibited, providing it was neither prejudicial 
to public order nor detrimental to public morals"; "Non-Muslims enjoyed all the basic rights 
and freedoms guaranteed to Muslim residents (and) they had full freedom to engage in their 
religious observances in private"; "No non-Muslim had ever been subjected to prosecution or 
punishment on religious grounds; indeed, it was a punishable offence to subject them to any 
interference or harassment". 50 While these assertions may be controvertible in practice, they 
no doubt demonstrate the country's recognition as State policy the obligation of equality and 
non-discrimination and can serve, at least as a moral basis, for challenging violations of the 
principle by the State. 
Women's Rights 
The Basic Law is also silent on the rights of women. It is obvious however that Saudi 
Arabia implements a hard-line and conservative interpretation of Islamic principles regarding 
48 See note 6 above, at Par. 40. 
49 ibid., Par. 45. 
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the role and participation of women in society. It is the only Muslim State where women are 
prohibited from driving cars based on extended interpretations of protecting public morality 
and the dignity of women. Before 1990 the prohibition of women from driving was not 
backed by any specific legislation but was a well-known practice in the kingdom. In 1990 
some professional women demonstrated by driving their cars in the capital city, Riyadh, in 
violation of the ban. 1 The women were arrested. The protest led to the issuance of a legal 
opinion (fatwä) by the kingdom's Grand Council of Ulamä stating that women should not be 
allowed to drive because the Shari `ah provides for the protection of women's dignity and 
that driving exposes the dignity of women to harm and was therefore un-Islamic. 52 
Subsequent thereof, the Ministry of Interior issued a formal directive prohibiting women 
from driving and stating that any woman who did so would be punished appropriately to 
deter others. 53 
Before the driving demonstration, the women had in a letter sent to the governor of the 
capital city, Riyadh, challenged the moral excuse of protecting women's dignity as basis to 
prohibit them from driving. They sought for a more moderate interpretation of the Shari 'ah 
and also cited the Prophet's Tradition, the practice of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs and 
that of the "early believers" to support their own claim that driving by women is not 
"something ruled out by our religion and its tolerant teachings". 54 The argument of the 
women (which would stand valid in other Muslim States) against that of the authority in 
Saudi Arabia, demonstrated the differences that could arise between a hard-line and a 
moderate interpretation of the Shari 'ah in modem Muslim States. Answering questions from 
Committee members during the consideration of its initial report on the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, Saudi Arabia's representative, Mr. Al-Nasser, confirmed that "there was 
no religious text prohibiting a woman from driving a car" but that "the scholars (in Saudi 
Arabia) had established general principles designed to protect the stability of society and to 
preserve its norms and traditions". He further stated that: "When the majority were in favour 
of a change in existing traditions, the rules would be amended to reflect that change". 55 
50 See UN Doc E/CN. 4/2000/SR. 30 of 26 April 2000, Par. 6 and 7. 
s' See Aba-Namay, (1993) supra, note 17 above, p. 300. 
52 See e. g. Zaraboso, M. A. (Trans) Islamic Fatawa Regarding Women, (1996) p. 310. 
S' See e. g. Aba-Namay, (1993) supra, note 17 above, p. 300, n. 20 See also Doumato, E. A., "The Ambiguity of Shari'a and 
the Politics of `Rights' in Saudi Arabia" in Afkhami, M., (ed. ) Faith and Freedom, Women's Human Rights in the Muslim 
World (1995)p. 135 at 139-140. 
54 See Doumato, E. A., (1995) ibid, pp. 139-140. 
55 See Summary Record of the 688` Meeting of the CRC: Saudi Arabia, UN Doc. CRC/C/SR. 688 of 24/10/2001, Par. 2. 
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In the sphere of personal status law, the traditional jurisprudence is still the applicable 
law in Saudi Arabia. 56 A conservative application of the traditional interpretations of the law 
does, from international human rights standards, suppress the rights of women in many 
ways. 57 Wynn, in her research on women's rights in Saudi Arabia, identified that unlike other 
Muslim States Saudi Arabia "has not had a significant legal or political debate over personal 
status law affecting women. " She observed that most of the rules that impinge on the rights 
of women are informal and traditional. She however established that Saudi women, 
especially the urban middle class women, are now more aware of their Islamic rights and 
subtly adopt different strategies to improve their lot within the Shari `ah in matters of 
education, marriage, and labour market participation. 58 This is not unconnected with the 
increased level of female education in the kingdom, and their exposure to the views of many 
Muslim women's rights advocates who propose a moderate alternative to hard-line 
interpretations of the Shari `ah to enhance women's rights in the Muslim world. It is 
interesting to observe however that statements have began to emerge from within the Saudi 
ruling authority expressing what seem to indicate a move towards a public dialogue on the 
role of women in Saudi society. In a recent speech, the Crown Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdul- 
Aziz, who is a Deputy Premier and Commander of the National Guards, fired what has been 
described as "the first trigger for the dialogue on the Saudi woman and forward moving of 
her role (sic)". The Crown Prince was quoted to have expressed the need to re-examine the 
role of Saudi women towards their religion and country. He said: "We will not allow 
anything to be said that we, in Saudi Arabia diminish the status of our mothers, sisters and 
daughters, " and concluded that "we need a dialogue that takes the social relations into 
consideration" a dialogue, according to him, that "will lead to defining the role of women 
and to changing the attitudes towards her and to consider her related to the man and therefore 
participates with him in the formation of society". 59 With respect to women driving cars, 
another Saudi official was reported to have indicated that the obstacles were more technical 
than social or religious, such as the present non-availability of female police officers to deal 
with female drivers. 60 
56 e. g. in marriage, divorce, inheritance, property rights, e. t. c. 
57 See Chapter 6 pp. 109-16 above. 
s$ See generally Wynn, L., (1996) supra, note 16 above, p. 106. 
S9 See "Saudi Women Have a Role in Society and the Western Model is not Applicable" Ain al- Yaqeen, Weekly Arab 
Political Magazine, April 30,1999, Online Edition at: 
hgp: //www. ain-al-vageen-conVissues/19990430/featSen. htm [25/2/2001] 
b0 ibid. In Saudi Arabia public intermingling between men and women is very restricted, except during the pilgrimage 
seasons when the rules are relaxed due to the presence of large numbers of foreign pilgrims in the country. 
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In his submission before the 56th Session of UN Commission on Human Rights, the 
Saudi Arabian deputy foreign minister stated in respect of women rights that: 
"All legislation applied equally to both sexes. Indeed, the Islamic shariah did not 
discriminate between men and women with regard to their duties and obligations. 
His Government was endeavouring to ensure that women enjoyed all their legally 
recognized rights and was pleased to report that educational enrolment among girls 
amounted to 95 percent and female illiteracy had declined sharply to 15 per cent. 
The state also provided grants and appropriate accommodation for female students... 
Education 
- 
especially female education- constituted the cornerstone for the 
advancement and development of society. 9961 
To further demonstrate its recognition of women's right under international human 
rights law Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women on 7 September 2000 with the following reservations: "(1). In case of contradiction 
between any term of the Convention and the norms of Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under 
obligation to observe the contradictory terms of the Convention. (2). The Kingdom does not 
consider itself bound by paragraph 2 of article 9 of the Convention and paragraph 1 of article 
. 
29 of the Convention. " 62 
Islamic Criminal Justice 
Criminal justice is conducted in Saudi Arabia according to strict Islamic law. All the 
hudüd punishments are enforced. 63 As analysed earlier, one of the safeguards against the 
severe criminal punishments under Islamic law is that the highest degree of fairness and due 
process of law must be ensured. This includes that the trials must be public, the innocence of 
an accused person must be presumed until guilt is proved, the accused must be given every 
opportunity of defence, guilt must be proved beyond every iota of doubt and the rule of law 
must be generally respected. 
TM International human rights watchers have however questioned 
the level of fairness in the Saudi Arabian criminal justice in these respects. Particular 
reference has been made to closed-door trials in the kingdom, which makes the violation of 
other principles of fair trial possible. 
65 As earlier identified in Chapter 6, Islamic law 
61 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/2000/SR. 30 of 26 April 2000, Par. 9. 
62 See UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: 
http"//untreatytin. ora/ENGLISH/bible/engiishintemetbible/partI/chapterlV/treaty2. asp [26/2/2001]. 
63 See Chapter 4 pp. 72-80 above. 
64 See Chapter 6 pp. 114-51 above. 
65 See e. g. Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia, Behind Closed Doors: Unfair Trials in Saudi Arabia (MDE 23/08/97) and 
Human Rights Watch, "Saudi Arabia" in World Report 1999. See also Walker, J. K., (1993), supra, note 7 above, at 874; 
and Moore, R. H., "Courts, Law, Justice and Criminal Trials in Saudi Arabia" (1987) 11 International Journal of 
Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, No. 1., p. 61 at 66. 
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requires that all trials must be in public except for reasons of state security or protection of 
public order and morality. Thus a complete resort to closed criminal trials not only violates 
international human rights rules of fair trial, but is also a departure from the ordinary fair trial 
rules of Islamic criminal justice. 66 Although Article 36 of the Saudi Basic Law provides that 
"No individual shall be detained, imprisoned or have their actions restricted except under the 
provisions of the law", there is no specific provision for habeas corpus, which in effect can 
allow for unlimited detention periods while criminal cases are investigated or prepared. 
67 
For the above reasons it has been argued that the Saudi Arabian criminal justice system 
caters "primarily for the might of the state at the expense of the rights of the individual". 
68 
To demonstrate human rights consciousness in its criminal justice system Saudi Arabia 
has issued a document titled "Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Procedure and in the 
Organization of the Judicial System (2000)"69 giving a "description of criminal and judicial 
procedure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and provisions for the protection of human rights 
during the three well-known stages of criminal proceedings: the pre-trial stage; the trial; and 
the post trial stage". 70 The document states, inter alia, in its introduction that the Kingdom is 
conscious of the need to respect human rights in its criminal justice system. It points out that 
many of the old regulations "are being amended in a manner consistent with its development 
in all fields" and that "the draft codes of criminal and civil procedure and the draft code 
regulating exercise of the legal profession, which, God willing, will soon enter into force 
following their approval, constitute a highly significant development in criminal procedure in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and clearly express the attentive concern that the Kingdom is 
showing for internationally recognized principles of human rights which are consistent with 
the Islamic Shariah. "71 (emphasis added) 
The document gives a detail of the Kingdom's rules and regulations designed to ensure 
the protection of human rights in respect of criminal investigation, criminal examination, 
trials, judicial structure, judicial safeguards, penalties and special safeguards. It states in 
respect of criminal investigation and examination that evidence "obtained by unlawful means 
I See note 64 above. 
67 See e. g. Human Rights Watch, Empty Reforms, Saudi Arabia's New basic Laws (1992) p. 26; Walker, J. K., (1993) supra, 
note 7 above, p. 872; and Dudley, J., (1982) supra, note 10 above, p. 76. Under the Principles of Arrest, Temporary 
Confinement and Preventive Detention Regulations issued in 1983 by the Ministry of Interior, detainees could be held for a 
period of fifty-one days upon which their detention may be reviewed by the regional governor of minister of interior, 
otherwise detainees could be held indefinitely. See Human Rights Watch, "Saudi Arabia" in World Report 1999. 
68 See Amnesty International, Behind Closed Doors, supra, note 65 above, p. 1. 
69 KSA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Procedure and in the Organization of the 
Judicial System (2000). For an Official English Translation of this document See Saudi Embassy News Website at: 
htt, 2: //www. saudiel-nbassV. net/press release/hr-judicial-l-menu. html [7/03/2001]. 
70 ibid. 3`d Preambular Paragraph. 
71 ibid. Introduction, Last 3 Paragraphs thereof. 
272 
constituting a violation of human rights of (the) accused person" is inadmissible and that 
necessary measures are taken "to ensure that the person responsible for such violation is 
brought to justice since the Kingdom has issued strict instructions prohibiting the ill- 
treatment or harassment of accused persons and stipulating that investigations must be 
conducted in a meticulous and proper manner". 
72 The State acknowledges that: "Society's 
right to punish the guilty must be reconciled with the need to safeguard the freedom and 
dignity of the accused and their right to defend themselves" and that the accused person has 
the right to "avail himself of the services of a lawyer or legal representative. " Articles 14,48 
and 50(1) of Regulatory Schedule appended to the Statute of the Public Investigation and 
Prosecution Department, recognises the accused person's right not to be separated from his 
lawyer or legal representative during interrogation and the right to contact his lawyer or legal 
representative. 73 Article 59 of the Administrative Rules of Procedure of Judicial Bodies also 
provide that: "Every person has an unrestricted right to appoint a legal counsel". 
Regarding public trials, the document refers to Article 33 of the Statute of the Judiciary 
which provides that "Court-hearings shall be held in public unless the court decides to hold 
them in camera in order to safeguard morality, family privacy or public order. In all cases, 
the judgement shall be handed down at a public hearing". Also Article 70 of the 
Administrative Rules of Procedure of Judicial Bodies provides that: "Pleadings shall be made 
in public except in circumstances in which the court believes that confidentiality is required 
in the interests of morality" and Article 15 of the Rules of Procedure of the Board of 
Grievances provides that: "Hearings shall be held in public unless the Division believes that 
confidentiality is required in the interests of morality or in order to safeguard public order. 
However, in all cases, the judgement must be handed down at a public hearing". 74 Public 
hearing is stated to mean that "everyone can attend and observe the trial proceedings without 
any restriction other than the need to safeguard public morality or maintain order in the 
courtroom". 
75 The document also states that "litigants are not required to pay fees or costs in 
respect of the legal hearing, even if they lose their case. " This strengthens the principle of 
equality before the law as it prevents "justice being monopolized by those able to afford it". 76 
The importance of the practical implementation of the rules is acknowledged in the 
conclusion of the document which states that: 
72 ibid. I. The Pre-Trial Stage: (2) Criminal Examination in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Par. 8. 
73 ibid. (a) The Characteristics of Criminal Examination, Par. 2 and 6; and (b) Remand in Custody, Par. 4. 
74 ibid. II. The Trial Stage, Par. 6(c) The Public Nature of Hearings. 
73 ibid. 
76 ibid. II. The Trial Stage, Par. (6)(b) Exemption from Fees. 
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"The Kingdom guided by the provisions of the Shariah, has established bodies for 
the administration of criminal justice and has promulgated rules and directives that 
regulate all stages of criminal procedure and constitute the cornerstone for the 
legislative protection of human rights in the Kingdom. In order to ensure that these 
texts do not provide only theoretical protection, lacking in essence and devoid of 
substance, the judicial authority in the Kingdom acts as the natural guardian of rights 
and freedoms and ensures strict compliance with those rules and directives by 
monitoring the legality of all stages of criminal procedure, thereby ensuring that 
those texts, far from being regarded as mere provisions on paper, are actually put into 
practice" 77 
Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment on 23 September 1997. It however entered reservations 
not to be bound by Article 3(1)78 and also denied the jurisdiction of the Committee Against 
Torture under Article 20 of the Convention. 79 These reservations are obviously instigated by 
the positions of UN treaty bodies and most Western nations that some Islamic criminal 
punishments violate the international law prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment and punishment. The reservation to Article 20 thus saves the kingdom 
from being called before the Committee Against Torture to defend the enforcement of 
Islamic criminal punishments which are applicable in Saudi Arabia. The reservation to 
Article 3(1) is also apparently aimed at inhibiting reliance on that Article to prevent return of 
offenders on grounds that they "would be in danger of being subjected to torture" through the 
application of Islamic criminal punishments. 
80 Saudi Arabia strongly opposes the view that 
Islamic criminal punishments violate the prohibition of torture, or are inhuman or degrading. 
It has been claimed for instance that: "(m)any Saudi Arabians would tell you that forty lashes 
are far more humane than a year or two in jail". $' The low rate of crime and violence in the 
Kingdom has also been strongly advocated as justification. 82 
Saudi Arabia occupies a position in the Muslim world that is comparable to that of the 
Holy See in Christendom. 83 Its conservative approach should therefore be understood as an 
attempt to conserve the traditional and orthodox practices of the Islamic faith. The 
77 ibid. Conclusion, Par. 2. 
78 Art. 3(1) provides that "No state party shall expel, return ('refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture" 
79 See UN., Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, Status as at 31/12/99, Vol. 1, Part 1, Chapter Ito XI, 
214. 
tO See e. g. the case ofJabari 
. 
v. Turkey under the European Convention. (2000) 9 Butterworths Human Rights Cases, Part 
1., p. l. 
$i This claim is quoted from the Website on Saudi Arabia's position on Human rights at: 
ht! p: //www. saudiarabiahumanriphts-orglghuinanr. htni [visited 25/2/2001]. $Z ibid. 
83 See e. g. the similarity in tone of the Statements of the Delegation of Saudi Arabia and the Delegation of the Holy See at 
the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights at Website: http: //www. unhchr. ch/html/menu5/d/statemnt/saoudi. htm and 
hiip: //www. unhchr. ch/htmi/menu5/d/statenint/hoiysce. htni respectively [25/2/2001]. 
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preservation of Islamic culture and identity was, and continues to be a powerful instrument of 
legitimacy for the Saudi ruling authority. While the political authority endeavours to 
demonstrate that it is committed to the international human rights objective of the UN, it is 
also very conscious of the censorship of the traditional Ulamä' who are considered by 
society as the actual custodians and preservers of Islamic traditions and norms. The Ulamä' 
consider themselves as the conscience of the society and in a position to reproach the 
political authority of transgressing the Shari `ah in case of any wholesale adoption of 
international norms that completely overrides traditional Islamic practices. The State thus as 
a matter of practice usually enters reservations on grounds of Islamic law in its ratification of 
international human rights treaties to the effect that the government of the kingdom will 
implement international conventions in a manner that does not conflict with the Shari'ah or 
Islamic law. Reservations are generally permissible under international law where not 
specifically prohibited by a treaty and subject also to the rule that it must not be incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty. 84 But considering Islamic law as Saudi Arabia's 
domestic law, the question would arise as to whether such general reservations are not 
conflictive of the international law rule that a party to an international treaty "may not invoke 
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty". 85 
General Representations on Human Rights 
Recent representations on human rights by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reiterate its 
cultural relativist stance to the international human rights regime. In October 1998, the 
kingdom submitted its first report to any international human rights treaty committee, i. e. its 
initial report on the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 86 The very comprehensive report 
refers extensively to the fact that Islamic law "considers the observance of human rights to be 
an act of worship that entails ordained duties"87 and that "Saudi Arabia abides by the 
teachings of Islam in the field of human rights. "88 It further buttressed "its deep-rooted faith 
in human rights and dignity as prescribed in Islam", 89 by reference inter alia, to the rights 
provisions under its Basic Laws of Government and its ratification of the OIC Cairo 
84 See Art. 19 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 UNTS 331. See also General Comment 24 of the 
HRC on Issues Relating to Reservations, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 6 of 2 November, 1994. 
eS See Art. 27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 UNTS 331. See also e. g. Lijnzaad, L., Reservations 
to UN-Human Rights Treaties, Ratify and Ruin? (1995) p. 320-324. 
86 UN Doc. CRC/C/61/Add. 2 of 26 March 2000. 
$7 ibid., Par. 9. 
$$ ibid., Par. 13. 
89 ibid., Par. 14. 
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Declaration of Human Rights in Islam. With respect to its judiciary, the report contended 
also that "the judiciary in the Kingdom shows due regard for human rights since it is 
important, in the interests of security, peace of mind and personal dignity, that everyone 
should feel that he is fully protected from injustice, that there are regulations to protect him 
and society and that any accusation made against him or others will not be taken at face value 
but will be duly investigated and verified. "90 The Chairperson observed after the session on 
the consideration of the report that: "While the Committee had not always been in agreement 
with aspects of Saudi Arabia's interpretation of the Convention, she expressed appreciation 
for the delegation's co-operative approach". 91 In its Concluding Observations, the Committee 
stated notably that: "Noting the universal values of equality and tolerance inherent in Islam, 
the Committee observes that narrow interpretations of Islamic texts by State authorities are 
impeding the enjoyment of many human rights protected under the Convention" 
. 
9z 
At the fifty-sixth session of the Commission of Human Rights in April 2000, the Saudi 
Arabian deputy minister for foreign affairs, Prince Torki ben Saud al-Kabeer, had stated, 
inter alia, that Saudi Arabia "could boast outstanding human rights achievements and looked 
forward to making ongoing improvement". 93 In that respect he observed that the country has 
established a mechanism for investigating allegations of torture and other individual abuses 
in fulfilment of its obligations under the Torture Convention, and had invited the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers to conduct an in situ mission to Saudi 
Arabia. The Saudi Arabian public was, according to him, also "being sensitized to human 
rights, the emphasis being placed on the application of humanitarian principles. " 94 He also 
referred to the fact that Saudi Arabia had submitted its candidacy for membership of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights and that this demonstrated "the importance it attached to 
international cooperation on human rights issues. "95 
As is the case with every State Party report to international human rights treaties the 
practical veracity of the assertions are not be taken for granted and are contestable and 
subject to verification. The important point established from these representations however 
is that there is demonstration of a State policy by Saudi Arabia that it recognises an 
obligation in respect of international human rights. The country however also continues to 
emphasise its commitment to Islamic law and in that regard pursues a cultural relativist 
90 ibid., Par. 16. 
91 See note 55 above Par. 90. 
92 CRC Concluding Observations on Saudi Arabia (2001), UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add. 148 of 26/1/2001, Par. 6. 
93 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/2000/SR. 30 of 26 April 2000, supra, Par. 3. 
94 ibid., Par. 3 and 4. 
9s ibid.. Par. 4. 
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argument in its international human rights policy. It has expressed concern that "some 
members of the international community appeared to have difficulty in understanding human 
rights within the context of Islam" and has thus declared "a need for constructive dialogue 
among the various civilizations and cultures, with a view to ensuring protection of the human 
person and human rights. s96 Such a constructive dialogue would certainly also demand a 
more moderate Islamic law approach on the part of Saudi Arabia for substantive 
reconciliation especially in respect of women's rights and roles in society. As demonstrated 
by the representations of the ruling authority, the country's recent practice tends to move 
slowly and cautiously in that direction. 
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
Iran was declared an Islamic Republic in 1979 after the revolution that ousted the Shah 
monarchy. 97 Since then Islamic law based on the Shi `ah (Twelver Ja fart) school of 
jurisprudence has been applied as State law in Iran. A study of the resolutions of UN General 
Assembly and the reports of the HRC puts Iran on the list of States that has attracted many 
resolutions and reports questioning their human rights practice. While there may be political 
reasons for this, 98 the application of Islamic law has been either expressly or implicitly 
referred to as a factor that has contributed to violations of human rights in Iran from 1979 
when it became an Islamic Republic. 
From its inception, the ideological stand of the Islamic Republic of Iran revealed an 
intention to challenge the hegemony of the Western nations in the existing international 
system. The first leader of the Republic, Imam Ayatollah Khomeini, criticised the existing 
international order, which he argued, was controlled by the West and East under the 
domination of the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union respectively. The 
two blocks, according to him, were sources of the world's contemporary problems. Iran thus 
adopted the non-aligned slogan of "Neither West nor East, only Islam" (lä garbiyyah wa lä 
sharqiyyah, jamhüriyyah Islämiyyah) indicating its intention to strictly follow an Islamic 
policy opposed to the dominating ideologies of both the West and the East. 
99 The bitterness 
was however greater against the West, particularly the USA because it opposed the Iran 
96 ibid., Par. 10. 
97 For a background on the Islamic Revolution See e. g. Monshipouri, M., Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the 
Middle East (1998) pp. 171-174, and Keddie, N. R., Iran and the Muslim World: Resistance and Revolution (1995). 
98 See e. g. Statement of Iran representative, Mr. Hossein Rezvani, at the 51St Session of the 3`d Committee of the UN 
General Assembly on 29, Nov. 1996, Permanent Mission of the Islamic Rep. of Iran to the UN Website at: 
httn"//ww un int/iran/statements/3ga/3ga51001. html[25/2/2001]. 
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revolution. This affected Iran's attitude towards the policies of the UN, especially its 
international human rights objective, which were seen as representing ideologies of the 
Western nations headed by the USA. Thus for instance, Imam Khomeini was quoted as 
describing human rights as "nothing but a collection of currupt (sic) rules worked out by 
Zionists to destroy all true religions. "100 Imam Khomeini was very cynical about the 
"champions" of international human rights, particularly the USA and Britain. In one of his 
speeches at the wake of the Iranian revolution he had declared to the Iranian people as 
follows: 
"All the miseries that we have suffered, still suffer, and are about to suffer soon are 
caused by the heads of those countries that have signed the Declaration of Human 
Rights.. 
. 
The U. S. is one of the signatories to this document.... But see what crimes 
America has committed against man... What we have said is true not only of 
America but also of Britain, another power that signed and ratified the Declaration of 
Human Rights... ". He concluded that: "The Declaration of Human rights exists only 
to deceive nations; it is the opium of the masses. "101 
As noted in Chapter three, these responses were not practically translated into a total 
rejection of the principles of international law or international human rights per se, but only 
represented a protest against the policies of the "big powers" who were seen as enemies of 
the revolution and of Islam. This is evidenced by the fact that despite those criticisms, Iran 
continued to appeal to and rely on international law principles in its foreign relations even 
with other Muslim States. In the words of Sarvenaz Bahar, Imam Khomeini's ideology did 
not practically translate "into an absolute rejection of all international principles and 
organizations, but rather have premised any reliance on such international instruments on a 
conformity with Shari 'a law". 
102 The position of Iran was therefore that international human 
rights would be complied with only within the scope of the Shari `ah. 
After the revolution in 1979, the religious scholars of Iran differed with respect to the 
interpretative approach of Islamic law to be adopted by the State. Bourojerdi has observed 
that the clerics "were split into two major camps: those who sanctioned traditional 
jurisprudence (fegh-e-sonnati) and those who advocated the need for a more dynamic 
jurisprudence (feqh-e puya) capable of dealing with the contemporary, public, and non- 
103 
esoteric challenges facing the Islamic umma". Although Shi `ah jurisprudence favours the 
"See Rajaee, F., Islamic Values and World View: Khomeyni on Man, the State and International Politics (1983) pp. 75-77. 
10° See Mortimer, E., "Islam and Human Rights" (1983)12 Index on Censorship, No. 5 (Oct. ), p. 5. 
101 See Algar, H., (Trans. ) Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations oflmam Khomeini (1981) p. 213-214. 
102 Bahar, S., "Khomeinism, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and International Law: the Relevance of Islamic Political 
Ideology" (1992) 33 Harvard International Law Journal, No. 1,145 at 177. 
103 Boroujerdi, M., Iranian Intellectuals and the West (1996) p. 166. 
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application of ijtihäd (juridical reasoning) greatly, the ruling theologians under the leadership 
of Imam Khomeini relied mostly on traditional jurisprudence and adopted a hard-line 
interpretative approach to Islamic law. Moderation and dynamism were deemed synonymous 
with Western culture, which the regime was advocating against, while traditionalism was 
considered as the road to the re-establishment of the proper Islamic norm and culture in the 
Republic. This may be interpreted as a consequence of the initial zeal of the revolution and 
the many internal and external pressures that threatened the sustenance of the Islamic 
Republic. This led to some harsh implementation of Islamic law, especially as a tool against 
the opposition within the Republic, presumably to instil fear and deter the opposition. This 
attracted a wave of criticism from international human rights watchers in respect of the 
country's application of Islamic law. 
104 A section of the Iranian clergy was also critical of the 
harsh application of Islamic law. Ayatollah Taleghani was quoted to have warned that: 
"The most dangerous of all forms of oppression are laws and restrictions forcibly 
imposed on people in the name of religion. This is what the Monks, through 
collaboration with the ruling classes, did with all the people in the name of religion. 
This is the most dangerous of all impositions, because that which is not from God is 
thrust upon the people to enslave and suppress them and prevent them from evolving, 
depriving them of the right to protest, criticise and be free. These very chains and 
shackles are the ones which the Prophet (Muhammad) came to destroy.... Any group 
that wants to restrict people's freedom 
... 
to criticise, protest, discuss and debate, 
does not comprehend Islam". 'os 
Due to their opposing views, some liberal clerics of the State were considered as 
saboteurs of the new Republic and they fell out with the then leadership due to its hard-line 
interpretation and application of Islamic law. 106 In recent years however, there has been a 
gradual shift in the State policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, regarding international law 
generally and international human rights in particular, from what it used to be during the first 
decade of the revolution. 
Although the position of Iran has remained unchanged with regards to its commitment 
to the Shari `ah as an instrument of State policy, it has shifted from its former hard-line 
position to that of co-operation with the UN and international law principles, especially 
under President Muhammad Khatami elected in 1997.107 
104 See e. g. Amnesty International, IRAN Briefing (1987) (MDE 13/08/87) and IRAN: Violations of Human Rights (1987). 
"'See Irfani, S., Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? (1983) on page preceding 
dedication page. cited in Mayer, A. E., Islam and Human Rights, (1999) 2nd Ed., p. 25. 
106 See e. g. Mayer, E. A., ibid, p. 74. See also Amnesty International, Iran: Human Rights Violations Against Shi'i Religious 
Leaders and Their Followers (1997) MDE/1 3/018/1997. 
107 See e. g. Monshipouri, M., (1998) note 97 above, p. 181-183. President Khatami was re-elected for a 2nd term in office in 
June 2001. 
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The State's resentment to the international human rights regime has declined greatly over the 
years with Iran submitting periodic reports to the UN human rights treaty organs and co- 
operating with UN representatives investigating the position of human rights in the country. 
While this has still been subject to Iran's policy of enforcing international human rights 
within the principles of Islamic law, 108 it has been through a co-operative and moderate 
approach rather than a hostile and hard-line one. The Deputy Permanent Representative of 
Iran to the UN, Mr. Ziaran, before the Third Committee of the 53rd Session of the General 
Assembly in November 1998, commenting on the 50`h anniversary of the UDHR, declared 
that "(t)he government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to the promotion of 
human rights". This commitment, he pointed out "is not out of political expediency rather it 
stems from the supreme teachings of Islam". He also avowed that "the government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran would extend its full cooperation to the human rights mechanisms" 
of the UN. 109 
Iran is a State Party to both the ICCPR and ICESCR and to at least 20 other 
international treaties relating to human rights. 10 Only the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child was ratified after the declaration of the country as an Islamic Republics 1. Despite the 
criticisms against the existing international order at the outset of the revolution, Iran did not 
however withdraw its ratification to any of the earlier Conventions ratified. Rather, the State 
policy in recent times, as earlier observed, indicates an intention to fulfil its international 
human rights obligations within its application of Islamic law. 
108 See e. g. Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties submitted by Iran to the UN, UN Doc. 
HRI/CORE/I/Add. 93. 
109 See Statement by H. E. Mr. Bozorgmehr Ziaran at, Permanent Mission of the Islamic Rep. of Iran to the UN (Online): 
a/3Qa53008. html [ 12/ 12/2000]. btt, 2: //www. un. int/iran/statements/3e 
10 Genocide Convention (1948); Convention on the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others (1950); Slavery Convention (1953); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956);; International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1965); International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
(1973); International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports (1985); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); 1949 
Geneva Convention I; 1949 Geneva Convention II; 1949 Geneva Convention III; 1949 Geneva Convention IV; ILO 
Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced Labour (1930); ILO Convention (No. 98) Concerning Application of the Principles 
of the Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively (1949); ILO Convention (No. 100) concerning Equal Remuneration for 
Men and Women for Work of Equal Value (1951); ILO Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour 
(1957); ILO Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (1958); ILO 
Convention (No. 122) Concerning Employment Policy (1964); ILO Convention (No. 135) Concerning Protections and 
Facilities to be Afforded to Workers' Representatives in the Undertaking (1971); UNESCO Convention Against 
Discrimination in Education (1960). See UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: http: //www. unhchr. ch/htnil/intlinst. htni 
[25/2/2001] and ILO Conventions Website at: htt: //itolex. ilo. ch: 1567/ ublic/en lish/docs/convdis 
. 
htm [25/2/2001] and 
International Humanitarian Law Treaties Website at: http: //www. icrc. org/ihl [25/2/2001]. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran entered a reservation upon ratification of the Child Convention reserving the right not to 
apply any provision of the Convention it considers incompatible with Islamic law. 
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Constitutional Rights 
Chapter 3 of Iranian constitution provides for the "Rights of the People", which includes 
civil, political, economic, social, cultural and welfare rights. ' 12 Some of the basic 
constitutional rights apply only to "citizens" and "people of Iran". 113 In pursuance of Article 
4 of the constitution, the constitutional rights are guaranteed either "in conformity with 
Islamic criteria"114, "not detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islami115 or as 
"sanctioned" or "provided" by law". 116 Rights may also not be exercised "in a way injurious 
to others or detrimental to public interest". 117 Mayer has observed that these "Islamic 
qualifications of rights have stripped rights of their substance" in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. 118 
Ideally, the subjection of rights to the principles of Islamic law should not constitute a 
threshold for their denial or abuse. It could simply aim at ensuring compliance with Islamic 
norms of public morality and social cohesion within the enjoyment of the guaranteed rights. 
This depends of course on the interpretative approach to Islamic law adopted by the regime 
in power. While subjection of rights to Islamic law can have adverse claw-back effects under 
a hard-line Islamic regime, the same may not be true under a liberal Islamic regime. Mayer 
thus concluded that "one must be careful to avoid creating the impression that somehow the 
Islamic qualifications on rights 
... 
created the human rights violations that ensued in Iran, but 
one should also not underplay... that rights could be restricted or denied in the name of 
Islam". 119 The present shift in State policy of Iran on international human rights guarantees 
corroborates the conclusion that it is not Islamic law per se that impedes human rights in 
Muslim States but it is the regimes in power that may employ the law to restrict human rights 
for their own purposes. 
Equality and Non-discrimination 
The Iranian constitution provides that all "citizens of the country, both men and women, 
equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and 
112 Articles 19 
- 
42 of Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
113 e. g. Art. 19 (Non-discrimination); Art. 20 (Equality before the law); Article 29 (Welfare rights); Article 30 (Education); 
Article 31 (Housing); Article 34 (Recourse to the courts). 
114 e. g. Art. 20 (Equality before the law); Art. 21 (Women's rights); Art. 26 (Freedom of association); Article 28 (Work). 
'15 e. g. Art. 24 (Freedom of the press); Art. 26 (Freedom of assembly). 
116 e. g. Art. 22 (Human dignity and rights); Article 25 (Secrecy of communication); Art. 32 (Arrest); Art. 33 (Residence). 
117 Art. 40. 
118 Mayer, E. A., (1999) supra, note 105 above p. 75. 
 ibid, p. 76. 
281 
cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic criteria". 120 This constitutional provision on 
equality is restrictive to citizens and thus raises the question of whether or not the equality of 
non-citizens is also assured. It has also been observed that there are provisions in both the 
penal and civil codes that discriminate against non-Muslims from international human rights 
perspectives. 121 On the rights of minorities, the Iranian constitution provides that: 
"All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy 
equal rights; and color, race, language, and the like do not bestow any privilege". 122 
The omission of religion in the proviso on non-privileges is related to the fact that the 
State is based on an Islamic ideology and thus certain positions would only be occupied by 
Muslims. 123 On the rights of non-Muslims Article 14 of the Iranian constitution provides 
that: 
"In accordance with the sacred verse "God does not forbid you to deal kindly and 
justly with those who have not fought against you because of your religion and who 
have not expelled you from your homes" [60: 8], the government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity 
with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect 
their human rights. This principle applies to all who refrain from engaging in 
conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran". 
The proviso exempting those who engage in "conspiracy or activity against Islam and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran" from enjoying the rights guaranteed to non-Muslims under 
Article 14 obviously aims at protecting the Islamic ideology of the State. It is however 
susceptible to abuse as is the case with all laws aimed at protecting State ideologies. While 
Article 23 also provides that the "investigation of individuals' beliefs is forbidden, and no 
one may be molested or taken to task simply for holding a certain belief', Article 13 
recognises only Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian Iranians as the "only religious minorities 
who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies and 
to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education". 
This follows the traditional conception of recognising the religious practices of "the people 
of the book" under Islamic law. However, in Iran's second ICCPR periodic report submitted 
120 Art. 20. 
121 See e. g. UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1999/32, Annex IV, See also Human Rights Watch, Iran: Religious and Ethnic Minorities, 
Discrimination in Law and Practice (1997), pp. 8-10. 
122 Art. 19 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
123 See e. g. Art. 115 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran which provides that qualifications for Presidency 
shall include "convinced belief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official madhhab 
(School of Thought) of the country". This can obviously be fulfilled only by a Shi'ah (Twelver Ja jari) Muslim. 
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in 1992 to the HRC it was indicated that the term "non-Muslims" in Article 14 of the 
constitution also referred to those who do not believe in monotheistic religions. 124 
One religious minority in Iran to whom the proviso on conspiracy has been applied are 
the Bahais. Rather than religious minorities per se, the Islamic Republic of Iran considers the 
Bahais as Islamic heretics. The Bahais hold their founder, Bahaullah, as a prophet but do not 
however claim to be Muslims. Apart from being declared as heretics the Bahais are also 
suspected and often accused by the State of espionage for Israel, bringing them within the 
proviso of Article 14 of the Iranian Constitution as "engaging in conspiracy or activity 
against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran" and thus exempting them from the rights of 
non-Muslims guaranteed under the constitution. The conspiracy factor puts the Bahais in a 
difficult position within the Islamic Republic of Iran. 125 This has attracted a lot of attention 
and criticism of Iran in international human rights circles and from the Baha'i International 
Community. '26 
Women's Rights 
A section of the Preamble in the Iranian Constitution is titled "Women and the 
Constitution" and it provides that: 
"Through the creation of Islamic social infrastructures, all the elements of humanity 
that served the multifaceted foreign exploitation shall regain their true identity and 
human rights. As a part of this process, it is only natural that women should benefit 
from a particularly large augmentation of their rights, because of the greater 
oppression that they suffered under the old regime. " (emphasis added). 
Article 21 of the Constitution also contains a substantive provision on women's right 
providing that: 
"The government must ensure the rights of women in all respect, in conformity with 
Islamic criteria, and accomplish the following goals: 
1. create a favourable environment for the growth of woman's personality and the 
restoration of her rights, both the material and intellectual; 
124 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/28/Add. 15 of 22/5/1992, Par. 5. 
125 See Human Rights Watch, Iran: Religious and Ethnic Minorities, Discrimination in Law And Practice (1997) p. 11; and 
Monshipouri, M, (1998) supra, note 97 above, p. 192-3. 
126 See UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1999/32, Par. 40-45. See also HRW, ibid, pp. 10-15. See also Mayer, E. A., (1999) supra, note 105 
above, pp. 141-144. See also Baha'i International Community, Iran's Secret Blueprint for the Destruction of a Religious 
Community (1999). 
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2. the protection of mothers, particularly during pregnancy and child-rearing, and 
the protection of children without guardians; 
3. establishing competent courts to protect and preserve the family; 
4. the provision of special insurance for widows, aged women, and women without 
support; 
5. the awarding of guardianship of children to worthy mothers, in order to protect 
the interests of the children, in the absence of a legal guardian. 
While the rights of women must be ensured in conformity with Islamic criteria, this 
should ideally be in a positive manner to accomplish the stated goals and not to restrict them. 
Despite the above constitutional provisions however, the status of women in Iran has been 
greatly criticised by advocates of women's rights on grounds that both the Iranian Penal and 
Civil codes contain, on the basis of Islamic law, provisions that discriminate against women 
in employment, education and family rights, which prevent the accomplishment of the above 
goals set out in the constitution for women. 
127 
In line with the shift in the human rights policy of Iran, there have however been official 
statements declaring improved policy positions by Iran on women's rights generally. 
128 The 
Iranian policy of wanting to cautiously blend the woman's motherhood role with her role in 
social affairs of the State was summarised by President Khatami as follows: 
"If you deprive a woman of the opportunity to participate in social activities, she is 
denied a balanced growth. Likewise, if you deprive a man of social activities, his 
development will also be stunted. On the other hand, we all agree that one of the 
greatest problems of the modem world is the way the foundation of family is 
undermined, and the ensuing emotional desolation of the children. What can we do, 
then, both to provide our women with to play their part in social affairs so that they 
can enjoy full natural growth as men do. (sic) And at the same time, safeguard the 
foundations of the family? Whether we like it or not, women play the pivotal role in 
the life of the family, and her absence may very well lead to the total collapse of the 
family. To prevent this, the Islamic Republic of Iran is trying to find a way of 
resolving this paradox in order to ensure women's participation in society while, at 129 the same time, preventing the breakdown of the family... 
In October 1997, the country's representative, Ms. F. Vadiati, stated, inter alia, before 
the Third Committee of the UN during discussions of the agenda items "Advancement of 
127 See e. g. Afshar, H., "Women, State and Ideology in Iran", in Women Living Under Muslim Laws (ed), Dossier 3 (1988) 
pp42-48; Kar, M., and Hoodfar, H., "Personal Status Law as Defined by the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Appraisal", in 
Women Living Under Muslim Laws, (ed. ) Shifting Boundaries in Marriage and Divorce in Muslim Communities: Special 
Dossier (1996) pp. 7-36; Mehrdad, A., "Women in Iranian Civil Law: 1905-1995", in Women Living Under Muslim 
Laws, (ed. ) Dossier 14/15 (1991) pp. 86-95. 
128 See e. g. Mayer, E. A., (1999) supra, note 105 above, p. 117; and Monshipouri, M., (1998) supra note 97 above, p. 190- 
192. 
284 
Women" and "Implementation of the Outcome of the Forth World Conference on Women", 
that: 
"In recent years, Iran has greatly embarked on promoting the status of women in 
different areas such as education, economy and decision-making". 
... 
In the 
aftermath of the recent Presidential elections in Iran, (that was in 1997) we expect to 
see a higher degree of attention and emphasis on the advancement of women, 
... 
the 
President has recently designated "a high advisor for women affairs whose chief duty 
includes to act as the main government coordinator (sic) on all activities pertaining to 
contribution of women in various dimensions of social life. The president has also 
included for the first time, a woman in the Cabinet as the Vice-President and the 
Head of Environment Organization. "'" 
Ms. Vadiati then enumerated the country's approach and policy towards ensuring 
women's rights as follows: 
1. Raising public awareness towards women's rights by organizing seminars and 
workshops with contribution and cooperation of NGOs; 
2. Developing national infrastructures and machineries for the advancement of 
women, particularly creation of special commissions or offices in government 
agencies, and special commissions for the youth, family and women in the 
Parliament. 
3. Incorporating of gender perspective into laws and regulations and government 
programs and policies including in (sic) the draft of National Plan of Action for 
Women. ' 31 
The above policies express a wider interpretation of the provision on women's rights 
contained in Article 21 of the Iranian constitution. Ms. Vadiati also spoke of Iran's 
condemnation of the discriminatory practices against women in Afghanistan which, the 
Iranian representative observed, "are sadly carried out in the name of Islam, but in fact have 
tarnished the true face of this divine religion". 132 The present Iranian supreme leader, 
Ayatollah Khamenei, was also quoted to have criticised the hard-line interpretation of 
Islamic law by the Taliban of Afghanistan saying, "(t)he world does not accept what the 
Taliban are doing in the name of Islam". 133 This reference by Iran to conservative customs 
129 President Khatami's speech to heads of diplomatic missions to Tehran, on February 10,1998, See the Presidency of 
Islamic Republic of Iran Website at: http: //web. president. gov. ir/outlooks/Women. htm [25/2/2001]. 
130 See Statement by Ms. F. Vadiati, before the 3rd Committee on October 23,1997, Permanent Mission of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Website at: http: /hvww. un. int/iran/statements/3a/3a52002. html [25/2/2001] 
13' ibid. 
132 ibid. 
133 See Sciolino, E., "The Many Faces of Islamic Law", The New York Times, Octoberl3,1996 (Editorial) 2. Also Ayatollah 
Jannati, Secretary of the Iranian Council of Guardians, was also quoted to have publicly denounced the Taliban policy on 
women in 1996 saying: "What could be worse than committing violence, narrow-mindedness and limiting women's rights [thereby] defaming Islam? " See Mayer, E. A., (1999) supra note 105 above, p. 117. 
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and traditions adopted by a neighbouring Muslim State in the name of Islam, tends to 
demonstrate its own move towards a moderate approach to the interpretation of the Shari `ah. 
It is important to note that the above are not isolated statements. Iran has consistently made 
policy statements in recent times that indicate a will to improve upon women's rights in the 
country. 
In his address before the 53rd Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1998, 
President Khatami of Iran emphasised the need for a reassessment of the status of women. 
He declared as follows: 
"Efforts at the global level geared to the promotion and strengthening of respect for 
women and their rights require a critical reassessment of the traditional and 
inappropriate views about women. The traditional outlook, based on the erroneous 
notion of superiority of men over women, does injustice to men, women and 
humanity as a whole; equally nefarious is the view that disregards the differences 
between men and women. We should recognize that both men and women are 
valuable components of humanity that equally possess the potential for intellectual, 
social, cultural and political development, and that comprehensive and sustainable 
development is only possible through the active participation of both men and 
women in social life. s134 
It is apparent that the words of the above statement by the Iranian president on the status 
of women were well chosen and frank. The status of the President and the platform at which 
the statement was delivered are both significant and lend weight to the conclusion that the 
statement represents a reiteration of a genuine Iranian State policy for the promotion of 
women's rights. Again at the 1998 meeting of the Third Committee of the UN, Ms. Vadiati 
of Iran, indicated during the continued discussions on the "Advancement of Women" and 
-Implementation of the Outcome of the Fourth World Conference on Women" that Iran had 
taken further steps in the practical implementation of its national plans for the advancement 
of women indicated in the previous year. The representative indicated the appointment of 
more women judges, admission of more women into the legal practice, granting of licences 
to more women as media practitioners and an increase in the admission of female students 
into institutions of higher learning. Legislation recognising women's pension and women's 
right to guardianship of children had also been passed. 
135 
The Special Representative of UN Commission on Human Rights to Iran confirmed the 
above efforts in his December 1998 report on the human rights situation in Iran, but went on 
1 34 See Statement of H. E. Mohammad Khatami, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the 53d Session of the UN 
General Assembly, New York, September 21,1998, Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran Website at: 
http: //www un int/iran/statements/aa/ga53001. html [25/2/2001]. 
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to indicate that "there needs to be a clearer focus on the legal and practical discrimination" 
faced by women. 136 The deputy speaker of the Iranian Parliament was reported to have also 
acknowledged that there was still much to be done, especially the amendment of laws, to 
ensure the full enjoyment of rights by women in the country. 137 With respect to the 
implementation and amendment of laws generally, President Khatami established a 
"Committee for Inspection and Supervision on the Implementation of the Constitution" in 
1997 empowered to, inter alia, "regulate policy for the implementation of the Constitution, 
with particular preference which should be given to articles that contain individual and social 
rights of the Nation, and to submit amendatory and supplementary proposals as to laws and 
regulations for better and comprehensive implementation of the Constitution; and to regulate 
and suggest educational and research programmes; in order to familiarize the Nation of their 
legal rights, and to adopt appropriate approaches for discharging these rights". 138 In a 
resolution adopted at its 51" meeting in April 1999 the UN Commission on Human Rights 
noted with interest, the "positive statements by the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran about the need to review laws and attitudes which discriminate against women, and the 
gradual increase of the presence of women in the public life of Iran". 139 
It becomes evident from the Islamic Republic of Iran's policy towards the promotion of 
women's rights within its Islamic socio-legal setting, that there is not necessarily an inherent 
suppression of women's rights under Islamic law. The status of women under the application 
of Islamic law in any particular country depends on the political and humanitarian will of the 
ruling authority and the approach adopted by it in its interpretation of the Shar `iah. The 
Shari'ah, as has already been analysed in previous chapters of this thesis, is able to 
accommodate the full enhancement of women's rights within the scope of the rules of 
Islamic morality, which applies both to the male and female. 
Islamic Criminal Justice 
Iran's Penal Code is based strictly on the Shi `ah Islamic criminal jurisprudence. 
Accordingly, the country implements the traditional Islamic criminal punishments, 140 which 
'35 See Statement of Ms. F. Vadiati before the 3`d Committee on October 19,1998, Permanent Mission of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Website at: http: //www. un. int/iran/statements/3ga/3ga53004. htini [25/2/2001]. 
'36 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1999/32, Par. 86. 
137 See ibid., Par. 30. 
138 See UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1999/32, Annex V, par. 12. 
139 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/13. 
140 See Chapter 4, pp. 72-80 above. 
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the HRC considers as incompatible with the provisions of Article 7 of the ICCPR. 14' For 
instance the Committee has expressed concern about the punishments of stoning, amputation 
and crucifixion imposed by the State. In his report to the 56`h Session of the UN General 
Assembly on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran for the year 2000, 
the UN Secretary General noted that the punishment of stoning was declining in Iran but that 
amputations and executions were still at a high rate. 142 The report however quoted opinions 
from Iranian Ministry of Justice spokespersons to the effect that "some of the hangings 
envisaged in Iranian laws were not necessary from a religious point of view and the system 
could replace them with other sentences"143 and also that the punishment of stoning may not 
be in the country's interest and the head of the judiciary believes that it could be avoided. 144 
The Iranian Constitution prohibits all forms of torture "for the purpose of extracting 
confession or acquiring information" and provides that violation of the prohibition of torture 
will be punishable in accordance with the law. 145 
General Representations on Human Rights 
President Khatami has recently expressed the importance of freedom in a manner that 
calls for a moderate interpretation of the Shari `ah as well as the guarantee of individual 
rights in Iran. In an address to students at Tehran University in 1998, to commemorate the 
first anniversary of his election, the president declared his belief in freedom as follows: 
"Let me declare my belief clearly. The destiny of the religion's social prestige today 
and tomorrow will depend on our interpretation of the religion in a manner which 
would not contradict freedom, whenever in history a religion has faced freedom, it 
has been the religion which has sustained damage 
... 
when we speak of freedom we 
mean the freedom of the opposition. It is no freedom if only the people who agree 
with those in power and with their ways and means are free. "146 
Also in his speech at the 53rd Session of the UN General Assembly the Iranian leader 
indicated that the history of humankind is that of liberty and expressed his belief in the fact 
that "humanity, despite all calamities and hardship, is heading towards emancipation and 
liberty". He called for co-operation of the international community "against genocide, 
aggression and the humiliation of mankind in various corners of the world", and finally 
141 See e. g. HRC Concluding Observations on Iran (1993) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 25., Par. 11. See also Human Rights 
Watch, Iran, Religious and Ethnic Minorities, Discrimination in Law and Practice (1997), Vol. 9, No. 7(E), pp. 8-10. 
142See UN Doc. A/55/363 of 8 September, 2000. Par. 49-58. 
13 ibid. Par. 49. 
144 ibid. Par. 57. 
145 Art. 38. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
. 146 See President Khatami's Homepage Online at: http: //www. persia. orv-fkhatamilindcx. htmi [13/12/2000]. 
288 
proposed in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the UN should designate the year 
2001 as the "Year of Dialogue among Civilizations". 147 In response of which the UN General 
Assembly adopted a Resolution proclaiming the year 2001 as the United Nations Year of 
Dialogue among Civilizations". 148 The present trend in Iranian State policy therefore 
indicates a big transition from the hostile and non-compromising phase of the first decade of 
the Iranian revolution. The present phase is more of reconstruction and moderation, which 
has shown accommodation for the freedom and rights of individuals and thereby 
demonstrates the possibility of establishing common grounds between Islamic law and 
international human rights principles. The conservative and hard-line sector within both the 
Iranian leadership and society however remain cynical of Khatami's moderate tendencies. 
REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN 
While Islamic culture in the Sudan dates back to as early as the 9th century, the formal 
application of the Shari `ah as the full legal system dates back at least to the Mahdist State 
established in Sudan between 1884-1898. With the British colonisation of Sudan in 1898 the 
legal system was pluralised by the introduction of the principles of English Common Law 
and later the recognition of native law and custom as part of the legal system. The pluralised 
legal system consisting of English common law, Islamic personal law and native law and 
custom continued into the independence and post independence period of 1956-83.149 
In 1983 President Numeiri introduced an Islamisation policy which principally involved 
the re-introduction of the full implementation of Islamic law in Sudan. A series of legislation 
that came to be known as the September (1983) Laws were enacted to bring the whole legal 
system into conformity with Islamic law. 15° The political manipulation of and the harsh 
implementation of the September (1983) laws met with both internal and external criticism 
with regards to the country's human rights practice. The question may be raised whether the 
fault is with Islamic law per se or with the manner it was enforced through the September 
(1983) laws in Sudan. An-Na'im has submitted that while "some of the defects of what came 
to be known as the September (1983) laws can be attributed to the haste and ambivalence 
147 See President Khatami's Speech at UN General Assembly on Sept. 21,1998, Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran Website at: http: //www. un. int/iran/statements/ga/ga53001. htnil [25/2/2001]. 
149 UN GA Resolution AIRES/53/22 of 16 November 1998. 
149 See Khalil, M. I., "The Legal System of Sudan" (1971) 20 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 626; 
Thompson, C. F., "A Case Study from the Republic of the Sudan" (1966) Wisconsin Law Review 1149-51. See also 
generally, Lauro, L. J., and Swamuelson, P. A., "Toward Pluralism in Sudan: A Traditionalist Approach" (1996) 37 Harvard 
International Law Journal, No. 1, pp. 65-138. 
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with which the policy of Islamization was imposed by former President Ja`far Numeyry, 
other defects reflect the basic problems of the modern application of the criminal law of the 
Shari`a... 11 151 He pointed out that the full application of Islamic criminal law was re- 
introduced in the Sudan when "the country was suffering from severe economic difficulties" 
and the "vast majority of the population (lived) under conditions of extreme poverty and 
need" 
- 
circumstances that forced many people to theft and other property crimes. 152 The 
situation was also complicated with the intermittent civil war in the country between 
Northern and Southern Sudan since 1983.153 It is important to reiterate here, as earlier 
observed in this thesis, '54 that Islamic jurists agree that the existence of certain adverse 
human and social conditions that contribute to the escalation of crimes may demand the 
enforcement of less severe punishments other than the hudüd punishments. On the 
application of Islamic penal system in contemporary Muslim societies, El-Awa has pointed 
out the need to always take cognisance of necessary social framework and factors that would 
prevent its nonsensical application. 
155 There is judicial precedent in the practice of the early 
Islamic State of restricted application of hudüd punishments in periods of severe economic 
and social difficulties. '56 
Sudan is a State party to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR and to at least twenty other 
international instruments relating to human rights. ' 57 It also signed the Torture Convention in 
"'See Gordon, C. N., "Islamic Legal Revolution: The Case of Sudan" (1985) 19 International Lawyer 793; An-Na'im, 
A. A., Towards an Islamic Reformation (1990), pp. 125-133. 
151 An-Na'im, A. A (1990) ibid., p. 127. 
ist ibid., 131. 
I" The Sudan Representative during the consideration of the 2nd ICCPR Periodic Report of Sudan by the HRC in 1998 
argued that: "most of the allegations of human rights violations related to the armed conflict in southern Sudan, which had 
been going on since the early 1950s. " See Summary Record of the 1628`h Meeting of the HRC on Sudan, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/SR. 1628 of 2 February 1998, Par. 5. 
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Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (1958); ILO Convention (No. 122) Concerning 
Employment Policy (1964); OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969); 
International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports (1985). See UN Human rights Treaty Website at: 
http: //www. unhcht. chfhti-nl/intlinst. htm [25/2/2001] and ILO Conventions Website 
at: http: //ilolex. ilo. ch: 1567/public/english/docs/convdisp. htm [25/2/2001] and International Humanitarian Law Treaties 
Website at: http: //www. icrc. org/ihl [25/2/2001]. 
290 
1986 but is yet to ratify it. We shall now examine its policy and practice towards fulfilling 
its international human rights obligations within its dispensation of Islamic law. 
Constitutional Rights 
Sudan adopted a new constitution in 1998 containing a section on "Freedoms, Sanctities, 
Rights and Duties". 158 The rights guaranteed are: Freedom and Sanctity of Life'59; Right to 
Equality 160; Sanctity of Nationality' 6'; Freedom and right of Movement '62; Freedom of Creed 
and Worship'63; Freedom of Thought and Expression 
164; Freedom of Association and 
Organisation 165; Sanctity of Cultural Communities'66; Sanctity of Earning and Property 167 ; 
Inviolability of Communication and Privacy 168; Immunity against Detention'69; Right and 
Sanctity in Litigation 170; Right of Innocence and Defence'"; Sanctity from Death save in 
justice. 172 Article 34 also provides for the right of access by every aggrieved person to the 
Constitutional court for the protection of the freedoms, sanctities and rights guaranteed in the 
constitution, including the right to compensation for damages sustained as a result of 
violation of the constitutional rights. 
While some of the rights under the constitution are apparently absolute173, most are only 
enforceable "as may be regulated by law". This certainly includes Islamic law because 
Article 65 of the Constitution provides for the country's sources of legislation as follows: 
"Islamic law174 and the consensus of the nation, by referendum, Constitution and 
custom shall be the sources of legislation; and no legislation in contravention with 
these fundamentals shall be made; however, the legislation shall be guided by the 
nation's public opinion, the learned opinion of scholars and thinkers, and then by the 
decision of those in charge of public affairs. " 
158 See Part II (Articles 20 
- 
35) Constitution of the Republic of Sudan (1998). Republic of Sudan Gazette Special 
Supplement No: 1. 
159 Art. 20. ibid. 
160 Art. 21. ibid. 
161 Art. 22. ibid. 
162 Art. 23. ibid. 
163 Art. 24. ibid. 
164 Art. 25. ibid. 
165 Art. 26. ibid. 
166 Art. 27. ibid. 
167 Art. 28. ibid. 
168 Art. 29. ibid. 
169 Art. 30. ibid. 
170 Art. 31. ibid. 
171 Art. 32. ibid. 
172 Art. 33. ibid. 
173 e. g. Freedom from slavery, forced labour, humiliation or torture (Art. 20) and Right to Equality (Art. 21) 
174 The Arabic term used is ("al-SharIah al-IsldmIyyah'). 
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Thus where Islamic law applies, at least to Muslims, some of the constitutional rights 
would be interpreted as regulated by Islamic law. From an international law perspective, this 
amounts to creating claw-back avenues on some of the apparent constitutional rights. This 
can be practically so in the face of hard-line interpretations of Islamic law. However, the 
proviso of that article, which takes the learned opinion of scholars and thinkers into 
consideration in legislation does encourage dialogue, which if positively utilised, should 
accommodate dynamic and moderate views of Islamic scholars and thinkers in the 
interpretation of the law in a manner that ensures the positive realisation of the rights 
guaranteed. 
The Islamic concept of public order (hisbah) is also constitutionalised in Article 16 of 
the constitution empowering the State to promote morals and unity of the society as follows: 
"The State shall, endeavour by law and directive policies to purge society from 
corruption, crime, delinquency, liquor among muslims, and to promote the society as 
a whole towards good norms, noble customs and virtuous morals, and towards such 
as may encourage the individual to actively and effectively participate in the life of 
society and guide the same towards rallying those around him for good collective 
gain, solidarity and fraternity by the firm divine cord in a way that preserves the unity 
of the country, stability of governance and progress towards civilized renaissance and 
higher ideals. " 
The Sudanese constitution thus attempts to blend the guarantee of human rights with the 
State obligation of protecting public morals under Islamic law. 175 How the State succeeds in 
achieving a balance between the two without unnecessarily encroaching upon individual 
rights will depend on two constitutional factors; (i) the influence that learned opinion of 
scholars and thinkers, as stated in Article 65 have on law making and enforcement, and (ii) 
the approach of the constitutional court in the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional 
rights of individuals in relation to the morality role of the State under the constitution. 
Equality and Non-discrimination 
Article 21 of the Sudanese constitution provides that: 
"All people are equal before the courts of law. Sudanese are equal in rights and duties 
as regards to functions of public life; and there shall be no discrimination only by 
reason of race, sex or religious creed. They are equal in eligibility for public posts 
and offices not being discriminated on the basis of wealth. " 
175 See Chapter 4, pp. 65-67 above. 
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Despite the constitutional provision above, the ESCR Committee confronted Sudan, 
during the consideration of its initial report on the ICESCR, with allegations and questions 
on religious and gender discrimination. 176 Sudan in its reply denied the allegations of 
religious discrimination contending that freedom of belief, thought and expression are 
guaranteed in the Sudan, that "all citizens in the Sudan are able freely to practice religious 
rites and ceremonies throughout the whole of the country". 177 Responding to a similar 
question raised by the Human Rights Committee during the consideration of Sudan's second 
Periodic Report on the ICCPR in 1997 that the application of Islamic law in Sudan was 
discriminatory to non-Muslims, the Sudanese representative contended that Islamic law 
applied only to Muslims, and since majority of the population were Muslims, "the use of 
Shariah as a source of law for Muslims and customary law as a source for non-Muslims was 
the best option available (and that) any attempt to impose the will of the minority would 
simply lead to further conflict 
.,, 
178 The ESCR Committee also raised questions on the Islamic 
law rules of inheritance, marriage, and divorce applicable in the Sudan as being 
discriminatory against women, which are examined below. 
Women's Rights 
The Sudanese constitution has a general provision on women in conjunction with the 
institution of family. This is also perhaps to portray the important role of women in 
protecting the institution of family within Islamic law and culture. Article 15 provides that: 
"The State shall care for the institution of the family, facilitate marriage and adopt 
policies to purvey progeny, child upbringing, pregnant women and mothers. The 
State shall emancipate women from injustice in all aspects and pursuits of life and 
encourage the role (the Arabic version says "her role") thereof in family and public 
life. " 
Although this provision is quite general and non-specific on the rights of women, the 
second sentence that the State "shall emancipate women from injustice in all aspects and 
pursuits of life and encourage (her) role thereof in family and public life" is so wide and 
absolute that it can be used as a constitutional provision to guarantee the general rights of 
women in Sudan. Article 21 also prohibits sexual discrimination. The extent of the rights that 
women may enjoy under these provisions will however depend greatly on the liberality or 
X76 See the Committee's List of issues on Sudan, UN Doc. E/C. 12/Q/SUD/1 of 13 December 1999, Par. 11-18. 
177 See Reply to List of Issues by Sudan, UN Doc. HR/CESCR/NONE/2000/10 of 24/06/2000, Par. 11-15 
178 See HRC Summary Record of 1629`h Meeting: Sudan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1629 of 31/10/97 Par. 26. 
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otherwise of the interpreting organs of that provision, especially when considered against the 
morality powers of the State under the constitution. Women's rights advocates have 
generally criticised the effect of Sudan's Islamisation policy on women's rights in the 
country. Sudan regulates public morality through the provision of public morality offences in 
the Penal Code179 and also through the Public Order Act of 1996. The provisions prescribe 
inter alia, the punishment of whipping for anyone who conducts him/herself in an indecent 
manner or in a manner contrary to public morality. The morality laws are enforceable mainly 
by the "Morality and General Discipline Police" or the "Popular Police" (Muhtasibün). 
Women are reported to be the most vulnerable groups to the excesses and abuses of the 
zealous enforcement of these provisions. ' 80 
In its concluding observations on Sudan's second periodic ICCPR report, the HRC had 
expressed concern at the "official enforcement of strict dress requirements for women in 
public places, under the guise of public order and morality, and at inhuman punishment 
imposed for breaches of such requirements. "181 We identified earlier in Chapter 4 of this 
study that in enforcing the doctrine of hisbah under Islamic law adequate care must be taken 
to ensure a proper balance between upholding societal values and ensuring the rights of 
individuals. The scope of hisbah should therefore be specifically defined and its 
implementation properly monitored by the State. Its interpretation and enforcement should 
not be left to the discretion of individuals to act as both prosecutors and judges enforcing 
their own interpretations of whatever they consider as violating public morality. 
In its second periodic report on the ICCPR submitted to the HRC in March 1997, Sudan 
enumerated its efforts in enhancing women's rights and declared the existence of a "de jure 
and de facto equality of sexes" in the country. 182 On the question of gender discrimination in 
respect of Islamic rules regarding marriage, divorce and inheritance, Sudan had responded 
that "Islamic law and the Inheritances Act apply to all Muslims in accordance with their 
religious conviction, as guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
connection with matters of their creed and religion (and that) Islamic law is not imposed on 
non-Muslims in matters of personal status. s183 It had also contended in its report on the 
ICCPR that "the claim that females are entitled to half the share of males in inheritance is not 
19 See Part 15 of the Sudan Penal Code 1991. 
180 See Lawyers Committee on Human Rights 
, 
Beset by Contradictions, (1996), pp-80-82 and Report of the Special 
Rapporteur, Mr. Gaspar Biro on Situation of Human rights in Sudan, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1998/66 (Part VII). 
'$' See UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 85 of 19/11/97, Par. 22. 
182 See Second Periodic Report of States Parties: Sudan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/Add. 2 of 13/03/97, Par. 35. 
183 See UN Doc. HR/CESCR/NONE/2000/10, Par 17 (a). 
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accurate, since in many instances, a female would be entitled to more than the share of a 
male. s184 Women, it argued, are also not prohibited from travelling abroad by any law. 185 
On the question of female representation in government and politics, Sudan has reported 
to the ESCR Committee that "Sudanese women are more widely represented in the public 
service than their counterparts in countries which are in similar circumstances" and that a 
"quota is allocated for women in parliament". 186 The country had also established an office 
for women development and claimed to be "one of three countries, worldwide, which have 
responded positively to the international efforts to eradicate harmful traditional practices". 187 
In 1995 the country drew a 10-year plan to achieve, inter alia: 
(a) Removal of obstacles to women's development and their integration into 
development projects; 
(b) Granting women all legal and political rights; 
(c) Strengthening capabilities of women to participate in policy-making, project 
planning, implementing and follow-up; 
(d) Promotion of the economic capabilities of women by increasing their access to 
production inputs; 
(e) Encouragement of women to start small projects in the industrial fields; 
(f) Promotion of infant health care services and family planning and reducing 
mother/child mortality rates, through intensive vaccination programmes; 
(g) Training of women in general health, environment and hygiene, as well as raising 
health awareness in general; 
(h) Education to decrease illiteracy and eventually eradicate it altogether; 
(i) Eradication of all harmful traditional practices, and in this connection a seminar 
has already been held in Khartoum (1995) to discuss female circumcision. "' 
In response to the demand by the HRC that Sudan should promulgate a law prohibiting 
female genital mutilation, the Sudanese representative, Mr. El-Mufti, stated that the practice 
was already an offence in Sudan but it was difficult to halt such traditional practices due to 
the reluctance of the victims to file complaints. The government has thus embarked on social 
and educational programmes to persuade people to abandon the practice. The second 
representative, Mr. El-Radi, added that the practice was "unfortunately an entrenched 
184 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/Add. 2 of 13/03/97, Par. 55. 
115 See UN Doc. HR/CESCR/NONE/2000/10, Par 17 (e); See also UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1629 of 31/10/97 Par. 20. 
186 See UN Doc. HR/CESCR/NONE/2000/10 ibid., Par. 17(f). 
'$7 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/Add. 2 of 13/03/97, Par. 51. 
188 ibid., Par. 52. 
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custom, particularly in isolated areas where people are ignorant and illiterate" which makes 
the enforcement of the law difficult. He stated that "trained midwives... knew that they were 
liable to prosecution for involvement in such practices. " 189 
It is instructive to observe here that there is a disputed traditional belief in Muslim 
societies that there is a Sunnah type of female clitoridectomy in Islam. This belief is quite 
contentious. For instance in December 1997 the High Administrative Court of Egypt 
overturned the decision of a lower court that had nullified a ban of female circumcision in 
Egypt. Earlier in 1995 the State jurisconsult (mufti) of Egypt and later head of the famous 
Azhar University of Cairo, Sheikh Muhammad Tantäwi, had stated that the practice had no 
legal basis in Islamic law, which led to the banning of the practice by the State. Some other 
Egyptian clerics however argued against the opinion of the mufti, claiming that there was a 
Tradition of the Prophet that allowed female circumcision. It was on that argument that a 
lower court granted the prayer of one of the clerics who had contested that the ban of the 
practice was irreligious, a decision which the highest Egyptian administrative court 
subsequently overturned. 190 
In its concluding observations on Sudan's second periodic ICCPR report, the HRC 
demanded Sudan to repeal "all legal provisions hindering women's free choice of spouse, as 
well as other rules differentiating between men's and women's rights to marry and within 
marriage" in Sudan191. As a general rule under Islamic law consent of the couple is a 
necessary condition for the validity of marriages. But according to Mälikl jurisprudence in 
Islamic law, the consent of a virgin girl is subject to her guardian's overriding power of 
restraint (ijbär). This is considered as "a safety measure in the interest of the girl herself' and 
thus a protective right for the girl. 192 Where the guardian uses this power of restraint against 
the interest of the girl, recourse can be made to the courts to override such restraint. The 
Committee however noted that such restraint is incompatible with Articles 3,16,23 and 26 
of the ICCPR. 193 The Sudanese representatives submitted that Sudan respected the ICCPR 
and gave it the highest priority. They admitted that mistakes could occur, and where they do 
the government tries to address the problem from the roots. The government thus considered 
189 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1629 of 31/10/97, Par. 19 and 34. 
190 See Middle East Times, Egypt Edition, 4`h January 1998. See also Egypt's reply to list of Issues on its ICESCR Report, 
UN Doc., HR/CESCR/NONE/2000/6 of 28/03/2000, Par. 34. 
19' See Concluding Observations of the HRC: Sudan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 85 of 19 November 1997, Par. 11. 
192 See Doi, A. R. I., Shari 'ah: The Islamic Law (1984) p. 123. 
193 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 85, Par. 11. 
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education as top priority in the effort to ensure gender or minority equality and had taken 
necessary steps towards ensuring assess to education by all. 194 
Islamic Criminal Justice 
Sudan adopted a new penal code in March 1991 based upon Islamic law. The code 
applies only in the northern part of Sudan, which is predominantly Muslim, including the 
capital Khartoum. It does not apply to non-Muslims in the south. All the traditional Islamic 
law criminal punishments are applicable under the code. 195 The application of the hudüd 
punishment by Sudan was immediately criticised by the HRC at the consideration of its 
initial ICCPR report in 1991. The Sudan Representative rebutted the HRC's criticism of the 
hudüd punishment and argued that countries must be free to choose their laws based on their 
convictions, traditions and customs. 196 He however also stated conversely that the ICCPR 
formed an integral part of Sudan's domestic laws and could be invoked before all tribunals in 
the country. What the representative seemed to be saying was that although it was bound by 
the ICCPR as a State Party to it, his country's obligation under it, as a Muslim State, were 
implementable only within the parameters of the convictions, traditions and customs of 
Sudan. 197 Bearing in mind however that Sudan has some percentage of citizens who do not 
share the Islamic conviction and customs, this raises questions about the general application 
of Islamic law in modern Muslim States comprising also of non-Muslim citizens. The status 
and treatment of non-Muslim citizens under the Islamisation policy in Sudan has been under 
serious criticism by international human rights monitors. 198 Hamidullah has however 
elaborated in his Muslim Conduct of State, the ideal status that non-Muslims should enjoy as 
citizens of a Muslim State. 199 
Christian leaders and other non-Muslim Sudanese had protested the application of 
Islamic law to non-Muslim Sudanese citizens under the September Laws of 1983.200 The 
new Penal Code enacted in 1991 attempted to address this issue by exempting the application 
of its provisions on Islamic offences and punishments in the non-Muslim southern part of 
Sudan, except the legislative authority of the region decides otherwise or the accused person 
194 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1629, Par. 61. 
195 See Chapter 4, pp. 72-80 above. 
'96 See UN Doc. A/46/40 Supplement No. 40 at 126, also LCHR, Beset by Contradictions, (1996) p. 63. 
197 It is important to note that Sudan did not enter any reservations at its adoption of the ICCPR. 
198 See e. g. Human Rights Watch, Sudan: "In the Name of God" (1994) p. 39. 
'99 Hamidullah, M., Muslim Conduct of State, (7`h Ed. 1977) pp. 111 if 
200 See An-Na'im, A. A., (1990) supra, note 150 above, p. 132. 
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himself requests for its application. 201 There were reports however that this did not prevent 
the continued application of Islamic criminal punishments to non-Muslims, especially for 
alcohol offences. 202 In Communications brought against Sudan under the African Charter of 
Human and People's Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has 
held that "it is fundamentally unjust that religious laws should be applied against non- 
adherents of the religion. Tribunals that apply only Shari'a are thus not competent to judge 
non-Muslims, and everyone should have the right to be tried by a secular court it they 
wish. "203 Doi has analysed the position of non-Muslims under Islamic law, stating inter alia, 
that: 
"... non-Muslims will not be forced to be governed by the Shari `ah law. All their 
cases will be decided in accordance with the personal law of their own choice.... If 
eating pork, drinking of wine or marriages regardless of consanguinity e. t. c. are 
permitted by their religious or customary law, they will not be prohibited from them 
by the Shari' ah. "204 
Sudan stated in its second periodic ICCPR report that the exemption of the southern 
States from the application of Islamic penal law in 1991 was a practical demonstration of 
Sudan's adherence and respect for the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. 205 The report further stated that Sudan operates on the policy of "there is no 
compulsion in Religion" as enshrined in the Qur'an and that the Sudanese Penal Code "does 
not make conversion from Islam an offence, but only the manifestation of such conversion if 
such manifestation adversely affects public safety". 
206 Article 126 of the 1991 Sudanese 
Penal Code makes apostasy from Islam a criminal offence punishable with death if 
proclaimed or made public expressly or by action. The explanation that it is an offence only 
"if such manifestation adversely affects public safety" is perhaps an attempt by Sudan to 
depart from the traditional interpretation which considers private conversion simpliciter as 
apostasy punishable with death under Islamic law. In which case there would be the need to 
clearly spell out what type of manifestation would be deemed to "adversely affect public 
safety". This is necessary to prevent abuse of the provisions. Sudan's report also indicated 
the country's commitment to the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
201 See Section 5(3) of the Sudan Penal Code 1991. 
202 See Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, Beset by Contradictions, (1996) pp. 74-78. 
203 See Amnesty International 
. 
v. Sudan, Communication No. 48/90; Comite Loosli Bachelard 
. 
v. Sudan, Communication No, 
52/91; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. v. Sudan, Communication No. 52/91; and Association of Members of the 
Episcopal Conference of East Africa. v. Sudan, Communication No. 89/93. See (2001) 8 Internationational Human Rights 
Reports, No. 1,256 at 266 Par. 73. 
204 Doi, A. R., Non-Muslims Under Shari ah (Islamic Law) (1979) p. 51. 
205 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/Add. 2. Par. 14 and 125. 
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treatment, stating that the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Act provided penalties for 
torture. 207 The Sudanese representative, Mr. El-Mufti, also stated in his answers to the HRC's 
questions that, in fact some police officers had been tried and convicted for acts of torture. 
208 
The HRC commended Sudan's effort in the above respects but expressed concern that 
the imposition of the death penalty for the Islamic offences such as apostasy, committing a 
third homosexual act and adultery as provided in the country's Penal Code were 
incompatible with Article 6 of the ICCPR. The Committee also noted that the Islamic 
punishments of whipping, amputation and stoning are not compatible with Articles 7 and 10 
of the ICCPR. 209 The Sudanese Representative, Mr. El-Mufti, responded that: 
"Those three punishments formed part of the Islamic faith, but were (also) 
accompanied by many guarantees. First of all, no stoning had occurred in the history 
of the Sudan, and in the entire history of Islam stoning had been ordered only once, 
in the time of the prophet, because the accused had confessed. For stoning to take 
place, there had to be four eyewitnesses to the acts with which the accused person 
was charged. An accused who had confessed could retract the confession. No one 
had ever been punished by stoning in the Sudan. s21° 
In response to the question of amputation, Mr. El-Mufti argued that the punishment was 
enforced for convictions in armed robbery cases that resulted in the victim's death. In case of 
theft where the theft has been committed to buy food or medication the punishment would 
not be enforced. He also pointed out that the punishment of whipping was accompanied by 
the guarantees that "it must not result in the slightest injury, not even a scratch. "211 Authority 
for this is found in the practice of the second Caliph, Umar, who used to instruct the whipper 
saying: "Strike in such a manner that your armpit is not revealed. s212 It must be noted 
however that this rule is seldom followed in practice in some Muslim countries where the 
punishment of whipping is enforced. 
213 Maududi had also stated in his interpretation of the 
verse on whipping that: "Flogging should not be entrusted to rough executioners. It should 
rather be entrusted to persons of knowledge and understanding who are well aware as to what 
kind of beating accords with the requirements of the Shari `ah". 214 He indicated that in case 
206 ibid., 
. 
Par. 127 and 133.. 
207 ibid., Par. 85 and 86. 
208 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1628. of 02/02/98, Par. 13. 
209 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 85 of 19/11/97 Par. 8 and 9. 
210 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1628, Par. 15. 
211 ibid., Par. 16. 
212 See Ibn al-`Arabi, A., Ahkäm aI-Qur'dn (Arabic) (1330 AH)Vol. 2., p. 84. 
213 For instance Mehdi notes the practice in Pakistan that "The flogging of male convicts... takes place in public... and... in 
some cases, a loud speaker has been used so that people can hear the screams of the convict from a long distance. " See 
Mehdi, R., The Islamization of the Law in Pakistan (1994) p. 146. 
214 See Maududi, A. A., Towards Understanding the Qur'än: English version of Tafhim al-Qur'än (1998) Vol. VII, p. 177. 
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of a weak or an aged person convicted of fornication, for example, touching him once with a 
broom consisting of a hundred straws will suffice to meet the formal legal requirements of a 
hundred lashes. 215 
In response to the argument of the HRC that "other countries which used Koranic law 
had eliminated such punishments, which was cruel and inhuman, from their legislation", 216 
Mr. El-Mufti stated that the hudüd punishments "had not been invented by the Sudanese 
government but were mandatory under a true interpretation of Islam, even if some Islamic 
countries were not applying them. In his view they constituted a manifestation of freedom of 
religion. " He further stated that the "(a)pplication of the punishments was well organized and 
there were many safeguards to prevent invalid judgements". 217 This response suggests that 
the claim by Sudan that the ICCPR prevails "over all national laws"218 is not taken to include 
provisions of the Shari `ah which is considered as the mandatory law of God. Apart from the 
hudüd punishments the 1991 Sudan Penal Code however also prescribes the death penalty 
and whipping for to ` zir offences for which such punishments are not specifically prescribed 
by the Shari `ah as in the case of hudüd. 219 As earlier pointed out in Chapter four, the State 
has discretion under Islamic law to prescribe less harsh punishments than the hudüd 
punishments in the case of ta'air offences. 22° 
The second representative of Sudan, Mr. El-Radi, observed with respect to the HRC's 
comments on Islamic criminal justice that the issue "seemed to loom very large in the mind 
of the Committee. " He pointed out that his researches on Islamic criminal justice indicates 
that the Islamic sanctions were mostly "hedged by legal impediments" due to the stringent 
evidential requirements that are almost impossible to fulfil. He stated that the indiscriminate 
enforcement of the punishments under the Numeiri regime were, in fact, a demonstration of 
how Islamic law should not be applied. Sudan, he said, had since then embarked on 
remarkable departure from that misapplication of the law, and the courts "were now on a 
right track". Mr. El-Radi further stated that: 
"(f)rom his own studies of Islamic law, he had concluded that apostasy, for example, 
was not a hadd offence. A person could change his religion, provided he did so 
without causing a danger to the State or to the public welfare. If that line was 
crossed, he could be prosecuted. Thus the offence became more like high treason, 
ns ibid. 
216 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1628 of 02/02/98, Par. 57. 
217 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1629 of 31/10/97, Par. 14. 
218 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/Add. 2, Par. 61. 
219 e. g. Criminal breach of trust in case of a public servant or entrusted employee may be punishable with death under 
Sec. 177(2) Sudan Penal Code 1991. 
220 See p. 78 above. 
300 
which was recognized as punishable all over the world. " He had also concluded as 
"an Islamic academician, that the drinking of intoxicating liquor was not a hadd 
offence eithers221 
The above representation of the Sudanese delegation at the HRC seems to indicate 
recourse to a more moderate interpretation of the Shari `ah by Sudan, different from the hard- 
line approach of the past. The delegation finally assured the HRC that majority of the 
Sudanese people shared the government's commitment to international human rights. 222 
General Representations on Human Rights 
Despite the extremely negative criticisms against Sudan by international human rights 
monitors since its Islamisation policy began in 1983,223 it has continued to reiterate in its 
representations a determination to discharge its international human rights obligations 
without the abandonment of Islamic law. It has however also demonstrated its appreciation 
of the fact that this will demand a moderate rather than a hard-line approach in its 
interpretation and application of the law in many respects. The above statement of one of its 
representatives, Mr. El-Radi, before the HRC is quite explicit of that appreciation. Its second 
periodic ICCPR report referred to many aspects of the State's policy and legislation through 
which it has endeavoured to improve upon its international human rights obligations. 
For instance the report mentioned the establishment of an Advisory Council for Human 
Rights chaired by the country's Minister of Justice with powers to familiarise the authorities 
concerned and the public with the contents of the ICCPR. Committees for Human Rights 
Education have also been established in all the 26 states of the Sudan on the advice of the 
Advisory Council. 224 It was also stated that human rights had been introduced as a subject in 
the syllabus of the Police College from the 1993/94 academic session. 225 Sudan also 
submitted a core document for use by the treaty bodies to the UN in 1998 in which it stated 
measures being taken at eliminating the obstacles to human rights awareness pursuant to the 
resolution of the UN General Assembly on raising awareness of human rights. 226 
221 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1629 of 31/10/97 Par. 39. 
222 ibid. Par. 63. 
223 See e. g. Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, Beset by Contradictions, (1996); and Human Rights Watch, New Islamic 
Penal Code Violates Basic Human rights (1991). See also the 1994 report by Special Rapportuer to Sudan, UN Doc. 
E/CN. 4/ 1994/48. 
2245ee UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/Add. 2., Par. 39 and 87. 
225 ibid., Par. 40. 
226 UN Doc. HRI/CORE/1/Add. 99 of 8/10/98. 
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Based on this moderate approach and combined with sincerity of purpose, it appears that 
the gap between the application of Islamic law and international human rights law in Sudan 
will become more narrowed with time. 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN 
Since Islam was the raison d'etre for the creation of Pakistan, reference to the State's 
adherence to Islamic law has featured in all its constitutions since 1956.227 The "Objectives 
Resolution" adopted by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly in 1949 declared it a "sacred 
trust" to run the State "within the limits prescribed by God". Pakistan was considered as a 
State "(w)herein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, 
as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed; (and) (w)herein the Muslims shall be enabled 
to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teaching and 
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna. "228 The "Objectives 
Resolution" became the country's constitutional preamble'229 and its provisions were later, 
through the 1985 constitutional amendment, absorbed as an operative part of the constitution. 
It has remained a reference point, since its adoption in 1949, for the application of Islamic 
law as State law in Pakistan. 230 
The first constitution of 1956 provided that "No law shall be enacted which is repugnant 
to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunna... and existing law 
shall be brought into conformity with such injunctions. , 231 Article 1 of the 1962 Constitution 
also provided that "no law should be repugnant to Islam" and was later amended to the 
wordings of the 1956 provision. The 1973 constitution contained the same provision in its 
Article 227. It also provided in its Article 2 that Islam shall be the religion of State. In 1979 
four Ordinances were introduced for the enforcement of Islamic criminal law under the 
Islamization policy began by President Zia ul Haqq in 1977.232 The enforcement of Islamic 
227 See e. g. Justice Shah, N. H., Islamization of Law in Pakistan (1992). See also generally Bokhari, A. H., The Protection of 
Human Rights in Islamic Republic of Pakistan with Special Reference to Islamic Shari a/ under 1973 Constitution (1998). 
PhD Dissertation, University of Nottingham. 
228 See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. V, No. 1 (7 March 1949) p. 1 for the full text of the Objectives 
Resolution. (All Emphasis added). 
229 See. e. g. the Preamble of the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 
230 See Mehdi, R. (1994) supra, note 213 above, p. 72; Justice Tanzilur-Rahman, Objective Resolution and its Impact on 
Pakistan Constitutional Law (1996); and Justice Shah, N. H., The Objective Resolution and its Impact on the Administration 
23 
f Justice in Pakistan (1992). 
1 Art. 198. 
232 Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order IV of 1979; Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 
VI of 1979; Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance VII of 1979; and Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) 
Ordinance VIII of 1979. See Justice Shah, N. H. Islamization of Law in Pakistan (1992) pp. 3-4; and generally, Waqar-ul- 
Haq, M., Islamic Criminal Laws (Hudood Laws & Rules) with up-to-date Commentary (1994). 
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law was further consolidated in 1991 when the Pakistan National Assembly passed the 
Enforcement of Shari`ah Act, 1991. Article 3 (1) of the Shari`ah Act provided that: "The 
Shari`ah, that is to say the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah, 
shall be the supreme law of Pakistan". Its Article 4(a) also provided that the courts "while 
interpreting the statute-law, if more than one interpretation is possible, the one consistent 
with the Islamic principles and jurisprudence shall be adopted by the Court". It will thus be 
correct to say that the Shari `ah (Qur'an and Sunnah) stands as the grundnorm of the State 
since the interpretation of the constitution itself will have to be consistent with Islamic 
principles. There is a Federal Shariat Court (FSC) established under Chapter 3A of the 1973 
Constitution which shall "either on its own motion or on the petition of a citizen of Pakistan 
or the Federal Government or a Provincial Government, examine and decide the question 
whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam". 233 An 
appeal lies from it to the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court. 
The prevalence of Islamic law in Pakistan even in emergency periods was demonstrated 
in the Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 1999 promulgated by the military regime of 
General Pervez Musharraf that took over power in October 1999. While the regime declared 
a state of emergency putting the substantive constitution in abeyance, Section 2(4) of the 
Order provided that: 
"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Proclamation of the 14th day of October, 
1999 or this Order or any other law for the time being in force, all provisions of the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan embodying Islamic injunctions 
including Article 2,2A, 31,203A to 203J, 227 to 231 and 260 (3) (a) and (b) shall 
continue to be in force and no provision as aforesaid shall remain in abeyance or be 
"234 deemed to have remained in abeyance at any time. 
The exemption was deemed necessary "for removal of doubts, " and to ensure "the 
continuity and enforcement of the Islamic injunctions in the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan". 235 
Pakistan is a State party to at least eighteen international instruments relating to 
international human rights law including the Women's Convention. 236 It has however not 
233 See Art. 203 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973). 
234 Sec. 2(4) Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of October 15,1999. 
235 ibid. 
236 Genocide Convention (1948); Slavery Convention (1926); Supplementary on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956); Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the 
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1950); Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952); International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973); Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (1979); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 1949 Geneva Convention 1; 1949 Geneva Convention II; 
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ratified either the ICCPR or the ICESCR. Pakistan voted for the adoption of the UDHR in 
1948 and its representative at the UN General Assembly expressed a different view on the 
question of freedom of thought, conscience and religion in contrast to the position of Saudi 
Arabia on the matter which led to the latter's abstention during the adoption of the UDHR. 
With the Islamisation of laws in Pakistan the courts came under the full obligation of 
implementing Islamic law and their decisions as it relates to international human rights issues 
have varied in respect of constitutional rights, women's rights and criminal justice as 
analysed below. 
Constitutional Rights 
The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan has a fundamental rights section that provides for the 
basic civil and political rights. Most of the rights are however subjected to law, public order 
or morality. 237 Although Pakistan has ratified neither the ICCPR nor the ICESCR, both its 
Federal Shariat Court and its Supreme Court have pronounced on questions relating to the 
scope of the fundamental rights provisions of its constitution in relation to Islamic law. We 
shall examine some of the decisions in the light of international human rights law. 
A recent decision of the Pakistan Supreme Court that has been quite controversial in the 
sphere of international human rights is Zaheer-ud-din and Others. v. The State and Others, 
238 
which litigated on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In that case the minority 
Ahmadi group relying on Article 20 of the Pakistan Constitution, challenged the 
constitutionality of the Ordinance 20 promulgated in 1984, which prohibited and 
criminalised the religious activities of the Ahmadis in Pakistan. 
239 The Ahmadis were 
considered to be non-Muslims due mainly to their belief that the founder of the group, 
Ghulam Ahmed, was a prophet of God. The enactment of Ordinance 20 was thus aimed at 
prohibiting them from "posing" as Muslims or using any of the traditional Islamic epithets. 
Section 298 of the Ordinance provided that: 
1949 Geneva Convention III; 1949 Geneva Convention IV; ILO Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced Labour (1930); 
ILO Convention (No. 87)Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (1948); ILO 
convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively (1949); 
ILO Convention (No.. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (1957); ILO Convention (No. 111) Concerning 
Discrimination-fn Respect of Employment and Occupation (1958). See UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: 
htt, 2: Hwww. unhchr. ch/htmi/intlinst. htm and ILO Conventions Treaty Website at: 
httn"//ilolex ilo. ch: I567/public/enalish/docs/convdisp. htm ; and International Humanitarian Law Treaties Website at: 
http: //www. icre. org/ihl [25/2/2001]. 
237 See Arts-8-28 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973). 
238 (1993) SCMR (S. Ct)1718. 
239 See The Anti-Islamic Activities of the Quadiani Group, Lahori Group, and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) 
Ordinance XX of 1984. 
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"298(B) 1. Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 
"Ahmadis" or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written or 
by visible representation: 
(a) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion of the 
Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) as "Ameer-ul-Mumineen", 
"Khalifa-tul-Mumineen", "Khalifa-tul- Muslimeen", "Sahabii" or "Razi 
Allah Anho"; 
(b) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the Holy Prophet 
Muhammad (Peace be upon him), as the "ummul-Mumineen"; 
(c) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family (ahle- 
bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him), as Ahle-bait; or 
(d) refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as "Masjid"; shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
2. Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call 
themselves "Ahmadis" or by any other name) who by words, either spoken 
or written, or by visible representation, refers to the mode or form of call to 
prayers followed by his faith as "Azan" or, recites "Azan" as used by the 
Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 
298(C) Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 
"Ahmadis" or by any other name), who, directly or indirectly, poses himself 
as a Muslim, or calls or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates 
his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or 
written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages 
the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also 
be liable to fine. 
The Ordinance was first challenged in the case of Mujibur Rahman v. The Federal 
Government of Pakistan 
'240 before the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) as being repugnant to 
Islamic injunctions. The FSC held that the Ahmadis were not Muslims according to Islamic 
tenets, so the Ordinance prohibiting them from "posing" as Muslims was considered proper 
and not repugnant to Islamic law. 
241 Zaheeru-ud-deen thus challenged the Ordinance in the 
Supreme Court as violating the Ahmadis fundamental right to freedom of religion as 
guaranteed by Article 20 of the Pakistan Constitution. Article 20 of the Pakistan Constitution 
provides that: 
240 (1985) PLD (FSC) 8. 
241 Other scholars do contest whether the Ahmadis' position about their founder makes them non-Muslims since they still 
believed in the oneness of God and in the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad. See Mahmud, T., "Freedom of Religion 
and Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of Judicial Practice" (1995) 19 Fordham International Law Journal 40 at 43. 
See materials cited in footnote 7 thereof. 
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"Subject to law, public order and morality: 
- 
(a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practise and propagate his religion; 
and 
(b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to 
establish, maintain, and manage its religious institutions. " 
The Supreme Court held by a majority decision of four to one that the Ordinance was 
not violative of the constitution because the State has a constitutional duty to protect the 
purity of Islam. The Court said it was clear that Pakistan had constitutionally adopted 
Islamic injunctions as contained in the Qur'an and Sunnah as its positive law, thus "even the 
Fundamental Rights as given in the Constitution must not violate the norms of Islam". 242 
A critical perusal of the judgement would indicate that the court's reasoning was against 
the background of the finding that the Ahmadis were not Muslims and thus do not have a 
right to "pose" as Muslims or represent their religious activities as that of Islam. The Court 
did not strictly address the issues involved as a straight constitutional question of the right to 
freedom of religion. It saw the matter as an issue of "religious misrepresentation" by the 
Ahmadis, rather than that of freedom of religion simpliciter. The Court thus relied, inter alia, 
on the "subject to law, public order and morality" proviso of Article 20, pointing out that the 
misrepresentation by the Ahmadis about their leader and their position concerning Prophet 
Muhammad as the final prophet was injurable and provocative to the feelings of the main 
body of Muslims, which may lead to the breach of public peace. 243 The Court gave priority 
to the constitutional duty of the State "to protect the purity of Islam", which the Constitution 
had declared as the State religion (i. e. the ideology of the State), above the right to freedom 
of conscience and worship of the individual. 
In the concluding part of its judgement, the Court however stated that the injunctions of 
Islam, which were the supreme law of Pakistan still guarantees the rights of the minorities 
"in such a satisfactory way that no other legal order can offer anything equal. " Perhaps the 
court was trying to make it clear that it considered Zaheer-ud-din as a case of religious 
misrepresentation by the Ahmadis rather than strictly a case of the right to religious freedom 
of a minority group. 244 In other words, the Ahmadis had a right to profess the faith of their 
choice, but this did not include the right to misrepresent a fundamental tenet of Islam as 
242 See Zaheer-ud-din v. The State (1993)SCMR 1718 at 1774. 
243 ibid at p. 1777. 
244 The court had brought in the analogy of trademark infringement and deceptive trade practices in its consideration of the 
case, probably to distinguish it. This has been criticised by Mayer, A. E., "Judicial Dismantling of Constitutional protections 
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professed by the majority of Muslims. 245 There is no doubt however that on the facts of 
Zaheer-ud-din, the Human Rights Committee will find a breach of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion under Article 18 of the ICCPR. 
A less controversial area where the courts have made a "conscious attempt to combine 
and harmonise Islamic law and secular fundamental rightsi246 is that of Public Interest 
Litigation. This was first manifested in 1988 in the case of Benazir Bhuto v. The Federation 
of Pakistan 247 where the Supreme Court side-tracked the stringent traditional rules on locus 
standi and stated that a combination of the secular and Islamic elements of the Constitution 
inspired the court to adopt a more relaxed interpretative approach in the procedural 
requirements of its prerogative writ jurisdiction for the enforcement of the fundamental rights 
provisions of the Constitution. The maintenance of substantive justice as enjoined under 
Islamic law has since then been greatly emphasised to enhance the enforcement of 
fundamental rights in public interest litigation. Thus in Akbar All v. Secretary, Ministry of 
Defence, Rawalpindi and An248 the Supreme Court noted that: 
"Since the introduction of Islamic law and jurisprudence in our Constitutional setup 
(sic) including the Objectives Resolution enacted by the first Constituent Assembly 
in 1949, the emphasis on real substantial justice has increased manifold. So much so 
that although it is not enshrined in the Constitution as a fundamental right, in the 
entire constitutional setup (sic) the right to obtain justice as is ordained by Islam, has 
become inviolable right of citizens of Pakistan". 
Lau has observed that this incorporation of an additional right to obtain justice as 
derived from Islamic jurisprudence has not only widened the concept of public interest 
litigation and relaxed the procedure governing the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme court, but 
has also widened the range of rights protected and guaranteed under the constitution. 249 it 
was on that basis that the Supreme Court also held in Darshan Masih v. The State 250 that 
"(fundamental rights) might cover all aspects of human dignity, deprivations and misery, 
for Religious Freedom: The Grim Legacy of Zaheeruddin v. State", Conference Paper at the Cairo Conference on 
Democracy and the Rule of Law, 7`h-9' Dec. 1997. 
245 The recognition of the rights of the Ahmadis as a minority group is inferable from an amendment to Article 106(3) of the 
Constitution allocating to them, along with other minority groups, additional seats in the Provincial Assemblies. See Zafar, 
E., The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 with Commentary (n. d. ) p. 437. 
246 See Lau, M., "Islamisation of Laws in Pakistan and its Impact on the Independence of the Judiciary in Pakistan", 
Conference Paper at The Cairo Conference on Democracy and the Rule of Law, 7`h 
- 
9`n Dec. 1997, p. 5. See also Khan, 
M. H., Public Interest Litigation: Growth of the Concept and its Meaning in Pakistan (1993) pp. 48-53. 
247 (1988) 40 PLD (S. Ct)416. 
249 (1991) 3 SCMR, 2114. 
249 See Lau, M., (1997) supra, note 246 above, p. 7. See also Lau, M., "Islam And Judicial Activism: Public Interest 
Litigation And Environmental Protection In The Islamic Republic Of Pakistan" in Boyle, A. E., and Anderson, MR., Human 
Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (1996) p. 285 at 295. 
250 (1990) 42 PLD (S. Ct) 513. 
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including those rights in this behalf which are ensured, in addition, as basic human rights in 
Islam.,, 251 
The Federal Shariat Court (FSC) has also considered petitions relating to human rights 
issues in which it rejected suggestions to restrict the rights of women on the basis of Islamic 
law. In Ansar Burney v. Federation of Pakistan and Others252 the petitioner challenged the 
appointment of women as judges or magistrates arguing that such appointments violated 
Islamic law. The court disagreed with all the grounds of the petition and disallowed it. Also 
in Mussarat Uzma Usmani and Ano v. Government of the Punjab and Ano., 253 the petitioner 
had complained of girl candidates being denied admission into medical colleges on grounds 
of gender discrimination. The Islamic law principle of "Ehsan" (i. e. Istihsan [juristic 
preference]) was invoked by the Court to circumvent the technical difficulty of "non- 
impleadment" to sustain the petition. The FSC then went on to find a violation of the 
petitioner's right to equality before the law as guaranteed by the constitution. 
One observes therefore that apart from the Zaheer-ud-din case the courts in Pakistan 
have adopted a broad interpretation of Islamic law to ensure, in combination with the 
fundamental rights provisions of the constitution, the maximum guarantee of constitutional 
and international human rights. According to Chief Justice Afzal Zullah (as he then was) 
rights conferred by the Pakistan Constitution 
"are by and large comprehensive and no internationally recognized Human rights 
would ordinarily remain out of them. In any case if at all any Human Rights which 
are not prima facie conferred by (the) Chapters of the Constitutions (sic), the 
necessary aid comes via Art 2A which enunciates rights and obligations under Islam 
and which is a substantive part of our constitutional set-up and which the courts are 
also trying to give effect to. Talking about rights under Islam, some of them 
definitely stand on a higher pedestal as compared to the internationally recognized 
Human Rights. For example, the right to obtain justice and the right to dignity of the 
man are so pronounced in Islam that they are made more comprehensive than similar 
rights provided in other systems". 254 
This no doubt expresses a very generous legal interpretation that facilitates the 
employment of Islamic law to achieve the ideals of human rights in Muslim States. It also 
demonstrates the important role of the judiciary, as interpreters of law, towards the 
enhancement of international human rights guarantees. 
251 ibid. at 545. 
252 (1983) 35 PLD (FSC) 73. 
253 (1987) 39 PLD (Lah. )178. 
254 Zullah, A., "Human Rights in Pakistan" (1992) 18 Commonwealth Law Bullet in, No. 3, p. 1343 at p. 1346 
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Equality and Non-discrimination 
Pakistan has often emphasised its commitment to the principle of equality and non- 
discrimination at UN human rights forums. 255 Article 25(1) of its Constitution provides that: 
"All citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of law" and Article 
25(2) provides that: "There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone". In the case 
of Fazal Jan v. Roshan Din256 the Pakistan Supreme Court held that the provision for 
equality under the Constitution "read in the light of Islam imposes a positive obligation on all 
organs of the state, including the judiciary, to take active measures to safeguard the interest 
of women and children". 257 Article 36 of the Constitution also provides that: "The State shall 
safeguard the legitimate rights and interest of minorities, including their due representation in 
the Federal and Provincial services". The Zaheer-ud-din case earlier examined above has 
however been criticised as a decision violative of religious non-discrimination within 
international human rights circles. 258 
Women's Rights 
Pakistan ratified the Women's Convention in 1996 with a declaration that: "The 
accession by [the] Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the [said Convention] 
is subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan" and a 
reservation that "it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of article 29 of the 
Convention' 
. 
259 Since the interpretation of the constitution of Pakistan is itself subjected to 
Islamic law as earlier identified above, its declaration subjecting the Women's Convention to 
the Constitution will indirectly also subject it to Islamic law. Sweden, Denmark and Portugal 
have however submitted objections opposing the declaration as inadmissible under 
international law. 260 Pakistan has not submitted any report yet to the Committee on the 
Women's Convention. 
The Pakistan Enforcement of Shari'ah Act, 1991 provides that the rights of women as 
guaranteed by the Constitution shall not be affected by the enforcement of the Shari `ah. 261 
However, some aspects of the Pakistan criminal ordinances have been very controversial in 
relation to women's rights. The Zina Ordinance of 1979, the Qanune-e-Shahadat (Law of 
255 Seep. 316 below. 
256 (1990) 42 PLD (S. Ct) 661. 
257 See Lau, M., (1997) supra, note 246 above, p. 8. 
258 See e. g. Mayer, E. A., (1997) supra note 244 above. 
259 See UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: http: //www. unhchr. ch/htnil/intlinst. htm [25/2/2001]. 
260 See ibid. 
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Evidence) Order of 1984 and the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance have all been criticised mostly 
by women as being gender discriminatory. 262 
In a line of cases, men accused of rape under the Zina Ordinance have been released for 
want of evidence while their female victims have earned convictions of to zir punishment for 
zina based on their own rape allegation, (which is considered as confession for zing due to 
failure to establish the alleged rape) or based on pregnancy resulting from the rape. 263 The 
most celebrated case in that respect has been Safia Bibi. v. The State 
264 in which a girl was 
reported to have been raped by her employers. The trial court acquitted the two accused men 
for want of evidence and sentenced the girl for zinä based on her pregnancy. This attracted a 
lot of demonstrations and protest by women groups in Pakistan because the girl was blind. 
Eventually the Federal Shariat Court reversed the judgement and acquitted the girl by 
holding that the self-exculpatory statement of an accused should be considered sufficient for 
her acquittal if there was no other evidence to prove her guilt. The evidence of the rape 
victim does not still seem to have much value except it is substantiated by evidence of "real 
resistance" on the part of the victim as indicated in the case of Bahadur Shah . v. The State265 
where the court held that there was no evidence that the victim had offered any "real 
resistance" because the doctors report found no injury to her thighs, legs, elbows, arms, 
knees, face, back and buttocks. It has been observed that women are thus reluctant to report 
rape cases for fear of being convicted for zinä on their own allegation of rape where not 
266 
successfully proved. 
It looks strange that a rape victim could be convicted for zind on the basis of her own 
allegation when in fact the Ordinance defines zinä as "wilful sexual intercourse between a 
man and a woman without being married to each other". 
267 Perhaps the argument would be 
that zinä offenders might use the allegation of rape to escape the law, knowing fully well that 
it is difficult to prove rape. In that case there should be a further burden of proof upon the 
prosecution (which must in this case be very heavy) to establish the consent of the victim to 
the sexual intercourse in alleged rape cases before zinä may be established. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of zinä offenders exploiting the allegation of rape to escape punishment must not 
261 Art. 20. 
262 See generally Section on Pakistan in Women Living Under Muslim Laws (ed. ), Dossier 3, (1988), particularly pp. 33-38. 
263 See Jahangir, A., "How far are Penal Laws Effective in Protecting Women", in Women Living Under Muslim Laws (ed), 
Dossier 3, (1988) p. 33 and n. 5. See also Chowdhury, N., "What Pakistani Women Face" in Women Living Under Muslim 
Laws (ed), Dossier I (1986) p. 70. 
264(1985) 37 PLD (FSC) 120. 
265 (1987) 39 PLD (FSC) 11. 
266 See Mehdi, R., (1994) supra, note 213 above, p. 126. 
267 c.. f Justice Hussain's observation on this point in Safla Bibi, supra at 123, Par. 14. 
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be used to close the door of justice against real victims of rape. Advocates of women's rights 
have argued that the requirement of four Muslim male adult eyewitnesses for the maximum 
conviction for rape protects the rapist and makes women especially vulnerable to violence. 268 
It must be noted however that the to zir punishment for rape under the Zina Ordinance does 
not require such difficult evidence. The judge may convict a rapist for to `zIr punishment on 
compelling circumstantial evidence, and the punishment in that case is also higher than that 
of adultery or fornication. 269 It is a fact that rape cases are normally difficult cases, the risk of 
the victim ending up being punished for zinä makes it more difficult under the Zina 
Ordinance. 
Another area of law touching on women's rights is that of evidence. Section 17 of the 
Qanune-e-Shahadah (Evidence Law) Order, 1984 provides that: 
"The competence of a person to testify and the number of witnesses required in any 
case shall be determined in accordance with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in 
the Holy Quran and Sunna. Unless otherwise provided in any law relating to the 
Enforcement of Hudood or any other special law 
- 
(a) in matters pertaining to 
financial or future obligations, if reduced to writing, the instrument shall be attested 
by two men, or one man and two women, so that one may remind the other, if 
necessary and evidence shall be led accordingly; and (b) in all other matters the court 
may accept, or act on, the testimony of one man or one woman, or such other 
evidence as the circumstances of the case may warrant. 
This provision is a codification of both the Qur'anic provision on evidence which 
requires the testimony of two women in the place of one man (in commercial transactions) 
and also the rules of traditional Islamic law which extends the provision of two male 
witnesses to hudüd cases other than zina. The question may be raised whether the inclusion 
of the clause "so that one may remind the other, if necessary" has any significance here. The 
actual Qur'anic provision indicate that this clause refers to the requirement of two women 
witnesses. "' What if it is shown that there is no necessity for one woman to remind the other 
due to the experience and knowledge of the one? Would the testimony of a single woman 
then suffice? If this is answered in the negative then it shuts out the possibility of considering 
the experience of women in modem commercial transactions as a basis of validity for the 
evidence of a single female in such transactions even if that will assist in doing substantive 
justice. From that perspective it has been argued that this belittles "the status of several 
26$ "Women Struggle Against Zia's Version of Islam" in Women Living Under Muslim Laws (ed), Dossier 1 (1986)p. 62. 
269 The ta'zIr punishment for rape is 25 years imprisonment plus 30 lashes while that of fornication or adultery is 10 years 
imprisonment plus 30 lashes. See also Carroll, L., "Rejoinder to the Proceedings of the Seminar on Adultery & Fornication 
in Islamic Jurisprudence: Dimensions & Perspectives" (1983) 3 Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly, 66. 
270 See Q2: 228. 
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women working as administrators, bankers, lawyers and judges, for they often have to 
request their male clerks and peons to attest documents drawn up by them". 
271 
Women have also shown great resentment in respect of the exclusion of female evidence 
to secure maximum punishment under the Hudood Ordinances. 
272 Advocates of women's 
rights see it as a discrimination against women. The wisdom and benefit of excluding female 
testimony from securing hadd punishments may however be viewed from the perspective 
that such exclusion actually serves as a means of restricting the scope for the application of 
hudüd punishments due to its severity. It is not that the evidence of women is totally 
inadmissible in Islamic criminal law. Their evidence is only excluded from securing hadd 
but is admissible for securing to `zir punishments when proved. For instance, while the 
testimony of a woman in a theft case may not secure the amputation of a limb, it can 
certainly send the thief to prison under to zir punishment where proved. The same applies to 
all other hudüd punishments. The exclusion of the evidence of women to secure hudüd 
punishments may therefore not be seen as discrimination per se, but as a procedural 
limitation upon the application of hudüd punishments. 
For the proof of murder cases the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance, 1990 provides for either 
the voluntary confession by the accused or "by evidence as provided in Article 17 of the 
Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984' 
. 
273 Since gisäs is different from hadd and the Qisäs and Diyat 
Ordinance does not itself exclude the testimony of women, the court would be right under 
Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat to admit the testimony of women in murder cases. In 
fact the initial draft of the Qanun-e-Shahadat had specifically provided for the requirement 
of two male adult witnesses, which was met by a lot of controversy and resentment by 
women groups in Pakistan. It was argued reasonably then that, if a man was murdered in the 
presence of his wife and daughter for instance, or if a woman was killed in the presence of 
her two daughters, then the testimony of the female eyewitnesses would not grant the 
maximum punishment for murder. 
274 The fact that the provision was removed from the final 
draft supports an interpretation of Article 17 to exclude murder (qisas) cases from the strict 
requirement of two male witnesses. The Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan alluded, obiter 
271 See Patel, R., Islamization of Laws in Pakistan. (1986) p. 81. 
272 The majority juristic opinion is that female evidence is not admissible for gisds and hudüd punishments under Islamic 
law. The Zähirl school however opines that the evidence of 2 women is acceptable along-side that of one man in gisäs and 
hudüd offences other than zina. See Al-Zuhayli, W., Al-Figh Al-Islami wa-Adillatuh (Arabic) (1997), Vol. 8, p. 6045. 
273 See Art. 304. 
274 See "Women Struggle Against Zia's Version of Islam", (1986) supra, note 268 above. 
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dicta, to the above arguments in its judgement in the case of Ansar Burney 
. 
v. Federation of 
Pakistan. 275 The Court, citing from the Muhalld of Ibn Hazm, 276 observed that: 
"The view that woman cannot appear as a witness in matters of Hudood and Qisas is 
only a juristic view and is not based on either Qur'an or Hadith. It is not based on 
any precedent of the Holy Prophet in which he might have refused to accept the 
evidence of a woman in such matters. "277 
The above opinion would however be a departure from the general traditional juristic 
position that only the testimony of two male adult witnesses is generally required also for a 
gisäs conviction. 
The traditional rule of four male witnesses in adultery/fornication cases is derived from 
the interpretation of Qur'an 4: 15 which says: "And those of your women who commit 
lewdness, take the evidence of four witnesses from amongst you against them... ", while the 
rule of two male witnesses for other offences is derived from the first part of the rule of 
testimony in Qur'an 2: 282 which says: "... And get two witnesses out of your own men, and 
if there are not two men then a man and two women... ". There have been contentions, as 
already observed in Chapter 6 of this thesis that the provision in Qur'an 2: 282 refers only to 
commercial transactions. 
278 It is this rule that was extended by the classical Islamic jurists to 
cover almost every other aspect of evidence except in matters where women were considered 
to possess exclusive knowledge. Apart from "financial or future obligations" and hudüd 
cases, the Evidence Ordinance gives the courts the discretion of accepting the testimony of 
one man or one woman 
in any other case. This last proviso tends to give a slight leeway for 
the courts to extend the rules a little further than the traditional evidence rules of Islamic law. 
With respect to the value of compensation for murder (diyah) the Qisas and Diyat 
Ordinance provides that the court shall fix the value of the diyah subject to the injunction of 
Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah. 279 Under traditional Islamic law the 
value of the diyah of a woman is half that of a man. The ordinance does not specifically 
mention this, but subjects the value to "the injunction of Islam as laid down in the Holy 
Qur'an and the Sunnah". The Qur'an does not state any difference between the value of the 
diyah for a man or woman. Ibn Qudämah also states in his al-Mugni that Ibn Ulyah and 
Asam were of the opinion that the blood money of the female was the same as that of the 
275 (1938) PLD (FSC) 73 at 90 par. 69. 
276 Ibn Hazm, M. A., al-Muhallä (Arabic) (1932), Vol. 6. p. 430. 
27 See note 272 above. 
278 See pp. 141-43 above. 
279 See Section 323. 
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male based on a Tradition of the Prophet in which he was reported to have said: "The blood 
money for the female is equal to 100 camels" (same as that of a male). 280 If the Court 
chooses to follow "the injunction of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah" then 
it could depart from the position established under traditional Islamic law and make no 
difference between the value of the diyah of the male and female. The initial draft of the 
Ordinance had actually provided that "If the victim was a female, her diyat shall be one half 
of that of a man". The changing of this wording in the final version of the Ordinance to the 
present provision in Section 323 could thus be construed as an intention to depart from the 
former position under traditional Islamic law. 
Islamic Criminal Justice 
The Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance of 1979 provides 
for the Islamic law punishment of amputation of the hand on conviction for theft liable to 
hadd under the Ordinance. 281 The conviction for hadd is however subjected to the strict 
evidential requirements of Islamic law, failing which the accused would be liable only to 
to zär punishment under the old Pakistan Penal Code of 1860.282 It is observed that the 
Pakistan courts have mainly exploited the strict evidential requirements of Islamic law, to 
avoid the application of the hudüd punishments on the basis of lack of proof. The courts have 
only imposed to `zir punishments in form of imprisonment, fine or whipping. In the theft 
case of The State v. Ghulam Ali, 
283 Justice Zullah, reversing the hadd punishment of 
amputation on appeal, stated that the two courts below 
"fell into error in ignoring a well-established and an uncontroverted principle of 
Hudood that not only the maximum benefit of every reasonable doubt will be 
extended to the accused, but also that effort is to be made not to inflict a Hadd so 
long (as) it can be avoided by all legitimate and established means" 284 
The Zina Ordinance also criminalises fornication, adultery and rape. The hadd 
punishment for both adultery and a married rapist is death by stoning (rajm), for fornication 
is one hundred lashes and for an unmarried rapist is one hundred lashes or such other 
285 
punishments, which may include the death punishment. In 1981 the punishment of stoning 
280 See Ibn Qudämah, M., al-Mugn1(Arabic) (1981), Vol. 7, p. 797. Ibn Qudämah however opines that this Tradition 
contradicts the consensus of the Companions that the blood money of the female is half that of the male. 
281 See Sec. 5 and 9 the Offences Against Property Ordinance 1979. 
282 See Sec. 7,13 and 14 ibid. 
283 (1986) 38 PLD (S. Ct) 741. 
284 ibid., at 759. 
285 See Sections 5 and 6. 
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(rajm) was challenged as being un-Islamic in the Federal Shariat Court. The court ruled by a 
decision of four to one that the punishment of stoning was repugnant to Islam. 286 The 
decision of the majority was based on grounds that the punishment cannot be specifically 
found in the Qur'an. That decision corresponded with the view of the Mu `tazilah and 
Khawärij sects who also oppose the punishment of rajm on grounds that it has no existing 
Quranic evidence. All the orthodox schools of Islamic jurisprudence however base the 
287 punishment of stoning on the Sunnah. 
The traditional `ulamä' strongly condemned the decision of the Federal Shariat Court 
and the State was forced to appeal against it to the Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court. 
Before the appeal was heard however, the Federal Shariat Court was reconstituted and the 
constitution was also amended allowing the Federal Shariat Court to review its own 
decisions. The reconstituted court reviewed the earlier decision and declared in 1982 that 
even though the punishment of stoning (rajm) cannot be specifically found in the Qur'an, 
there is authority for it in the Sunnah and thus the punishment was lawful under Islamic 
law288 The punishment of stoning has however never been enforced in Pakistan due also to 
the strict evidential requirements to establish its application. The hadd punishment for zinc 
requires either a confession of the accused or the evidence of four trustworthy, sane Muslim 
adult male eyewitnesses to the actual commitment of the unlawful sexual intercourse at the 
same time and place. 289 Both the confession and evidence are retractable, in which case the 
hadd punishment cannot be enforced. In Allah Bux and Ano v. The State 290 the trial court 
had sentenced the man (who was married) to hadd punishment and the girl (who was a 
spinster) to one hundred lashes on the basis of confession to the offence. The decision was 
set aside by the Federal Shariat Court on appeal, on grounds that the accused persons had 
retracted their confessions pursuant to Section 9(2) of the Zina Ordinance. Due to the 
severity of the punishment, the courts, in the words of Justice Zullah seem to always strive 
"not to inflict a Hadd so long (as) it can be avoided by all legitimate and established 
means". 
291 The Zina Ordinance provides that where there is not enough evidence to convict 
for the hadd punishment, the ta'zir punishment of imprisonment, whipping or a fine may be 
286 Hazoor Bakhsh 
. 
v. Federation of Pakistan (1981)38 PLD (FSC) 145. 
287 See e. g. al-Juzayri, A. R., Kitäb al-Fiqh 'alä al-Madhähib al- Arba'ah (Arabic) (7`h Ed. 1986), Vol. 5, p. 69. 
288 See Federation of Pakistan 
. 
v. Hazoor Bukhsh and Others, (1983)PLD (FSC) 255. 
289 See e. g. Maududi, A. A., (1998) supra, note 214 above, pp149-179 for a detailed discourse on the nature and punishment 
of adultery/fornication under Islamic law. 
290 (1982) 34 PLD (FSC) 101. 
291 See Zullah, A. (1992) supra, note 254 above. 
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imposed. 292 The ordinance does not provide any standard of proof for the application of 
to zir punishments but leaves the determination to the judge's discretion. 
The application of the hudüd punishments in Pakistan has thus been more symbolic than 
practical. It seems that they exist in the statute books only as a matter of faith to validate 
their divine sanction, while every legitimate means is always sought to avoid their 
application due to their severity. Mehdi has observed that: "The trial of cases under hadd (in 
Pakistan) has been nothing but an intellectual exercise, while the (old) PPC (Pakistan Penal 
Code) still applies for practical purpose". 293 
One can observe therefore that in the codification of Islamic criminal law in Pakistan, a 
cautious attempt is made to depart from some traditional Islamic jurisprudence as much as 
possible through every legitimate means in a manner that promotes a benevolent application 
of the Shari `ah and encourages the guarantee of international human rights. In doing so, the 
legislature however tries to satisfy both the hard-line and moderate Islamic pressure groups 
and thereby sometimes leave the provisions as vague as possible, transferring the task of its 
interpretation to the courts. The courts as analysed above have in most cases tended towards 
a moderate interpretation and application of Islamic law which certainly bridges the gap 
considerably between the application of Islamic law and the demands of international human 
rights in the State. 
General Representations on Human Rights 
Pakistan's representatives to the UN continue to assert a commitment to international 
human rights objectives of the UN but often with reference to Islamic law and to the need for 
co-operation in that regard. 
294 At the fifty-fifth session of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights in March 1999, the Pakistan permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Munir 
Akram, had reiterated Pakistan's support for "the promotion and protection of human rights 
through cooperation and not confrontation". 295 Similarly, Pakistan's representative at the 
fifty-sixth session of the Commission on Human Rights in April 2000 had restated the 
country's commitment to human rights and had asserted that "the principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mirrors the values of a 
just Islamic society". She then went on also to state, inter alia, that Pakistan had declared 
292 See Sections 9 and 10. 
293 Mehdi, R., (1994) supra, note 213 above, p. 115. 
294 See e. g. Website of Pakistan Mission to the UN at: http: //www. un. int/pakistan/ [13/12/2000]. 
295 See Statement By Ambassador Munir Akram at the 55 Session of the Commission on Human Rights, March 23,1999, 
Geneva. Par. 3. Available Online: http: //www3. itu. int/pakistan/55%20CHR-Itcm`/`203. htni [8/3/2001]. 
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the year 2000 as the Year of Human Rights and Human Dignity and that at least two civil 
awards would be given yearly in the field of human rights. A Commission on the Status of 
Women had also been established, and a directive had been issued reaffirming that the 
practice of "honour killing" was murder and any perpetrator of that practice would be 
apprehended. The representative also declared the possibility of Pakistan ratifying the 
ICESCR before the end of the year 2000.296 
REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA 
The case of Tunisia differs from the first four Muslim States earlier examined above, in 
the sense that the trace of Islamic law is found only in the area of personal law. The 
application of Islamic law in Tunisia had been restricted to family law and land ownership 
matters during French rule in the late nineteenth century. There were then Shari 'ah courts 
that exercised jurisdiction on those civil matters, applying traditional Islamic law according 
to the classical treatises of the Mäliki and Hanafi schools of Islamic jurisprudence. French 
law was applied by secular courts in all other matters including criminal law. Thus at 
independence in 1956 Islamic criminal law did not apply in Tunisia and this has continued up 
to the present period. 297 
The discrimination suffered by Tunisians under the colonial French administration had, 
according to Mayer, "accentuated the people's consciousness of the importance of rights and 
democratic freedoms". 298 While "Islam provided the moral, cultural, and ideological 
symbols needed to formulate popular resistance" in Tunisia's struggle against France for 
independence, 299 a republican form of governance was constitutionally adopted after 
independence on the belief that it was the best guarantee for the respect of human rights. 300 
However, the preamble of the Constitution declared the will of the people "to remain faithful 
to the teachings of Islam" and Article 1 of the Constitution also stated that Islam is the 
religion of the State. Although total secularism was not formally proclaimed by the State as 
was the case, for instance, in Turkey, the outlook of governance since independence has been 
296 See UN Doc E/CN. 4/2000/SR. 25, Par. 11-12. 
297 See e. g. Mahmood, T., Statutes of Personal Law in Islamic Countries, History, Texts and Analysis (2"d Ed., 1995) p. 42. 
298 See Mayer, A. E., "Human Rights" in Esposito. J. L. (ed. ) The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World (1995) 
143. 
299 See Entelis, J. P., "Tunisia", in Esposito. J. L. (ed. ) The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World (1995) Vol. 4, 
235 at 236; See also Salem, N., Habib Bourguiba, Islam and the Creation of Tunisia (1984) pp. 132-166. f0° 
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very secular in nature. 301 Apart from Article 1, the only other substantive constitutional 
provision referring to Islam is the provision in Article 38 that the religion of the President of 
the Republic is Islam. 
Tunisia is a State party to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR. It has also ratified at least 
32 other international treaties relating to human rights. 302 The State has emphasised in its 
reports to the UN treaty bodies that it had "adopted a dynamic interpretation of Islam" and 
that the country's legislation, since its independence "had been modelling a new society 
within the framework of modern Islam, gradually abandoning the static models of thought 
inherited from traditional society (and) concerned with following the principles of religion 
. 
without sacrificing progress" 
3o3 
Constitutional Rights 
The 1991 Tunisian Constitution provides for a combination of political and civil rights 
and economic, social and cultural rights. The constitutional rights include, right to personal 
integrity, conscience and belief; 304 right to equality; 305 freedom of expression and 
assembly; 306 right to privacy; 
307 freedom of movement and domicile; 308 freedom from 
expatriation; 309 right to presumption of innocence; 
310 right to property; 311 right to asylum; 312 
301 Art. I of the Tunisian Constitution states that: "Tunisia is a free State, independent and sovereign: its religion is Islam, its 
language is Arabic and its form is a Republic. " 
302 Slavery Convention (1926); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and 
practices Similar to Slavery (1956); Genocide Convention (1948); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951); 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967); Convention of the Political Rights of Women (1952); Convention 
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954); Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957); Convention of 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriage (1962); International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); Convention on the Non-Application of Statutory Limitation to 
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (1968); OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problem in 
Africa (1969); International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973); Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (1979); African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
(1981); International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports (1985); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); 1949 
Geneva Convention I; 1949 Geneva Convention II; 1949 Geneva Convention 111; 1949 Geneva Convention IV; Protocol I 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions (1977); Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions (1977); ILO Convention 
(No. 29) Concerning Forced Labour (1930); ILO Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organize (1948); ILO Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to 
Organize and Bargain Collectively (1949); ILO Convention (No. 100) Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and 
Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (1951); ILO Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour; 
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); ILO Convention (No. 
111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (1958). ILO Convention (No. 122) Concerning 
Employment Policy (1964); UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education (1960). See UN Human Rights 
Treaty Website at: htt//www. unhchr. ch/htmi/intlinst. htm [25/2/2001]]; and ILO Conventions Website at: 
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and right to vote. 313 It is observed that the rights are mostly addressed at citizens and Article 
7 also provides that the rights are subject to conditions established by the law. 
Equality and Non-discrimination 
Article 6 of the Constitution provides that "All citizens have the same rights and the 
same duties. They are equal before the law". There is no specific provision on non- 
discrimination. The HRC has alluded to the provision of Article 38 of the Tunisian 
constitution, which provides that the religion of the head of State is Islam, as a legal 
impediment to the equal participation of non-Muslims in presidential elections, and called for 
its review. 314 It is important to note however that the Core Document forming part of the 
report submitted by Tunisia to the HRC in 1994 indicated that almost the whole population 
of Tunisia is Muslim. 315 Ninety-eight per cent of the population is recorded to be Muslim 
while one per cent each is recorded as Christian and Jewish respectively. 316 It is arguable 
that since Islam is adopted as the religion of the State, it logically followed that the President 
must be Muslim for ideological consistency. 317 Despite Tunisia's secular nature of 
governance, Islam remains a very strong instrument of legitimacy utilised by the government 
since its independence. Islamic institutions and language are more often than not, used to 
further the goals of the State and to acquire authenticity for its social and legal reforms in the 
Islamic culture of the people. The provisions of Articles I and 38 of the Tunisian 
Constitution may therefore be seen as constitutional expressions of the Islamic identity of the 
Tunisian people. 
Women's Rights 
There has been radical reforms to traditional Islamic personal law in Tunisia to a point 
of controversy. Immediately after independence, the first head of state, President Bourguiba, 
embarked on the reform of the traditional Islamic personal laws applied in Tunisia. Amidst a 
lot of controversy the Tunisian Code of Personal Status was enacted in 1956 to replace the 
310 Art. 12. 
311 Art. 14. 
312 Art. 17. 
313 Art. 20 &21. 
314 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 43 (1994), Par. 18. 
315 See UN Doc. HRI/CORE/1/Add. 46, Par. 24 states that: "In 1991 the population of Tunisia was 8.2 million. Tunisians are 
Sunnite Muslims most of them of the Maliki rite. There are also a few thousand Jews and Christians in Tunisia. " 
316 See CIA World Factbook (2000). Online Edition at: bttp: //www. cia-gov/cia/l)tiblications/factbook / [10/6/2001]. 
317 Pakistan has a similar provision in Arts. 2 and 41 of its Constitution. See also Article 115 of the Constitution of Iran. 
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traditional Islamic family law applicable in the then shari'ah courts. The Code was declared 
as a necessary step aimed particularly at ensuring equality of gender in personal status law. 
The State sought support for its reforms from the views of early advocates of Islamic 
liberalism such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Qasim Amin, Khayr al-Din 
al-Tunisi, and Tahir al-Haddad, all of whom had criticised an unmitigated application of 
traditional interpretations of the Shari 'ah that suppressed the rights of women. These liberal 
Islamic thinkers had particularly pleaded the humane spirit of the Shari 'ah to advocate for 
equality between the male and the female in both family and societal life. Muhammad 
Abduh in his Qur'anic exegesis "Tafsir al-Mandr", Qasim Amin in his "The Liberation of 
Women" published in 1899 and his "The New Woman" published in 1900, and Tahir al- 
Haddäd in his "Our Women in Shar? 'ah and Society" published in 1930 had all advocated 
more moderate interpretations of the Shari 'ah in a manner that enhances the freedoms and 
rights of Muslim women. The work of Tahir al-Haddad attracted a lot of criticism from the 
conservative sector, which subsequently led to his being denounced as a heretic and 
dismissed from his teaching position at Zaytuna University in Tunisia. 318 
One of the radical reforms in the 1956 Code was the formal prohibition and 
criminalisation of polygyny. 319 The Code also reformed the law of divorce by divesting the 
husband of the right of unilateral divorce (taläq) and making it possible for either of the 
couple to initiate a divorce before the Courts. 
320 In the same year the shari'ah courts were 
abolished and their jurisdiction was merged into that of the secular civil courts. Thus apart 
from reforming the law, the formal interpretation and application of Islamic law was 
removed completely from the control of the traditional Islamic judges (Qädis) and placed in 
secular institutions. Moore has observed that President Bourguiba saw himself as an Islamic 
reformer in the like of Muhammad Abduh321, and his approach was to deprive the traditional 
Islamic scholars ('ulema ) of any control in the legal and political institutions. He personally, 
using the tool of State power, embarked fully on radical reforms of traditional Islamic law. 
The reformatory drive by President Bourguiba however went further than those advocated by 
Muhammad Abduh and others. It encroached unto the actual areas of Islamic mode of 
worship ('ibddät). In 1960 an attempt was made by the State to suspend one of the main 
318 See Hourani, A., Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939 (1967); and Leites, J., "Modernist Jurisprudence as a 
Vehicle for Gender Role Reform in the Islamic World" (1991) 22 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 251 at 290-313. See 
also Kelly, P., "Finding Common Ground: Islamic Values and Gender Equity in Tunisia's Reformed Personal Status Law", 
in Women Living Under Muslim Laws (ed), Special Dossier: Shifting Boundaries in Marriage and Divorce in Muslim 
Communities (1996) p. 75 at 80. 
319 See Art. 18 of the Tunisian Code of Personal Status (1956). 
320 See Articles 30 and 31 ibid. 
321 Moore, C. H., Tunisia Since Independence: the Dynamics of One Party Government (1965) pp. 48-60. 
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pillars of the Islamic faith through an interpretation formulated by President Bourguiba that 
the obligatory one-month fast of Ramadan should be suspended to foster the State's 
economic development. 322 The President openly defied the Ramadan fast and called upon all 
Tunisians to do the same. He argued that his interpretation did not contradict Islamic 
teachings but that it was a "progressive" interpretation, analogising that development of the 
county's economy was a compelling necessity that demanded the suspension of the Ramadan 
fast. The Tunisian Muslims protested against that policy and the president's order was 
strongly criticised. Further attempts were made in following years, which also met with 
opposition from the Muslim populace. According to Magnuson, the attempted "reform" of 
every aspect of Islam by Bourguiba was so total that "social observers in the 1960s 
questioned whether Tunisia might have entered a post-Islamic or de-Islamized age". 323 The 
Islamists thus saw Bourguiba's reforms as an attempt to undermine Islam. Explaining some 
of the issues that contributed to the emergence of the Islamist movement in Tunisia against 
the State's policy of Islamic reforms, Ghannouchi reiterated that: 
In 1957, once in power, he (Bourguiba) prohibited the use of the hab and once 
uncovered a woman and tore her veil in public. Later, in 1981, a law was passed 
forbidding women employed in government offices or those entering universities and 
colleges to wear the hab. In 1957, he forbade polygamy.. 
. 
In 1960, Bourguiba 
prohibited fasting in Ramadan, alleging that it was harmful to the country's 
economy... In 1974 he stated that the Qur'an was self-contradictory and ridiculed the 
9024 miracles of the Prophet Moses... 
Encroachment by the State upon Islamic acts of worship (ibädät), particularly to a point 
of strangulating an obligatory aspect of it, contradicts the principles of Islamic law and is not 
sustainable, no matter how liberal one tries to be. Such interpretations go to the other extreme 
and can undermine the main core of the Islamic faith and therefore not justifiable. Such 
action by the State could qualify as a violation of the right of freedom of religion and beliefs. 
The traditionalists do cite such examples against the arguments for Islamic liberalism stating 
that it is a dangerous endeavour the limit of which is very difficult if not impossible to 
delineate. The fact is that there is hardly any need, as pointed out in Chapter three of this 
thesis, for any change or re-interpretation of the jurisprudence on the acts of Islamic worship 
(`ibäddt). Those are settled aspects of Islamic law that are not affected by either change in 
time or place. 
322 See e. g. Entelis, supra, note 299 above, p. 237. 
323 Magnuson, D. K., "Islamic Reform in Contemporary Tunisia", in Zartman, I. W., (Ed. ) The Political Economy of Reform 
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The Tunisian Personal Status Code has been amended several times to accommodate 
more reforms in respect of equality of gender. 325 Tunisia has referred to the Code and the 
subsequent amendments to it as one of the steps taken to fully integrate women into the era 
of international human rights in the country. 326 Tunisia's commitment to human rights has 
also been emphasised in almost every public function by the State. 327 The CEDAW 
Committee thus described Tunisia "as a shining example for other (Muslim) countries, 
because of its progressive and programmative interpretation of Islam". 328 The Committee 
however went on to raise questions on issues such as prostitution, prohibition of night work 
for women, abortion, inter-faith marriages and non-recognition of free unions. Most of these 
issues touch on basic and sensitive Islamic religious and cultural values. In ratifying the 
Women's Convention, Tunisia had entered a general declaration stating that: 
"The Tunisian Government declares that it shall not take any organizational or 
legislative decision in conformity with the requirements of this Convention where 
such decision would conflict with the provisions of chapter 1 of the Tunisian 
Constitution. " 
Bearing in mind that Article I which provides that Islam is the religion of the State is 
part of Chapter 1 of the Tunisian Constitution, perhaps the declaration was, inter alia, to 
express the fact that despite the State's very liberal approach to Islam, there were some social 
and family values based on the Islamic identity of the people that should still be protected. 
The country's reservation to Article 16 paragraphs (c), (d), (fl, (g) and (h) of the Women's 
Convention also goes to the same effect. Policies that may promote or encourage practices 
such as prostitution, abortion, sexual relationships outside marriage and the general 
undermining of the institutions of marriage and family will certainly conflict with the Islamic 
culture and identity of the people and might create problems in Muslim societies. While 
every positive effort to ensure the guarantee of international human rights in Muslim States 
must be encouraged, Islamic social ideals of preserving the Islamic sense of morality need be 
respected as well. This is necessary to remove any fear in the Muslim world, of an intended 
destruction of cherished Islamic moral values through the promotion of international human 
rights. 
325 See generally Kelly, (1996) supra, note 318 above, and Mahmood, T., (1995) supra, note 297 above, pp. 42-45. 
326 See UN Doc CEDAW/C/TUN/1-2. 
327 See Amnesty International, Tunisia: Rhetoric versus Reality, The Failure of a Human Rights Bureaucracy (1994). 
328 UN Doc. A/50/38, Par. 222. 
322 
Islamic Criminal Justice 
Islamic criminal law is not applied in Tunisia, thus there is no question of Islamic 
criminal law provisions affecting the State's international human rights obligations in any 
way. It is only in the law of personal status that any influence of Islamic law is reflected. 
General Representations on Human Rights 
Although Tunisia, as eulogised by the CEDAW Committee, appears to "come close to 
achieving a harmonious relationship between Islam and human rights and becoming a liberal 
state without being a secular one"329, its liberal approach has not been free of criticism and it 
in fact has been the cause of opposition from both the political Islamists and the traditional 
`ulema' who accused the ruling authority of the secularisation of Islam. This gave rise to 
Islamist opposition in the State against what was considered as a violation of the fundamental 
rights of the Tunisian Muslim populace. The exiled leader of the proscribed Tunisian Islamic 
Movement, Rashid Ghannouchi, stated in his book "Civil Liberties in the Islamic State" 
that: 
"The issues of civil liberties in the Islamic State became of greatest interest to me 
when, due to the dominance of a foreign culture, the Tunisian Islamic Movement 
changed from mere propagation of basic principles of Islam to address the 
, 
wider 
issue of the needs of Tunisian society..., the highest of which was and still is the 
issue of freedoms33° 
This created many confrontations between the Islamists and the ruling authority leading 
to the proscription of the main Islamist opposition, the "Islamic Tendency Movement" later 
the "Renaissance Party" in 1989 and forcing its leaders into exile. 331 
The conflict between the Islamists and the ruling authority has created another 
dimension between Islamic law and international human rights in Tunisia. According to the 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) "(t)he worsening human rights situation in 
Tunisia since (1989) can be traced directly to the deterioration of relationship" between the 
ruling government and the Islamist political opposition. 332 The ruling authority considers the 
Islamist opposition as Islamic extremists and "fundamentalists" who are both a threat to the 
maintenance of a free State as enshrined in the Tunisian Constitution and inhibitors to the 
'Z' Dalacoura, K., Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights (1998)p. 151. 
33° Ghannouchi, R., Huriyät al- 'ämah fi al-Dawlah al-Islämiyyah (1993) p. 17. 
"'See generally Hamdi, M. E., An Analysis of the History and Discourse of the Tunisian Islamic Movement, Al-Nahda 
(1996) PhD Dissertation, SOAS, University of London. 
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enhancement of international human rights in the State. This alleged threat forced the 
government to retract its plans towards a pluralist political governance when members and 
allies of the Islamist opposition won some considerable seats in the Tunisian Assembly 
elections of 1989. The LCHR thus observed that "in the single-minded determination to 
liquidate the Islamist threat to the governments monopoly on power (the) respect for human 
rights in Tunisia has declined. "333 
This confronts us again with the question of whether Islamism is so inherently inimical 
to international human rights that it must always be excluded from government. From the 
analyses on the theory and practice of human rights in Islamic law given in Chapter four of 
this thesis, it is clear that neither Islamic law nor Islamic governance is inherently inimical to 
human rights values. The problem has two dimensions. On one hand, there are regimes that 
only utilise Islamism as a vehicle of legitimacy to acquire or remain in power during periods 
of compelling pressure for change in the political status quo of a Muslim State. Such regimes 
usually manipulate Islamic law for their own purposes. They cling to power through harsh 
and hard-line interpretations and application of the law that intimidates the populace and the 
opposition. On the other hand, the stereotyped opinion about Islamic fundamentalism always 
puts Islamists on the defensive whether in or out of government in the political dispensation 
of modern Muslim States. This creates suspicion and distrust that lead to governmental or 
oppositional activities that inhibit human rights guarantees. 
The moderate and co-operative approach to human rights principles that is gradually 
manifesting in different forms in the State practice of almost all modem Muslim States 
indicate the possibility of achieving the enforcement of international human rights law within 
the application of Islamic law through understanding and co-operation rather than 
confrontation. This however depends further on two important factors, one on the part of the 
ruling authorities in Muslim States and the other on the part of the international community. 
The first factor is that the ruling authorities in Muslim States must accept the need to shift 
from strict and hard-line to more moderate interpretations and application of the Shari `ah, on 
the basis that the Shari `ah was not revealed to cause distress or hardship but as mercy and 
ease for humanity. 334 It is interesting to note that in arguing their cause internationally, most 
Islamist groups do appeal today to the obligation of States to respect their own political and 
civil liberties. This indicates their belief in international human rights principles, which 
332 Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, Promised Unfulfilled: Human Rights in Tunisia Since 1987 (1993)p. 4. 
333 ibid. at 13. 
334 See e. g. Qur'an 20: 1- "We have not sent down the Qur'an unto you to cause you distress" ; and Q21: 107- "We sent thee 
not, but as a mercy to all creatures. " 
324 
mirrors back at how far the Islamist groups themselves are prepared to respect those 
principles. In the case of Tunisia one observes that the ideas of the exiled leader of the 
Islamist Renaissance Party of Tunisia, as expressed in his Civil Liberties in the Islamic State, 
demonstrate to a large extent, a comparatively liberal and moderate interpretation of Islamic 
law in a manner that accommodates international human rights principles. 335 He strongly 
advocates the values of freedom and equality but also emphasises on the need to preserve the 
Tunisian Islamic identity and religious values, such as not intruding upon the acts of Islamic 
worship and moral norms. This brings up the second factor which is that the international 
community must co-operate sincerely with the Muslim States, not expecting that every 
Islamic traditional value or religious norm would have to be discarded in the liberal approach 
to Islamic law. There is need to develop a cross-cultural understanding on many aspects in 
the relationship between international human rights and Islamic law with respect especially 
to justifiable religious and traditional norms and values. 
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 
Turkey is a predominantly Muslim State with a legendary Islamic heritage. It was the 
last capital of the Ottoman Empire and seat of the Islamic Caliphate until 3`d March 1924 
when the Turkish Grand National Assembly formally abolished the institution of the 
Caliphate. 336 Article 2 of the Turkish independence Constitution, which provided that "The 
religion of the Turkish State is Islam" was deleted in 1928 and the ideology of "Kemalism" 
(named after the first Turkish president and leader Kemal Ataturk) was adopted and 
constitutionalised in 1937 based on the principles of Nationalism and Secularism. Turkey 
thus became the first fully and formal secular State in the Muslim world. The preamble of its 
current Constitution also provides that: "as required by the principle of secularism, there 
shall be no interference whatsoever of the sacred religious feelings in state affairs and 
politics". 337 Although the Kemalist ideology advocated a complete separation of religion and 
the State, yet Islam was not left to exist autonomously as a religion outside the State's 
control. The State still controlled Islamic practices through a department of religious affairs 
established within the general administration to ensure that Islam was practised "in 
I" See generally, Ghannouchi, R., (1993) supra, note 330 above. 
336 See Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, (1938 ) pp. 572-575. See also Berkes, N., The Development of Secularism 
in Turkey (1998) for the history of the evolution of Turkey from an Islamic State to a secular one. 
117 See 5`h Preambular Paragraph of the 1982 Constitution of Republic of Turkey (As amended). 
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accordance with the principles of secularism" in the State. 338 As observed by Professor 
Ozbudun, "(i)t was feared that total non-interference between religion and the state would, in 
fact, result in the interference of religion in government affairs, since Islam is not only a 
system of faith but also a system of law, a social and political ideology and a total way of 
life" and thus had the potential to "inevitably retain its hold over the society" if left 
uncontrolled by the State. 339 
Between independence in 1923 and 1938 there were enormous secular reforms to the 
legal, educational and cultural institutions of the State. 340 The Shari `ah courts and every 
aspect of Islamic law that hitherto existed in the State were totally abolished in this period. 
Thus despite its long Islamic heritage and culture, there is no longer any formal application 
of Islamic law as State law in Turkey. Islamic law does not therefore in anyway intervene 
with the country's international human rights obligations. Nicole and Hugh Pope have 
however observed that: 
"(while the urban elite of the early republic quickly adopted Atatürk's brand of 
secularism, they were relatively few in numbers and secularism was not uniformly 
applied throughout the country. Rural areas on the whole escaped its strictures. Even 
in the cities, it was only successfully imposed in the period of the iron-fisted one- 
party regime. As soon as Turkey converted to a multi-party system, religion became 
a political tool" 341 
Due to its total non-application of Islamic law as State law, Turkey does not make 
reference to Islamic law in its international human rights reports or statements. Conversely 
however, the enforcement of Kemalist secularism in Turkey has raised human rights 
questions on right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in relation to Islamic 
norms. During the Ataturk era, some principal reform laws were enacted embodying the 
secular policies of the State. These were laws that, inter alia, established secular education 
and strictly regulated religious education, 342 introduced the wearing of the European top-hat 
and outlawed the wearing of the Fez and turban, 343 abolished the Religious Brotherhoods, 344 
recognised only civil marriages leaving religious marriages without any legal effect, 345 
338 See Art. 136, Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. 
339 Quoted in Ansay, T., and Wallace, D., (Eds. ) Introduction to Turkish Law (1996) p. 3 1. 
340 See e. g. Berkes, N., supra, note 336 above, p. 461 if. 
341 Pope, N., and Pope, H., Turkey Unveiled: Ataturk and After (1997) p. 318. 
342 Act No. 430 of 3 March 1340 (1924) on the Unification of the Educational System. 
343 Act No. 671 of 25 November 1341 (1925) on the Wearing of Hats. 
344 Act No. 677 of 30 November 1341 (1925) on the Closure of Dervish Covenants and Tombs, the Abolition of the Office 
of Keeper of Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition of Certain Titles. 
34s The Principle of civil marriage adopted with the Turkish Civil Code No. 743 of 17 February 1926 and Article 110 of the 
Code. 
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prohibited the use of Arabic script in all public affairs and adopted the Latin script, 346 
abolished the use of certain religious titles347 and prohibited the wearing of certain religious 
garments. 348 Article 174 of the current Turkish constitution still protects these reform laws by 
providing that no provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted to render the 
reform laws unconstitutional. Turkey is yet to ratify either the ICCPR or ICESCR but is a 
State Party to the European Convention on Human Rights and at least twenty-eight other 
international treaties relating to human rights. 349 
Constitutional Rights 
Part Two of the Turkish Constitution provides for Fundamental Rights and Duties, 
which cover an extensive range of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. 350 of 
significance in relation to Islamic law is the right to freedom of religion and conscience, 351 
Freedom of Thought and Opinion, 352 Freedom of Expression and Dissemination of 
Thought 
, 
353 and Freedom of Association. 354 The reform laws earlier stated above are also 
protected by Article 174 of the Turkish Constitution. In relation to the regulation by Muslims 
of their personal lives in accordance with Islamic norms, the prohibition of wearing of certain 
religious garments, the abolition of certain religious titles, and the legal recognition of only 
346 Act No. 1288 of 20 May 1928 of the Adoption of International Numerals and Act No. 1353 of 1 November 1928 on the 
Adoption and Application of the Turkish Alphabet. 
347 Act No. 2590 of 26 November 1934 on the Abolition of Titles and Appellations such as Efendi, Bey or Pasa. 
348 Act. No. 2596 of 3 December 1934 on the prohibition of the Wearing of Certain Garments. 
349 Slavery Convention (1926); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery (1956); Genocide Convention (1948); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951); 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967); Convention of Political Rights of Women (1952); Convention on the 
Elimination of All Kinds of Discrimination Against Women (1979); Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989); 1949 Geneva Convention I; 
1949 Geneva Convention II; 1949 Geneva Convention III; 1949 Geneva Convention IV; European Social Charter (1961); 
European Code of Social Security (1964); European Convention of Social Security (1972); Supplementary Agreement for 
the Application of the European Convention on Social Security (1972); European Convention on the Legal Status of 
Migrant Workers (1977); European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1987); ILO Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
(1948); ILO Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and Bargain 
Collectively (1949); ILO convention (No. 100) Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women workers for Work of 
Equal Value (1951); ILO Convention (No. 102) Concerning Minimum Standard of Social Security (1952); ILO Convention 
(No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (1957); ILO Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in 
Respect of Employment and Occupation (1958); ILO Convention (No. 122) Concerning Employment Policy (1964); ILO 
Convention (No. 135) Concerning Protections and Facilities to be Afforded to Workers' Representatives in the Undertaking 
(1971); ILO Convention (No. 151) Concerning Protection of the Right to Organize and Procedures for Determining 
Condition of Employment in the Public Service (1987). See UN Human Rights Treaty Website at: 
http"//www. unhchr. ch/html/intlinst. htni [26/2/2001] and ILO Conventions Website 
at: http: //ilolex. ilo. ch: 1567/public/english/docs/convdisp. htm [26/2/2001] and International Humanitarian Law Treaties 
Website at: http: //www. icrc. org/ihl [26/2/2001]. 
350 See Articles 12-74 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution. 
35' Art. 24 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution. 
352 Art. 25 ibid. 
353 Art. 26 ibid. 
354 Art. 33 ibid. 
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civil marriages under the reform laws can be violative of their religious freedom guaranteed 
by the Turkish Constitution. 
In the sphere of family law only civil marriages performed by authorised marriage 
officers are legally recognised under the Turkish civil code, 355 thus religious marriages 
conducted in accordance with Islamic law have no legal effect whatsoever. It is only after 
the conduct of a civil marriage that a religious marriage may be conducted. Both the 
religious officer and the couple who contravene that provision are liable to prosecution under 
the Penal Code. 356 This will be violative of right to religious freedom under international 
human rights law. 
Equality and Non-discrimination 
Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution provides that: "All individuals are equal without 
any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political 
opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations. No privilege shall 
be granted to any individual, family, group or class. State organs and administrative 
authorities shall act in compliance with the principle of equality before the law in all their 
proceedings". 
In relation to Islamic law, prohibition of the head-veil has been used as an instrument of 
discrimination against Muslim women in government institutions and establishments in 
Turkey. Muslim female teachers and students are prohibited from using the veil in public 
institutions of learning. Also Muslim female government employees and their families 
cannot attend public functions wearing the veil. 357 Muslim female students are reported to 
have been expelled or denied admission into colleges and higher institutions of learning for 
refusing to discard their head veils worn on Islamic religious grounds. 358 There are also 
"strict rules against lawyers wearing Islamic headgear in court". 359 The veil is considered by 
the State as an emotive symbol of Islam that contradicts the secular nature of Turkey. In the 
2000 Report on Turkey by the Special Rapporteur on Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance 
and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, it is stated that: 
"The (Turkish) Council of State, in response to a complaint brought by a medical 
student against a decision of the university suspending her for one month for wearing 
ass See Art. 151 of the Civil Code. 
356 See Articles 108 and 237 of the Criminal Code. 
357 See Berkes, N., supra, note 336 above, p. 474. 
ass ibid. 
359 Pope, N., and Pope, H., (1997) supra, note 341 above, p. 328. 
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the veil in class, found that the wearing of the veil symbolised a vision of the world 
contrary to the freedoms of women and the principles on which the Republic is 
founded" 360 
The report further stated that a parliamentary attempt in 1988 "to amend the law on 
higher education to allow wearing of the veil for religious reasons" was aborted. 361 The 
Constitutional Court is reported to have set aside the amendment at the request of the 
President on grounds that "to allow female students to cover their heads on university 
grounds might adversely affect the public security and unity of the nation because the 
headscarf or turban shows who belongs to which religion (and that it) was contrary to the 
principle that all beliefs are equal before the law, (and) incompatible with secularism". 362 
This has led to institutionalised discrimination against Muslim women who wear the 
headscarf as is further elaborated under Women's rights below. It also leads indirectly to 
violation of the fundamental right to education for women denied higher education on that 
ground. 
Also on equality and non-discrimination, the Committee of Independent Experts on the 
European Social Charter has observed that certain articles of the Turkish Civil Code give 
greater power to the husband and thus contrary to the principle of equality between spouses 
under the Charter. 363 The Committee referred to Article 152(1) of the Turkish Civil Code 
which provides that the husband is the head of the family; Article 152(2) which provides that 
the husband shall choose the couple's dwelling-place; Article 156 which provides that the 
husband may deprive the wife of her legal authority to represent the couple if she abuses that 
authority; and Article 263 which provides that the husband should have sole parental 
authority if any dispute arose as to its use. Turkey had however noted in its report that "draft 
legislation had been drawn up with a view to revoking these articles". 364 
Women's Rights 
During consideration of Turkey's CEDAW report in 1997, the country's representative 
reported the "development of a gender-sensitive agenda in Turkey", and that "women had 
36° See UN. Doc. A/55/280/Add. I of 11 August 2000, Par. 19. 
361 The intended amendment read as follows: "It is obligatory to have contemporary appearance and dress in higher 
educational institutions, their classrooms, laboratories, clinics and corridors. There is freedom however, for women to 
cover, due to religious belief the neck and hair with a headscarf or turban ". See UN. Doc. A/55/280/Add. I of 11 August 
2000, Par. 20. 
362 ibid. 
363 See European Social Charter, Committee of Independent Experts Conclusions, XIII-3, p. 384. 
364 ibid. 
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become visible and had been expanding their sphere of action" in society. 365 She also 
observed that "(t)he most arduous and urgent task facing the Government now was to 
respond to the demands of women, particularly the enhancement of their basic citizenship 
rights within a secular social order". 366 
The question of the veil always comes up in the examination of women's rights in 
Muslim States. 367 While in some non-secular Muslim States women are forced to wear it, in 
Turkey women are forced to discard it because it is seen as contrary to the "secular social 
order" of the State. 368 From a secular perspective the veil is often seen as a religious symbol 
of women's subjugation. This derives from allusions in earlier religious scriptures that the 
use of the veil by women symbolises their inferiority and subservience to men. 
369 On the 
contrary, there is no reference to it as a symbol of subservience or subjugation in the context 
of both the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 
370 
Under Islamic law the veil is an aspect of the rule on Islamic modesty in dressing, which 
applies to both men and women. Since sexual relationships outside marriage is a criminal 
offence under Islamic law, the law attempts to close the avenues of temptations to it. In that 
regard the Shari'ah provides that certain obvious parts of both men's and women's bodies 
must not be exposed in public to prevent invitations to sexual abuse in the Muslim society. 
While there is legal consensus on the fact that men must not expose any part from their navel 
to their knee in public, the opinion with regards to women are divided. 371 While the Sha fi'1 
and the Hanball schools of Islamic jurisprudence hold that women must cover up their whole 
person without exception from public glare, the Maliki and Hanafi schools of jurisprudence 
exempt the face, the hands up to the wrists and the feet up to the ankles. 
372 Many 
contemporary Muslim thinkers and jurists have disagreed with the view on complete veiling 
of women. 373 Rahman has argued that the Qur'anic provision on lowering of gaze374 would 
I's See Concluding Observation of the CEDAW on Turkey (1997) UN Doc. A/52/38/Rev. 1, of 23/01/97, Par. 154. 
366 ibid. 
367 See e. g. Ali, S. S., "Women's Rights in Islam: Towards a Theoretical Framework", (1997-98) Yearbook of Islamic and 
Middle Eastern Law, Vol. 4., p. 117 at 143-146.; and Jansen, J. G., The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism (1997) 
p138-157. 
d8 Both of which can amount to violation of international human rights law. See e. g. the Human Right Committee's GC 28, 
Par. 13. 
369 See e. g. I Corinthians 11: 5-10. See also Durant, W., Storyof Civilization, (1939), Vol. Ill. pp. 596-597 
370 See Q24: 31 and Q33: 59- 
371 See e. g. All, S. S., supra, note 367 above, and references cited therein in respect of the differences of opinion with regards 
to the veiling of women in Islam. 
372 See e. g. Al-Zuhayli, W., al-Fiqh al-IslamI wa-Adillatuh (Arabic) (1997) Vol. 1, and pp. 743-754. See also Stowasser, 
B. F., Women in the Qur'an, Traditions, and Interpretation (1994) pp. 93-94. 
373 See e. g. Rahman, F., Status of Women in the Qur'an in Nashat., G., (ed. ) Women and Revolution in Iran (1983). See also 
the judgement of the Pakistan Federal Shariat Court in Ansar Burney. v. Federation of Pakistan , (1983) PLD (FSC) 73 at 
75ff. 
374 See e. g. Q24: 30-31. 
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not have been necessary (at least for men) if women were required to cover up completely. 375 
In practice, majority of Muslim women follow the view of the second two schools. 76 
It is in relation to this religious obligation of modesty that Muslim women use the head- 
veil. This allows an atmosphere whereby men and women are able to perform their societal 
functions without invoking their sexual tempers. Women who dress modestly and cover their 
hair are respected and honoured in most Muslim societies. They are considered to be free 
from contributory negligence to sexual abuses on women. The head-veil does not prevent 
women from achieving whatever heights they are capable of reaching in many Muslim 
societies of today. Nicole and Hugh Pope have observed that: "Contrary to perceptions in the 
West, these women, who often wear a long Islamic coat as well as a headscarf, are not 
always uneducated peasants submitting to tradition. Some are well educated professional 
women, who have made a conscious choice to embrace religion". 
377 Wearing the veil is more 
of a religious obligation, which many Muslim women carry out willingly. This is evidenced 
by the fact that while the State strongly discourages the use of the head-veil in Turkey most 
women outside government institutions still wear it as a religious obligation in their daily 
lives. Turkish female students have demonstrated against the prohibition of the head-veil in 
higher institutions of learning as a violation of their religious rights. 378 Muslim women in 
Western non-Muslim States also use the head-veil willingly as a religious obligation. 
The controversy about the Muslim woman's veil in Turkey reached a summit on May 2, 
1999 when an elected Member of the Turkish Parliament, Merve Kavakci (a Muslim lady), 
entered parliament for the swearing-in ceremony wearing a head-veil. This raised mayhem in 
the assembly. She was accused of violating the secular principle of the State and ordered to 
either remove the veil or vacate the assembly. The lady refused to do either, pleading her 
right to dress in accordance with her religious beliefs. The parliament ended in a row. 
While Kavakci was seen by the State as an "agent provocateur working for radical 
Islamic states", Kavakci saw herself setting a simple test in democracy, tolerance and 
freedom of expression, which according to her, the State had failed. This quickly led to 
judicial moves by the country's chief prosecutor to close down the Virtue Party on whose 
platform Miss Kavakci was elected on grounds that the party was trying to overthrow the 
secular Constitution of the State by supporting her. The veil saga led to the revocation of 
375 See Rahman, F., (1983) supra, note 373 above, at 40. 
376 See Chapter 6, pp. 115-16. 
377Pope, N., and Pope, H., (1997) supra, note 341 above, p. 328. 
378 Media reports indicate that some Muslim female students have been charged in Turkish courts with the crime of 
intending to overthrow the secular nature of the State for demonstrating against the ban on the use of the veil in higher 
institutions. 
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Miss Kavakci's Turkish citizenship within days, on grounds that she had taken USA dual 
citizenship without informing the Turkish authorities. Kavakci had been earlier forced to 
abandon her medical course at Ankara University and migrated with her parents to study 
computer science in the USA because she had also refused to uncover her hair then as a 
medical student. This revocation of citizenship raises other international human rights issues 
on the right to citizenship apart from the initial issue of a Muslim's right to wear the head- 
veil on religious grounds, and perhaps that of a Christian nun as well, in a secular State. The 
Kavakci veil saga has been described as "a serious breach of human rights, representing an 
attack on the fundamental right of freedom of religion. s379 Turkey thus represents an 
example of a Muslim State where principles of international human rights are pleaded against 
State practices that violates Islamic religious rights. It also dispels any proposition that tends 
to suggest the application of Islamic law as the major factor for the violation of international 
human rights in Muslim States. 
Of relevance also in the discussion of women's rights in Turkey is the practice of forced 
"virginity examinations" carried out on women. The examination is conducted to determine 
that the virginity of a female is intact, often to "defend" the family's honour. It is a traditional 
practice carried out on the presumption that female virginity is a legitimate interest of the 
family, the community and, ultimately, the State, and is thus not only deemed justifiable, but 
also seen as legitimately overriding the individual rights of women to bodily integrity, 
privacy and equality before the law. 380 The CEDAW Committee has "emphasized that such 
coercive practices were degrading, discriminatory and unsafe and constituted a violation by 
state authorities of the bodily integrity, person and dignity of women" 
. 
381 Turkey being a 
State with predominant Muslim population, it must be emphasised that this practice is 
absolutely cultural and has no support whatsoever under Islamic law. The Shari `ah 
provisions on protection of the female's privacy, modesty and integrity actually makes such 
practice unlawful under Islamic law. Its non-relation to Islamic law is evidenced by the fact 
that such practice does not occur in other Muslim States that actually implement Islamic law. 
379 See UN. Doc. A/55/280/Add. l of 11 August 2000, Par. 67. 
380 See Human Rights Watch, "Forced Virginity Exams in Turkey" in The Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women's 
Human Rights (1995) pp. 418-444 particularly 419. See also Monshipouri, M., (1998) supra note 97 above, pp. 128-9. 
381 See CEDAW Concluding Observation on Turkey (1997), UN. Doc. A/52/38/Rev. 1, Par. 178. 
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Islamic Criminal Justice 
Similar to Tunisia, Islamic criminal law is not also applied in Turkey. Thus there is no 
question of Islamic criminal law provisions affecting the State's international human rights 
obligations in any way. 
General Representations on Human Rights 
Despite criticisms against its human rights practice, Turkey continues to affirm its 
commitment to the international human rights regime. At the fifty-sixth session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in April 2000, the Turkish Minister in charge of human rights 
agreed that the nation's "shortcomings in the area of human rights were, regrettably, not 
negligible". He blamed the situation on what he described as "a wave of ideological terror" 
and "ethnic terrorism with separatist objectives" faced by the State. He however reiterated 
the nation's commitment to international human rights, listing out a number of reforms by 
the government towards the improvement of human rights in the State, which includes that: 
"... only civilian judges currently sat on the State Security courts; a repentance law 
had granted amnesty and reduced sentences of members of terrorist groups; 
amendments to the Penal Code had redefined and increased the penalties for torture, 
ill-treatment and abuse of power by public officials 
- 
the definition of torture had 
been brought into line with the United Nations and European conventions; legislation 
had been passed to postpone sentences and trials relating to crimes committed 
through the media 
- 
to date 22 writers and reporters had been released from prison; 
new legislation made it easier to prosecute public officials for torture and ill- 
treatment; stricter guidelines on detention and interrogation had been introduced; 
human rights education had been intensified, particularly in the context of the United 
Nations Decade for Human Rights Education; and it had been made easier for civil 
servants to engage in trade union activity. " He further stated that: "Work was 
continuing on reforms to the Civil Code, the Penal Code, the Code of Penal 
Procedure, the Code of Execution of Sentences and the Ombudsman Bill. s082 
He concluded that "Turkey would soon be signing the international Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 383 
both of which it did sign on 15 August 2000 but is yet to ratify.. 
382 See Summary Record of the 0 Meeting at the 56`h Session of the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. 
E/CN. 4/2000/SR. 4 of 4 April 2000. Par. 39-49. 
383 ibid., Par. 47. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
An examination of other Muslim States will reveal, mutatis mutandis, State practices in 
respect of international human rights that fall within the case studies conducted in this 
chapter. Theoretically, the ideals and humane spirit of the Shari `ah as expatiated in the first 
and second parts of this thesis creates an expectation that human rights should best be 
respected in the Muslim world. This is regrettably not so, and human rights are violated in 
Muslim States as much as they are violated in non-Muslim States. International human rights 
law is seen to be violated both where there is a hard-line traditional application of Islamic 
law or the enforcement of hard-line secularist agendas against Islamic norms and rights. 
There is therefore a need to find a balance between these two positions in the relationship 
between Islamic law and international human rights law in the Muslim world. 
It is obvious that there is a common phenomenon of consciousness in Muslim States of 
the appealing nature of international human rights ideals, especially on the part of those 
exposed to the modern concepts of freedom, liberty and equality. Muslim States can thus not 
feign indifference but are rather advancing cautiously and with different degrees of 
moderation in bridging the gap that exists between their interpretation of the Shari `ah and the 
realisation of their international human rights obligations. While the State practice of Muslim 
States concedes generally to the universality of human rights, they have persistently 
advanced the cultural relativist argument to sustain Islamic morals and values within their 
human rights practice. To achieve greater harmony, the need for Muslim States to depart 
from hard-line interpretations of the Shari `ah has been stressed in this thesis. However, State 
practice, especially that of the first four Muslim States examined in this chapter, also 
confirms that, no matter how moderate Muslim States are in their application of Islamic law, 
there will still remain some areas of cultural differences vis-ä-vis current international human 
rights practice. Those areas of differences that can be reasonably justified on grounds of 
public order and morality are those for which this thesis proposes the adoption of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine by the UN treaty bodies in emulation of the European human rights 
regime. This will allow for an international evaluation and control of the justifications 
advanced for the cultural differences and promote an inclusive universalism that will enrich 
international human rights practice universally. 
As has been argued in the earlier parts of this thesis, the legitimising effect of the 
Shari `ah and its ultimate objective of ensuring both the temporal and spiritual well being of 
individuals make it a very important vehicle for realising the ideals of international human 
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rights law in the Muslim world. Adopting the margin of appreciation doctrine will provide 
leeway for the healthy interaction between Islamic law and international human rights law in 
the Muslim world. It must be noted however that there is yet to emerge a unified 
interpretation or application of Islamic law that facilitates a common Islamic human rights 
evaluation among Muslim States. Thus with the Islamic resurgence in the Muslim world and 
the adoption of Islamic law in one form or another by modern Muslim States, an important 
challenge that also faces them is the establishment of a common Islamic human rights 
standard and an enforcement mechanism as a reference point towards bridging the gap that 
presently exists between the application of Islamic law and the enforcement of international 
human rights law in the Muslim world. The concluding chapter of this thesis will address and 
recommend possible means for meeting that challenge in co-operation with the international 
human rights regime of the UN. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Conclusion 
This research has examined the question whether or not Islamic law and international 
human rights are compatible, and whether Muslim States can comply with international 
human rights law while they still adhere to Islamic law. We have exhaustively analysed and 
responded to the salient traditional arguments on the subject from both an international 
human rights and Islamic legal perspective. The substantive rights contained in the ICCPR 
and ICESCR as well as some aspects of the Women's Convention have also been examined 
in the light of Islamic law. The State practices of six Muslim States were also examined as 
case studies. The findings and recommendations of the research are summarised in this 
concluding chapter. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It has emerged from the analyses and arguments herein that there is certainly a human 
rights discourse in Islamic law. Although the manifestation of this may have been eclipsed by 
the traditional emphasis on the differences of scope between the two legal regimes, the 
expositions in this research impugns the incompatibility theory and reveals the existence of a 
large positive common ground between Islamic law and international human rights law. This 
does not however obscure their differences of scope and application, but rather establishes a 
positive basis for managing the differences through the development of complementary 
methodologies between the two legal systems. The analysis and argumentation of the 
theoretical and practical differences reveal that the differences are not totally irreconcilable. 
The important harmonising elements are demonstration of good faith, appreciation of human 
dignity, and the abandonment of prejudice between Islamic law and international human 
rights advocates. The detailed examination of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR in the light 
of Islamic law demonstrates the possibility of constructive harmonisation of international 
human rights norms with Islamic law. The contentions between Islamic law and 
international human rights law arise mainly from points of interpretation, which are largely 
and mutually reconcilable. Consequently, the eliminative and "end of history" approach to 
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the interpretation of both Islamic law and international human rights law has been herein 
challenged. It is only an inclusive, evolutionary and constructive method of interpretation 
that will bring the best out of the two regimes for the enrichment of human rights in the 
Muslim world. 
Generally, the ideals of international human rights are very lofty and thus no nation can 
today be indifferent to its challenges. Modern Muslim States are conscious of that and they 
do demonstrate acknowledgement of the importance of human rights. They also 
acknowledge the universality of human rights and their reports neither challenge the binding 
nature of international human rights treaties nor deny their obligations under treaties ratified 
by them. Their contention has mostly been about interpretation of international human rights 
norms and that "(t)here was a need to develop current human rights concepts with reference 
to the humanitarian values enshrined in the various religions, civilizations and cultures of the 
world". ' The question is therefore not simply an argument about Muslim States being bound 
by the norms of international human rights law, 2 for they do not appear to dispute that. 
Rather the question is about the evolution of a universally applicable interpretation of the 
norms. It is ultimately a question of universalism not universality. The Muslim World 
League reiterated after its international conference on human rights in Rome on February 28, 
2000 that "dialogue be encouraged among all cultures and civilizations in a manner that 
paves the way toward a better understanding of human rights". 
3 The Muslim world thus 
generally affirms international human rights coupled with varying degrees of persistence 
upon Islamic legal traditions in interpreting human rights norms. This reflects the strong link 
of Islamic legal traditions with the Islamic civilisation as a whole. In their examination of the 
major legal systems of the world, David and Brierly observed the impossibility of rejecting 
the Islamic legal tradition without rejecting the entire Islamic civilisation. Since a rejection 
of the Islamic civilisation is not the goal of the international human rights objective, 
accommodation of the Islamic legal tradition is of utmost importance for realising the ideals 
of international human rights and for achieving universalism in human rights in the Muslim 
world. Through mutuality and accommodation the legitimising force of Islamic law in many 
Muslim States can be positively utilised for the enforcement of international human rights 
law in the Muslim world. 
I See Statement by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia at 56`h Session of UN Commission on Human 
Rights. UN Doc. E/CN. 4120000/SR. 30 of 26 April 2000. Par. 2. 
2 See e. g. argument along that line in Mayer, E. A., Islam and Human Rights, Tradition and Politics (3`d Ed. 1999) p. 12. 
3 See Rome Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. Saudi Embassy News Website at: 
http: //www. saudiembassy. net/press release/00 spa/02-28-Islam. html [6/03/2001]. 
See David, R., and Brierley, E. C. Major Legal Systems in the World Today, (1985), p. 482. 
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The scope of international human rights can be positively enhanced in the Muslim world 
through moderate, dynamic and constructive interpretations of the Shari 'ah rather than 
through hard-line and static interpretations of it. This is particularly so in respect of women's 
rights, minority rights, and the application of Islamic criminal punishments. We have shown 
by reference to the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence and classical juristic views that 
even the early Islamic jurists and scholars emphasised the importance of moderation and had 
adopted constructive views that can today greatly enhance the realisation of international 
human rights norms within the dispensation of Islamic law. The Muslim ummah is actually 
described as "justly balanced" in the Qur'an, a description signifying moderations The 
Islamic legal analysis of the two international human rights Covenants has established the 
need for reviewing some traditional interpretations of the Shari 'ah in the light of equally 
valid moderate opinions that had existed even from the earliest Islamic jurists as 
demonstrated in this research, for the full realisation of the rights contained in them. The 
rules of Islamic jurisprudence do actually encourage interpretations of the Shari 'ah that 
promote the benevolent nature of Islam, especially where the reasoning for such 
interpretations commensurates with prevalent needs of social justice and human well being. 
This conclusion is not unmindful of possible difficulties in that respect. For instance, the 
representative of Iran, Mr. Nasseri, had stated, inter alia, before the ESCR Committee in 
1993 that "it was not always easy to apply traditional Islamic law without falling short of the 
commitments undertaken in acceding to the Covenant. " He however also added that "(t)he 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
... 
was sincerely endeavouring to reconcile Islamic law and the 
provisions of the Covenant". 
6 This buttresses the fact that even where interpretational 
difficulties exist, there is often possibility of rapprochement as contended and demonstrated 
in this research. Likewise, when Egypt ratified both the ICCPR and ICESCR in 1982 it 
entered a general declaration "taking into consideration the provisions of the Islamic Sharia". 
In paragraph 3 of its initial report on the ICESCR submitted in 1998, Egypt stated in respect 
of the said declaration as follows: 
"Egypt expressed a general reservation to the effect that account should be taken of 
the need to ensure that the Covenant was not incompatible with the provisions of the 
Islamic Shari'a. However, the practical implementation in Egypt of the provisions of 
the Covenant, as one of the country's laws, from 14 April 1982 to date has not 
revealed any incompatibility between the provisions of the Islamic Shari 'a and the 
I See Q2: 143. A Tradition of the Prophet also instructs Muslims as follows: "Beware of extremism in religion. People 
before you have perished as a result of such extremism". See also generally, al-Qaradawi, Y., Islamic Awakening between 
Rejection and Extremism (1990). 
6 See Par. 36 and 37 of Summary Record of the 8`h Meeting: Iran; E/C. 12/1993/SR. 8 of 20 December 1993. 
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principles and rights set forth in the Covenant and relating to its field of 
application. "' (emphasis added). 
The Egyptian representative before the ESCR Committee, Mr. Salama, had also pointed 
out that: "Enlightened interpretations of Islamic law were permitted... (in Egypt) and had 
actually contributed to the positive developments mentioned by the delegation in many 
fields, such as women's and family issues. " 8 This reflects the importance of good faith and 
humanitarian will on the part of State authorities in endeavouring to realise international 
human rights within the ample limits of the Shari'ah and their application of Islamic law. 
Conversely, there is similar need to depart from the exclusionist approach in the 
interpretations of the provisions of international human rights treaties. To encourage the 
promotion and realisation of international human rights in the Muslim world, the UN 
international human rights treaty bodies must develop consideration for Islamic values in 
their interpretation of international human rights norms in relation to Islamic law. This is 
possible through the adoption of the margin of appreciation doctrine on moral issues relating 
especially to Islamic ethical and family norms. Due to the obvious relevance of Islamic law 
in the quest for universalism in international human rights in the Muslim world, there is a 
positive need for the inclusion of highly qualified experts in Islamic international law on the 
membership of international human rights treaty bodies to reflect the "representation of the 
different forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems" of the world on the 
Committees. 9 This would boost the confidence of Muslim States and Islamic legalists in the 
international human rights treaty bodies and lead to more positive inclination towards 
interpretations and general comments of the relevant Committees of international human 
rights treaties. It will also encourage the ratification by Muslim States not only of substantive 
human rights treaties but also Optional Protocols that provide for individual complaints 
systems within the international human rights regime. With reference to the HRC for 
instance, McGoldrick has rightly observed that: 
"The presence of experts from different legal systems can assist the HRC in its 
consideration of reports under article 40. For example, during consideration of the 
report of Morocco it was useful to have members of the HRC who were conversant 
with Islamic laws. The provision in article 31(2) can give States parties the 
confidence that their approach will at least be understood even if disagreed with... i10 
7 Initial State Party Report: Egypt; E/1990/5/Add. 38 of 30 June 1998. 
e Summary Record of the 13`h Meeting: Egypt; E/C. 12/2000/SR. 13 of 9 May 2000 and Par. 64 of Summary Record of the 
I1 Meeting: Egypt; E/C. 12/2000/SR. 1 I of 8 May 2000. 
9 See e. g. Art. 31(2) of the ICCPR and Art. 8 ICERD. 
10 McGoldrick, D., The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1994) p. 55 n. 5. 
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Joseph, Schultz and Castan have however observed that "a Western representative bias 
can be detected in recent years, with over half of the (HRC) members serving from 1998 to 
2000 coming from the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, 
Israel, Finland, Germany and Poland". 11 Thus the need for the reflection of a more 
"equitable distribution of membership" not only of the HRC but of all the UN human rights 
treaty bodies cannot be overemphasised. 12 
Based on the findings herein, this conclusion proposes a mutual approach for the 
realisation of international human rights within the dispensation of Islamic law in the Muslim 
world. Both Islamic law and international human rights jurists and scholars need to adopt an 
accommodative and complementary approach to achieve the noble objective of enhancing 
human dignity, fostering an ideal human community, ensuring justice, peace and the general 
well being of all human beings, which are common aims of both the Shari `ah and 
international human rights law. The objective must be towards combining the best in both 
systems for all humanity. This proposal impugns the unilateral approach, which demands that 
the harmonisation between Islamic law and international human rights law depends only on 
reforming the Shari `ah to conform totally with current international human rights 
interpretations, some of which are considered by Muslims as insensitive to Islamic religious 
and moral viewpoints. For instance one advocate of that unilateral approach, while answering 
the question "How should international law respond to the incompatibility of claims based on 
Shari 'a with international human rights norms? ", submitted that: "international law norms 
must not be compromised, and that it may be desirable for Muslim scholars to explore 
alternative interpretations of Islamic sources under which Shari 'a can be reconciled with 
developments in international human rights law". 13 The difficulty of such unilateral demand 
upon Islamic law is quite obvious. Practically, it is synonymous with an attempt to clap with 
only one hand. 
The mutual and complementary approach proposes that in respect of Islamic law, the 
necessary means for harmonisation are: (i) adopting an "enlightened interpretations" 
approach, as observed by the Egyptian representative above, and (ii) a "sincere endeavour to 
reconcile" as observed by the Iranian representative. We have observed earlier that the 
Joseph, S., Schultz, J., and Castan, M., The International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, Cases, Materials, and 
Commentary (2000) p. 10. 
12 For example the balance of State Party membership of the European Court of Human Rights does make easier its search 
for an "European Consensus" in cases brought before it. Art. 20 of the European Convention provides that: "The Court 
shall consist of a number of judges equal to that of the High Contracting Parties ". 
13 Nanda, V. P., "Islam and International Human Rights Law: Selected Aspects" (1993) American Society of international 
Law Proceedings, p. 327 at 331. 
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Islamic law doctrine of maslahah is very relevant for this purpose. And in respect of 
international human rights law the necessary means are: (i) accommodation of necessary 
margin of appreciation in respect of Islamic ethical and moral values, (ii) appreciation that 
human rights are not inherently non-achievable within the scope of Islamic law. We shall 
now consider some salient practical means of achieving these domestically, regionally and 
universally. 
Domestic Means for Enhancing Human Rights in the Muslim World 
1. Human Rights Education 
It is submitted that the greatest debilitating factor against the enhancement of human 
rights in the Muslim world today is ignorance about human rights and lack of human rights 
education. While, as shown in this thesis, Islamic law substantially recognises the duty of the 
State to promote and protect the human rights of every human being as guaranteed under 
international human rights law, most of the populace in Muslim States are ignorant about 
these rights. They do not often understand what human rights is all about. Some even believe 
that it is an affront against their religious values. They do not see human rights law as a 
means of protecting the individual against the abuse of State power. There is an important 
need therefore for Muslim States to embark on extensive formal and informal human rights 
education for their populace. 
Due to the importance and role of religion and religious institutions in the Muslim 
world, human rights education should not be limited to the secular institutions but also 
extended to the religious institutions. The provisions of the Qur'an and Sunnah that promote 
the ideals of human rights must be stressed. The provisions of international human rights 
instruments need also to be explained and illustrated through the Islamic legal tradition as 
demonstrated in this research. To praticalise their assertion in the OIC Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam that human rights are divine part of the Islamic legal tradition, which no 
authority can withhold, Muslim States must disseminate what those rights are through a 
massive human rights education in the Muslim world. Under Islamic law, the populace have 
a right to know and to be informed of everything of benefit to them, not only for the hereafter 
but for their well being in this world as well. There are many Qur'anic verses, as referred to 
in this thesis, that enjoin the promotion of education and condemn the concealment of 
knowledge, which in this case includes human rights education due to its value for the 
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ultimate benefit of the individual in every society of today's world. An Islamic and 
international human rights curriculum for primary, secondary and tertiary institutions would 
be of great benefit in that regard. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) also have an 
important role to play in that regard. 
2. The Judiciary 
The primacy of domestic enforcement of human rights is acknowledged in both 
universal and regional human rights instruments. 14 Equally, the importance of the judiciary in 
the domestic enforcement of human rights guarantees can not be over-emphasised. In 
respect of the exhaustion of all available domestic remedies by victims of human rights 
violations, the HRC has stressed that this "clearly refers in the first place to judicial 
remedies". 15 Thus the judiciary is the ultimate resort to claiming one's right in case of its 
denial by the State. However justice is, to a degree, relative to the judge's understanding and 
values. Thus, for the reflection of a human rights approach to justice in the Muslim world, 
the courts and the judges must also be specially attuned to be human rights conscious. 
Judges in Muslim States and courts must be attuned in that regard in their dispensation of 
justice to adopt a human rights approach based on the humane objective of the Shari `ah 
(magäsid al-sharI'ah), which is the protection and promotion of human welfare. This will 
also require the introduction of Islamic judges to international human rights jurisprudence to 
afford a reflective comparison in their legal thinking. 
Judicial human rights training would also be very essential in this respect. This would 
not necessarily be only in international human rights law but also encourage the development 
of Islamic human rights training for Islamic court judges in Muslim countries in their 
application of Islamic law. 
3. National Human Rights Commissions 
The establishment of national human rights commissions in the Muslim States would 
also certainly enhance the realisation of human rights in the Muslim world. The national 
human rights commissions would be independent bodies conferred with adequate autonomy 
for the general promotion of human rights ideals in the countries. The commissions would 
14 See e. g. Art. 8 UDHR, Art. 2(3) ICCPR, Art. 6 ICERD, Art. 14(l) CAT, Art 25 ACHR, Art. 13 ECHR and Art. 7 
ACHPR. 
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also play supplementary roles in realising the first two objectives stated above. The presence 
of such commissions has contributed to the awareness about human rights in some Muslim 
countries already. 16 
While the above domestic means, coupled with the good will of the State can go a long 
way in enhancing the ideals of human rights in individual Muslim States, national apparatus, 
for obvious reasons, cannot be solely adequate for the full realisation of human rights 
guarantees. Especially to promote and encourage universalism, there is the need for inter- 
State co-operation as an important means for further enhancement of international human 
rights. Regionalism has proved to be a very effective means to achieve that, but which the 
Muslim States have not adequately exploited. 
Regionalism as a Vehicle of Universalism 
While the State, as the main object of duties in the guarantee of human rights, is a very 
important institution for the realisation of human rights, the traditional concept of the modem 
nation-state is itself absolutist and to a large extent inhibits the realisation of a common 
universal human rights practice. Community is thus an important vehicle of ensuring the 
effective universalisation of international human rights. 
After the UN General Assembly adopted the UDHR in 1948, the Council of Europe 
quickly demonstrated the utility of the regional community approach through the adoption of 
an European regional convention17 as the first step towards realising a collective enforcement 
of human rights. An important motivation for that approach is as stated in the preamble of the 
European Convention that "the governments of European countries.. 
. 
are likeminded and 
have a common heritage of political traditions, (and) ideals... ", which could promote a 
collective enforcement of human rights amongst European countries. 
18 The common 
heritage of the American people had also contributed to the adoption of the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948 and the American Convention on 
Human Rights in 1969. The African nations were also motivated in 1981 to adopt the African 
'5 R. T. [name deleted] 
. 
v. France, Communication No. 262/1987 (30 March 1989), UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at 277 
(1989). Par. 7.4. For provisions on the exhaustion of domestic remedies See e. g. All. 5(2)(b) OP 1 to the ICCPR, Art. 35 
ECHR, Art. 46(1)(a) ACHR, and Art. 50 ACHPR. 
16 e. g. The Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights. For information on its functions and role in promoting 
human rights ideals in Indonesia See its 1999 Annual Report. Available Online at: 
http: //www. koninas. go. id/english/report/index. htný [21/3/2001]; and The Nigerian Human Rights Commission established 
under the National Human Rights Commission Decree No. 22 of 1995. See a commendation of the work of the Nigerian 
National Human Rights Commission in the Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Nigeria by the Special Rapporteur 
of the UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1999/36 of 14/1/99, Par. 69-72. 
1' European Convention For The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950). 
'B See the Preamble of the European Convention. (emphasis added). 
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Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, "(t)aking into consideration the virtues of their 
historical tradition and the values of African civilization which should inspire and 
characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights". 19 These regional 
arrangements do not constitute a deviation from the universal aspiration of international 
human rights pursued by the UN as it may appear. Rather, they narrow down the diverse 
cultural differences and difficulties that may confront the universal enforcement of 
international human rights in practice. The UN has itself welcomed the regional human rights 
regimes and appealed to States to establish regional institutions for human rights where non 
already existed. 20 The preambular statements of the regional human rights instruments 
quoted above indicate that rather than mere geographical proximity, the basis for those 
regional human rights arrangements and co-operation includes political, social, cultural, 
economic and moral ideals. 
The Islamic culture and civilisation transcends geographical boundaries and creates a 
stronger heritage between modern Muslim States. According to Hurewitz, "all the countries 
of North Africa and most of those of the Middle East are Arab and view themselves as 
belonging to a regional community of states. 
... 
The Arab states, moreover, form part of a 
bigger yet more deeply fractured Islamic world". 21 Despite their geographical spread, the 
historical bond of Islam provides the modem Muslim States with a sense of commonality. 
Islamic law represents a sort of common law of the Muslim world. This was what actually 
held them together in the past as a single community under the Caliphate. This can be utilised 
for the achievement of an effective collective supervision and enforcement of human rights 
in the Muslim world that will greatly enhance the universal practice of international human 
rights law. The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) is one community organ founded 
"to consolidate cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and other vital fields 
of activities" among Muslim States. 22 It is suggested that the OIC can thus provide a 
community framework among modem Muslim States within the international order for the 
practical realisation of international human rights law in the Muslim world. 23 
19 See the Preamble to the African Charter. (emphasis added). 
20 See UN Doc. GA Res. 32/127 (1977), which has been reiterated yearly since then. The Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Actions (1993) also reiterated this call. See 32 International Legal Materials (1993) 1661 at 1672, par. 37. 
21 Hurewitz, J. C., (ed. ) The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, (1975) Vol. 1., p. xvii. 
22 See Art. II (A) (2) of the OIC Charter. 
23 The definition of Muslim States for this research had in fact been based on Membership of the OIC. See Chapter 1, p. 7 
above. 
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The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) as a vehicle of Universalism 
in the Muslim World 
The OIC was founded by Muslim Heads of State and Governments in 1969 with the 
main objective of promoting "Islamic solidarity among member States. i24 The Charter25 
establishing the OIC entered into force on 28 February 1973. By December 2000 it had a 
total membership of fifty-six Muslim States, all of whom are also members States of the 
UN. 26 This approximates almost one third of the present membership of the UN, an 
indication of the viability of the OIC serving as a platform to fulfil the need for a community 
approach to international human rights within the dispensation of Islamic law in the Muslim 
world. The preamble of the OIC Charter declares, inter alia, that the Member-States are: 
"Convinced that their common belief constitutes a strong factor for rapprochement 
and solidarity between Islamic people; 
Resolved to preserve Islamic spiritual, ethical, social and economic values, which 
will remain one of the important factors of achieving progress for mankind; 
Reaffirming their commitment to the UN Charter and fundamental Human Rights, 
the purposes and principles of which provide the basis for fruitful co-operation 
amongst all people; 
Determined to consolidate the bonds of prevailing brotherly and spiritual friendship 
among their people, and to protect their freedom and the common legacy of their 
civilization founded particularly on the principles of justice, toleration and non- 
discrimination; 
In their Endeavour to increase human well-being, progress and freedom everywhere 
and resolved to unite their efforts in order to secure universal peace which ensures 
security, freedom and justice for their people and all people throughout the world. " 
It will be observed that the OIC member States reaffirmed their commitment to the UN 
Charter as well as to fundamental human rights as purposes and principles towards a fruitful 
co-operation amongst all people. The OIC Charter was also registered as an international 
treaty with the UN on February 1,1974 in conformity with Article 102 of the UN Charter, 
making the charter invocable before the organs of the UN. 
27 
24 Article II(A)(1) Charter of the Islamic Conference. 
25 914 UNTS Ill. 
26 This is with the exception of Palestine, which is not a full member of the UN yet but has only an observer status. 
27 Art. 102 of the UN Charter provides that: 
"(1) Every Treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the 
United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be 
registered with the Secretariat and published by it. 
(2) No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United 
Nations. " 
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After a conference on "Liberties and Human Rights in Islam " in the Republic of Niger 
in 1979, the Tenth Conference of Foreign Ministers of the OIC agreed, in line with its 
Charter commitment on fundamental human rights, to set up a consultative commission of 
Muslim experts to draft an Islamic human rights document for the Organisation. 28 Through 
that and subsequent efforts the OIC Cairo Declaration on Human Rights emerged and was 
endorsed by the OIC Foreign Ministers in 1990. In further pursuance of its commitment to 
the promotion of human rights, the OIC in co-operation with the UN organised a seminar in 
1998 on "Enriching the Universality of Human Rights: Islamic Perspectives on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights" as part of the activities marking the 50th 
Anniversary of the UDHR at the UN Secretariat in Geneva. The OIC Secretary General, 
Azzedine Laraki, described the initiative as "a positive step forward among nations and a 
building block in the edifice of inter-civilizational dialogue (and to which) the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference possesses all the potential and desire to contribute actively in 
furthering and enriching". 29 
Following the UN General Assembly's unanimous adoption of Resolution 53/22 in 
November 199830 declaring the year 2001 as the "Year of Dialogue among Civilizations", 
the OIC adopted a "Declaration on Dialogue among Civilizations" in May 1999 in which it 
identified the following eight areas needing international dialogue: 
1. Responding to the common longing of humanity for faith and ethics; 
2. Enhancement of mutual understanding and knowledge about various 
civilizations; 
3. Cooperation and mutual enrichment in various fields of human endeavor and 
achievement: scientific, technological, cultural, social, political, economic, 
security; 
4. Promotion of the culture of tolerance and respect for diversity; 
5. Cooperation to arrest threats to global peace, security and well being: 
environmental degradation, conflicts, arms, drugs, terrorism; 
6. Confidence-building at regional and global levels; 
7. Promotion and protection of human rights and human responsibility, including 
the rights of minorities and migrants to maintain their cultural identity and 
observe their values and traditions; 
28 See al-Ahsan, A., OIC, The Organization of the Islamic Conference: An Introduction to an Islamic Political Institution 
(1988)P. 113 
29For the OIC Secretary General's Opening Address See UN Human Rights Website at: 
http"//www unhchr. ch/huricane/huricane. nsf/(Symbol)/OHCHR. 98I I29. B. En? OpenDocument [6/03/2001]. 
30 UN Doc A/RES/53/22 of November 16 1988. 
346 
8. Promotion and protection of the rights and dignity of women, safeguarding the 
institution of family, and protection of the vulnerable segments of the human 
population: the children, the youth and the elderly. 
31 
Also in his address at the 56th Session of the Commission of Human Rights in March 
2000, the Secretary General of the OIC stated inter alia that: 
"At the threshold of the 21st Century it is imperative to put an end to all (the) blatant 
violations of human rights so that all people of the world may enjoy the same rights 
to education, health, development and welfare in a decent moral environment by 
eradicating poverty, misery, hunger, illiteracy etc. We can achieve these objectives, 
especially through a decisive and voluntary international cooperation deriving from 
an understanding and mutual respect of the cultural idiosyncracies of each people. In 
this perspective, the Organization of the Islamic Conference is convinced that the 
dialogue of civilizations which it had called upon vehemently and which the United 
Nations has announced for the year 2001 will reinforce the basis of such a 
cooperation. I am pleased to announce to you that the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference is actively working in this regard. 9732 
The UN has itself demonstrated the desire to co-operate with the OIC in the search for 
solution to global problems. Such co-operation can be traced back to 1975 when the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution to invite the OIC to participate in the sessions and work of the 
General Assembly and of its subsidiary organs in the capacity of observer. 33 From 1982 the 
General Assembly has also adopted resolutions on co-operation with the OIC and continues 
to include on its agenda the item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference". 34 
The above endeavours of co-operation and mutuality are fully accommodated within the 
founding objectives of the OIC without discarding the Islamic religious ideology of its 
Member-States. Such co-operation and mutuality are also encouraged by the Shari `ah on the 
basis of equity and good faith. Ensuring the realisation of international human rights in the 
Muslim world demands priority in these endeavours. The OIC needs to encourage among 
Muslim States, the practical interpretation of the general "Islamic spiritual, ethical, social and 
economic values", which they hold as "one of the important factors of achieving progress for 
mankind"35 in a manner that enhances the realisation of international human rights. 
31 See Par. B of Tehran Declaration on Dialogue Among Civilizations. See OIC Website at: http: //www. oic- 
un. org/news. htm [14/12/2000]. 
32 See Address of Secretary General of OIC Before the 56`h Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, on 
24 March, 2000, Online: http: //www. oic-un. org/Statements/SG56. html [19/12/2000] 
33 Res. 3369 (XXX) of 10 October 1975. 
34 See e. g. A/RES/53/16 of I1 November 1998. See also the Report of the UN Secretary General A/53/430 of 24 
September 1998 on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 
35 See Par. 4 of the Preamble of the OIC Charter. 
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However, an identified important problem in that regard is that while the Shari 'ah is a 
strong value-unifier in the Muslim world, there presently exists no interpretative or 
enforcement organ with the competence of a "universal" interpretation of the Shari 'ah in 
relation to international human rights, or with the jurisdiction of determining the scope of the 
Shari'ah on any violation that might arise even under the Cairo Declaration adopted by the 
OIC. This situation gives room to each member State to individually determine its own 
scope of the Shari 'ah, which is sometimes vaguely pleaded by some States to restrict even 
the most basic human rights. The lack of an interpretative or enforcement organ has rendered 
the Cairo Declaration a dormant document which neither the Muslim States individually, nor 
the OIC as a body formally refers to in the face of the sometimes obvious violations of basic 
fundamental human rights in some Muslim States. There is thus a real need for a supervisory 
and enforcement organ for the rights guaranteed by the Declaration. In the absence of such 
institution, the political authorities will, for example, not be restricted in any way from 
clawing-back whatever rights may be apparently guaranteed even by the OIC Cairo 
Declaration. The nearest to having a judicial organ by the OIC was in 1981 when the 
Organisation decided at its Third Islamic Summit Conference in Saudi Arabia to create an 
Islamic Court of Justice in Kuwait with the competence to hear, inter alia, cases "which the 
concerned Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference agree to refer to it" 
and cases "whose referral to the Court is provided for in any treaties or conventions in 
force". 36 The court has so far not been established. The Regional and the UN human rights 
enforcement organs have contributed greatly to the protection of international human rights 
by serving as independent determiners of the scope of human rights within the regional and 
UN systems respectively. The OIC as a unifying organisation of the modern Muslim States 
can emulate the regional institutions in that regard for the Muslim world. In his exposition on 
Human Rights in Islam, Maududi had stated that 
"(t)he charter and the proclamations and the resolutions of the United Nations cannot 
be compared with the rights sanctioned by God; " because, he continued, "the former 
are not obligatory on anybody, while the latter are an integral part of the Islamic 
faith. All Muslims and all administrators who claim to be Muslim have to accept, 
recognize and enforce them. 07 
It is regrettable to observe that the above statement is today, at best only theoretic. Due 
to lack of any enforcement or monitoring mechanism, the administrators of modem Muslim 
36 See Art. 25 Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Statute of the Islamic Court of Justice, ICJ/2-86/D. I (FINAL). 
Available at the OIC Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva. 
37 Maududi, A. A., Human Rights in Islam (1993) p. 16. 
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States often violate those "rights sanctioned by God" and even on some occasions vaguely 
cite the Shari `ah as an excuse to violate international human rights law. And when this 
happens, other Muslim States stand by and watch hopelessly. Perhaps the Muslim States 
have resigned the redress of such violations to God in the judgement of the hereafter. Yet 
one finds in the Qur'an such provisions as follows: 
"And what is wrong with you that you fight not in the cause of God and for those 
weak, ill-treated and oppressed among men, women, and children, whose cry is: Our 
Lord! Rescue us from this town whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from 
You one who will protect, and raise for us from You one who will help. s38 
"And if two groups among the believers fall to fighting, then make peace between 
them both. But if one of them outrages against the other, then fight you (all) against 
the one that outrages till it complies, then make reconciliation between them justly, 
and be equitable. Verily God loves those who are the equitable. "" 
"... for had it not been that God checks one set of people by means of another, 
monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques wherein the name of God is 
mentioned much would surely have been pulled down. Verily God will help those 
who help His cause. God is All-Strong, All-Mighty. 40 
The clarity of the above Qur'anic provisions in relation to the principle of collective co- 
operation against oppression and violation of human rights under Islamic law needs no 
further commentary. 
A Binding Covenant and an International Islamic Court of "Mazälim " 
Based on OIC's commitment to the enforcement of human rights there is firstly the need 
for a full and binding Islamic Human Rights Covenant, to be ratified by all its member 
States. This is necessary because, apart from the present Cairo Declaration not being legally 
binding, it also leaves out many essential rights as depicted by our analysis of the ICCPR and 
ICESCR in this thesis. Secondly there is the need for a supervisory and enforcement organ 
that will bind all the member States. The enforcement organ could be in the form of an 
international Islamic Court of Mazälim with jurisdiction to hear complaints against States 
and interpret the scope of the rights guaranteed under the present Cairo Declaration, the 
proposed binding Covenant and under the Shari ah in general. 41 The International Islamic 
38 Q4: 75. 
39 Qur'an 49: 9. 
40 Qur'an 22: 40. 
41 See Chapter 4 supra, for the concept of the mazälim court under Islamic law. 
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Court of Mazälim would be composed of highly qualified Islamic law jurists not only learned 
in Islamic jurisprudence, but also conversant with international human rights law and 
jurisprudence. That would provide a definite and unified Islamic parameter for determining 
the scope of human rights within the application of Islamic law by Muslim States. 
As earlier proposed in Chapter 2 the international Islamic Court of Mazdlim would 
adopt an evolutionary approach in its interpretation of the law whereby it would employ a 
combination of the jurisprudence of all the Islamic schools. It would take advantage of the 
utility of the doctrine of maslahah enabling it to adopt the juristic opinions that ultimately 
enhances human well being and benefit and averts human difficulty and hardship. The 
Islamic legal principle of takhayyur (eclectic choice) permits movement within the different 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence and is supported by the Tradition that whenever the Prophet 
had a choice between equally lawful situations, he always chose the easiest and most 
beneficial option. 42 The international Islamic Court of Mazälim would then consciously 
develop a definite human rights jurisprudence that would serve as a specific departure point. 
for international human rights practice in the Muslim world. Thirdly, the international 
Islamic Court of Mazälim should have compulsory jurisdiction for individual complaints 
under the proposed Islamic Human Rights Convention. This would afford a more collective 
approach to guaranteeing human rights practice amongst Muslim States based on a common 
interpretation of Islamic law, and a more unified and determinable approach towards 
international human rights practice in the Muslim world. 
The reaffirmation of commitment to the UN Charter by the Muslim States in the 
preamble of the OIC charter indicates a commitment to the international legal principles of 
the UN and also to the international human rights regime. The General Assembly of the UN, 
at its 53rd Session in November 1998 had equally recognised the need for close co-operation 
between the UN and the OIC in the search for solutions to global problems including 
fundamental human rights. 43 In pursuance of such co-operation and dialogue for 
universalism in international human rights, which aims at combining the best in all cultures 
and legal traditions for all human beings wherever they are, the international Islamic Court of 
Mazdlim would be expected to co-operate with the UN international human rights bodies as 
well as with the other regional human rights bodies in realising a "universal universalism" in 
international human rights law. 
42 See e. g. Karnali, M. H., "Have We Neglected the Shad'ah Law Doctrine of Maslahah? " (1988) 27 Islamic Studies, p. 287 
at 290. 
43 See UN Doc A/RES/53/16 of l la' November, 1998. 
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The "Margin of Appreciation"Doctrine as a Means of Universalism 
Complementary to the above Islamic regional human rights regime, this thesis has also 
emphasised the need for the adoption of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the UN 
international human rights treaty bodies in interpreting international human rights treaties 44 
The margin of appreciation doctrine exists within the European human rights regime and it 
has been defined as "the line at which international supervision should give way to a State 
Party's discretion in enacting or enforcing its laws". 45 While the doctrine has its critics, it no 
doubt allows for the sustenance of justifiable moral values of different societies through 
"striking a balance between a right guaranteed 
... 
and a permitted derogation [or 
limitation]" 46 In practice the UN Human Rights Committee has not formally adopted the 
margin of appreciation doctrine47 but has referred to it only on one occasion in Hertzberg and 
Others v. Finland48 where the authors had brought a complaint alleging violation of their 
freedom of expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR. The State Party had in that case 
censured TV programmes dealing with homosexuality. The State Party argued that the 
restrictions were for the protection of public morals. In finding that there had been no 
violation of Article 19, the HRC stated that: 
"It has to be noted, first, that public morals differ widely. There is no universally 
applicable common standard. Consequently, in this respect, a certain margin of 
discretion oust to be accorded to the responsible national authorities. s49 
The Committee however rejected the doctrine in Ilmari Lansman et al v. Finlandso 
where the authors had brought a complaint alleging violation of their right to enjoy their own 
culture under Article 27 of the ICCPR. The State Party had argued that the acts complained 
of were in pursuance of national development and that "a margin of discretion must be left to 
national authorities in the application of article 27" in that regard. 
51 Although the HRC did 
not find a breach of Article 27, it however pointed out that the scope of a State Party's 
" On the "margin of appreciation" doctrine See e. g. Steiner, H. J. and Alston, P., International Human Rights in Context, 
Law, Politics, Morals, (2d Ed. 2000) pp. 854- 857; Harris, D. J., O'Boyle, M, and Warbrick, C, Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1995) pp. 12-15; and Clayton, R., and Tomlinson, H., The Law of Human Rights (2000) 
Vol.!, pp. 273-278; Ghandhi, P. R., The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communication: Law and 
Practice! 998) pp. 311-314 and n. 96 at p. 326. 
45 See Yourow, H. C., The Margin ofAppreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence 
(1996) p. 13, citing Wong, "The Sunday Times Case: Freedom of Expression Versus English Contempt-of-Court Law in the 
European Court of Human Rights" (1984) 17 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 35 at 58. 
46 ibid. 
47 See Ghandhi, P. R., (1998) supra, note44 above, p. 314. 
°S Communication No. 61/1979 Finland: 2/4/82. UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37140) at 161 (1982). 
49 ibid., Par. 10.3. 
50 Communication No. 511/1992: Finland 08/11/94. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992. 
S' ibid., Par. 7.13. 
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freedom to encourage development "is not to be assessed by reference to a margin of 
appreciation, but by reference to the obligations it has undertaken in article 27". 52 It is 
probable that the rejection of the margin of appreciation by the HRC in the later case was due 
to its non-relatedness to the protection of morals. The HRC has obviously refrained from 
adopting the margin of appreciation doctrine due to the fear of its potential abuse by States 
Parties to limit important rights like freedom of expression or as justification for imposing 
states of emergency on grounds of threat to the existence of the State. The issues of public 
morals and religious values does not however give rise to such fears because the application 
of a margin of appreciation on these grounds is based on public sensibility and morality 
rather than for the protection of the State per se. Its application on grounds of public 
sensibility and morality will thus be justifiable on the obvious accepted practice in the State 
concerned. 
The European Court of Human Rights has effectively applied the doctrine in a variety of 
cases under the European Convention of Human Rights. Macdonald has observed that "(t)he 
margin of appreciation is now the primary tool of the Court in ensuring the efficacy of the 
application of Articles 8 to 11,14 and 15 and Article 1 of Protocol No. l. i53 This has 
consisted of cases brought under the European Convention involving issues such as 
protection of morals, protection of reputation of others, commercial speech, respect for 
private and family life, matrimonial status, family life and home, sexual morality, respect for 
private life, peaceful enjoyment of possessions, expropriation and nationalism, control of 
rental property, licensing and regulations, non-discrimination, liberty and security of 
person. 54 The relevance and rationality of the proposal in this thesis for the adoption of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine within the UN international human rights regime can not be 
better buttressed than in the following conclusion of Macdonald after his detailed exposition 
of the doctrine. He justified the doctrine as follows: 
"The margin of appreciation which is more a principle of justification than 
interpretation, aims to help the Court show the proper degree of respect for the 
objectives that a Contracting Party may wish to pursue, and the trade-offs that it 
52 ibid., Par. 9.4. See also the debate on cultural practices during consideration of Nigeria's initial report to the ICESCR, 
where in response to the cultural arguments of the Nigerian delegation the ESCR Committee Members stated, inter alia, that 
"it was not the Committee's mandate to evaluate cultural practices and pass judgement on them, but rather to determine 
whether a State party to the Covenant was conforming with the obligations it had entered into". UN Doc. E/C. 12/1998/SR. 7 
of 09/09/98. 
53 Macdonald, St. J. R, "The Margin of Appreciation" in Macdonald, J, et al. (ed. ) The European System for the Protection 
of Human Rights (1993) p-83- 
5" See generally ibid, pp. 83-124; See also Yourow, H. C., (1996) supra, note 45 above. 
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wants to make, while at the same time preventing unnecessary restrictions on the 
fullness of the protection which the Convention can provide ss 
This flexibility has enabled the Court to avoid any damaging dispute with 
Contracting States over the respective areas of authority of the Court and the 
Convention and the Contracting States and their respective legislatures. The margin 
of appreciation has also helped the Court strike a proper balance between the 
application of the Convention by national organs and the central institutions of the 
Court and Commission. Practices within States vary. In one State a law viewed in 
the abstract outside other national circumstances might be seen as violating the 
convention, but viewed in the light of some other national matter or practice it may 
not. The intention of the drafters of the Convention was not that each Contracting 
State would have uniform laws but that there would be a European standard which, if 
violated, would give redress to the Members of the Contracting State. The margin of 
appreciation has very much assisted in this task. 
The justification of the margin of appreciation is usually a pragmatic one. The 
argument is that the margin of appreciation is a useful tool in the eventual realization 
of a European-wide system of human-rights protection, in which a uniform standard 
of protection is secured. Progress towards that goal must be gradual, since the entire 
legal framework rests on the fragile foundations of the consent of the Contracting 
Parties. The margin of appreciation gives the flexibility needed to avoid damaging 
confrontations between the Court and Contracting States over their respective spheres 
of authority and enables the Court to balance the sovereignty of Contracting Parties 
with their obligation under the Convention' 56 
It will be observed that the margin of appreciation doctrine is likened to the principle of 
justification, which we had also referred to as an important principle for addressing the 
differences of scope between Islamic law and international human rights earlier in this thesis. 
Expressing the fears of the HRC on the adoption of the doctrine, Schmidt has argued that the 
adoption of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the Committee "might prompt some states 
parties to rely on arguments of `cultural relativism', however ill-defined or inappropriate in 
the circumstances of a given case, or to seek to justify serious human-rights abuses. , 57 The 
proposal in this thesis is not for an arbitrary or unjustifiable application of the doctrine. The 
margin of appreciation will be exercised proportionately and supervised by the Treaty Bodies 
to prevent its abuse. A State Party that pleads the doctrine would be saddled with the onus of 
establishing a legal justification for exercising its margin of discretion in any alleged 
violation of right. The scope of the doctrine would thus be determined by the circumstances 
of each case as has been demonstrated in the practice of the European Court. The approach of 
the European Court in that regard is to search for an "European consensus" in interpreting the 
ss See also Mahoney, "Judicial Activism and Judicail Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides of 
the Same Coin", (1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal p. 57. 
56 Macdonald, St. J. R., (1993) supra note 53 above, p. 123. 
57 Schmidt, M. G., "The Complementarity of the Covenant and the European Convention on Human Rights 
- 
Recent 
Developments" in Harris, D. J., and Joseph, S., The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and United 
Kingdom Law (1995) p. 628 at 657. 
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provisions of the Convention. Whenever the practice among member States achieves a 
certain measure of uniformity the Court raises "the standard of rights-protection to which all 
states must adhere". 58 According to Helfer, the Court, broadly speaking, relies "on three 
distinct factors as evidence of (an European) consensus: legal consensus, as demonstrated by 
European domestic statutes, international treaties, and regional legislation; expert consensus; 
and European public consensus. "59 In the absence of any such consensus, the Court gives a 
wide margin of appreciation to the State concerned 
. 
60 
The European human rights regime is regarded as the most developed human rights 
regime. If, as observed by Macdonald above, the margin of appreciation has provided the 
system with the "flexibility needed to avoid confrontations" and considered as a "useful tool 
in the eventual realization of a European-wide system of human-rights protection, in which a 
uniform standard of protection is secured", then the adoption of the doctrine supplemented 
with the Islamic regional approach proposed above would ultimately lead to a similar 
stability within the international human rights regime in relation to Muslim States, who 
constitute a significant proportion of the parties to the Covenants and whose practice is 
relevant to any consensus as to the meaning of Covenant rights. In respect of the 
international bill of rights examined in this thesis, the margin of appreciation doctrine will be 
a useful tool in addressing issues such as definition of family, homosexuality, blasphemy, 
abortion and other moral questions in relation to Muslim States Parties that apply Islamic 
law. The consensus approach will also require an equitable balance of membership of both 
the HRC and the ESCR Committee to reflect at least the civilisations and legal systems of all 
the State Parties if not of the world as a whole. This will faciliate a universal interpretation 
that accomodates the norms of all the States Parties to the Covenants as observed by 
McGoldrick earlier above. 61 
To assist the international human rights committees on questions of Islamic law the 
proposed international Islamic Court of Mazälim will be a harmonising institution on Islamic 
law for matters brought before it among Muslim States, and its jurisprudence and opinions 
would thus serve as the reference point on Islamic values and norms in the determination of 
any necessary margin of appreciation for Islamic values by the UN international human 
"See Helfer, L., "Consensus, Coherence and The European Convention on Human Rights" (1993) 26 Cornell International 
Law Journal, No. 1,133 at 139. 
'9 ibid at 134. 
60 See e. g. Rees 
. 
v. United Kingdom (1986) 106 Eur. Cf. Human Rights (Series A) at 15; Cossey. v. United Kingdom (1990) 
184 Eur. Ct. Human Rights (Series A) at 16; and B. v. France (1992) 232 Eur. Ct. Human Rights (Series A). 
61 See p. 339 above. 
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rights treaty bodies. This will eliminate any problems of differences of opinion in respect of 
Islamic legal norms under consideration before the international treaty bodies. 
The above propositions, implemented in good faith and backed with political and 
humanitarian will, is capable of providing the flexibility needed to avoid confrontation 
between Islamic law and international human rights law and create "breathing space" or 
"elbow room" for a more closer rapport that will gradually and ultimately lead to the 
realisation of a common standard of universalism in human rights between Islamic law and 
international human rights law in the Muslim world. 
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